Just letting you know that I haven't forgotten your challenge. Life has gotten in the way and there was a great deal of reading to do as well ;'} In truth I wasn't paying particular attention to the specifics of the go-around between you and BroJoeK. In truth, most of the claims and counter-claims don't add up to a hill o beans - from either of you. But (just for schitz und gigglez) let's examine this exchange and see where it sends us.
As best I can tell, the root of contention lies with this assertion by you:
"Speaking of Fort Pickens, that is exactly where Lincoln sent Lieutenant Porter in the Powhatan under hand carried secret orders. Porter immediately upon arrival, tried to fire on Confederate shore batteries and did indeed fire on Confederate ships, and all with no knowledge of the events in Charleston. So yes, Lincoln fully intended to start the war somewhere else and was only conning Virginia to get them to do what he wanted long enough to keep them in line."
You then double-down here:
"This has been explained to you before. Lieutenant Porter immediately tried to engage the confederate shore batteries as soon as he arrived. If you think he was doing this contrary to the President's orders, you are greatly mistaken. One can only conclude that his orders were to start a d@mn fight as soon as he got there. Nothing else is reasonable."
Thus brings us to your challenge to me:
"Was his actions in initiating this attack in compliance with the President's orders, or was he going rogue?"
Ignoring the stink of the "When did you stop beating your wife?" gotcha and (for a moment), dismissing the the strawman of "attacking", and setting aside the logical fallacy associated with the nonsensical "Nothing else is reasonable" we need to look at Lincoln's orders and then compare them to Porter's actions to make any sort of reasonable interpretation. Say, do you happen to have a copy of them handy?
Well, in case you don't, I suppose that we'll just have to guess at them. My guess is, "Git your butt down to Pickens post haste, secure the fort, and relieve Colonel Brown."
It's about here that I want to insert an analogy. When Lincoln assumed office on March 4, 1861 it was like taking possession of a used car. You don't know much about the condition and worthiness of the vehicle - only that it was misused by its previous owner.
Lincoln was caught flat-footed by circumstances that threatened to spiral out of control and all needed immediate attention. The institutions of the United States were being threatened in all quarters, from illegal seizures to mutiny and desertion. Even his "inner circle" of cabinet members were akin to cats requiring constant herding. Problems needed to be addressed. Solutions needed to be identified. Choices needed to be made. And actions needed to be initiated. On every front and in every respect. Now!
What we can glean from the records that survive is a recognition of the confusion, the pandemonium, and the need to stave off panic. There was massive treachery afoot by those both without and within. There were conflicting opinions as to what to do (or not do), who to do what, and who to do the ordering. As a result conflicting orders and countermands were being issued. Hindsight being 20-20 we can look back at the events as they were unfolding and presuppose our own values onto the flow of events. In truth the fog of war blinds all of us equally.
So what do the records tell us? First, that Gustavus Fox had devised and initiated a relief expedition for Fort Sumter. We also know that (unbeknownst to Fox) an expedition similar to Fox’s was simultaneously being fitted out under the command of Navy Lieutenant David Porter. Secretary of State William Seward, without the knowledge of Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles, had obtained Lincoln’s authorization to divert Powhatan to the gulf expedition. Just as she was preparing to sail from New York on April 6, Powhatan was ordered to leave the Charleston expedition and diverted to Fort Pickens. Communication breakdown.
As to the orders, Porter states he wrote them himself:
"'Lincoln reluctantly agreed', taking no notice of the incompatibility of the Pensacola scheme and the Sumter relief expedition, perhaps simply confusing the name of the ship whose presence was vital to assure success in both places.
"Porter immediately wrote the 'confidential' carte blanche orders. Lincoln picked up his pen; "Seward,' he said, see that I don't burn my fingers.' - Porter David D. “The Naval History of the Civil War”.
"Porter tried to initiate an attack on the Confederates."
Not accurate.
"Captain Meigs stopped him."
Sorta. Since Meigs had arrived before Porter he intercepted Porter to let him know of Colonel Brown's desires. Having specific written orders from the president, Porter was conflicted but insisted that Lincoln's orders superseded the Colonel's.
Among my readings was cited opinion by a couple of officials, including Welles, that initially distrusted Porter. Suspicions ran high what with all the treachery underway. Porter was known to have many southern friends and associates and there was speculation that he might join the exodus to the rebs. As it turned out Porter liked where he was situated and eager to join the fray.
"Was his actions in initiating this attack in compliance with the President's orders, or was he going rogue? "
My guess is that he acted in compliance (more or less) of Lincoln's orders.
"Lieutenant Porter immediately tried to engage the confederate shore batteries as soon as he arrived."
Not accurate. There were no "shore batteries". Remember that Brown and even Meigs were already onsite and had already taken possession of the fort when Porter was intercepted upon by Meigs and acceded (more or less) to Brown's order to stand down. The next day spotters saw vessels bearing down on them. No vessel names, flags, captains, or intentions are listed in any of the accounts I read. Porter fired a warning shot. The vessels retreated and did not return.
"One can only conclude that his orders were to start a d@mn fight as soon as he got there. Nothing else is reasonable."
Nonsense.
"Yes, if Lincoln fully expected to start the war somewhere else, and only told Virginia what they wanted to hear until he could pull another trick to start a war, then you are correct."
Pure speculation. You wish it to be true so you int4rpret the narratives one way. I interpret them differently.
Funny thing that. The order taking away command of the Powhatan from Captain Mercer is available. The other order, which is Porter's explicit hand carried order of his mission has never been made public. Porter appears to have taken it to his grave. I guess he thought the public would be uninterested in what the President instructed him to do with the Powhatan.
Communication breakdown.
Communication breakdown? Well with Porter insisting that the whole affair be kept completely away from the Navy chain of command, it is understandable that communications could break down.
But it's not so simple. Porter actually received a telegram from Gideon Wells (After Wells had gotten Lincoln to agree) ordering him to return control of the ship to Captain Mercer. His response was to say that he had orders from the President which he would obey, and he therefore blatantly defied the order from the secretary of the Navy.
He then set about disguising the ship so that no one would recognize her, up to flying a British flag. Funny, because when he got to Pensacola, he was all about showing the flag and hoping to provoke an attack. Why did he feel the need for secrecy on the trip there when he felt no need for secrecy when he actually got there?
"'Lincoln reluctantly agreed', taking no notice of the incompatibility of the Pensacola scheme and the Sumter relief expedition, perhaps simply confusing the name of the ship whose presence was vital to assure success in both places.
Except it wasn't vital in Pensacola. In fact, the commander there initially treated it as a nuisance.
I think it was vital that it didn't show up in Charleston, because the other ships would have attacked Charleston if it had.
Could have been a mistake that the Powhatan went to Pensacola instead of Charleston, but Admiral Porter, in writing his memoirs said that if the Powhatan had showed up to lead the other ships, all of the ships would have been sunk. He said it was the most badly thought out operation he had ever seen.
Really odd, because the Generals had informed Lincoln it would take a force of 20,000 men to take and hold that area. Somehow Lincoln thought five warships and a troop transport with only a couple of hundred riflemen could do the job.
Either he was grossly foolish or he never expected them to actually do what their orders said they would do.
Porter was intercepted upon by Meigs and acceded (more or less) to Brown's order to stand down.
After Porter kept changing the ship's direction to avoid Meigs. He kept trying to steer around Meigs until Meigs put his ship directly in his path. He even said he thought about running Meigs over. Now why would he even contemplate running Meigs (in the Wyandotte) over? What was that?
Also all his cannons on the shoreward side loaded with shell and grapeshot? He was itching to get into a fight.
The next day spotters saw vessels bearing down on them. No vessel names, flags, captains, or intentions are listed in any of the accounts I read. Porter fired a warning shot. The vessels retreated and did not return.
I assume the dock was also approaching him in a suspicious manner, and that is why he felt the need to lob a shell into the dock area? Or did you miss that part?
I interpret them differently.
How do you interpret him trying to run down a Captain in another ship, load his cannons to attack gun crews on the shore, express regret at not being able to do so, and then fire at both approaching ships and a stationary dock with people on it?