The IJN carriers at Midway were sunk by as little as a single 1,000-lb aerial bomb. It was the internal secondary explosions that did them in.
Interestingly the USN learned a major lesson from the loss of the USS Lexington at Coral Sea — once you fly off your main strike, you flood your fuel lines with inert, non-flammable gas and return any unloaded ordnance to the armored magazines. The law of averages says that you’ll sustain a hit or 2. But USN damage control and defensive preparations were key to making US carriers much more difficult to sink. (notice I didn’t say, knock out of action).
Japanese carriers did not have nitrogen blanketing systems for the avgas storage tanks, nor could they purge their piping systems with nitrogen. This was a fatal design flaw in their carriers. Our carriers could fill avgas fuel lines with nitrogen and blanket the avgas fuel tanks with nitrogen. Also at Midway, the Japanese did not strike bombs below to magazines when rearming their aircraft with torpedoes. These two factors resulted in 3 of their carriers being destroyed by bomb hits that would not have not seriously damaged an American carrier.