The Virginia statement above was included by Virginia in their 1861 secession ordinance.
From the Richmond Dispatch of March 25, 1861:
Tradition says of the men she elected to the Convention called to pass upon it, a majority were pledged to vote against its adoption. It is certain that a majority of the body did vote against the ratification at one time; and that not until a clause was inserted in the ordinance of ratification, protesting that Virginia would resume the powers granted when they should be perverted to her injury and oppression, was the small vote obtained in its favor, of 89 to 79.
None of the three resume/resume statements above were conditional. They were expressions of what the Constitution meant with regard to secession.
Secession? Or the right of revolution? Unilateral secession at will? Or a negotiated withdrawal?
Notice that the ratification convention says that the federal governments powers derive from the people of the United States, and the newspaper says the powers were granted by Virginia.
Secession was a very thorny question and apt to end in war. Which it did. Obviously, it wasn't as simple a matter as many people claim
The Constitution has no provision where power is given to the en masse people of the whole country.
An answer to the point you make about the wording of the Virginia resume powers statement dates back to an 1866 book by Albert Taylor Bledsoe, an Illinois lawyer who bested Lincoln in court more times than Lincoln bested him. The book was, "Is Davis a Traitor? Secession as a Constitutional Right Prior to the War of 1861." Bledsoe noted the following in the book:
In the first place, the Constitution was not to be established by the people of America as one nation, or by "the people of the United States as one great society;" and this fact was perfectly well known to the Virginia Convention of 1788. It has already been sufficiently demonstrated, that the Constitution was ordained, not by the people of America as one great society, but by each People acting for itself alone, and to be bound exclusively by its own voluntary act. It would be a great solicism in language, as well as logic, to say that the people of the United States as one great society, might resume powers which were not delegated by them. The sovereignty which delegates, is the sovereignty which resumes; and it is absurd to speak of a resumption of powers by any other authority, whether real or imaginary.
Bledsoe made the arguments for the right of secession better than I can, so I'll quote more of his arguments (paragraph breaks mine for readability):
… the evil intended to be remedied shows the true meaning of the words in question. The Virginia people did not fear, that the people of the United States might pervert the powers of the Federal Government for their own oppression. Their fears were for the weak, not for the strong; not for the people of the United States in the aggregate, but for the Southern States in the minority; and especially the State of Virginia.
They feared, as the burning eloquence of Henry, and Mason, and Monroe, and Grayson evinced, that the new Government would "operate as a faction of seven States to oppress six;" that the Northern majority would "operate as a faction of seven States to oppress six;" that the Northern majority would, sooner or later, trample on the Southern minority.
They feared in the language of Grayson, that the new Union would be made "to exchange the poverty of the North for the riches of the South." In the words of Henry, "This Government subjects everything to the Northern majority. Is there not, then, a settled purpose to check the Southern interest? We thus put unbounded power over our property in hands not having a common interest with us. How can the Southern members, prevent the adoption of the most oppressive mode of taxation in the Southern States, as there is a majority in favor of the Northern States? Sir, this is a picture so horrid, so wretched, so dreadful, that I need no longer dwell upon it."*
Did the Convention of Virginia, then, seek to quiet these dreadful apprehensions, by declaring, that the people of the United States "as one great society," might resume the powers of the Federal Government whensoever they should be perverted to their oppression? By declaring, that this one great society, or rather the majority of this society, might resume the powers of the Federal Government whensoever they should be pleased to use them for the oppression of the minority? Could any possible interpretation render any legislation more absolutely ridiculous? It puts the remedy in the hands of those from whom the evil is expected to proceed! It gives the shield of defence to the very power which holds the terrible sword of destruction!
The Convention of Virginia spoke "in behalf of the people of Virginia;" and not in behalf of the overbearing majority, by whom it was feared these people might be crushed. They sought to protect, not the people of America, who needed no protection, but the people of Virginia. Hence, as the people of Virginia had delegated powers to the Federal Government, they reserved "in behalf of the people of Virginia," the right to resume those powers whensoever they should be perverted to their injury or oppression.
* Elliot's Debates, Vol. iii, p. 312.
Now this reservation enures to the benefit of all the parties to the Constitutional compact; for as all such compacts are mutual, so no one party can be under any greater obligation than another. Hence, a condition in favor of one is a condition in favor of all. This well-known principle was asserted by Mr. Calhoun in the great debate of 1833, with the remark that he presumed it would not be denied by Mr. Webster; and it was not denied by him. Hence any State, as well as Virginia, had the express right to resume the powers delegated by her to the Federal Government, in case they should be perverted to her injury or oppression.
But, it may be asked, were the powers of the Federal Government perverted to the injury or oppression of any Southern State? It might be easily shown, that they were indeed perverted to the injury and oppression of more States than one; but this is unnecessary, since the parties to the compact, the sovereign States by whom it was ratified, are the judges of this question.*
* See Virginia Resolutions of *98; Kentucky Resolutions of '98 and ‘99; the Virginia Report of 1800, &c., &c.
Here are some opinions about the question of the whole people of the United States:
They acted upon it in the only manner in which they can act safely, effectively and wisely, on such a subject — by assembling in convention. It is true, they assembled in their several States — and where else should they have assembled? No political dreamer was ever wild enough to think of breaking down the lines which separate the States, and of compounding the American people into one common mass. Of consequence, when they act, they act in their States. But the measures they adopt do not, on that account, cease to be the measures of the people themselves, or become the measures of the State governments.
[Chief Justice John Marshall, McCullough v Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, (1819)]
When the American people created a national legislature, with certain enumerated powers, it was neither necessary nor proper to define the powers retained by the States. These powers proceed, not from the people of America, but from the people of the several States; and remain, after the adoption of the constitution, what they were before, except so far as they may be abridged by that instrument.
[Chief Justice John Marshall, Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122 (1819)]
The ultimate source of the Constitution's authority is the consent of the people of each individual State, not the consent of the undifferentiated people of the Nation as a whole. The ratification procedure erected by Article VII makes this point clear. The Constitution took effect once it had been ratified by the people gathered in convention in nine different States. But the Constitution went into effect only "between the States so ratifying the same," Art. VII; it did not bind the people of North Carolina until they had accepted it.
[Justice Clarence Thomas, US Term Limits v Thornton, 514 US 779, (1995)]
In addition, it would make no sense to speak of powers as being reserved to the undifferentiated people of the Nation as a whole, because the Constitution does not contemplate that those people will either exercise power or delegate it. The Constitution simply does not recognize any mechanism for action by the undifferentiated people of the Nation.
[Justice Clarence Thomas, US Term Limits v Thornton, 514 US 779, (1995)]
Those excerpts from opinions were posted long ago by poster 4CJ.