We had no capability to bomb Japan more heavily than something like the Doolittle Raid before 1944. There was no possibility of “carpet bombing” Japanese cities in 1942. We got there about as fast as we could. The long range of the B-29s was required, plus island airbases in the Marianas, and we did not have those until 1944.
p.s. We couldn’t reasonably fly more Doolittle type raids from carriers because (1) the risk to the carriers was enormous and it was a one-time mission (B-25s couldn’t come back and land on carriers, they had to fly to a land base); (2) after the initial surprise of the Doolittle Raid the Japanese were much better prepared to defend against such raids; (3) flying 16 B-25s at a time, once in a long while, is not any kind of “carpet bombing” — the military significance would have been inconsequential. The Doolittle Raid was great for shaking the Japanese psyche, making them devote more resources to defend their home islands, and probably helping lead their navy into the attempt to take the island of Midway (to complete their arc of island-based surveillance). But a series of Doolittle type raids going forward would have been much too expensive and too risky for too little military return.
great point
while the doolittle raid had very little actual military impact, the psychological impact was incredible. It did indeed force them to make quicker decisions to consolidate their gains up to that time, and prompted them to make the decision to take Midway.
Some say that midway was the turning point....I tend to disagree with that. Personally, I think the turning point was the struggle for Guadalcanal, and the subsequent loss of their position in the southern Solomons.
just my .02, of course...