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Did you read my Comment #43 and the links? I have now followed up on the question, Did JFK plan to withdraw? This very long and heavily documented account shows that JFK definitely planned a 1,000 man drawdown in the months before the Nov. 22, 1963 assassination, and a complete withdrawal by 1965.

http://bostonreview.net/us/galbraith-exit-strategy-vietnam

Among other things: “The President approved the military recommendations contained in section I B (1-3) of the report [Oct. 11, 1963], but directed that no formal announcement be made of the implementation of plans to withdraw 1,000 U.S. military personnel by the end of 1963.
In other words, the withdrawal recommended by McNamara on October 2 was embraced in secret by Kennedy on October 5 and implemented by his order on October 11, also in secret. Newman argues that the secrecy after October 2 can be explained by a diplomatic reason. Kennedy did not want Diem or anyone else to interpret the withdrawal as part of any pressure tactic (other steps that were pressure tactics had also been approved). There was also a political reason: JFK had not decided whether he could get away with claiming that the withdrawal was a result of progress toward the goal of a self-sufficient South Vietnam.
The alternative would have been to withdraw the troops while acknowledging failure. And this, Newman argues, Kennedy was prepared to do if it became necessary. He saw no reason, however, to take this step before it became necessary. If the troops could be pulled while the South Vietnamese were still standing, so much the better.4 But from October 11 onward the CIA’s reporting changed drastically. Official optimism was replaced by a searching and comparatively realistic pessimism. Newman believes this pessimism, which involved rewriting assessments as far back as the previous July, was a response to NSAM 263. It represented an effort by the CIA to undermine the ostensible rationale of withdrawal with success, and therefore to obstruct implementation of the plan for withdrawal. Kennedy, needless to say, did not share his full reasoning with the CIA. [After the 11/22/63 JFK assassination, the CIA was instrumental in ocean attacks on North Vietnam that led to the Gulf of Tonkin vote in Congress giving LBJ powers to attack the North, which resulted in commitment of the entire NV army to go south, and our major, big dollar SV buildup so profitable to Texas and other contractors, and the death of 37,000 of our young military.]

On Nov. 21, 1963, 20 days after the Saigon coup and assassination of leaders Diem and Nhu, NSAM 273 (draft form) was released including: “7. With respect to action against North Vietnam, there should be a detailed plan for the development of additional Government of Vietnam resources, especially for sea-going activity, and such planning should indicate the time and investment necessary to achieve a wholly new level of effectiveness in this field of action. (Emphasis added. ‘additional Govt of Vietnam resources’ was italicized)” Then on Nov. 26 (4 days after JFK’s assassination) Johnson signed the final version of NSAM 273. It “differs from the draft in several respects. Most are minor changes of wording. The main change is that the draft paragraph 7 has been struck in its entirety (there are two pencil slashes on the November 21 draft), and replaced with the following:
Planning should include different levels of possible increased activity, and in each instance there be estimates such factors as: A. Resulting damage to North Vietnam; B. The plausibility denial; C. Vietnamese retaliation; D. Other international reaction. Plans submitted promptly for approval by authority.
The new language is incomplete. It does not begin by declaring outright that the subject is attacks on the North. But the thrust is unmistakable, and the restrictive reference to “Government of Vietnam resources” is now missing.
Newman concludes that this change effectively provided new authority for U.S.–directed combat actions against North Vietnam. Planning for these actions began therewith...”

Before a large audience at the LBJ Library on May 1, 1995,...[McNamara] confirmed that President Kennedy’s action had three elements: (1) complete withdrawal “by December 31, 1965,” (2) the first 1,000 out by the end of 1963, and (3) a public announcement, to set these decisions “in concrete,” which was made. McNamara also added the critical information that there exists a tape of this meeting, in the John F. Kennedy Library in Boston, to which he had access and on which his account is based.” “Unfortunately, the last White House tape from the Kennedy administration is dated November 7, 1963. The archivists at the JFK Library have no information on why the tapings either ended or are unavailable for later dates.” Could it be that the next batch of tapes starting Nov. 8 had not been stored and LBJ decided to NOT forward them to their proper repository?
LJB also had to deal with “war hawks”, some of whom seemed to feel that nuclear war while Russia had few nuclear weapons might be a good idea. Generals might want major war, but small well financed wars probably seem preferable to most large construction and infrastructure corporations. LBJ’s backers got funding for building in spades. A comment by LBJ to John Kenneth Galbraith, not long before the Vietnam war drove them apart, indicates the dilemma: “You may not like what I’m doing in Vietnam, Ken, but you would not believe what would happen if I were not here.” [As a construction man, I hope President Trump will limit us to small well financed wars and not allow escalation to a nuclear one.]