Thanks. That’s far more detail than I’ve seen anywhere before. I based my comments on the “legend” of the M1911 in the Philippines and its stopping power against drugged Moro warriors. And I’d presumed the Krag and 1903 Springfield in the hands of determined troops (in terms of PC the Moro rebellion was a dirty war and more resembled the Indian Wars than any modern conflict) made more difference than Gen. Pershing’s psy ops. Never resent being corrected with more detailed and better information.
“Thanks. That’s far more detail than I’ve seen anywhere before. I based my comments on the “legend” of the M1911 in the Philippines and its stopping power against drugged Moro warriors. ...”
Numerous thanks to katana for such a courteous reply.
I spent more than half my active-duty career of 24-1/2 years conducting operational testing and performing scientific analyses. Collecting data on which system worked and which did not is a task rather more complex and difficult than the average citizen might guess (same is true for the average member of the armed forces, strangely): “common sense” might be intensely desired and believed in, but is of no use. “We won the war, therefore our systems were better” may indeed be true, but leaves us with nothing to catch hold of, in evaluating the success or failure of an individual system.
As a researcher, I’ve been trying for over 30 years to gain access to reports on small arms effectiveness. Little of it is classified, but the responsible agencies still won’t grant permission. Correlating the effectiveness of modern weapons to those in use over 100 years ago poses additional problems: many of the clinical techniques and forensic methodolgies had yet to be invented when the United States was dealing with the Philippine Insurgency. And our knowledge of trauma, anatomy, and medicine has changed a lot also.
Modern analyses can only be approximate, but I deem it hard to overstate the importance of the 45 Colt cartridge as originally loaded (which was not the load used for most of its active duty life, from the mid 1870s until the mid 1890s).
As the Insurgency dragged on, numbers of M1873 Single Action revolvers were removed from storage, degreased, and issued to troops. They were said to be the only handgun capable of downing drug-fueled juramentadoes.
The data-crunching imp within leads me to hypothesize that hand-to-hand engagements may have gone down like this: US foot patrol is attacked. 2Lt empties his Colt M1895 DA revolver into the Moro coming at him; the Moro keeps on coming, and hacks him to death with his barong (or whatever those bloody great machete knives are called). Platoon Sgt draws his M1873 Single Action and fires one or two rounds, at point blank range; nearing death from blood loss after absorbing six 38 Colt slugs, the Moro drops the blade and collapses.
Thus the 45 caliber legend was enthroned. And in some latter-day loadings (some of which rival 44 Magnum ballistics - use in NEW guns only!), it still holds its own against younger challengers.
But we will never know for certain; data collection in the midst of a close-combat engagement is a very iffy thing.