It was a tactical defeat but a strategic victory. We lost more ships but stopped them from advancing, which until that time, seemed like no one could.
In the middle of this, Corregidor surrendered. I always wondered if MacArthur had not screwed up so badly, we might have eventually been able to reinforce/rescue those guys. (If the U.S. hadn't of needed a hero at that time, Mac would have been court-martialed for all his blunders.)
Time to dredge up that bitter bit of doggerel those abandoned guys said:
We're the battling bastards of Bataan
No mamma, no pappa, no Uncle Sam
No aunts, no uncles, no cousins, no nieces,
No pills, no planes, no artillery pieces,
And nobody gives a damn!
“In the middle of this, Corregidor surrendered. I always wondered if MacArthur had not screwed up so badly, we might have eventually been able to reinforce/rescue those guys. (If the U.S. hadn’t of needed a hero at that time, Mac would have been court-martialed for all his blunders.)”
First, I’m going to disclaim being any sort of a fan of Douglas MacArthur. That said, however, you are completely wrong in blaming MacArthur for the failure of the Philippine Defensive Campaign. If anyone was responsible for the failure of the Philippine Defensive Campaign it was Dwight D. Eisenhower, Marshall, and President Quezon. For years before the military campaign, these men tied the hands of MacArthur and his command by wrongly assuming there was no way of successfully defending the Philippines against a Japanese invasion. Despite all of the disadvantages these men imposed on MacArthur’s command, they still very nearly succeeded in defeating the Japanese invasion forces on Luzon. MacArthur’s men ran out of munitions and other key support at the very moment they had put the Japanese invasion force into retreat towards their landing beaches. After that failure in combat support, MacArthur and his command had no further viable choice but to retreat into the Bataan Peninsula, where they had already concluded before the war would be doomed to eventual defeat without the assistance of a relieving American force from overseas. Even then the Bataan force defeated the initial Japanese offensive force, and their commanders recommended withdrawal. Instead, the Japanese Field Marshal diverted a Japanese force from a different assignment outside the Philippines in order to reinforce the Japanese offensive on the Bataan front. Eisenhower advised the War Department to not send any relieving force to what he wrongly assumed could only be a failed defensive campaign. The physically weakened and inadequately supplied American forces in Bataan were therefore forced into surrendering.