Replies

In the context of IRC 6671 the penalties mentioned are based (and calculated) on an underlying tax. In the ACA there is no underlying tax.

The tax is the income tax. That's why this bill is not free standing, but deliberately positioned as an accessory to the income tax. How can you possibly offer a criticism if you're not even aware of that fundamental fact?

Likewise, your argument the income tax doesn’t apply to 95% of Americans is also specious. The courts have repeatedly rejected those arguments—despite any assertions you may make to the contrary.

The courts have never ruled on these particular arguments. They do not exist in the case law, because if they've ever been used the government dropped the case to avoid a ruling. In addition, these aren't esoteric arguments - they are simple and straightforward citations of declarations of applicable enforcement authorities made by the Title 26 itself. And finally, these aren't "my" arguments. As I took great pains to point out, they were directly indicated, invoked and even cited by the Chief Justice in his ruling. And in fact, he specifically said they need to be "strictly observed in order to avoid a police state."

So what are you left with - a declaration that I'm wrong because other people who didn't say what I'm saying are wrong, and you don't need to hear the differences? What are you, some kind of public school teacher?

LOL, thanks for playing. Go have another glass of wine.

You missed my point entirely. There is no income tax on the ACA. There is only a penalty for not having coverage. You cannot have a legally enforceable penalty under 6671 if there is no tax which is the basis for calculating the penalty. Just bexause Roberts called a penalty a tax doesn’t make it a tax. The ACA penalty is stand alone and IMHO illegal. 6671 does not justify it. Now, how about you put down the bong.

They do not exist in the case law, because if they've ever been used the government dropped the case to avoid a ruling.

One of the major causes of tyranny is the Court's continuing failure to distinguish between things which are legitimate, and things that cannot be shown to be illegitimate. This distinction is important, since the benefits of the doubt, which should be afforded to those who endeavor in good faith to act legitimately, should not be extended to those who deliberately act in ways whose legitimacy is at best murky.