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I got to my tank unit less than a year after the battle of 73 Easting. My unit had not been in the lead during that, but as it became dark, they passed through the lead elements, to take the lead - and had a battle called the battle for Objective Norfolk...or ‘Fright Night’.

I talked to a lot of the guys about what happened, and I have studied it quite a bit.

After the engagements at 73 Easting, the other Republican Guard units in the area heard the explosions, and assumed it was an air attack - you may remember the protracted bombing phase. As a countermeasure to the perceived air attack, the Iraqi’s made their tanks ‘cold’ - as in shut down engines so they wouldn’t produce as bright of a heat signature. This also disabled power turrets and rangefinders.

So, our tankers described ‘floating watermelons’ - their thermal sights would pick up the heads of Iraqi crewmen peering out of cold tanks. And, our highly mobile, fire on the move, M1 tanks were ‘maneuvering’ against static gun emplacements, rather than a mobile tank force. Yes, earlier in the day they had maneuvered circles around the Iraqis at 73 Easting...but now it was more akin to running a gauntlet.

The Iraqis weren’t stupid, and they would wait for most of the unit to pass by, before firing. This caused great confusion for our guys, and the entire night was a tedious exchange of radio communications getting clearance to fire (the unit I later joined in peacetime was 2-34 Armor - and every single shot had to be cleared from above, while sister units were looser...but did have fratricide).

In general, besides the fact that the Iraqis didn’t have the use of power turrets or fire control systems, the biggest advantage came down to ammunition. The Soviets had not sold their top notch ammo to the Iraqis, and the second tier stuff didn’t penetrate. Now the 125 mm gun they had was a monster - and with the right ammo, who knows how deadly it could have been. Its moot now, since our armor and Russian ammo have both changed since.

And there was also a range component - and the story of our range advantage somewhat disturbs me. If one of our tankers was able to see a ‘floating watermelon’ at max range (4,000 m), he essentially had a 2,000 meter advantage over the Iraqis. And, as he was moving, he tried to work the radio and get clearance to fire before he closed in to the T-72 range. If he got clearance in time, dead T-72. If he didn’t, do you remember stories of M1’s taking direct frontal hits and surviving? That’s generally why it happened. What scares me is - what would happen if we fought against an enemy with equal range, and we still persisted in getting clearance to fire.

Anyway, a little back story on the M1 vs T72 in Iraq. For a few hours, 2nd ACR demonstrated our superior capabilities against an Iraqi maneuver force...literally one Scout Troop (equivalent of a company) destroyed and entire regiment (equivalent of around 6 companies). But after that it was just a slaughter - the complete lack of Iraqi communications made the feared Republican Guard prepare for an air attack, and spelled their doom.