Lost interest right there.
There were about 10,000 "engagements" during the war, of which less than 100 were classified as battles. Of all those battles probably 1/3 of them "substantially" altered the outcome of the war.
Virtually none of the battles fought after Gettysburg were going to turn the tide for the South. The writing was on the wall. Lee Read it, Grant knew it.
Correction: “probably” should have said “possibly”.
Virtually none of the battles fought after Gettysburg were going to turn the tide for the South. The writing was on the wall. Lee Read it, Grant knew it.
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And Grant was where the rubber really hit the road, Vicksburg.
A serious argument can be made that Vicksburg was a considerable greater loss for the CSA than was the battle at Gettysburg. They lost a lot more than troops at Vicksburg, they lost the river that cleaved the Confederacy in two.
But let’s face it, Gettysburg was near the population centers and Vicksburg was flyover country, 1860s style.
There are some interesting counter-factuals here.
Let us assume Johnson was able to severely defeat Sherman in GA and Lee whipped Grant/Meade in VA, prior to the election. Lincoln loses, as he expected in summer of 64, and McClellan is elected.
Both sides now want peace. The problem is the terms.
Can anybody seriously imagine the Union agreeing to retreat from the immense areas it had paid hard cash to conquer, including the entire Mississippi Valley? Or West Virginia? Or Tennessee?
Can anybody imagine the CSA being willing to settle for boundaries less than those of their states before the war? Heck, the CSA claimed both MO and KY as states. Would they have demanded their cession, or possibly referenda? Would the shrunken CSA at summer 1864 have even been a viable nation?
The moral of the story, IMO, is that a person or group should be cautious about starting a war. They aren't always as easy to wind up as would seem to be the case, even when both sides desperately want peace.