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So, you wanted the war to continue for another year, six months. Children were starving--six more months of those conditions, and they would likely have been dead. All across the Japanese nation. Medicines were being manufactured and used primarily by the Japanese military at the expense of the civilian population.

Women and children were being trained and whipped up to a suicidal frenzy in hopes and belief that the Yamato spirit would prevail and these ersatz defenders of the nation would attack and kill white American soldiers. So how do you stop an attack of half-starved women or children charging Americans with sharpened sticks and family-owned katana after Americans have set foot on the mainland?

The fact is, Eisenhower, did not have command experience relative to the Japanese Empire, nor did he have any combat experience. He served for about two years in the Philippines under General MacArthur and was later given responsibility for drawing up war plans for defeating Japan in the event of war. As much experience that he had directing the war again the German armies, he himself never faced the likes of a Japanese suicidal charge--often called a banzai charge. That all seems to say that General Eisenhower was not qualified to judge the warfare of the United States of America on the Empire of Japan. We can all thank God and thank General Eisenhower for the warfare he conducted in Europe. But he never had to face the prospect of defending against fanatical military officers, and women and children.

Furthermore, the statements "Japanese leaders, both military and civilian, including the Emperor, were willing to surrender in May of 1945 if the Emperor could remain in place and not be subjected to a war crimes trial after the war" is a complete fabrication, if not pure baloney. As late as the Japanese Imperial conferences in late July and August 1945, most of the general staff wanted to go on fighting. John Toland the historian tells of an incident in August (I believe) of two officers who went into use the lavatory facilities of Imperial Navy headquarters after they had come from the conference in which the Emperor had directly voiced his wishes that the war be concluded. (Rumors abounded in the Japanese military and among civilians, that a huge American Marine-naval-army force lay just over the horizon.) One of the two officers said that they should go after the force afloat and do whatever it would take the defeat the Americans. The other officer had to remind him of the Emperor's wishes. Further, after the Imperial conference, a squadron of suicide bombers left to attack American warships. So to conclude that there was a general consensus that a monolith of opinion that supported surrender, is a complete distortion and twisting of facts.

So, now. What was America supposed to do? Continue the blockade and force Japanese mothers to cook grass and weeds so their families could eat? Force Japanese civilians to give up medicines to the Japanese military? Or make the difficult decision that would be second-guessed by gutless critics decades later who likely were not even alive at the time of World War II, to drop the bomb and end the stranglehold of the Japanese military machine on the nation before the Japanese nation died under that stranglehold? To allow the war to continue at the expense of the American youth of that day?

The fact is, the Japanese military was not a very professional military. Toland and other continually tell stories of how individual Japanese military leaders, from Naval captains on up and down the chain of command, continually violated orders. Most or all of them saw the War as a way they could achieve immortality. Most or all of them wanted them to provoke that "one single, decisive battle" that Japanese military doctrine and thinking believed wins wars. They, generally, wanted to go out in a blaze of glory, so standing and direct orders were often ignored as the officers and leaders sought to glorify themselves--oh, for the honor and glory of the Emperor and the Empire, of course--in hopes of becoming a Japanese legend. In that milieu, many, most, or all of the Japanese officers were hoping to keep the War going for their own hopes and benefits. It would be a fine thing, after all, if a statue were cast to honor YOUR final battle--the one that won the war.

It would be horrible decision to have to make, to drop an atomic bomb. But America has, until now, risen to the difficult decisions and has not given into the brainless fabrications of facts and opinion of those who have tried, and are trying, to dishonor those whose responsibility it was to protect America.

I'm not an historian, either. But I think Carney's and SEEKANDFIND's opinions in this matter are simply nonsense.