The point is that MacArthur was capable enough to have learned from the errors in both campaigns without making them himself.
Guadalcanal is a rather interesting study in military importance. The truth of the matter is that it was very costly for both sides in terms of men and material invested for little strategic importance.
Henderson Field, the focal point of the battle, was important only because it was the focal point of the battle. Certainly, when the battle begin, both sides felt it had great importance, coming so soon after the massive Japanese defeat at the Battle of Midway.
But the harsh truth (albeit in 20-20 hindsight) was that it was basically a frontier airfield which the Japanese were ill-equipped to use after the loss of so much air power and four carriers at Midway. Yes, it could have potentially extended their power toward Australia and New Zealand to bomb and open up invasion routes, if they'd had the men and material available for such an operation, but they didn't.
As for the Americans and Aussies, once we won uncontested control of Guadalcanal, Henderson field was actually used for little more than a convenience stopover between our bases in New Guinea and Australia's more developed east coast, a role which had been ably filled by less developed Australian bases on the northeast coast prior to the construction of Henderson Field.
Henderson Field played almost no role in neutralizing the large Japanese naval base at Rabaul. In fact, we really never did anything more than bomb Rabaul as it turned out to be one of those places which could be bypassed. There was still a substantial Japanese military presence in Rabaul which was in near starvation conditions when it was finally allowed to schedule surrender sideshow just a few days after the main unconditional surrender was signed in Tokyo Bay.
Guadualcanal was rather like Iwo Jima: Attacks that didn’t do much toward winning the war but may have been necessary for politics.