I believe, although I’m not wholly certain of it, that the KuKluxKlan was conceived as a means for terrorizing the Negro freedmen who, being permitted to vote, were tending too strongly to vote Republican. Possibly they had learned that the Republican Party came into existence largely as a protest against slavery.
This was, in deed as well as in word, to "establish and ordain liberty." Hence the most violent contest, of the Convention of 1787 ceased to agitate the bosom of the new Union. This admirable arrangement was proposed by Oliver Ellsworth, of Connecticut, and recommended on the ground that, in a Republic, it is always necessary to protect the minority against the tyranny of the majority. The same principles and policy governed the Conven tion in its attempt to adjust and settle the great antagonism between the North and the South. -r. Madison was so deeply impressed with the importance of arming each of these sections with a defensive power against the other, that he proposed "the numbers of free white inhabitants" as the basis of representation in one House of Congress, and the whole population, including blacks as well as whites, as the basis of representation in the other. This distribution of power would have given the North a majority in one branch of the Legislature, and the South a majority in the other. But the proposition failed. Mr. Madison did not urge it, indeed, because, as he said, it presented a cause of quarrel which was but too apt to arise of itself.
After the States were made equal in the Senate, each having two representatives in that body, the North had the entire control of it. As there were eight Northern States, (Delaware was then considered a Northern State), and only five Southern States; so the North had a majority in the Senate of 16 to 10. Hence, if the South was to have any defensive power at all, it should have had a majority of representatives in the other branch of Congress. Accordingly, Southern members insisted on the full representation of the whole population of the South, as well as of the North, in order that their section might have a majority in one branch of the common Legislature. The North, on the contrary, insisted that the slaves should be entirely excluded from the basis of representation; which would have given that section a decided majority in both branches of Congress. Thus, while the South contended for a power of self-defence or protection; the North aimed at no less than absolute control and dominion. The South would not submit. The North and the South were then, as they afterward appeared to De Tocqueville, "more like hostile nations, than rival parties, under one government." The fierce contest for power between them resulted in the compromise of the three-fifths clause of the Constitution. In proposing this clause, Mr. Wilson, of Pennsylvania, said it could not be justified on principle, whether property or population were regarded as the basis of representation, but that it was deemed "necessary as a compromise" between the North and the South. As such it was seconded by Mr. C. C. Pinckney, of South Carolina, and as such it was adopted by the Convention. This clause was, then, a compromise, not between abstract metaphysical principles of government, but between the opposite and conflicting claims of the two rival sections. Did the North, then, "truckle to the slave power"?
It is certain, that she grasped at and gained a majority in both branches of the common Legislature. For, in spite of the clause in question, the North had a majority of 36 to 29 in the House of Representatives, as well as of 16 to 10 in the Senate; a share which certainly ought to have satisfied any ordinary lion. But it is the fate of a democracy to be governed more by words than by ideas, more by "telling cries" than by truth. The cry has always been that the slaves, who had no wills of their own, were represented in Congress; and that this "singular provision," this "strange anomaly," had resulted from a base "truckling to the slave power." But for this provision, says Professor Cairnes,* there seemed to be nothing in the Constitution, "which was not calculated to give to numbers, wealth, and intelligence, their due share in the government of the country." Did the general clause, then, which places idiots, paupers, free negroes, and infants of all ages, in the basis of representation, provide for nothing but a representation of "the intelligence and wealth of the country?" The truth is, that none of these clauses were represented in Congress; they were merely considered in the difficult question of the distribution of power among the States *The Slave Power, and the Sections. The only persons really represented were the voters, who had the legal right to choose their own representatives.' It was in this way, and in this way alone, that the Convention sought to secure a representation of the "wealth and intelligence" of the country. But who cared for the truth? The telling cry, that slaves were represented in Congress, inflamed the passions of the North, and served the purpose of demagogues infinitely better than a thousand truths. Hence the world has been filled with clamors about "the slave representation of the South."
Hence the world has been filled with clamors about "the slave representation of the South." The deceivers are, however, careful to conceal the fact, that all classes of "persons," except the slaves, are reckoned at their full value in constituting the basis of representation. The women and children of the North alone, many of whom were born in foreign countries and had never been naturalized in America, have been the source of far greater political power, than that which has resulted from the whole population of the South. Is it not much nearer to the truth, then. to say that the South has been governed by the women and children of the North, than that "the North has been governed by the slaves of the South"? Immense, indeed, has been the advantage of the clause in question to the South! Only let Mr. Ludlow, or one of his school, estimate this advantage, and it is sufficient to astonish the world! It gives to "every poor white" at the South, "however ignorant and miserable," "ten times the political power of the Northerner, be he never so steady, never so wealthy, never so able."* How wonderful the disparity! And, considering that "all men are created equal," how infinitely more wonderful, that the wealthy and the able Northerner should have so long and so patiently submitted to such an amazing inequality! What! The rich Northerner, the merchant prince, or the great lord of the loom, only the one-tenth part of the *History, political power of the "poor white" at the South! Is it possible? Mr. Ludlow proves the whole thing by figures; and "figures," it is said, "cannot lie."
Let us see, then, this wonderful proof of the wonderful fact. "Suppose," says Mr. Ludlow, "300,000 be the figures of population required to return a representative, then, whilst 300,000 freemen of the North are required for the purpose, 30,000 Southerners, owning collectively 450,000 slaves, or 15 on an average (many plantations employing hundreds) are their equals politically, and every poor white," however ignorant and miserable, has his vanity gratified by standing at the ballot-box the equal of his richest slave-holding neighbor, whilst each of them is equally invested with ten times the political power of the Northerner, be he never so steady, never so wealthy, and never so able." But he must, indeed, have been a most "ignorant and miserable" white, if he could have had his vanity grati fied, or his-judgment swayed, by any such logical pro cess or conclusion. This specimen of logic, or rather of legerdemain, only assumes that none but "the 30,(00 Southerners," with their "450,000 slaves, or fifteen on an average," are included in the basis of representation. But since, in fact, all persons are included in that basis, Mr. Ludlow should have taken some little pains to explain to his poor ignorant readers how it is possible for eight mil lions of whites to own only four millions of blacks; and yet for each white to own, "on an average," as many as "fifteen slaves." It would seem, without much calcula tion, that, in such a case, there could be only one slave to every two whites. If so, then if the slaves had been regarded as whole "persons;" the Southerner would have had only one and a half times the power of the North erner. But as, in fact, the slave was counted as little more than the half of a person; so the Southerner pos sessed only a little more than one and a quarter times as much political power as his Northern neighbor. There 2 -7 was, then, no reason why the vanity of the poor, ignor ant white of the South should have been so highly grati fied, nor why the pride of the rich nabob of the North should have been so deeply wounded. But this whole way of viewing the subject is, in reality, perfectly puerile. What has the political power of the indi vidual to do with such a question? There is the broad fact, acknowledged by all parties and all sections, that, at the time the Constitution was formed, the South was superior to the North both in wealth and population. Hience, if either wealth or population had been made the basis of representation, and fairly carried out in practice, the South would have had the majority in one branch of Congress. As it was, however, the North resolutely fought for and secured the majority in both branches thereof. Was not this, then, sufficient to gratify the pride of the North, as well to humble that of the South. Suppose that in a society of ten millions of people, eight millions are united by one interest, and the remaining two millions by another interest.
Suppose, again, that in order to get the two millions to enter into such a society, each individual of them had been allowed two votes, or twice as much power as an individual of the eight millions. Would this render the two millions secure? Would this give the minority a "defensive power" against the majority? "Ignorant and miserable," inideed, must be the individual in such a minority, if his vanity could be gratified by the possession of twice as much power as an individual of the majority, while that majority had the power to rob him of both his purse and his good name. The only strange thing in the transaction is, why the South should have consented to enter into so unequal a union with the North. Why she should have entrusted her rights, her interests, her honor, her glory, and her whole destiny, to the care and keeping of a foreign and hostile majority. This seems the more wonderful; because, at 228 that time, every statesman in America regarded nothing as more certain than the tyranny of the majority. "Complaints are everywhere heard," said fr. lladison, in The Federalist, "from our most considerate and virtuous citizens........ that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice, and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority." * It was the grand object of the ConveAion of 1787 to correct this tendency, this radical vice, if tot this incurable evil, of all democratic republics. The evils under which the country labors, it was said in that Convention, are, on all hands, "'traced to the turbulance and violence of democracy," to the injustice and tyranny of the majority. "To secure the public good, and private rights," said The Federalist, "against the danger of such a faction, (i. e. of such "an interested and overbearing majority,") and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of a popular government, is then the great object to which our inquiries are directed. Let me add, that it is the great desideratum, by which alone this form of government can be rescued from the opprobrium under which it has so long labored, and be recommended to the esteem and adoption of mankind." t Did the South, then, with her eyes open, willingly put her neck in the yoke of such a majority=? If, as every Southern statesman knew perfectly well,'iit is of great importance in a republic to guard one part of society against the injustice of another part;" did the South really fail to demand such a safeguard? Did she place herself under the rule of the North, without taking any security for her protection, without claiming any "constitutional power~f defence?" Nothing was further from her thoughts. If she had been seduced into the Union by the idea, by the immense advantage, that each of her citizens would have a little more power in one branch of Congress than those of the North; she would have been the weakest and most contemptible of creatures. The citizen of a small State, such as Delaware or Rhode Island, might have had ten, or twenty, or thirty times the power..in the other Houe of Congress, which a citizen of Pennsylvania or Virginia possessed; and yet this would not have satisfied him unless the small States could have controlled that branch of the ILegislature. This control ofthe Senate was demanded for the small States, as one of the indispensable conditions of Union, and this demand was conceded to them; in order that the minority might, in this instance, enjoy that freedom, and independence, which it had resolutely refused to hold at the mercy of the majority.
By all the principles, then, of the Convention of 1787, by the great object for which that Convention assembled, by the very nature and design of all constitutional republics; they were bound to protect the minority against the majority. They were, especially, bound to protect the South against the North; the weaker and the richer sections against the stronger and the more rapacious. Accordingly, this was the grand object of the Convention.