[Oatka]

American codebreakers deciphered the Japanese plans,

And messed with their minds as well. The Japs kept referring to "AF" (their code for Midway). We thought it was but weren't sure, so we had Midway send an uncoded message saying they were out of water. Sure enough, the Japs telegraphed that "AF" reported they were out of water.

What blew my mind in reading about the Pacific War was that by FEBRUARY of 1942 we were already launching carrier-based air attacks on some of the Jap-held islands. I thought we didn't start to bounce back until the Coral Sea in May '42.

[mathurine]

I enjoyed "The Lonely Ships"; by Edward P. Hoyt which chronicled the Asiatic Fleet in China and the Philippines at the outbreak of WWII. These were not the top-of-line American ships, and many were there to serve out their time mostly peacefully in coastal or close waters. They could maneuver, but could not make the speeds that modern warships of the 40's could in open waters. Some had formidable naval guns. None had the communications they could have used to operate in mass formations.Logistically they were virtually unsupportable. Most probably could not have withdrawn any further than Singapore and Manila Bay (at night) because the Japanese controlled the air and therefore the day. Though they were expendable since there was not much in early 1942 that the U.S. could do to bring them back, they did a remarkable job of tying up a vast number of Japanese military assets, sunk a few ships, slipped a few of their more valuable ships to India for repair and refitting, made good decisions about scuttling ships and large boats which would have been valuable salvage for the Japanese forces, and brought a lot of sailors and naval guns to Corregidor. As in many another war, the treacherous surprise action that trapped this fleet in the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea left this fleet, such as it was, right on the nautical threshold of waters strategically critical to Japan, and shackled them with the task of clearing the area. That took the Japanese time on the defensive that would perhaps have served them well on the offensive. In a classic strategic manner, we traded this old fleet with its antiquated fleet and its thousands of sailors first to try to help the Americans at Corregidor, and also to help the Brits at Singapore. We traded heroes for time, because that's about all we could do. These heroes helped by us by buying time for the likes of the Battle of Midway. There was a lot of war left after that, but there were still heroes left in America, at least enough enough for the remaining battles of WWII. Iam an elderly Marine, but I salute the swabbies of the Asiatic Fleet, most of whom lost their lives at the outset of WWII buying the time our Country needed to shift to the offensive and earn the unconditional surrender of the foe in the end

[mathurine]

I enjoyed "The Lonely Ships"; by Edward P. Hoyt which chronicled the Asiatic Fleet in China and the Philippines at the outbreak of WWII. These were not the top-of-line American ships, and many were there to serve out their time mostly peacefully in coastal or close waters. They could maneuver, but could not make the speeds that modern warships of the 40's could in open waters. Some had formidable naval guns. None had the communications they could have used to operate in mass formations.Logistically they were virtually unsupportable. Most probably could not have withdrawn any further than Singapore and Manila Bay (at night) because the Japanese controlled the air and therefore the day. Though they were expendable since there was not much in early 1942 that the U.S. could do to bring them back, they did a remarkable job of tying up a vast number of Japanese military assets, sunk a few ships, slipped a few of their more valuable ships to India for repair and refitting, made good decisions about scuttling ships and large boats which would have been valuable salvage for the Japanese forces, and brought a lot of sailors and naval guns to Corregidor. As in many another war, the treacherous surprise action that trapped this fleet in the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea left this fleet, such as it was, right on the nautical threshold of waters strategically critical to Japan, and shackled them with the task of clearing the area. That took the Japanese time on the defensive that would perhaps have served them well on the offensive. In a classic strategic manner, we traded this old fleet with its antiquated fleet and its thousands of sailors first to try to help the Americans at Corregidor, and also to help the Brits at Singapore. We traded heroes for time, because that's about all we could do. These heroes helped by us by buying time for the likes of the Battle of Midway. There was a lot of war left after that, but there were still heroes left in America, at least enough enough for the remaining battles of WWII. Iam an elderly Marine, but I salute the swabbies of the Asiatic Fleet, most of whom lost their lives at the outset of WWII buying the time our Country needed to shift to the offensive and earn the unconditional surrender of the foe in the end

[rmlew]

What blew my mind in reading about the Pacific War was that by FEBRUARY of 1942 we were already launching carrier-based air attacks on some of the Jap-held islands. I thought we didn't start to bounce back until the Coral Sea in May '42.
Bounce back? Those were desperate operations to keep the Japanese distracted and off balance. The closest we got to any serious confrontation was the abortive campaign to rescue Wake Island. The operations were useful in giving us tactical experience and learning things like the poor quality of our 5" anti-aircraft ammunition.