Unfortunately, I wasn't able to find pictures of the road to Khafji (the reporters never got there). Most of the Iraqi Army got slaughtered on the road.
Where you did get the pick from...Highway of Death
Attacks took place on two different sections; some 1,400 vehicles on the main highway north of Al Jahra and another 400 or so on the coastal road to Basra - the former predominantly stolen civilian vehicles and manned by Iraqi conscripts and the latter predominantly military and belonging to the Iraqi Republican Guard's 1st "Hammurabi" Armored Division. ("Most of the Iraqi Army got slaughtered on the road.") When visited by journalists the former was a long uninterrupted line of damaged and abandoned vehicles. On the other road, known as the place of the Battle of the Junkyard, vehicles of the had been destroyed over a much larger area in smaller groups, and the attacking Allied forces included ground units of the US 3rd Armored Division.
I take it you're unfamiliar with the Battle of Stalingrad, then.
On the contrary.
The German Sixth Army didn't "cut and run," so they should have been victorious--they weren't.
You're right, they didn't cut and run. They stayed in place on the orders of Hitler, another incompetent military leader. They didn't strategically withdraw and regroup either, which is what I believe they should've done. Don't you?
That you see no potential threat from a superhighway, not just "another road", passing for hundreds of miles through another country to eventually connect to the middle of America is...unusual...IMO. I guess where I see military strategy you see...what exactly? Skepticism? Belief in the good nature of your fellow man? Ignoring the possibility will make it not happen?
Do you remember how effeciently German troops were moved on the Autobahn? Do you remember how fast our troops moved on the Autobahn once we controlled it? WWII mobilized forces were turtles compared to today's mechanized warfare.
Did you write the two paragraphs I just quoted from Post #144? Yes or no, please.
The 24th Mechanized drove faster, farther, and with more firepower than General George S. Patton’s entire 3rd Army storming across France.
Had the war gone on one more day as planned, the 24th Mech would not have advanced any further--as it was, they were literally out of gas, and spent the next day resupplying. Remember the difference between tactical and strategic mobility. That one day of zero mobility would've knocked their rate of advance down by 20%.
The Division’s attack has been called, "The Greatest Cavalry Charge in History".
Aptly named. Cavalry charges are purely tactical events.
Also, you didn't discuss Khafji. There, an Iraqi army advanced--and died, mostly on the road, mostly because of American airpower.