Regarding "leaks" from the US government I have spoken of in this thread, I submit the following from Jay Edward Epstein. I hope most people will see the obvious. To those who do not, keep trying, your struggle is not in vain.
http://edwardjayepstein.com/KSMQuestions.htm quote:
Question:
In his 2004 State of the Union Speech, President Bush named the "mastermind of September 11th:" Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (who had been captured in Pakistan in March 2003.)
According to "leaks" from the U.S. government to the Associated Press, KSM is now not only talking to his American interrogators but supplying them with details of the plot. If so, he is presumably in a position to cast light on some of the key issues that now confront the 9-11 Commission. What questions should the Commission put to the KSM?
Answer:
Since Khalid Shaikh Mohammed has been identified by the U.S. as the controlling case officer for both Ramzi Yousef, who helped organize the attack on the World Trade Center in 1993, and Mohammed Atta, who helped organize the attack on the World Trade Center in 2001, he can clarify the planning, intelligence-gathering and logical support that aided both attacks. The questions KSM could cast light on include:
You were indicted by a U.S. Grand Jury 1996 for plotting to destroy 12 U.S. airliners. At that point, your chief subordinate, Ramzi Yousef, had been operating under a stolen Kuwaiti identity-- "Abdul Karim Basit." Documentation backing up that identity legend, including Yousef's fingerprints, had been inserted in Kuwait's records in 1990 when Kuwait was occupied by Iraq.
1) When those records were in the control of Iraq, why did the Iraq Intelligence Service provide this legend for your subordinate? Did you yourself, or any of your other operatives, receive similar assistance in maintaining false identities from Iraq? If so, what, if any, was the quid pro quo and what were the terms for the assistance?
2) Farouk Hijazi, the Iraqi Foreign Intelligence chief, met in in Afghanistan in March 1998 with top Al-Qaeda leaders. Did he offer further assistance in providing Al-Qaeda operatives false identities? If so, was this offer accepted, and were these identities delivered?
3) Mohammed Atta applied for a Czech visa in May 2000 after receiving a U.S. visa. On May 30th-- one day before the visa arrived-- he flew to the Prague International Airport to spend 5 hours in the transit lounge and then he returned to Hamburg. What was the purpose of Atta's brief trip? Why was it so time-sensitive that he could not wait one day until May 31, when his visa, in fact, arrived? Whom did he meet in the transit lounge? Why did Atta return to Prague, two days later, on June 2, 2000, before proceeding on his mission to America?
4) On April 4, 2001, Atta checked out of the Diplomat Inn in Virginia Beach, Virginia, and withdrew $8,000 in cash from his account at the Suntrust Bank-- the largest cash withdrawal he made-- and then disappeared for at least a week. Was this withdrawal authorized by KSM? If so, what was its purpose?
5) On April 8th, 2001, a Czech counterintelligence watcher identified Atta in Prague. Was Atta authorized to be in Prague at this time? If so, what was the purpose of his trip? What identity did he use to leave and re-enter the United States? Whom did he meet in Prague on this trip?
6) A number of the 9-11 hijackers were supplied with false identities. For example, Atta's traveling companion used the stolen identity of Abdulaziz Alomari (a Saudi engineer, whose passport had been reported stolen in 1995 in Colorado). How many false identities did the conspiracy obtain for the hijackers and their logistical supporters? Were they backed up with documented legends, as in the case of Ramzi Yousef? Who supplied these false identities and back-up documentation?
7) On September 10, 2001, Atta and "Alomari" drove from Boston to Portland, Maine, and booked themselves onto a commuter flight back to Boston on September 11th. If that commuter flight was delayed by an hour, they would not have been able to participate in the 9-11 attack. What circumstances justified al-Qaeda taking this risk? What was the purpose of the trip to Portland?
8) In the 1993 World Trade Center plot, there were escape routes for at least two operatives-- Ramzi Yousef (to Pakistan) and Abdul Rahman Yasin (to Iraq). Did any similar escape routes exist for the 2001 plot?
Corollary Question:
Why has the 9-11 Commission been denied access, even over a remote television hook-up, to the "mastermind"?
In light of the above, and accepting for the moment that the information I have presented here about the capture of Osama bin Laden is 100% accurate, what extrapolations can be drawn?
How about:
According to "leaks" from anonymous sources from anonymous sources in Virginia to the Northeast Intelligence Network...
A partial quote from the NEIN Operational Statement for 2003-2004 follows. Use the link provided to see the entire statement.
quote:
OPERATIONAL STATEMENT 2003-2004
Although the Northeast Intelligence Network has been in operation since October 21, 2001 , we only began to present our information to the public via our website in late July of 2003. As the founder and director, I chose to do so after much careful thought and reflection, driven by the lack of information being provided by our own government. The events of September 11th, 2001 forever changed the lives of every American; on that day, most of us became aware we are all considered "legitimate" targets in our own country by a vicious and formidable enemy driven largely by their ideology. Formidable not by the sophistication of their weaponry, but by their sheer numbers, persistence, and the decades of infiltration into key areas of our infrastructure and public and private institutions. Decades of political correctness overruled sensible security measures and adversely affected the operation of our intelligence services. As the Northeast Intelligence Network operated "in the shadows" for nearly 18 months, we began to realize that the same communication failures that led to the events of 9/11 continued to exist. We would report certain findings to one federal agency that were to be shared with another agency, however found that the lines of communication were still dysfunctional at best, or non-existent at worst. Additionally, we noticed a growing frustration within the general public and even within a number of local law enforcement officials concerning the lack of specificity concerning the terror alerts, despite the utilization of the color-coded alert system. Quite simply, people want to be informed so they can be better prepared. "Knowledge replaces fear" became our mantra, and consequently, our website became accessible to the public. Our objective is to provide the public with reliable, specific information about current threats that could affect our country, the safety of our families and our way of life without compromising the efforts of our government in their fight against terrorism. Many of our findings are presented on our website and are a contributing component to the Terror Alert Update developed by Mr. Steven Quayle.
What We Accomplished in 2003
The following information encompasses our activity between July 1 and December 31, 2003 :
Intelligence items submitted to federal authorities: 532 individual (unique) items
Federal agencies contacted: JTTF, DHS, FBI , US Treasury , US Customs, INS, DTRA , US Diplomatic Security, State Police in 4 states, and Airport police in 3 states.
General Results: One KNOWN arrest although several additional arrests were implied but not confirmed. Of the 532 unique pieces of intelligence provided to the various federal agencies, at least 40% (about 215) were classified as "new" items that resulted in files being opened on a federal level. Our information resulted in at least 15 active surveillance operations being initiated within the US borders involving multiple subjects of interest. We received no "direct" feedback on the remaining 60% of data and intelligence provided, although informal or "off the record" confirmation that the information was of "significant" value stands at 30% (about 95 of the unique data items provided).
Note: It is important for the reader to understand that communicating with the intelligence community is usually a one-way communication; feedback in most cases is rare. For the most part, they will neither confirm nor deny any information of substance.
http://www.homelandsecurityus.com/2004.htm#OSOh, I should mention just for the record and to be perfectly clear, the above reference and link to the Jay Edward Epstein article was emailed to me this morning by Dr. Laurie Mylroie.