TMI and most especially Chernobyl...those are object lessons in the danger of the human mind. Mentally, the human brain is astonishing in what it is capable of, but humans, being humans, are prone to make mistakes. Especially when things get complicated.
I have often thought of the human brain as having a buffer, where information is stored and processed from. We can do very well when that buffer of information is manageable.
But when that buffer overflows, it takes training, discipline, and intelligence to manage it. And even then, it simply isn't enough.
I always thought the Master Caution light in an airplane was perfect. Pilots are trained that the first thing they must do when that big square light and audible alarm sounds, it to reach out and shut that Master Caution light off.
Not just for the obvious fact that you need to free up that light and alarm to retrigger if a new warning comes in, but the human brain, with the light flashing in the face, and the audible alarm going off, steals brain cycles, if not overtly, but behind the scenes.
And in an airplane cockpit, even rigorous military training and adherence to a procedure for a given situation isn't always enough to keep a human being from trying to improvise and improve the situation. It takes a lot of discipline and training NOT to do that.
An object example of this is the crash of Kara Hultgreen's F-14 Tomcat. (LINK: The REAL Truth About Kara Hultgreen's F-14 Tomcat Mishap
I think this former F-14 RIO, Ward Carroll, does a respectful and informative description of a fatal mishap, but his explanation about why procedures are developed for given situations a pilot may encounter is astonishingly good. (I do disagree with him on integration of the military. That is my opinion.) That said, as this retired Naval Officer points out, these procedures are often developed BECAUSE someone encountered a specific situation.
In the US Navy, the pilot's guide is the NATOPS manual for that plane. And as this Ward Carroll points out, these instructions in those manuals were printed in blood. (When I was in Naval aviation, I remember a Chief getting all the rookies together before the rookies went up on the flight deck for the first time (It has been a while, I have to paraphrase): "When you are working on the flight deck, you may be be taught to do a specific task a very specific way. And it may sound inefficient or stupid. And you may think of a way to do that task faster, easier, and more efficiently. DON'T. Those stupid, inefficient procedures are often done that way because someone was hurt or killed, and that procedure is done that way as the best way to prevent it. Those procedures are often written in blood. And one more thing-I don't want to see any grab-ass or horseplay on the Flight Deck. If I do, you will be sorry."
All that was delivered in a flat, serious, menacing montone. So we took it seriously.
But in the case of Kara Hultgreen, the procedures she was expected to follow were indeed written in blood, prior fatal crashes of Tomcats. And they seem to be pretty onerous processes. Here is the page from the NATOPS manual that describes what to do in the event one of your two engines fail as you are coming in to land:
She probably wasn't a bad pilot, but this is what happens when that buffer in our brains overflows and time speeds up. But pilots train on this kind of thing to the point it is less brain memory and more muscle memory. (Any pilots here can correct me if I am wrong, but I don't think I am)
This pilot made every mistake up to to the point of "Landing gear......UP" because by then, the mishap was a done deal and ejecting was the only option.
This is why, when I get on a plane, and see the short gray hair on the back of the pilot's head as I pass the cockpit on my way to my seat, that I feel more at ease. He may not be ex-military, but...he might well be.