Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 11, 2024
Russian regional governments continue to commit large portions of their social budgets towards payments to Russian veterans, likely as part of ongoing efforts to incentivize Russian military service. Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii (iStories) reported on November 11 that Stavropol Krai is spending 83 percent of its social budgets on payments to Russian veterans and that Russian regions are spending on average 13 percent of their budgets on one-time payments to contract servicemembers (kontraktniki).[80] iStories reported that one-time payments to veterans and the families of deceased servicemembers have reached or exceeded a quarter of the entire budget for 35 percent of all Russian regions.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-11-2024
“one-time payments to veterans and the families of deceased servicemembers”
That is what they are calling “GDP”.
“New record 1,950 (Russian casualties in a day), or 1.35/min”
That, they are calling GDP growth.
In reality, it is a giant bonfire of Russia’s wealth and human capital.
All because of Vlad, the disaster.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 12, 2024
Recent Western and Ukrainian estimates about the size of the Russian force grouping in Kursk Oblast do not represent a significant inflection, as Russian forces have spent several months gathering forces for a future counteroffensive effort to expel Ukrainian forces from Russian territory. Ukrainian officials and Western media recently reported that Russia has concentrated a rough total of 50,000 personnel, including about 8,000 - 10,000 North Korean forces, in Kursk Oblast in preparation for an operation to push Ukrainian forces from Russian territory before late January 2025 and suggested that Russia has not redeployed any of these forces from eastern Ukraine.[19] Ukrainian sources estimated in September and October 2024 that Russian forces had already concentrated between 30,000 and 50,000 personnel in Kursk Oblast, including an estimated 35,000 personnel from Russia’s Northern Grouping of Forces who were operating in Kursk, Bryansk, and Belgorod oblasts and northern Kharkiv Oblast prior to the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast in August 2024.[20] US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin stated on October 31 that 8,000 North Korean soldiers are also currently operating as part of the larger Russian force grouping in Kursk Oblast.[21] A Ukrainian servicemember stated on November 11 that Russian forces are also redeploying additional elements of the 104th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (76th VDV Division) and several battalions of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) from western Zaporizhia Oblast to Kursk Oblast, but ISW has not observed independent indications of these redeployments as of this report.[22] ISW observed reports in mid-October 2024 that elements of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment were operating near Chasiv Yar.[23] Ukraine’s Pivnich (Northern) Operational Command Spokesperson Colonel Vadym Mysnyk reported on November 11 that the Russian military is frequently transferring new reserves to Kursk Oblast due to high personnel and equipment losses.[24] These reserves are likely intended to replace personnel losses and not significantly bolster the existing Russian force grouping in the area.
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
The Russian military reportedly continues to coerce conscripts into signing Russian military service contracts, likely as part of ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts. Russian opposition outlet Mobilization News reported on November 12 that Russian commanders coerced conscripts subordinated to the Russian 80th Tank Regiment (90th Tank Division, Central Military District [CMD]) into signing volunteer service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).[79]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-12-2024
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 13, 2024
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian oil executives reportedly rejected a proposal to merge Russia’s three largest oil companies. The Financial Times (FT) reported on November 13, citing unspecified “people,” that Russian President Vladimir Putin shot down the proposal to merge Russian state-owned Gazprom Neft, state-affiliated Rosneft, and independently owned Rosneft.[13] FT’s sources attributed the proposed merger to Russian Energy Minister Sergei Tsivilev, the husband of Putin’s cousin and Russian State Secretary — Deputy Defense Minister Anna Tsivileva. Former Russian oil executives told FT that, while the merger would have given Gazprom Neft and Rosneft access to Lukoil’s UAE-based trading arm, concerns over the ability to circumvent Western sanctions and temporarily reduced oil production also contributed to Putin’s rejection of the proposed merger. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) first reported on the proposed merger on November 9 but noted that the Kremlin and Rosneft denied the talks while Gazprom Neft and Lukoil did not comment.[14]
Contradictory reporting on the proposed Russian oil merger highlights a possible factional struggle between close affiliates of Putin and Russian energy executives. FT reported that Tsivilev attempted to utilize his family connection to Putin to promote the deal but that Russian energy executives also had the political leverage to oppose the proposed merger.[15] Rosneft Head Igor Sechin and Gazprom Head Alexey Miller are both longtime friends and supporters of Putin, and Putin reportedly rejected Tsivilev’s proposal on their behalf despite reportedly desiring more direct Kremlin control over Russian oil production and his family connection to Tsivilev.[16] The initial reports of a merger may have been intended to weaken Sechin in particular. The WSJ reported that Sechin was a “main player” in the merger talks and was a possible, but not definite, candidate to lead the resulting company, though Rosneft rejected notions that “Evil Sechin” had “insidious intentions to take over the assets” of other oil companies.”[17]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-13-2024