Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 13, 2025
Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said that ongoing US-Russian negotiations are unlikely to result in “lightning-fast results,” contrary to US President Donald Trump’s stated objective of achieving a general ceasefire and lasting peace agreement in Ukraine in the near future. Peskov told Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin on April 13 that “everything is moving very well” regarding US-Russian bilateral talks and discussions about the war in Ukraine but that there will likely not be immediate results.[1] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Second Department of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Director Alexei Polishchuk gave an interview to Russian state media group Rossiya Today (RT) and stated that Russia is willing to engage in negotiations that “take into account the modern realities” of the war and eliminate the “root causes” of Russia’s war in Ukraine.[2] Russian officials have repeatedly claimed that any peace process in Ukraine must address these so-called “root causes.”[3] Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov previously defined “root causes” as NATO’s alleged violation of obligations not to expand eastward and Ukraine’s alleged discrimination against Russian-speaking minorities in Ukraine.[4] These so-called ”root causes” are a reference to Russia’s pre-war demands that effectively amount to Ukraine’s full capitulation and the installation of a pro-Russian government in Ukraine.[5] Peskov’s and Polishchuk’s comments also reflect the Kremlin’s continued rejection of President Trump’s stated approach of first establishing a ceasefire and then negotiating a broader peace agreement and the Kremlin’s commitment to war aims that are incompatible with President Trump’s goal of achieving a lasting peace in Ukraine.
It is unclear if Russian officials will agree to any meaningful monitoring mechanisms, however, as Russian officials continue to reject the possible future deployment of a European peacekeeping contingent to Ukraine.[9] Polishchuk responded to a question about whether Russia will agree to sending peacekeepers to Ukraine on April 13 and stated that peacekeeping deployments are “not on the agenda.”[10] Polishchuk insinuated that Russia and Ukraine must conclude a peace or ceasefire agreement before considering the issue of peacekeepers and claimed that the French- and British-led “Coalition of the Willing” is attempting to intervene in Ukraine by forming what it is calling a “reassurance force.” Polishchuk accused the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s (OSCE) Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine of falsifying reports on Russian violations of the Minsk agreement between 2014 and 2022, despite indications that Russia itself maintained significant influence over the OSCE and seriously hindered the OSCE’s monitoring and enforcement mandates during this time.[11] The Kremlin’s ongoing refusal to engage with US and European proposals to establish a peacekeeping force in Ukraine and Polishchuk’s accusation that the OSCE has previously acted in Ukraine’s — and not Russia’s — favor underscores the Kremlin’s continued unwillingness to accept any kind of monitoring mechanisms that could undermine Russia’s ability to attack Ukraine again in the future.
Ongoing milblogger complaints about the Russian military’s conduct of the war in Ukraine reinforce ISW’s assessment that Russian tactics will degrade Russia’s manpower and materiel resources and contribute to slowing Russian advances along the frontline. A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor claimed on April 12 that the Russian military command is using a “thousand cuts” tactic against Ukraine to the detriment of Russian forces and complained that deploying poorly equipped and poorly trained Russian infantry to attack Ukrainian defensive positions only results in marginal gains and heavy losses.[23] The milblogger argued that the Russian military command is attempting to present high manpower and materiel losses as necessary by falsely portraying the preceding combat engagements as evidence of Russia‘s coordinated “grinding” down of Ukrainian defenses.[24] The milblogger claimed on April 12 and 13 that the Russian military command is ignoring the fact that Russian forces are facing shortages of materiel necessary for offensive operations, which contributes to issues conducting assaults and to the failure of small group assaults along the frontline in Ukraine.[25] The milblogger claimed that frontline Russian commanders are under significant pressure from their superiors to conduct more infantry assaults, do not have sufficient time to plan new assault routes, and that some frontline commanders order assaults simply to be able to report something back to their superiors. ISW previously assessed that these grinding assaults will likely degrade available Russian manpower and materiel significantly enough that Russian forces will have to decrease offensive tempo on lower-priority sectors of the front.[26] The milblogger speculated that Russian forces are in a self-perpetuating cycle, where poorly trained infantry killed or injured in failed assault attempts are replaced with similarly poorly trained infantry, who are again sent into doomed assaults.[27] The milblogger’s claims reflect the general trend of slowing Russian advances along the frontline recently and highlight some of the critical issues that Russian forces will have to address if they intend to make significant territorial gains or conduct more sophisticated offensive operations in Ukraine in the future.[28]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-13-2025