Attack On Europe: Documenting Russian Equipment Losses During The 2022 Russian Invasion Of Ukraine (2 year anniversary)

This list only includes destroyed vehicles and equipment of which photo or videographic evidence is available. Therefore, the amount of equipment destroyed is significantly higher than recorded here. Loitering munitions, drones used as unmanned bait, civilian vehicles and derelict equipment are not included in this list. All possible effort has gone into avoiding duplicate entries and discerning the status of equipment between captured or abandoned. Many of the entries listed as 'abandoned' will likely end up captured or destroyed. Similarly, some of the captured equipment might be destroyed if it can't be recovered. When a vehicle is captured and then lost in service with its new owners, it is only added as a loss of the original operator to avoid double listings. When the origin of a piece of equipment can't be established, it's not included in the list. The Soviet flag is used when the equipment in question was produced prior to 1991. This list is constantly updated as additional footage becomes available.

USA doesn’t provide any aid to Ukraine, so Trump has little leverage.

Maybe it's time to slip on those Clown shoes and red nose and entertain us?

Overview of US Aid to Ukraine Since 2022

Since February 24, 2022, the United States has provided extensive support to Ukraine and affected regions, making it the largest single-country donor globally. Aid has been delivered through congressional appropriations, primarily via five supplemental funding bills totaling approximately $175 billion in budget authority as of mid-2025. This includes military/security assistance (e.g., weapons, training), economic/financial support (e.g., direct budget aid, loans), humanitarian aid (e.g., food, medical supplies), and operational costs (e.g., US agency oversight).However, figures vary significantly by source and methodology:Budget authority/allocations: Often the highest (~$175–$183 billion), reflecting total congressional approvals, including funds spent in the US (e.g., replenishing stockpiles) or on regional support.

Aid directly to Ukraine: Typically lower (~$120–$135 billion committed), focusing on transfers to the Ukrainian government or forces.

Aid spent/delivered: Even lower (~$50–$85 billion), accounting for actual disbursements.

These differences arise because not all appropriated funds go directly to Ukraine—some cover US military operations in Europe, refugee support, or future commitments. Military aid dominates (70–80% of totals), with the rest split between economic, humanitarian, and other categories. Data is current as of mid- to late 2025, with a policy shift under the Trump administration emphasizing diplomacy and a temporary aid freeze in early 2025 (lifted after ceasefire talks).Total Aid Allocations by Status (February 2022–December 2024)Status

Amount (USD) Percentage of Total Notes Allocated $182.8 billion 100% Total emergency funding for Ukraine and region. Committed $140.5 billion 77% Funds pledged for specific uses. Spent $83.4 billion 46% Actual expenditures to date. Expired $2.7 billion 1%

Breakdown by Aid Type (February 2022–August 2024)Based on Kiel Institute data (government-to-government transfers), totaling ~$91 billion allocated to Ukraine's war effort.

Category Amount (USD) Percentage Key Examples Military/Security $64.8 billion 71%

Weapons (e.g., HIMARS, Javelins, Patriots), training, intelligence sharing. Includes $31.7 billion via Presidential Drawdown Authority from US stockpiles. Economic/Financial $22.9 billion 25%

Direct budget support ($32.6 billion via World Bank reimbursements/loans), governance aid. Humanitarian $2.7 billion 3%

Food, shelter, medical aid for ~6 million IDPs and 6 million refugees; demining ($91.5 million in FY2023 alone). Other (Operations) $0.6 billion 1%

US agency coordination and oversight.

Yearly Breakdown of Allocations (Fiscal Years 2022–2024)Congressional appropriations by fiscal year (October–September), totaling $113.4 billion in the first four bills (through FY2023), plus $61 billion in FY2024. Actual spending lags due to procurement and delivery timelines.

Fiscal Year Total Appropriated (USD) Military/Security (USD) Non-Military (USD) Key Notes FY2022 $66.9 billion $12.3 billion $54.6 billion Initial surge post-invasion; heavy on economic aid (88%). FY2023 $46.5 billion $38.0 billion $8.5 billion Increased military focus; $12.1 billion via Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative. FY2024 $61.0 billion $49.8 billion $11.2 billion Includes $5.55 billion PDA drawdown; aid freeze March–April 2025 disrupted flows. Total (through FY2024) $174.4 billion $100.1 billion $74.3 billion Excludes minor FY2025 adjustments (~$0.8 billion expired/unspent).

Key Developments and ContextMilitary Highlights: The US has delivered over 10,000 Javelin systems, 3,000 Stinger missiles, 40+ HIMARS, and three Patriot batteries. Training has reached 20,000+ Ukrainian troops via the Security Assistance Group-Ukraine. Third-party transfers from NATO allies added ~$50 billion in equipment. Economic Support: $4.65 billion in direct loans/grants forgiven in November 2024; USAID provided $3.41 billion in late 2024 budget aid.

Humanitarian Focus: Over $3.75 billion via USAID/State for IDPs/refugees through September 2024, including aid in Ukraine, Poland, and Moldova.

Oversight and Impact: Funds boosted US defense manufacturing in 70+ cities; total aid is <1% of the US federal budget ($20.1 trillion, FY2022–2024). Corruption safeguards include end-use monitoring and inspector general reports.

2025 Updates: Aid totaled ~$130.6 billion through June 2025 (Kiel Institute). A brief freeze in March was lifted post-Jeddah talks (March 11, 2025), proposing a 30-day ceasefire. Future aid may tie to peace negotiations.

With regard to the Trump/Putin peace planning and the Public TV report I spoke of earlier, analysts later said they thought it was very unlikely that NATO and EU countries would back off the support they plan to provide to Ukraine. It also appears that Zelensky is moving to firm up his support to the south with Turkey.

Trump and others have 3 distinct interests to consider. The first is real estate; who will keep which land, and what future uses might be made of such land. In the past Trump has been interested in putting a hotel in Moscow. I wonder if he and his real estate buddy, Witkoff have given thought to prime coastal beach RE in Crimea. It was reported in the past that members of Trump’s family were discussing RE prospects in Turkey with Erdogan’s sons-in-law. Trump’s SIL, is currently working on a big deal in Serbia, but has also been busy in Saudi Arabia. I suspect Trump has given up on his idea of a fine beach development in Gaza, but he never stops thinking RE, and now that he has the funds for his glitter ball room in our heart of democracy the White House, he needs new RE fields to conquer.

The second important area is economic. Here the need and hope for rare earths from both Russia and Ukraine is a concern. Given his efforts to lure US companies back to our shores, and develop microelectronics production here, overseas US businesses will be a lot happier if they can get their raw materials here, and at a good price. Both countries will need a lot of rebuilding after the bombing stops, so lots of happy contractors from the US and elsewhere to appreciate these construction and furnishing opportunities that Trump’s peace would provide. Russia also stole a great deal of Ukraine’s high grade agricultural equipment so John Deere and other companies would be able to make some good sales. The RUssian thieves also grabbed all the busses, fire engines, ambulances, and other public safety and welfare supplies they could run off with. To bad Russia has even fewer factories that could supply these things, they were even stealing toilets like in 1945, and those lovely new washing machines. Too bad Putin and Dugin do not understand how important a washing machine is to any woman who has one or more babies or small children. No wonder the Russian population is shrinking so fast.

Just picture how much fun it is to hand wash dirty diapers, especially in winter. At least 77 years ago when I had to help my mother we had a primitive washing machine that swished the soap and diapers around, but then my job was to crank them thru rubber rollers to wring them out, while my mother drained the dirty water and put in fresh water twice for rinsing while I wrung them out twice more. She would hang them on the clothes line, but in winter they would be frozen stiff, and I would stack them up in a cool place where the moisture would gradually dissipate in the fresh air. We then had more clothes line to hang more laundry and eventually a pile of clean dry cloth diapers and clothes. Now that Russia has stolen most of the Washing machines, Ukraine’s women are back to that level too or worse.

The third major area that Trump must consider is military. We are building more war equipment to restore our depleted old weapons with more modern new ones. Our MIC is happy, the workers are happy, and Trump has to balance how much we will sell to NATO and EU countries, and how much we keep to replenish our supply. He is also concerned with rebuilding our naval construction facilities and production. China has been ship building extensively. However, it is quite possible that Xi is now less interested in attacking Taiwan, and looking at reoccupying lands that were once Chinese, but later taken by Russia. Anything like military weakness of Russia which takes Xi’s mind off of Taiwan is good for the US. Leaving Ukraine untethered to continue weakening Russia helps makes Chinese prospects in eastern Siberia better. China has certainly been annoyed that Russia has not been able to provide the oil and gas from Siberian petroleum development projects in the works or promised. Trump has done a fine job in persuading Saudi Arabia to increase OPEC oil production so Russia loses oil income in the world market, and we continue to have reasonable gasoline prices in the US. His plans regarding Venezuela (and oil) are definitely worth watching.

These three areas of action give Trump plenty of chances to practice The Art of the Deal. Let’s see what he does with those opportunities.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 20, 2025

All available reporting continues to indicate that the stipulations of the reported 28-point Russia-US peace plan amount to Ukraine's full capitulation to Russia's original war demands. Western media outlets and Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Deputy Oleksiy Honcharenko published on November 20 all 28 points of the reported peace plan.[1] The reported provisions include that:

Ukraine will withdraw from the remainder of unoccupied Donbas (Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts) and this area will become a “neutral demilitarized buffer zone” internationally recognized as Russian territory;
All of Crimea, Donetsk Oblast, and Luhansk Oblast will be recognized as de facto Russian territory, including by the United States;
The conflict will freeze along the current frontline in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts;
Russia will relinquish the territory it controls outside of occupied Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts;
Ukraine's military will be capped at a maximum of 600,000 personnel;
Ukraine must enshrine in its constitution that it will not seek NATO membership, and NATO agrees to include statute provisions that it will not admit Ukraine any time in the future;
It is “expected” that NATO will not further expand;
NATO will not deploy troops to Ukraine;
Ukraine will receive “reliable” security guarantees, including from the United States, for which the United States will receive unspecified compensation;
The US guarantee holds that a renewed Russian invasion of Ukraine would provoke a coordinated military response, reimpose all international sanctions against Russia, and revoke all other benefits to Russia listed in the proposal;
The US security guarantee will be revoked if Ukraine invades Russia or launches missiles at Moscow or St. Petersburg;
Ukraine must reject and prohibit “all Nazi ideologies” and hold elections within 100 days of codifying the agreement;
Ukraine will receive funds and assistance from the United States, proceeds from frozen Russian assets, and the international community for reconstruction and energy infrastructure modernization.

ISW is unable to confirm the exact provisions of the reported peace plan at the time of this writing. A US official told PBS Newshour and Axios that the White House views the plan as a “live” or “working” document that can change based on further discussions.[2] Many of the points from the reported peace plan text cohere with prior Western reporting of the peace plan from November 19 and 20.[3] White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt confirmed on November 20 that US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio have been working to develop a plan since roughly mid-October 2025 and that they have engaged both Russia and Ukraine “equally.”[4] Key Russian officials continue to deny the reported peace plan.[5]

There are no provisions in the reported peace plan in which Russia makes any concessions, and ISW continues to assess that accepting Russian demands would set conditions for renewed Russian aggression against Ukraine. Many of the provisions in the full text of the reported plan align with the Kremlin's original 2022 Istanbul demands, which amount to Ukraine's full capitulation, even though the battlefield situation has changed markedly in the years since and has forced Russia to resort to grinding, foot-pace offensives to make marginal tactical advances.[6] The Kremlin has continuously reiterated that it intends to achieve all of its war goals either diplomatically or militarily, setting informational conditions to justify renewed aggression against Ukraine at a later date.[7] Russian officials have also set informational conditions to justify the aggression for the occupation of Ukraine beyond the five regions it has illegally annexed.[8] This reported plan would capitulate to Russian President Vladimir Putin's theory of victory, which is predicated on the assumption that Russia's military and economy can outlast Western support to Ukraine, and would reinforce the Kremlin's belief that the Kremlin can achieve its maximalist objectives against Ukraine and elsewhere with minimal international consequences.[9] Russia would therefore be likely to launch renewed aggression against Ukraine with a blooded, rested, and reconstituted military at a time of its choosing on battle lines in Ukraine that would heavily favor Russia.[10] A Ukrainian withdrawal from Donetsk Oblast would force Ukraine to withdraw to lines that would largely be indefensible against renewed Russian aggression from positions in the oblast, and would also provide Russia with easy access to seize Ukraine's Fortress Belt – Ukraine's key defensive line in Donetsk Oblast that is a critical logistics and defense industrial hub – if left undefended in a demilitarized buffer zone.[11] Russian forces would likely be able to launch renewed pushes into southern Kharkiv Oblast and eastern Zaporizhia and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts from the proposed ”frozen” frontline. ISW continues to assess that timely and sufficient Western military assistance and weapon sales to Ukraine, in concert with strong US and other Western economic measures against Russia, can enable Ukraine to inflict more severe battlefield losses on Russia and therefore challenge Putin's theory of victory.[12] The reported peace plan, by contrast, cedes all Western and Ukrainian leverage to Russia.

Russian officials continue to react to the reported 28-point peace plan by reiterating their commitment to Russia's original war aims and blaming Ukraine for Russia's own unwillingness to compromise.[13] Senior Russian officials reiterated on November 19 and 20 the Kremlin's demand that an end to the war address its alleged “root causes” of the war, which the Kremlin has long used as shorthand for its original war justifications, and amplified the false narrative that a Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable.[14] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that Russia is committed to negotiations but deflected blame onto Ukraine and the West for the stall in peace negotiations as a result of Russia's unwillingness to make concessions to end the war.[15] Some Russian officials expressed doubt about or rejected components of the reported peace deal despite the significant benefits it would afford Russia. Some Western media outlets reported that the plan holds that Russia would make lend-lease payments to Ukraine for its occupation of Donbas, a provision that Russian State Duma Committee on Economic Policy Deputy Chairperson Artem Kiryanov explicitly rejected as “completely unacceptable” and “unworthy” of serious discussion.[16] State Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa claimed that discussions on the reported 28-point plan may “take some time” and deflected blame from Russia's continued intransigence in negotiations to discredit the Ukrainian government and Europe.[17]

The Kremlin continues to use a combination of economic incentives and nuclear saber-rattling to extract concessions from the United States to normalize US-Russian relations without making reciprocal concessions to end the war. The reported peace proposal also stipulates that the United States and Russia will agree to extend nuclear non-proliferation treaties including the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), that Russia will be reintegrated into the global economy including multi-staged sanction relief and a bilateral US-Russian long-term economic cooperation agreements, and that about 50 percent of the profits from frozen Russian assets will be invested in a joint US-Russian investment vehicle.[18] The Kremlin has repeatedly used economic incentives unrelated to the war in Ukraine and the prospect of US-Russian arms control talks to extract concessions from the United States about the war in Ukraine.[19] These concessions would give away leverage that is crucial to US President Donald Trump's stated objective of achieving an enduring, just, and mutually beneficial peace in Ukraine.

Russian forces operating in the Hulyaipole direction continue to employ their new offensive template that relies on a combination of a prolonged battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign, tactical interdiction efforts, infiltration missions, and mass small group assaults to advance.[20] The situation in the Hulyaipole direction remains serious as Russian forces continue efforts to isolate Hulyaipole from the north and advance on the town from the northeast and east.[21] Geolocated footage published on November 20 indicates that Russian forces likely recently seized Vesele (east of Hulyaipole).[22] Russian milbloggers and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) credited elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) with the seizure of Vesele.[23] A Ukrainian servicemember operating in the Velykomykhailivka direction (north of Hulyaipole) reported on November 20 that Russian forces exploit foliage, terrain features such as ravines and lowlands, and fog to avoid Ukrainian drone detection.[24] A servicemember of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) acknowledged on November 20 that Russian forces exploited fog during the claimed seizure of Hai (southwest of Velykomykhailivka), which the Russian MoD claimed to have seized as of November 17.[25] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are exploiting the cover of fog that inhibits Ukrainian drone operations to launch attacks.[26]

https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-20-2025/

Кремлевская табакерка

20NOV2025 Gerasimov complained to Putin that contract soldiers “die too quickly in battle” and again asked for mobilization. He was told to wait

As a source in Valery Gerasimov’s entourage told us, the Chief of the General Staff again asks Vladimir Putin to announce a serious mobilization in Russia. “Valery Vasilyevich reported to the president on the situation on the battlefield. He also spoke about the problems that arose during the NWO. In particular, the quality of the military who sign contracts with the Ministry of Defense is of concern. Contract soldiers die too quickly, most within a month or two, in battle or lose their arms and legs, that is, they cease to be full-fledged fighters. In this situation, Valery Vasilyevich again asked Vladimir Vladimirovich to announce a serious mobilization and recruit several hundred thousand people into the army. The losses are significant, the troops need to be replenished. Vladimir Vladimirovich promised to think about it,” the channel's interlocutor said.

The Kremlin confirmed that Gerasimov asked Putin for mobilization. But the head of the General Staff was offered to wait for “whether it will be possible to bend the Kyiv regime and force it to make serious concessions.” In particular, the announcement of a new mobilization will depend on this.

https://t.me/kremlin_secrets/6444

Кремлевская табакерка
21NOV2025

Gerasimov was afraid of being dismissed and announced the complete liberation of Kupiansk. What's wrong with that?

We have an important statement to make. When the Chief of the General Staff is so afraid of being dismissed that he informs the president about the liberation of a city that has not yet been completely liberated, it is a terrible mistake. Not only because you cannot deceive the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. It is also because Valery Gerasimov is putting our boys on the front line in great danger. They, too, are misinformed, at least partially...

We desperately need victory. But it cannot be achieved through lies!

https://t.me/kremlin_secrets/6444

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