Attack On Europe: Documenting Russian Equipment Losses During The 2022 Russian Invasion Of Ukraine (2 year anniversary)

This list only includes destroyed vehicles and equipment of which photo or videographic evidence is available. Therefore, the amount of equipment destroyed is significantly higher than recorded here. Loitering munitions, drones used as unmanned bait, civilian vehicles and derelict equipment are not included in this list. All possible effort has gone into avoiding duplicate entries and discerning the status of equipment between captured or abandoned. Many of the entries listed as 'abandoned' will likely end up captured or destroyed. Similarly, some of the captured equipment might be destroyed if it can't be recovered. When a vehicle is captured and then lost in service with its new owners, it is only added as a loss of the original operator to avoid double listings. When the origin of a piece of equipment can't be established, it's not included in the list. The Soviet flag is used when the equipment in question was produced prior to 1991. This list is constantly updated as additional footage becomes available.

Even the Russian Defense Industrial Base is now contracting rather sharply.

This is is significant watershed in the depletion of the old Soviet Arsenal, that we have been tracking on this thread. Now Russia’s ability to produce new tanks, or refurbish old ones, has itself begun to decline.

(Hat tip to UMCRevMom@aol.com)

Russia’s biggest tank factory implodes, entire divisions shut down
RFU News — Reporting from Ukraine
11-17-2025
Length 6:01 Minutes
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mK1sHhD4x_8

“Russia’s largest tank producer has begun mass layoffs, a stunning reversal for a nation that claims to be building a war economy capable of outproducing Ukraine and the West. The move signals deep strain at the heart of Russia’s defense industry and raises doubts about how long it can sustain large-scale production.

Russia’s main tank manufacturer, Ural-vagon-zavod, has announced layoffs of roughly ten percent of its workforce and a freeze on new hires until February, with some internal divisions reportedly losing up to half their staff. The cuts go far beyond administrative reshuffling, as insiders cite a combination of crippling factors: sanctions that block imports of Western optics and fire-control systems, exhaustion of stored spare parts, and delayed state payments for ongoing contracts.

The company is already behind on deliveries of T-90M and T-72B3 tanks, with workshop activity down by nearly 33% compared to last winter. It’s a chain reaction: without foreign components, upgrades stall; without upgrades, contracts shrink; and without new contracts, entire divisions begin to shut down.

The consequences reach far beyond one factory, as Ural-vagon-zavod, builds and repairs most of Russia’s main battle tanks, including the T-90M and T-72 series that form nearly 80 percent of its active armored fleet. Even a modest ten percent reduction in staff could mean 25 to 30 fewer tanks repaired or produced each month, enough to reduce frontline availability by hundreds over a single year.

The reported 50 percent layoffs in some divisions would push output back to pre-war levels, erasing two years of industrial mobilization. Russia has already been losing armored vehicles faster than it can replace them. What is changing now is that they lose the ability to rebuild reserves for massed assaults altogether.

The layoffs also highlight a problem at the core of Russia’s war economy, as Moscow is short nearly 5 million workers across key sectors, according to official estimates, and defense plants are among the hardest hit. Skilled welders, machinists, and engineers have been drafted or have fled abroad, while those who remain are aging and overworked, with Russia not having enough to fill the heightened demand.

Entire industrial regions from Nizhny Tagil to Ufa now offer 40 to 60 percent wage bonuses and still fail to fill vacancies. The fact that Ural-vagon-zavod is cutting jobs instead of hoarding them shows the problem is not labor, but resources: a major red flag, as it signals that Russia’s production system is running out of both money and metal.

The plant may have workers, but without imported electronics, high-grade alloys, or Western machine tools, those workers have little to build. As sanctions continue to bite, the cost of replacement parts and foreign components has skyrocketed, forcing factories to idle production lines they can no longer afford to operate. In many cases, layoffs are a disguised form of shutdown, a way to quietly freeze activity without admitting bankruptcy.

The same pattern is emerging elsewhere, as in Tula and Bryansk, small-arms and component plants have halted production several days each week due to missing parts and unpaid contracts. Workers in Izhevsk report wage delays of up to two months.

Ammunition factories in the Urals, which had been running 24-hour shifts, are now cutting back to two. Even the aerospace sector, long prioritized for funding, is postponing engine deliveries for drones and cruise missiles because of alloy shortages. The once-overheated war economy is visibly cooling, showing what happens when political ambition outruns industrial capacity.

The slowdown in one sector ripples through others, as less steel means fewer tank hulls, fewer engines mean stalled assembly lines, and fewer optical systems means tanks that roll out incomplete. Russia’s defense industry is interconnected, so a failure in any major factory cascades across the supply chain. Ural-vagon-zavod’s cutbacks, therefore, hint at a broader production crisis, one that no emergency decree of forced overtime can fix.

Overall, the layoffs at Ural-vagon-zavod are not just an economic footnote; they are a warning sign that Russia’s industrial war machine is reaching its limits. What began as a mobilization boom is turning into a contraction driven by exhaustion, shortages, and overextension. For Ukraine and its partners, this is a strategic opening; a weakened Russian industry cannot sustain a prolonged war of attrition.

The Kremlin can order new offensives, but if it cannot decree new factories or resurrect a workforce that no longer exists. The tanks that may keep rolling right now, but behind the front-line, the engine that builds them is beginning to fail.”

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 18, 2025

Russian forces are struggling to focus on a single decisive objective in the Pokrovsk direction and instead continue simultaneous attempts to close the encirclement of the wider Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket while also attacking within both towns. The Russian military command does not appear to be focusing forces and means on completing the encirclement of the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad area, which would normally be the fastest and least costly way to seize the entire area, and instead continues to pursue some level of head-on attacks. Geolocated footage published on November 18 and reportedly filmed on November 16 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced within northeastern Pokrovsk.[1] The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Airborne Assault Forces reported on November 18 that Russian forces are increasingly attempting to infiltrate into Myrnohrad from the side of Krasnyi Lyman (north of Myrnohrad) — indicating that Russian forces operating north of Myrnohrad are not focused on advancing westward to close the encirclement but are attempting to attack southward directly into Myrnohrad.[2] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on November 18 that Russian forces are attempting to cut off Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) into Myrnohrad from the northwest and west.[3] Russian forces are also conducting glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian positions throughout the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket, likely to disrupt Ukrainian logistics and to destroy buildings and other shelters that Ukrainian forces use as part of their wider battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign in the area.

Russian forces are likely struggling to complete the encirclement in part due to the threat that Ukrainian forces are posing to Russia's northern shoulder of the pocket. Elements of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army (CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are operating north of Myrnohrad on the northern shoulder but have been unable to sufficiently push to close the encirclement from the northeast.[4] The 51st CAA’s opportunistic penetration in the Dobropillya tactical area (northeast of Pokrovsk) in August 2025 created vulnerabilities for Russian forces that Ukrainian forces have since exploited to threaten the rear of the 51st CAA elements fighting northeast of Pokrovsk. The Russian military command may assess that elements of the 2nd CAA (Central Military District [CMD]), which are operating south and southwest of Pokrovsk, can more effectively complete the encirclement from the western flank instead. The 2nd CAA continues to dedicate forces and means to attacks within Pokrovsk itself and north of the town, however, and does not seem to be prioritizing efforts to close the pocket from the west.

Russian forces are trying to employ their new offensive template in the Siversk and Slovyansk-Lyman directions to set conditions for an advance on Ukraine's Fortress Belt from the northeast and east. Russian forces have been employing a new operational template that relies on a combination of a prolonged battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign, tactical interdiction efforts, infiltration missions, and mass small group assaults.[5] ISW has recently reported on applications of this operational template in the Pokrovsk, Velykomykhailivka, and Hulyaipole directions.[6] Geolocated footage published on November 18 indicates that Russian forces, including elements of the Russian 123nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]), recently infiltrated into southern and eastern Siversk, although ISW assesses this event did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).[7] A Russian milblogger claimed that observed Russian infiltrations in southern Siversk suggest that Russian forces will try to covertly concentrate forces in the town in an effort to repeat the “Pokrovsk scenario.”[8] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) also claimed on November 18 that elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) seized Platonivka (northwest of Siversk) after conducting a feint, attacking under the cover of fog and rain when Ukrainian forces had limited drone support, and conducting first-person view (FPV) drone and artillery strikes.[9] The Russian MoD claimed that the Russian seizure of Platonivka allows Russian forces to interdict the T-0513 Lyman-Siversk highway, although ISW has not observed geolocated footage confirming the alleged seizure.[10] A source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence reported on November 17 that Ukrainian forces have prevented Russian forces from reaching the T-0513 road.[11] Ukrainian military sources recently observed that Russian forces were conducting infiltration missions in groups of one to three personnel in order to accumulate forces in the Siversk direction and anticipated that Russian forces would conduct larger mechanized assaults in the winter after the ground freezes.[12] Ukrainian military sources also observed that Russian forces simultaneously saturated Ukraine's forward positions with various drones in an effort to sever Ukrainian logistics.[13]

Russian forces are similarly using infiltration tactics in the Slovyansk-Lyman direction against the backdrop of poor weather conditions and ongoing efforts to disrupt Ukraine's ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the area. The spokesperson of Ukraine's 3rd Army Corps reported on November 18 that Russian forces are trying to infiltrate and establish forward positions in the Lyman direction in an effort to set conditions to conduct further flank attacks and to take Ukrainian forces into semi-encirclements.[14] The spokesperson noted that Russian forces conduct infiltration missions during rainy and foggy conditions that hinder Ukraine's ability to use drones. The spokesperson observed that Russian forces are trying to overwhelm the Ukrainian defensive system — likely referring to Ukraine's tactical “wall of drones” defensive barrier. The spokesperson also stated that Russian forces are trying to undermine Ukraine's logistics with tactical drone strikes and infiltration missions that aim to accumulate forces for subsequent larger assaults. A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction similarly reported on November 18 that Russian forces are trying to set conditions for assaults in the brigade's area of responsibility (AoR) by using FPV drones and fiber-optic sleeper drones to undermine Ukrainian logistics.[15] The NCO added that Russian forces are also using drones to coordinate artillery strikes before launching assaults.

ISW recently assessed that Russian forces have initially made significant advances in and around Pokrovsk after successfully achieving partial battlefield air interdiction (BAI) effects that degraded Ukrainian GLOCs and enabled Russian infiltration missions.[16] Russian forces also relied on poor weather conditions to bypass the Ukrainian “wall of drones” and infiltrate weak spots in the Ukrainian defensive lines in the Pokrovsk direction.[17] Russian forces have been attempting to replicate this new campaign design in the Velykomykhailivka and Hulyaipole directions.[18] Russian forces appear to be employing this campaign design in the Siversk and Slovyansk-Lyman directions to put pressure on the Fortress Belt – Ukraine's main defensive line in Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces will likely further conduct infiltrations into Siversk and may attempt to infiltrate into Lyman but will likely need to allocate significant manpower, materiel, and time to recreate their Pokrovsk successes.[19] Russian forces have been faltering in their ability to coherently apply this offensive template in the Pokrovsk direction, highlighting the broader challenges Russian forces will face when operationalizing this campaign design throughout the entire theater.

Russian military commanders continue to order Russian forces to commit war crimes on the battlefield. The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) reported on November 18 that elements of the Russian 1st Motorized Battalion of the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) used two adults and one child as human shields during an assault on the northeastern outskirts of Pokrovsk on November 10.[20] The SBU noted that the Russian military command gave the order to the battalion over a radio transceiver. Article 28 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War prohibits the use of civilians as “human shields.”[21] The reported incident is in line with ISW’s long-held assessment that the Russian military command is endorsing and sometimes ordering war crimes on the battlefield.[22] ISW has also observed an increase in Russian war crimes in the Pokrovsk direction in recent weeks as Russian forces have approached and infiltrated the town.[23]

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted an ATACMS missile strike against military targets within Russia. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 18 that Ukrainian forces conducted a precision strike using ATACMS missiles against unspecified military targets in Russian territory.[24] ISW continues to assess that the Russian military has previously exploited sanctuary space on the Ukrainian-Russian border to facilitate ground operations in Ukraine and that hundreds of known military objects in Russia are in ATACMS range.[25]

Ukraine continues to collaborate with its European partners on the joint production of interceptor drones. Ukrainian state-owned defense enterprise manager Ukroboronprom CEO Herman Smetanin announced on November 18 that Ukroboronprom and Czech aviation parts supplier Air Team signed an agreement on the joint development and production of interceptor drones.[26] The Ukrainian-Czech agreement comes against the backdrop of the recent launch of Ukrainian serial production of the ”Octopus” interceptor drone and the announcement of joint efforts between the Ukrainian and French defense industrial bases to produce interceptor drones.[27] Europe can learn important lessons from Ukraine's air defense to understand how tactical and technological measures can counter Russia's evolving aerial threats. ISW continues to assess that the West should support Ukraine's interceptor drone program not only for Ukraine's defense against Russian strikes, but also for the defense of Europe.[28]

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of November 15 to 16 that appeared to target the regional headquarters of major Ukrainian broadcasters. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 18 that Russian forces launched four Iskander-M ballistic missiles from Rostov and Voronezh oblasts and 114 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones — of which 70 were Shahed-type drones — from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[29] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 101 drones, that four missiles and 13 drones hit 15 locations, and that drone debris hit two locations. Ukrainian officials reported that the strikes damaged residential, railway, and civilian infrastructure in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kharkiv oblasts and resulted in civilian deaths.[30] Ukrainian broadcasters Suspilne and Ukraine Radio Dnipro reported on November 18 that Russian forces struck both of their headquarters in Dnipro City.[31] Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Heorhii Tykhyi stated on November 18 that Russian forces severely damaged Suspilne Dnipro headquarters.[32]

Polish officials attributed the recent sabotage attacks against a Polish railway to Russian security services. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk stated on November 18 that Russian secret services recruited two Ukrainian citizens who used explosives to damage two segments of the Lublin-Warsaw railway line near Mika and Lublin on November 16.[33] Polish Special Services Spokesperson Jacek Dobrzynski stated that “everything” indicates that Russian special services commissioned the sabotage attacks.[34] Tusk stated that the suspected saboteurs entered Poland from Belarus in Fall 2025 and returned to Belarus following the attacks.[35] Polish Defense Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz stated on November 18 that the sabotage attacks are part of Russia's broader effort to “destroy community, destroy alliances, and sow uncertainty.”[36] Chief of the Polish General Staff Wiesław Kukula similarly stated on November 17 that Poland is in a ”pre-war situation” in which Russia is creating favorable conditions for “potential aggression on Polish territory.”[37] These official Polish statements cohere with ISW’s continued assessment that Russia is intensifying its ”Phase Zero” campaign to destabilize Europe, undermine NATO's cohesion, and set the political, informational, and psychological conditions for a potential future Russian war against NATO.[38]

https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-18-2025/

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