Posted on 02/24/2024 5:59:01 AM PST by SpeedyInTexas
More of that Russian disinformation debunked:
Kyiv Post (17 Nov):
“Reports circulated Monday claiming that Rustem Umerov – the former defense minister now serving as secretary of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) – had stayed abroad to avoid a looming defense probe by the country’s anti-graft agency.
However, a government-affiliated agency quickly dismissed the claims.
Multiple outlets, including the Turkish-based account Clash Report, claimed on Monday that Umerov had “refused to return to Ukraine” amid the corruption scandal surrounding businessman Timur Mindich – a longtime associate of President Volodymyr Zelensky.
According to those reports, Umerov had allegedly told Zelensky he would not return and had abruptly departed for Turkey under the pretext of negotiating prisoner exchanges...
...In an official statement, the CCD (Ukraine’s Center for Countering Disinformation) said the allegations circulating online do not correspond to reality.
The CCD said Umerov is on a planned official trip to the US, not Turkey, as of Monday for a series of high-level consultations aimed at strengthening international support for Ukraine, adding that Umerov is in constant contact with Ukraine’s leadership and continues to oversee key matters of security, defense and humanitarian policy.”
Just being the disrupter it has always admitted to being, latest juvenile pics/memes are not displaying 😂😂
Russian forces may be attempting to fix Ukrainian forces within Pokrovsk itself while also encircling Ukrainian forces in the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket from the west, likely because Russian forces have found such an encirclement more feasible than an encirclement from the east. Elements of the Russian 2nd Combined Arms Army (CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) and 51st CAA (formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are attempting to close the encirclement of the pocket from the southwest and northeast of Pokrovsk, respectively, but are each struggling to concentrate forces and make significant advances. The 51st CAA is fighting in two directions that are not mutually supportive because the CAA is simultaneously trying to advance north of Pokrovsk, close the encirclement, and reduce the pocket around Pokrovsk. This split focus is likely hindering the 51st CAA’s efforts to close the Ukrainian pocket, consistent with Russian forces’ pattern of pursuing different objectives in an operational direction rather than concentrating efforts on a single decisive objective.[1] SMD elements northeast of Pokrovsk are simultaneously attempting to attack in multiple directions, particularly around Dobropillya. Elements of the 51st CAA are attacking southwestward to seize Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk) to close the encirclement. Russian naval infantry elements, likely operationally subordinated to the neighboring Russian 8th CAA (SMD), are attacking southeast of Dobropillya toward Sofiivka and Novopavlivka.[2] Ukrainian forces have been counterattacking the base of the Dobropillya salient from the west and east, likely to blunt Russian attacks in the area to advance north.[3] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 114th and 132nd motorized rifle brigades (both of the 51st CAA) counterattacked along the Zapovidne-Ivanivka line (southeast of Dobropillya) and the Mayak-Nove Shakhove line (east of Dobropillya), likely to defend against these Ukrainian counterattacks.[4]
Russian forces likely initially seized on an opportunity to advance in the Dobropillya direction in part to portray Russian forces as making significant advances ahead of the August 2025 Alaska summit, but the resulting vulnerabilities from failing to make operationally significant advances in the area may be hindering Russian efforts to complete the encirclement of the Pokrovsk pocket at this time.[5] A Russian milblogger acknowledged at the height of the Dobropillya effort in August 2025 that the base of the Russian penetration was too narrow to develop stable logistics, making the salient vulnerable to Ukrainian counterattacks.[6] Elements of the 51st CAA have since deprioritized the Dobropillya effort to focus on collapsing the Pokrovsk pocket, but the 51st CAA must now divide its attention between advancing northeast and north of Pokrovsk while still defending against Ukrainian counterattacks in the Dobropillya direction that now threaten Russia's near rear on the eastern flank of Pokrovsk.[7]
The 2nd CAA is also struggling to concentrate sufficiently to close the pocket from the southwest. Mashovets reported that elements of the 2nd CAA attacked near Udachne and Kotlyne (both southwest of Pokrovsk), indicating that the 2nd CAA is dispersing its offensive efforts to both close the Ukrainian pocket from the west as well as to advance within Pokrovsk and north from the town.[8] Mashovets assessed that Russian forces are attempting to fix Ukrainian forces within Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) to prevent Ukraine from conducting an orderly withdrawal that would negate the potential operational impact of the future Russian seizure of Pokrovsk. The 2nd CAA has made speedier advances within Pokrovsk and on the western flank of the pocket than the 51st CAA has made on the eastern flank, but has failed to seize Pokrovsk and collapse the pocket at this time since rapidly infiltrating into the town in late October 2025.[9] Russian forces fighting in the Pokrovsk direction have taken some of the highest losses on the battlefield in recent months, and elements of the 51st and 2nd CAAs are likely degraded as they attempt to complete the seizure of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.[10] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will very likely complete the seizure of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, though the timing and operational implications of these seizures remain unclear at this time.
Russian forces may attempt to use vehicles to transport troops, likely under the cover of fog, in order to speed up the clearing of Pokrovsk itself. Mashovets assessed that Russian forces are specifically clearing the T-0504 Novoekonomichne-Myrnohrad and O0544 Hrodivka-Myrnohrad roads (both east of Myrnohrad) to allow vehicle-borne Russian soldiers to enter Myrnohrad.[11] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces are using the cover of fog that inhibits Ukrainian drone operations to transport troops into Pokrovsk.[12] Mashovets stated that the continued Ukrainian presence in northern Pokrovsk is forcing small Russian infantry groups in the area to fight under conditions of a sub-tactical encirclement in the area, while the Ukrainian forces remaining south of the Donetska Railway in Pokrovsk are fighting in similar conditions. The inability of Russian small group infiltration tactics to generate sufficient mass to clear Ukrainian forces within Pokrovsk presently will likely force Russian forces to resort to using vehicles during inclement weather conditions to transport large numbers of troops into Pokrovsk.
Russia is reportedly continuing to struggle to replace its battlefield losses with new recruits. Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii reported on November 17 that Russian federal budget expenditure data shows that 262,700 people signed contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and received one-time sign-up bonuses between January and September 2025 — an average of roughly 29,189 new recruits per month.[13] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces suffered about 28,400 to 48,000 losses per month between January and September 2025.[14] The data from the Ukrainian General Staff indicates that Russian forces suffered an average of roughly 35,400 losses per month — more than the reported average monthly recruitment rate. Russia's main method for generating manpower through high financial incentives and price surging has reportedly been losing momentum and hitting diminishing returns in recent months.[15] ISW continues to assess that Russia's recent law on the deployment of active reservists within Russia and occupied Ukraine is part of wider efforts to set conditions to deploy involuntarily called up active reservists to combat operations in Ukraine in an effort to offset these decreasing recruitment rates.[16]
Saboteurs recently damaged at least two segments of a Polish railway on a route to Ukraine. Polish police reported that a train conductor observed damage to a portion of the Lublin-Warsaw railway line near Życzyn, Poland on the morning of November 16.[17] Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk stated on November 17 that an explosion from an act of sabotage destroyed portions of the Lublin-Warsaw railway line near Mika and Lublin.[18] Polish authorities have not attributed the explosions to a specific actor as of this writing. Investigative journalist Christo Grozev published images of a damaged rail track near Warsaw and an electrical cable laid across the track on the route to Rzeszów.[19] Grozev assessed that the cable was 300 meters long and led to a nearby parking lot, allowing a saboteur to remotely detonate an explosive device. It is unclear whether this incident on the Warsaw–Rzeszów railway line is connected to the incidents on the Warsaw-Lublin line. The Lublin-Warsaw and Warsaw–Rzeszów railway lines support Western military assistance deliveries to Ukraine.[20] The rail line explosions come against the backdrop of Russia's intensifying “Phase Zero” campaign to destabilize Europe, undermine NATO's cohesion, and set the political, informational, and psychological conditions for a potential future Russian war against NATO.[21]
France agreed to sell Ukraine weapons systems, such as fighter jets and air defense systems. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and French President Emmanuel Macron signed a declaration of intent on November 17, allowing Ukraine to purchase military equipment from France.[22] Zelensky reported that the document will allow Ukraine to purchase 100 Rafale F4 fighter aircraft by 2035, radars for air defense systems, air-to-air missiles, aerial bombs, and eight SAMP/T air defense systems with six launchers each. The document calls for technology transfers and joint production of Rafale aircraft in Ukraine. Zelensky stated that the Ukrainian and French defense industrial bases (DIBs) will begin joint production of interceptor drones and work to develop components for Ukrainian drones in 2025.[23] Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba told CNN on September 3 that only US-made Patriot systems and French- and Italian-made SAMP/T air defense systems can intercept Russian ballistic missiles.[24]
Recently, the media reported on the exposure of a sabotage group that was going to assassinate a high-ranking Russian official. His name was not disclosed. As it became known to MK, the assassination attempt was being prepared on the Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Sergei Shoigu.
https://www.mk.ru/politics/2025/11/17/stalo-izvestno-imya-rossiyskogo-chinovnika-na-kotorogo-planirovali-pokushenie-diversanty.html
Кремлевская табакерка
Shoigu, after the assassination attempt, does not rule out that he will return to the post of Minister of Defense
This was reported to us by several sources close to the Secretary of the Security Council. “Everyone already knows that the saboteurs wanted to kill Sergei Shoigu. Such desires of the enemy can hardly be considered accidental. The target turned out to be one of the most experienced and important politicians in Russia. And we all must understand: it is good that Sergei Shoigu has not yet said his last word in the history of our country,” one of them is sure.
According to another associate of Shoigu, he does not rule out that he may again take the post of Minister of Defense, because under Andrei Belousov, “the army has not achieved great success.” And the assassination attempt may push Vladimir Putin to return Sergei Shoigu to his previous position. After all, it “shows the significance” of the Secretary of the Security Council for Russia. It should be noted that this is not the first time that Shoigu has announced his desire to retake the post of Minister of Defense. Earlier, his attempts to replace Belousov were unsuccessful.
There has been increasing talk in Europe about the possibility of direct military confrontation with Russia. One of the possible flashpoints is said to be the Baltic states, with Russia potentially using force to create a corridor to the Kaliningrad region.
We have previously written about the existence of such plans on paper. This is no big secret. In response to the words of German Defense Minister Pistorius, who stated the possibility of direct military conflict with Russia as early as 2028-2029, we were contacted by people close to General Gerasimov. They asked us to publish the following statement.
“Kaliningrad is Russian territory. In response to various provocations and attempts at blockade in the Baltic Sea, the Russian Armed Forces reserve the right to respond harshly,” said the channel's source. He emphasized that this is not only about creating a corridor to Kaliningrad, but also about the possibility of regaining control over the Baltic countries, including Poland.
“Modern warfare is very different from how the art of war is currently perceived in Europe. It is a whole complex of various measures and long-term campaigns,“ the source said, stressing that this includes information campaigns, which the Chief of the General Staff wrote about in his famous ”Gerasimov Doctrine” back in 2013.
Like so many others perverted by homosexuality, like assassins Thomas Crooks and Tyler Robinson, and horrific psycho killers like John Wayne Gacy or Jeffery Dahmler, debasing himself and disgracing his family with filth has likely unmoored him from any real connection to goodness or the divine, leaving him to twist the self-hatred that he earned, into a pathological relationship with others.
A personality crippled by the wages of sin.
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