Posted on 02/24/2024 5:59:01 AM PST by SpeedyInTexas
This list only includes destroyed vehicles and equipment of which photo or videographic evidence is available. Therefore, the amount of equipment destroyed is significantly higher than recorded here. Loitering munitions, drones used as unmanned bait, civilian vehicles and derelict equipment are not included in this list. All possible effort has gone into avoiding duplicate entries and discerning the status of equipment between captured or abandoned. Many of the entries listed as 'abandoned' will likely end up captured or destroyed. Similarly, some of the captured equipment might be destroyed if it can't be recovered. When a vehicle is captured and then lost in service with its new owners, it is only added as a loss of the original operator to avoid double listings. When the origin of a piece of equipment can't be established, it's not included in the list. The Soviet flag is used when the equipment in question was produced prior to 1991. This list is constantly updated as additional footage becomes available.
(Excerpt) Read more at oryxspioenkop.com ...
https://bsky.app/profile/stratcomcentre.bsky.social/post/3m5bhorlijs25
45 s video Eng subtitles
“I think we (Russia) will start telling the truth. I hope soon. Of course, not all of them”
…of course not. That is obvious to all.
“we will worship the greatness of our state. Let’s start worshiping now, with Putin”
Replacing Christianity is a (the) fundamental error, but with Putin? Can’t they at least find a golden calf or graven image, to make do? Putin is really scraping the bottom of the barrel.
Ah gee, I guess that’s just too bad.
November 10, 2025
Russian President Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine over three years ago with the intent, among other things, of stealing its children. Putin launched his imperial conquest to first and foremost dominate the Ukrainian people, and he recognized that to deprive Ukraine of its children would be to deprive it of its multigenerational potential. When Russian troops rolled across the border into Ukraine on the night of February 24, 2022, the groundwork for the massive deportation of Ukraine’s children was already in place. Ukrainian human rights activists uncovered Kremlin documents dated February 18, 2022, which laid out plans to remove Ukrainian children from orphanages in occupied Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts and bring them to Russia under the guise of “humanitarian evacuations.” These documents revealed that Russia planned to target vulnerable Ukrainian children, especially those without parental care before the full-scale invasion had even begun. In the subsequent three years, Russia has embarked on a Kremlin-directed, deeply institutionalized project to abduct Ukrainian children and forcibly turn them into the next generation of Russians.
Ukraine has been able to verify Russia’s deportation of 19,456 children to date, although the true figure is likely to be much higher because Russia frequently targets vulnerable children without anyone to speak for them.[1] Yale’s Humanitarian Research Lab placed the number of deported children closer to 35,000 as of March 19, 2025.[2] Putin’s Children’s Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova (against whom the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant in March 2023 for her role in abducting children alongside Putin) claimed that Russia has “accepted” 700,000 Ukrainian children between February 2022 and July 2023—a terrifying benchmark for the lengths that Russia is willing to go to rob Ukraine of its own people.[3] The true number of deported children is near-impossible to verify, but the implication remains the same—Russia has stolen tens, potentially hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian children with the explicit intent of eradicating their Ukrainian identities and turning them into Russians. International law explicitly forbids the forcible transfer of children from one group to another group for the purpose of destroying, in whole or in part, a national or ethnic group, and considers these violations as constituent acts of genocide.[4]
Russia’s crimes against Ukrainian children have been remarkably well-documented, particularly by the perpetrators themselves. The Russian legal system made immediate accommodations for the intended influx of stolen Ukrainian children, signaling the intentionality behind Putin’s deportation project. Putin signed a decree in May 2022 providing for a simplified procedure for the acquisition of Russian citizenship for Ukrainian “children left without parental care and incapacitated persons,” which amounted to a legalization of the process of deporting Ukrainian children and forcibly granting them Russian citizenship.[5]
With the legal framework in place before the full-scale invasion, Russian occupation administrators and occupation officials have blatantly advertised programs that take Ukrainian children from their homes in occupied Ukraine to Russia under a variety of guises, such as camps for their supposed rest, relaxation, and rehabilitation.[6] As recently as March 19, 2025, Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky announced that his administration, with financial support from the Russian Ministry of Education, plans to remove 70 children from occupied Zaporizhia Oblast to a Russian government-controlled children’s camp in occupied Crimea in order to give the children an opportunity to “rest and improve their health” after living in proximity to the frontline.[7] Russia has gone to great lengths to claim that these crimes are humanitarian gestures, but the legally-consistent humanitarian response would be to transfer Ukrainian children back to Ukrainian-controlled territory and return them to the care of their fellow Ukrainians—not deport them to the invading country.
Author screenshot of the Krasnodar Krai Regional Administration page on August 23, 2022. Translation: “Kids from Mariupol are looking for new families.”
Russia’s abduction of Ukrainian children inflicts lasting psychological impacts as children are forced to assimilate to life inside a hostile occupying power.[8] Yale’s Humanitarian Research Lab has confirmed that Russia is using at least 43 children’s camps throughout Russia to house deported children, at least 32 of which are explicitly “re-education” facilities.[9] At least one of these camps in Russia’s far eastern Primorsky Krai is physically closer to Alaska than it is to Ukraine. Russia uses these camps to indoctrinate Ukrainian children, punishing them for their Ukrainian identities and forcibly instilling pro-Russian sentiment through carefully curated Kremlin-approved curricula and “military-patriotic” training courses. Chechen Republic Head and close Putin ally Ramzan Kadyrov has lauded the “military-patriotic” training of abducted Ukrainian teenagers in Chechnya, for example.[10] Former Ukrainian Children’s Rights Commissioner Mykola Kuleba has termed these re-education programs as “death camps for Ukrainian identity.”[11]
Of the tens of thousands of children whom Russia has deported since 2022, a likely significant portion have been forcibly adopted into Russian families. Dmytro Lubinets, Ukraine’s Human Rights Commissioner, stated that Ukraine has confirmed at least 400 children whom Russian families have adopted, but as with estimated number of deportations, the true number of adoptions is likely to be much higher.[12] Within the first six months of the invasion, Russia’s Krasnodar Krai regional administration posted a quickly deleted advertisement claiming that there were over 1,000 orphans from occupied Mariupol alone “awaiting” adoption into Russian families. High-ranking Russian officials with close ties to Putin, such as Lvova-Belova herself and A Just Russia Duma Deputy Sergei Mironov, have adopted abducted Ukrainian children from occupied Mariupol and Kherson, respectively.[13]
The adoption process strips Ukrainian children of their Ukrainian names and birthplaces, replacing them with Russian birth certificates and documentation intended to erase the child’s Ukrainian identity and any paper trail that would allow Ukrainian authorities or family members to search for the child.[14] For teenage Ukrainian boys, their forced acceptance of Russian citizenship can result in a near immediate military summons to fight in the Russian army against their fellow Ukrainians—a completely separate but equally clear violation of international law.[15] The Russian adoption system is swallowing Ukrainian children up into a bureaucratic black hole, premised on the administrative eradication of Ukrainian identity. For the younger children, especially those adopted in their infancy, their adoption means that an entire generation of Ukrainians are growing up in Russia, unaware that they are Ukrainian.
There can be no true peace in Ukraine without the return of the children that Putin has stolen. The fate of these children is inextricably tied to both the military and political outcomes of Putin’s war. Negotiations and an end to the fighting without consideration for the deported children will empower Russia to continue to commit these crimes with absolute impunity. A negotiated outcome to the war on any terms but Ukraine’s will result in the loss of Ukraine’s children, a loss that will be impossible to reverse.
For further reading on Russia’s illegal activities in the occupied areas of Ukraine, see: The Kremlin’s Occupation Playbook: Coerced Russification and Ethnic Cleansing in Occupied Ukraine
[1] https://childrenofwar.gov.ua/en/
[2] https://www.rferl.org/a/yale-ukraine-war-crimes-investigation/33351956.html
[3] https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-ukraine-icc-judges-issue-arrest-warrants-against-vladimir-vladimirovich-putin-and; https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-children-taken-ukraine/32527298.html
[4] https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf
[5] https://www.ukrinform dot net/rubric-ato/3496766-putins-decree-legalizes-abduction-of-children-from-ukraine-mfa.html
[6] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/573
[7] https://t.me/BalitskyEV/4913
[8] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukrainian-children-abducted-by-russia-left-with-psychological-scars-campaigners-2024-06-15/
[9] https://www.razomforukraine.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/UPDATED-January-2024-one-pager-Children-of-War-_-Russias-Forced-Deportation-of-Ukrainian-Children.pdf
[10] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/3104
[11] https://www.cbc.ca/radio/asithappens/russia-ukraine-peace-deal-children-1.7488114
[12] https://www.dw.com/en/how-are-ukrainian-children-faring-in-russian-adoptive-families/a-68138393
[13] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67488646; https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2023/07/19/maria-lvova-belova-adopted-mariupol-boy-philip-golovnya/
[14] https://www.dw.com/uk/ak-zivut-ukrainski-diti-v-simah-u-rosii-i-ak-ukraina-ih-povertae/a-68070847
[15] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67368313
All going according to plan😎
“Get Me Out of Here”: Argentine Student Trapped Fighting in Russia’s War
Gianni Dante Bettiga, from Tierra del Fuego in Argentina’s far south, traveled to Russia in February to study Russian culture and language at a university in Yekaterinburg, about 1,600 kilometers east of Moscow, according to Argentinian newspaper Clarin on November 4.
But after meeting two Brazilian classmates, he was persuaded to sign a contract with a private company that recruits foreigners to fight for Russia—a decision that, his father says, quickly turned into a nightmare.
“He signed a contract—it was written in Russian—and what was supposed to be for one year ended up being for three,” said Juan Bettiga, Gianni’s father, speaking from Ushuaia, Clarin reported.
“He underwent military training for two weeks near Moscow, and in the third week, they sent him to Donetsk, Ukrainian territory occupied by Russia.”
Gianni told his mother he “ended up in the army by mistake,” saying the job he thought was administrative turned out to be combat training, Clarin reported.
According to his parents, cited by Clarin, Gianni had one clear condition: he did not want to be part of the Russian Army. But within weeks, he was enlisted and deployed.
In this 17 minute video, Jason Jay Smart analyzes the role of Russian mafia clan corruption in the conduct of the war, and the risk of civil war.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7D4ECbBdJHE
Perhaps (my speculation) the objective of the attack on Russian oil revenues, is to destabilize the regime through the mechanism of unleashing mafia civil war - fighting over a shrinking pie. The Capo of one of the major clans, is the head of Rosneft.
Putin’s Russia is a mafia State.
That Brazilian has regrets about fighting in Ukraine? Duh!
Nobody should ever volunteer to go and fight in a war, especially if they’re not a citizen of that country.
But, the ones having the most regrets are the Russian ‘volunteers’ who are getting big contracts to go join the fight in Ukraine. The biggest regret they’ll have is soon after getting fatally wounded. A split second of regret and they, total darkness. Hundreds of thousands of Russian regretting signing a contract to go to their certain deaths. And millions more mothers and fathers and brothers/sisters and sons/daughters expressing their regrets that their sons stupidly signed those contracts.
What good is a contract if you’re going to be dead and have no chance to collect the promised money? Dumbasses! Which reminds me: you are not better than those idiots.
Have you singed up with Putin to go to the fight? You’re not a good Russian if you refuse to die for your country.
Without cash there is no pitin regime.
It is held together by paying people off, and fear.
The fear part costs a lot , I believe the “internal security” budget is close to the military budget.
Without the mechanism to instill fear, arrest musicians and artists, police the socials and pay for “window crews” the fear goes away and dissent rises.
Without cash there is no “loyalty “
In fighting is just a side bonus
Is Russia running out of money for war?
Kyiv Independent (10 Nov):
“In early October, the Russian government released the full draft of its 2026–2028 federal budget, outlining President Vladimir Putin’s key policy priorities for the coming years...
...”To keep (Russia’s) military machine running like this, a lot more money is needed — and there simply is not any,” Milov, who was an economic advisor for the Russian government in the early 2000s, told the Kyiv Independent...
... According to the report, Russia is experiencing a full-blown budget crisis.
Vladimir Dubrovskiy, a senior economist at the Center for Social and Economic Research Ukraine, said the deficit is “Russia’s most serious economic and political-economic problem.”
The country is facing seven consecutive years of high budget deficit (over 2%) — a streak unseen since 1999, according to Milov’s report. The Russian government has officially abandoned its goal of keeping the deficit below 1% of GDP.
For 2025, the projected deficit was increased by 0.5% to a 2.6% total. The government expects the 2026 deficit to fall to 1.6% of GDP, but analysts say that projection is likely unrealistic.
“The deficit that Russia is expecting for 2025 is quite significant. It is true that the planned deficit for 2026 is lower, but those numbers are wishful thinking,” Benjamin Hilgenstock, head of macroeconomic research and strategy at the KSE Institute, said.
Dubrovskiy also believes the projected figures are an underestimation.
“If the war continues, the deficit will almost certainly grow significantly, as it did in the past,” he told the Kyiv Independent. “Moreover, this estimate does not take into account the potential impact of future economic sanctions.”
Hilgenstock added that in any case, a deficit of 2-3% of GDP is “a lot for Russia since it doesn’t have access to financing like normal countries.”... Even China, once seen as a potential lender, has refused to provide government loans.
...The Kremlin has been forced — at least on paper — to cap further increases in military spending to keep its books in check. Yet the government no longer publishes real expenditure data, releasing only projections.
Between 2026 and 2028, Moscow claims defense spending will remain flat, falling slightly as a share of GDP from 6.3% in 2025 to 5.5% in 2026 and 2027, and further to 4.7% in 2028.
Milov says the figures hide a deeper problem.
“The military-industrial complex is facing financial difficulties,” Milov said. “To keep it operating even at its current pace — without further cuts we’ve seen — is becoming increasingly difficult.”
Sergey Chemezov, CEO of Rostec, Russia’s largest arms producer, admitted in August that “the profitability of production remains low, and somewhere even zero, if not negative,” leaving “not too many funds for development.”
The result, Milov said, is that Russia can afford only a limited, low-intensity war.
He noted that the current phase of the war is “not very intense” in terms of the use of military equipment like tanks, relying mostly on drone strikes, missile attacks, and localized offensives.
“This type of warfare they can sustain for some time,” Milov said, “but the question is what for.”
Several major regions — including Saint Petersburg, Samara, Tatarstan, and Bashkortostan — have slashed recruitment bonuses for volunteer fighters, in some cases fivefold...
...Although these payments are drawn from regional, not federal, budgets, this trend reflects Russia’s broader budget crisis, Milov noted, which severely limits the federal center’s ability to provide financial assistance to the regions.
With traditional funding routes exhausted, Russia is left with limited options to finance its budget deficit.
The liquid part of the National Wealth Fund — once Russia’s main fiscal cushion — has dwindled to 4.2 trillion rubles ($50 billion), far short of the 5.7 trillion rubles ($70 billion) deficit expected for 2025 alone.
Domestic borrowing through state bonds is also functionally impossible under current conditions, as yields on 10-year bonds exceed 15%. The high cost of debt servicing offsets the amount that can be potentially raised.
Mark Stalczynski, Senior Analyst at RAND, noted that the Russian government has raised taxes “to partially offset” defense spending since the beginning of the full-scale war.
But while the government has resorted to extensive tax hikes — such as increasing the corporate profit tax to 25% and planning a value-added tax increase to 22% — the resulting revenue generated only a fraction of what’s needed.
Therefore, the only remaining option the government seems to be resorting to is monetary emission — de facto Central Bank credit to the government, Milov noted.
“Large-scale domestic borrowing would further depress the economy and would immediately remind Russian elites of the disastrous 1998 financial collapse, which was caused by the same type of deficit financing at high interest rates,” Dubrovskiy said.”
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