😂😂😂😂
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Posted on 02/24/2024 5:59:01 AM PST by SpeedyInTexas
😂😂😂😂
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Refineries and drone storage areas go boom, and they post memes😂🤡
anout ?
Give us a clue, genius.
And Russia has to import gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel😂😂😂
KABOOM KABOOM KABOOMSKI!
Your video by https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=_DMqVTBfK6Y&pp=ugUEEgJlbg%3D%3D
Jay in Kyiv shows one of the biggest KABOOMS of the war as Ukrainian drones etc explode a Rooski Shahid drones factory. A huge fireball n mushroom cloud like a nuke makes.
Actually the hapless idiots do not, cannot make these drones. They assemble Shahids from knockdown (Ikea) kits the Iranians sell them. Shahid means muslim jihad warrior who dies in battle. He is a martyr who goes immediately to fake allah’s X-Rated Paradise. They believe this drek from all the hashish and captagon pills they consume. >>>>>>
“Captagon, originally a pharmaceutical drug, is now widely known as an illicit stimulant associated with addiction and significant social issues, particularly in the Middle East.”
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=_DMqVTBfK6Y&pp=ugUEEgJlbg%3D%3D
bunch of other stories. Uh we have to
0:27
start with Ukraine’s overnight strikes
0:30
on uh it looks like this was a shahed
0:32
factory. This is one of the biggest
0:35
explosions of this war. It’s absolutely
0:39
um just take a look. I mean look at that
0:41
shock wave. It’s like a nuclear test
0:43
from what the uh whatever that was
0:46
Marshall Islands or Tahiti back in the
0:47
1950s. I’ll read you what I wrote last
“And Russia has to import gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel”
Diesel, jet fuel, kerosene, home heating are just about the same thing and same density. Buy some diesel from the gas station to safely start a campfire. The genius of jet airplanes is that they burn cheap kerosene aka jet fuel. While propeller aircraft burn aviation fuel, a more expensive, more refined gasoline.
It is easier for a cracking tower to make kerosene, than gasoline. So diesel’s natural price is lower than gasoline. However market forces and supply vs demand forces can often make diesel more expensive than gasoline.
“Another night, another Russian refinery struck - Volgograd.”
Great news and add it to the Rus refinery wrecked bingo card.
Pro tip: don’t drive Angelina Jolie in The Ukraine.
😂😂😂🤣🤣🤣
Ewwwwww!!
And after their Bild stooge said there is kein problem...
Even Putin dupes n stooges are grooving to the huge fireballs and explosions of Russian refineries. You come here for the KABOOMS.
The video that you (Dennis) linked (Jay in Kyiv) reports full closure of both the export terminal of Tuapse, and the Tuapse oil refinery.
Those are big effects - the explosion at the port must have been massive.
NATO Secretary General Rutte reports that NATO now outproduces Russia for ammunition (I assume this refers to Artillery shells).
That was like, Russia’s one thing.
Gone.
Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to try to blame US President Donald Trump for the nuclear arms modernization and buildup program that Russia began years ago. Putin held an award ceremony on November 4 for the developers of the new Burevestnik missile and Poseidon unmanned underwater vehicle, in which he continued to laud the weapons’ purported technical capabilities.[1] Putin held a Russian Security Council meeting on November 5 in which Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov, Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov, Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Head Sergei Naryshkin, Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu, and Federal Security Service (FSB) Head Alexander Bortnikov offered their assessments of US President Donald Trump's statements since October 29 that the United States would start testing its nuclear weapons.[2] Belousov advised Putin to begin preparation for “full-scale” nuclear testing immediately, and Putin called for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Ministry of Defense (MoD), special services, and relevant civilian agencies to submit proposals on the possible start of nuclear weapons tests. The Kremlin officials continued to interpret that Trump's recent statements meant that the United States would begin testing nuclear warheads. Trump did not specify if the United States would test nuclear warheads or the delivery systems, however, and US Energy Secretary Chris Wright stated on November 2 that Trump is likely referring to tests of delivery systems.[3] Russia has violated the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) and likely restarted low-yield nuclear tests in 2019 in violation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).[4] Russia's latest weapons developments fundamentally do not change the nuclear balance between the United States and Russia, even if the technical details that Putin is touting are true — as the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) recently noted.[5]
Russia's grinding advances in the Pokrovsk direction continue to absorb significant Russian losses. The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) reported on November 5 that SBU units operating in the Pokrovsk direction killed over 1,500 Russian servicemembers and destroyed 20 tanks, 62 armored fighting vehicles (AFVs), and 532 transport vehicles in October 2025.[6] The SBU’s numbers only account for casualties inflicted by SBU forces, and total Russian losses in the area are likely much higher. Geolocated footage published on November 5 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in western Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk).[7] Russian milbloggers claimed on November 4 and 5 that Russian forces advanced within northeastern Pokrovsk, southeast of Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk), and southwest of Sukhetske (north of Pokrovsk).[8] A servicemember of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on November 5 that Russian forces are concentrating their efforts against Ukrainian forces in southern Pokrovsk and are wearing civilian clothes as part of deception tactics — considered perfidy under international law.[9] ISW has recently observed multiple reports of Russian forces committing acts of perfidy in the Pokrovsk direction as Russian forces have leveraged infiltration tactics to penetrate the town between Ukrainian positions.[10]
The Russian military command has committed significant portions of the 2nd, 41st, and 51st combined arms armies (CAA) to the Pokrovsk direction, indicating its prioritization of the seizure of the pocket.[11] Elements of the Russian 35th and 74th Motorized Rifle Brigades (both of the 41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) and the 1441st Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 2nd CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating in western Pokrovsk; and elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA), the 506th and 589th motorized rifle regiments (both of the 27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA), and the 1452nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 41st CAA) are reportedly operating in eastern Pokrovsk.[12] Elements of the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) and the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment are reportedly operating in Rodynske; elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly operating in Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk); elements of the 1435th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 2nd CAA) are reportedly operating in Zvirove (southwest of Pokrovsk); and elements of the 1437th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 2nd CAA) are reportedly operating in Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[13] Russian forces in the Pokrovsk direction have been taking some of the highest losses on the battlefield in recent months, and the 21-month campaign to seize Pokrovsk has likely degraded these three CAAs.[14] The servicemember noted that Russian forces rarely employ mechanized vehicles in the Pokrovsk direction, apart from near Myrnohrad. ISW recently observed reporting of Russian mechanized assaults near Myrnohrad on October 13 and 22.[15]
North Korea is reportedly deploying additional troops to support roles in the Russian rear. South Korea's Yonhap News Agency, citing South Korean parliamentarians who received a briefing from South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS), reported on November 4 that North Korea deployed roughly 5,000 military engineering troops to Russia, likely to restore infrastructure.[16] South Korean intelligence reportedly assessed that North Korea is training and selecting personnel in preparation for additional troop deployments to Russia. The NIS reportedly stated that there are currently about 10,000 North Korean troops near the Russo-Ukrainian border performing “security duties,” and another 1,000 are clearing mines. ISW continues to assess that it is unclear whether North Korean troops will deploy for combat operations to Ukrainian territory, which would mark a significant inflection, but that North Korean troops operating in Russian border areas would free up Russian forces to deploy to the battlefield.[17] ISW previously observed reports that North Korean military personnel and “technical advisers” were operating in occupied Donetsk Oblast, and it is unclear if Russia plans to deploy the North Korean troops to restore infrastructure in Russia or occupied Ukraine.[18]
The Kremlin continues to set conditions to deploy active reservists to combat in Ukraine. Russia recently passed a law allowing active reservists to participate in special training sessions to ensure the protection of critical facilities in Russia.[19] Russian officials previously claimed that Russian authorities will only send reservists to protect critical infrastructure within their home region, but the law notably does not include such restrictions.[20] The Kremlin defines the four illegally annexed oblasts in Ukraine as part of Russia, such that the law's lack of territorial restrictions could allow Russia to send active reservists to areas of occupied Ukraine.
Russian President Vladimir Putin also passed a law on November 5 extending the monthly payments that Russian contract soldiers receive to any military personnel serving to repel an armed invasion of Russia, during an armed provocation on the state border or in Russian territory, or near areas in which Russia is conducting a “special military operation.”[21] Russian officials have long discussed extending benefits to personnel serving in border regions after domestic backlash following the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast in 2024.[22] The timing of Putin's decision to pass the law suggests that it may also be related to the recent law on the deployment of active reservists. The Kremlin may be using the clause in the law about those serving near a “special military operation” to set conditions for the deployment — and payment —of active reservists to combat in Ukraine, as ISW continues to assess.[23] The Kremlin is likely framing its recent legal changes regarding active reservists as only part of plans to protect infrastructure in order to conceal longer-term plans to deploy them to Ukraine. A source in one of Russia's largest oil and gas companies notably told Russian opposition outlet Verstka that the company's security personnel “do not have high expectations” of the active reservists who will protect critical infrastructure and that only real army air defense systems can offer adequate protection.[24]
Russian forces continue to commit war crimes against Ukrainian civilians. Ukrainian Deputy Prosecutor General Andriy Leshchenko reported on November 4that Russian forces have committed over 190,000 war crimes since the beginning of the full-scale invasion and that Russia is conducting a “planned state policy” of crimes against the Ukrainian people.[25] Ukrainian Department of Counteracting Crimes Committed in Armed Conflict Head Yuriy Rud reported that Russian forces have conducted over 5,100 drone strikes against civilians so far in 2025 — twice the total number in all of 2024. A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade reported on November 5 that Ukrainian intelligence officers assessed that the November 3 Russian drone strike that killed two Ukrainian civilians in the Borova direction likely occurred as the civilians were evacuating from Kruhlyakivka (northeast of Borova).[26] Kupyanksyi Raion Police Department Head Kyrylo Schcherbinsky reported that the civilians were walking from Kruhlyakivka toward occupied Berestove (east of Kruhlyakivka) and that the direction of the drone strike indicated that Russian forces were responsible. The watermark of the footage showing the strike showed the insignia of the Russian 96th Separate Reconnaissance Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]).[27] ISW has long assessed that the Russian military command is endorsing and sometimes ordering war crimes on the battlefield.[28]
Authorities reported unidentified drone incursions near the Brussels and Liege airports in Belgium on the evening of November 4. Belgian authorities closed the Brussels Airport due to an unidentified drone.[29] Authorities reopened the Brussels Airport approximately two hours later but closed the airport again after subsequent drone sightings. Belgian authorities also closed the Liege Airport due to unidentified drone sightings.[30] Belgian officials reported that there were three unidentified drones flying over the Kleine Brogel Air Base from October 31 to November 2.[31] Belgian Defense Minister Theo Francken stated that the repeated drone overflights are “in line with the hybrid techniques seen in other countries” and that the actors organized them “in a very structured way.”[32] Belgian authorities have not officially attributed these latest drone sightings to a specific actor as of this writing. The repeated unidentified drone incursions near Belgian critical infrastructure come against the backdrop of Russia's intensifying “Phase Zero” campaign to destabilize Europe, undermine NATO's cohesion, and set the political and psychological conditions for a potential Russian war against NATO.[33]
The Kremlin is continuing its long-term efforts to integrate the Belarusian and Russian economies. Belarusian state news agency Belta reported on November 5 that Belarusian parliamentarians ratified an agreement between Belarus and Russia to form a unified electricity market.[112] A Belarusian National Assembly deputy stated that Russia and Belarus are planning to establish a unified gas market and that they currently have a unified energy market. Belarusian Minister of Energy Denis Moroz stated on November 5 that Belarus and Russia are in the final stage of negotiating a common price for natural gas for Belarus and Russian customers.[113] ISW assessed in January 2025 that the creation or absence of functional common markets for gas, electricity, oil, and petroleum products by 2027 will be a key indicator for the progress of the Kremlin's effort to integrate Russia and Belarus’ economies.[114]
more + maps https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-5-2025/
According to experts, by 2026 Russians may be required to log in through the government portal “Gosuslugi.” To make this work, all social networks, video platforms, and websites would have to be restructured. The result will be a unified database showing who watches what content.
Anonymity? Forget it. Who needs that anyway? 😂
Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski told TVP World that Russia's defeat in its war against Ukraine is the only way to stop its neo-imperial ambitions and restore security in Europe.
“If Russia prevails in Ukraine, it will hardly resist the temptation to use its territory, industrial base, and human potential to move further. That's why it's crucial to keep Putin's army as far from our borders as possible,” Sikorski emphasized.
https://x.com/nexta_tv/status/1986712346220253527
Putin will not admit this, but those who come after him will.
The Russian military command is reportedly augmenting its troop presence in the Pokrovsk direction, likely to consolidate the gains Russian forces initially secured through infiltration missions and advance further through the town. Geolocated footage published on October 28 indicates that Russian forces advanced southeast of Balahan (east of Pokrovsk and east of Myrnohrad).[1] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced to the T-0515 Pokrovsk-Dobropillya highway in northeastern Pokrovsk and east of Pokrovsk.[2] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Novopavlivka (south of Pokrovsk) and seized part of the Pokrovska Mine complex north of Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[3] The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported that Russian forces conducted an at least platoon-sized mechanized assault near Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) at dawn on November 5 and that Ukrainian forces destroyed three vehicles. Russian forces have rarely employed mechanized vehicles in the Pokrovsk direction recently, apart from mechanized assaults near Myrnohrad on October 13 and 22.[4] Ukrainian officials continued to note how Russian forces are disguising themselves as civilians, a war crime under the Geneva Convention, in line with recent reports of Russian perfidy in the area.[5]
Ukrainian officials reported a recent increase in Russian assault and accumulation efforts in the Pokrovsk direction. The 7th Corps reported on November 6 that Russian forces significantly increased the number of assaults in the corps’ area of responsibility (AoR).[6] The corps reported that Russian forces attacked on average 13 times per day in September 2025, but conducted 30 assaults on November 5. The Ukrainian General Staff 0800 November 11 report, which covers activity between 0800 November 10 and 0800 November 11, reported that there were 276 combat engagements along the entire frontline — 100 of which were in the Pokrovsk direction.[7] The commander of a Ukrainian drone battalion reported that Russian forces in Pokrovsk are exploiting poor weather conditions to gather in large groups and enter the town in motorcycles or buggies.[8] The commander noted that Russian forces are starting to bring in provisions and are trying to infiltrate further into northern Pokrovsk and into Ukrainian rear positions where mortar crews and drone pilots are located.[9] The commander stated that Russian forces have infiltrated practically all over Pokrovsk such that Russian and Ukrainian positions are interspersed house-to-house. A Ukrainian servicemember reported that Russian forces have already conducted three rotations in the Pokrovsk direction after suffering heavy losses in the past four months.[10] The servicemember confirmed that the Russian military command committed unspecified Spetsnaz and naval infantry elements to the Pokrovsk direction. Russian efforts to infiltrate and then consolidate gains in Pokrovsk notably differs from Russia's efforts in the Dobropillya salient, where Russian forces made initial infiltrations but failed to deploy reinforcements to consolidate the gains before Ukrainian efforts to push Russian troops back.
Russian forces are intensifying their battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign against Ukrainian railway infrastructure, seeking to disrupt Ukrainian rear logistics hubs to erode frontline forces and eventually facilitate frontline gains. Ukrainian railway operator Ukrzaliznytsia announced on November 6 that it will temporarily close the railway line from Husarivka, Kharkiv Oblast (west of Slovyansk, about 45 kilometers from the frontline) to Slovyansk (about 29 kilometers from the frontline) and Kramatorsk (about 22 kilometers from the frontline).[11] Ukrzaliznytsia stated that it will also close the railway between Bantysheve (west of Slovyansk, about 40 kilometers from the frontline) and Kramatorsk and between Slovyansk and Raihorodok (southwest of Lyman, about 20 kilometers from the frontline). Ukrzaliznytsia cited “security factors” for the closures — likely referring to the recent intensification of Russian strikes against railways.
Russia has been intensifying its strike campaign against railway infrastructure. Dnipropetrovsk Oblast news channel D1 reported on November 6 that Russian forces conducted a drone strike against a railway station in Kamyanske, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (about 104 kilometers from the frontline) on the night of November 5 to 6, heavily damaging the station building.[12] The Kamyanske drone strike comes against the backdrop of Russian attempts to interdict ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, including recent strikes against bridges in the Velykomykhailivka direction.[13] A Ukrainian drone battalion commander operating in the Velykomykhailivka direction recently noted that the Russian strikes against bridges in the direction are degrading Ukrainian logistics to set conditions for Russian attacks.[14] Russian forces have also been targeting trains in Chernihiv and Sumy oblasts with modified Shahed-type drones as of early October 2025 and struck a passenger train at the railway station in Shostka, Sumy Oblast on October 4 and high-speed rail infrastructure in Kozyatyn, Vinnytsia Oblast on August 28.[15] Russia's BAI campaign that involves strikes against targets in the near rear of the frontline, such as roads, railways and bridges that support GLOCs, aims to facilitate subsequent Russian offensive operations in the weeks and months that follow by degrading Ukraine's ability to sustain frontline forces.[16] ISW recently assessed, for example, that Russia's BAI efforts over the past five months set conditions for recent Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction.[17] Russia's recent BAI efforts against rail infrastructure aim to disrupt Ukraine's use of its intermediate rear area for logistics, particularly along the E-40 Izyum-Slovyansk highway (about 20 to 35 kilometers from the frontline) and T-0514 Dobropillya-Lyman highway (about 14 to 30 kilometers from the frontline) — both critical arteries that supply Ukraine's fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast.[18] The Russian military command may intend to shift its focus to attacking the fortress belt after the seizure of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) in the future and is using its BAI campaign to set conditions for such attacks now. It remains unclear if Russia's success in using its BAI campaign to facilitate advances in the Pokrovsk direction will be exportable to other areas of the front, however.[19] Denying Russia's BAI campaign will likely be critical for an effective Ukrainian defense of the fortress belt. Ukrainian forces should also invest in systematically degrading attacking Russian forces’ operational GLOCs through a Ukrainian BAI campaign as well.
NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte noted on November 5 how the term “hybrid warfare” inaccurately describes Russia's intensified attacks and malign actions against NATO – in line with ISW’s ongoing assessment. Rutte advised against using the word “hybrid” to describe recent Russian assassination attempts and repeated incursions into NATO airspace.[20] Rutte also stated on November 6 that Russia is increasing its cooperation with Iran, the People‘s Republic of China (PRC), and North Korea to destabilize Europe and prepare for long-term confrontation.[21] Rutte’s statement coheres with ISW’s assessment that Russia's ongoing airspace violations and non-conventional activity against NATO states are part of an intensifying “Phase Zero” campaign meant to destabilize Europe, undermine NATO's cohesion, and set psychological, informational, and political conditions for a potential Russian war against NATO.[22]
Authorities reported an unidentified drone incursion near the Hannover airport in Germany on the evening of November 5. German authorities temporarily closed the Hannover airport overnight after pilots spotted an unidentified drone.[23] Deutsche Welle reported that the drone flew over a nearby industrial zone.[24] German authorities have not officially attributed this drone sighting to a specific actor as of this writing. This most recent incursion is the third time authorities have closed a German airport due to drones this week.[25] Belgian Prime Minister Bart de Wever responded to similar drone flights over Belgian airports and critical infrastructure in recent days, stating on November 6 that he will hold an emergency government security council meeting.[26]
Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to emphasize the multiethnic and multireligious nature of the Russian Federation and reject efforts by Russian ultranationalists to frame Russia as an exclusively Orthodox Christian and ethnically Russian nation. Putin emphasized in a November 5 speech to the Presidential Council for Interethnic Relations that Russia's war in Ukraine is consolidating interethnic unity and that the “addition” of Crimea and the four occupied oblasts of Ukraine has expanded Russia.[27] Putin called for Russia to integrate occupied Ukraine into Russian society. Putin explicitly defined Russia as a multiethnic state and claimed that he would declare 2026 the Year of the Unity of the Peoples of Russia. Putin called for Russia to replace the ideologically driven concept of the “Soviet people” with patriotism, which Putin defined as a love for Russia with the clear understanding that this is inclusive of all people and ethnic groups of Russia. Putin continued to accuse foreign intelligence services and foreign-sponsored “provocateurs” of attempting to undermine Russian interethnic unity, repeating calls on Russians to unite against external threats.[28] Putin also claimed on November 4 in a speech celebrating National Unity Day that Russia is committed to unity based on shared spiritual values and that Patriarch Kirill, head of the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (ROC MP), is working to promote cooperation among all forces in Russia and Russian communities abroad.[29] Putin's statements show his continued commitment to portraying Russia as an inclusive multiethnic and multireligious state to engender civic — rather than ethnic — nationalism. ISW continues to assess that Putin must balance between demands from the Russian ultranationalist community — one of Putin's main constituencies — for restrictions against migrants on the one hand, with the need for migration to address Russia's labor shortages and long-term demographic issues.[30]
The Kremlin continues to spread narratives about alleged Western provocations to create the appearance of external and internal enemies who aim to undermine the Russian state. The Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) claimed on November 6 that British authorities, with support from British think-tank Chatham House, are attempting to organize sabotage at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) in occupied Ukraine.[31] The SVR has been releasing similar claims more frequently since mid-September 2025, constituting a concerted pattern of activity that is likely part of Russia's “Phase Zero” informational, political, and psychological condition setting phase for a higher level of NATO-Russia conflict.[32] The Kremlin often uses the SVR to spread unfounded allegations designed to weaken support for Ukraine and sow doubt about the nature of Russia's own provocations against NATO members.
Russia continues to develop its modernization and refurbishment programs of older, lower quality tanks, likely for the battlefield in Ukraine where Russia's tank use is limited. A social media source tracking Russian military depots via satellite imagery assessed on November 6 that Russia's 103rd Armor Repair Plant (BTRZ) near Chita, Zabaykalsky Krai, the main refurbishment and modernization plant of Russian T-62 tanks, will be able to maintain an annual refurbishment and modernization rate of 300 to 500 T-62 tanks by the end of 2025 after experiencing a spike in activity this year.[33] The source noted that Russia had a pre-war total of 1,822 T-62 tanks in storage and has pulled 1,000 for refurbishment or modernization in 2025, leaving no tanks in “decent” condition left in storage. The source reported that Russian vehicles in storage bases are no longer in good enough condition to send to the front without refurbishment. The source previously reported in early October 2025 that Russia had roughly 885 T-62 tanks in reserve and was also increasing its refurbishment programs for T-72 tanks.[34] The source noted that Russian forces have recently exploited worsening weather conditions to resume limited mechanized assaults in Ukraine, which coheres with ISW’s ongoing assessment and observed patterns on the battlefield.[35] Russian forces, however, are mainly using tanks in Ukraine to transport infantry or as localized firepower in ways that do not currently require more modern or better condition vehicles. ISW continues to assess that Russia's refurbishment of older tanks is likely for use on the battlefield in Ukraine in the short term, and Russia's reported long-term efforts to increase T-90 tank production are likely not intended for immediate use in Ukraine.[36]
more + maps:
https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-6-2025/
Due to his meat wave, meat grinder policies, it looks like Putin’s war will only end when Putin is done away with, within the next twelve months. And at worst in winter 2026-2027.
Next Tuesday. Slava Ukeanally!
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