Attack On Europe: Documenting Russian Equipment Losses During The 2022 Russian Invasion Of Ukraine (2 year anniversary)

This list only includes destroyed vehicles and equipment of which photo or videographic evidence is available. Therefore, the amount of equipment destroyed is significantly higher than recorded here. Loitering munitions, drones used as unmanned bait, civilian vehicles and derelict equipment are not included in this list. All possible effort has gone into avoiding duplicate entries and discerning the status of equipment between captured or abandoned. Many of the entries listed as 'abandoned' will likely end up captured or destroyed. Similarly, some of the captured equipment might be destroyed if it can't be recovered. When a vehicle is captured and then lost in service with its new owners, it is only added as a loss of the original operator to avoid double listings. When the origin of a piece of equipment can't be established, it's not included in the list. The Soviet flag is used when the equipment in question was produced prior to 1991. This list is constantly updated as additional footage becomes available.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 4, 2025

Recent Russian advances through Pokrovsk are the culmination of a 21-month campaign to seize the town and a five-month dedicated battlefield air interdiction (BAI) effort to degrade Ukrainian defensive capabilities. Russian gains on the Pokrovsk sector have been in large part enabled by the Russian targeting of Ukrainian drone capabilities. A Ukrainian drone unit operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces are sending nearly 100 fireteams consisting of up to three personnel each into Pokrovsk per day.[1] The Ukrainian drone unit stated that these Russian fireteams are overwhelming Ukrainian positions such that Ukrainian drone operators do not have time to launch drones. Ukrainian military sources have recently reported that Russian infiltration groups are deliberately targeting Ukrainian drone crews to engage them in close combat, inhibiting Ukrainian drone operations.[2] Combined Russian ground tactics and the implementation of BAI effects have created an environment in which it is very difficult for Ukrainian forces to operate drones. BAI is the use of airpower to strike targets in the near rear of the frontline to impact battlefield operations in the near term; it aims to deny the adversary the use of crucial logistics lines and facilities necessary to sustain battlefield operations.[3] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets indicated that Russian forces created the drone denial environment in Pokrovsk using dedicated tactics that degraded the organization and efficacy of Ukrainian defensive and drone operations ahead of Russian infiltration missions, which also further degraded these Ukrainian operations.[4] Mashovets reported that the Russian military command established a new three-phased process for infiltrations: preparation, execution, and exploitation.[5] Mashovets stated that in the preparation phase, the military command prioritizes identifying Ukrainian tactical and tactical-operational ground lines of communication (GLOCs) supporting forward Ukrainian positions, Ukrainian drone operator positions and drone launch sites, and other exploitable areas.[6] Mashovets stated that Russian forces send in Spetsnaz forces to conduct the initial infiltration missions and subsequent surprise attacks against Ukrainian positions during the preparation phase, after which standard assault forces conduct their own infiltration missions in the execution phase.[7] Mashovets stated that Russian forces send out many small assault groups for further infiltration missions and to consolidate and reinforce positions during the exploitation phase, likely hoping to overwhelm Ukrainian forces while sustaining heavy casualties.[8] Mashovets’ reporting is consistent with ISW’s recent observations of the conduct of Russian infiltration missions.[9]

The current battlespace in the Pokrovsk direction took Russian forces 21 months to achieve. Russian forces took 21 months to advance the 39 kilometers (just over 24 miles) from Avdiivka to Pokrovsk. Russian forces first began the Pokrovsk effort in February 2024 after seizing Avdiivka and began setting conditions to take Pokrovsk through direct frontal assaults in March 2024.[10] This effort failed, however, and Russian forces instead shifted to an envelopment campaign in Fall 2024.[11] Russian forces conducted a short series of assaults in the Pokrovsk direction in Winter 2025 but did not reprioritize the direction again until July 2025.[12] Successful Ukrainian drone operations largely stymied Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction from late 2024 into summer 2025.[13]

Russian forces began achieving partial BAI effects against Ukrainian GLOCs in the Pokrovsk direction in July 2025, at which point Russian forces effectively denied Ukrainian forces the ability to use Pokrovsk as a logistics hub.[14] Russian technical innovations, such as first person view (FPV) drones with increased ranges, thermobaric warheads, and “sleeper” or “waiter” drones along GLOCs, allowed Russian forces to generate BAI effects and restrict Ukrainian troop movements, evacuations, and logistics.[15] Russia also deployed elite drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies to the Pokrovsk direction and other priority sectors in Donetsk Oblast to focus on interdicting Ukrainian GLOCs and eliminating Ukrainian drone operators.[16] Russian forces began attempts to infiltrate into Pokrovsk in late July 2025 in tandem with their dedicated BAI efforts in the area.[17] Russian forces achieved a limited penetration northeast of Pokrovsk in the Dobropillya tactical direction in August 2025, likely taking advantage of a porous frontline while seeking to secure the eastern flank of the Pokrovsk direction.[18] Mashovets stated on November 4 that Russia created the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies to primarily target and strike Ukrainian drone crews and noted that Russian forces prioritize Ukrainian drone crews in tactical, operational, and strategic-level strikes.[19]

These Russian BAI interdiction efforts have not proven as effective across the entire frontline, however, and will not necessarily be exportable to other parts of the theater. The urban environment in Pokrovsk has provided Russian forces with cover and concealment for infiltration groups and drone crews that are absent in other areas of the frontline, and Russia has dedicated staggering and unsustainable amounts of manpower and materiel to seizing Pokrovsk.[20] Russian forces briefly deprioritized the Pokrovsk effort to focus on the Dobropillya tactical penetration in August 2025.[21] Russian forces failed to exploit this penetration, however, likely in part due to the threat of Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian forces attempting to advance across open terrain. Russian forces then shifted back to prioritizing the Pokrovsk direction by September 2025, and Ukrainian forces have been successfully clearing the Dobropillya salient as Russian forces continue efforts in the Pokrovsk direction as of November 2025.[22] Russian forces have also been attempting to penetrate weak points in Ukrainian defenses and advance near and into Kupyansk, but have not succeeded in destabilizing Ukrainian defenses to the same degree as in Pokrovsk.[23] The differences between the Russian efforts to seize Kupyansk and Pokrovsk are likely in part due to the open terrain surrounding Kupyansk and Russia's inability to dedicate the same degree of manpower and resources to offensive efforts in the Kupyansk direction, especially as the Russian effort to collapse the Ukrainian pocket in the Pokrovsk direction is ongoing. Russian forces have also not prioritized generating BAI-type effects in the Kupyansk direction to the same degree as Pokrovsk. Russia would have to commit to potentially years-long, resource-intensive ground operations and BAI implementation to recreate the conditions in Pokrovsk elsewhere in the theater.

Russian forces continue advancing through Pokrovsk. Geolocated footage published on November 3 and 4 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northwestern, northern, and northeastern Pokrovsk.[24] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced within, northwest of, and west of Pokrovsk beyond what available geolocated footage indicates.[25] Russian milbloggers acknowledged that Russian forces have not yet seized the entirety of Pokrovsk and that fighting continues in the town, particularly in northern and eastern Pokrovsk, and that Russian forces are consolidating positions in central and eastern Pokrovsk.[26] One milblogger claimed that Russian forces “control” northern Pokrovsk, however.[27] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk), and other milbloggers claimed that both Russian and Ukrainian forces are conducting airstrikes against Rodynske as fighting continues in the settlement.[28] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced close to Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk) and that fighting is ongoing along the M-30 Pokrovsk-Pavlohrad highway southeast of the settlement.[29] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger stated that Russian forces are conducting mechanized assaults to try to enter Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk).[30] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on November 3 that there are about 260 to 300 Russian soldiers within Pokrovsk and that 30 percent of all fighting in the theater is occurring near Pokrovsk.[31]

Ukrainian forces continue defensive efforts in the Pokrovsk direction. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on November 4 that GUR units continue operations in the Pokrovsk direction after having conducted a heliborne assault west of Pokrovsk on October 31.[32] The GUR reported that its forces opened a ground corridor to bring in reinforcements to Pokrovsk and are conducting operations to improve frontline logistics and prevent Russian forces from expanding their fire control over Ukrainian GLOCs.[33] The GUR separately reported on November 4 that it conducted a strike with an FP-2 drone against a headquarters of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies in occupied Avdiivka and killed Rubikon officers and drone operators.[34] Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Pokrovsk, Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk), Zatyshok, and Sukhetske (north of Pokrovsk).[35] Ukrainian forces also continue counterattacks on the eastern flank of the Russian Pokrovsk effort in the Dobropillya tactical area to relieve pressure on Pokrovsk. A Russian milblogger claimed on November 3 that Ukrainian forces advanced southwest from Vilne (east of Dobropillya) and Nove Shakhove (southeast of Dobropillya, severing the road that connects Nove Shakhove to Shakhove (southeast of Dobropillya) and attempting to split the Dobropillya salient in two.[36] The Russian milblogger noted that footage of a Russian mechanized column stuck in the Kazennyi Torets River near Pankivka (east of Dobropillya) during a failed October 25 mechanized assault indicates that autumn weather conditions are impeding Russian mechanized operations.[37] Senior Ukrainian officers reported to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on November 4 that Ukrainian forces are clearing Shakhove.[38]

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed two laws on November 4 that likely aim to facilitate the use of Russia's inactive reserve in a protracted war in Ukraine and a possible war against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as well as the use of the active reserve in combat in Ukraine. Putin signed a law allowing Russian military conscription administrative processes to occur year-round, as opposed to the current system that only processes conscripts during the semi-annual spring and fall cycles.[39] The law will come into effect on January 1, 2026, at which point military registration and enlistment offices will be able to issue conscription summonses, organize medical examinations, and hold draft board meetings year-round instead of only twice a year. ISW continues to assess that the year-round conscription process aims to mitigate bureaucratic bottlenecks that complicate Russia's force generation efforts during large-scale involuntary call-ups.[40] Changes to Russia's personnel processing system are likely intended to support ongoing efforts to increase the size of the Russian military and would allow Russia to mobilize forces faster and more efficiently during both a protracted war in Ukraine and a possible future war against NATO.

Putin also signed a law requiring active reservists to participate in special training to protect critical and other infrastructure in Russia.[41] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) first proposed a version of this law in October 2025 that would have permitted the Russian military to use Russia's active reserve (“human mobilization reserve”) in expeditionary deployments outside of Russia without an official Kremlin declaration of mobilization or a state of war.[42] Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov stated on October 13 that the prior draft of the law would allow the Kremlin to deploy active reservists outside of Russian territory, including to Ukraine's Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts.[43] The version of the law that Putin signed into law only calls for active reservists to protect Russian infrastructure facilities, but ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is using the deployment of active reservists to protect critical infrastructure to set conditions to mobilize active reservists for combat in the future, including in Ukraine.[44]

Russian forces continue to commit war crimes against Ukrainian civilians. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Borova direction reported that Russian forces conducted a drone strike against two civilians carrying a white flag in Kruhlyakivka (northeast of Borova) and walking their dog on November 3.[45] The drone strike killed the two civilians and the dog. The spokesperson stated that Ukrainian forces have been unable to evacuate or identify the bodies.[46] The deliberate execution of civilians is a violation of the international legal principle of distinction that requires that parties only target combatants and civilians directly participating in hostilities.[47] The civilians in the footage, aside from being hors de combat due to their clear civilian status, were also holding a white flag–a clear sign of surrender and request for safety. ISW has long assessed that the Russian military command is endorsing and sometimes ordering war crimes on the battlefield.[48]

More + maps https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-4-2025/

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