Attack On Europe: Documenting Russian Equipment Losses During The 2022 Russian Invasion Of Ukraine (2 year anniversary)

What an amazing depletion of Russia’s tank inventories!

Out of all of their T-80s and T-90s, only about 100 hangar queens remain.

Amazing. Russia is simply no longer a tank power.

At over 1,300, Greece can field more tanks today, than Russia. For Turkey, 2,200.

Poland only had a few hundred in 2022 (after their donations to Ukraine), but their Defense buildup is now well into the delivery stage, with 110 new Korean K2 Black Panther tanks already delivered from Korea, and Polish domestic production of theK2 to begin in part next year (full rate by 2028j.

Production of new M-1 Abrams tanks for Poland began last year, and they are on track to receive 250 by the end of next year. They also have Germany producing Leopards for them. All of the above.

At a minimum, they would have 1,600 top of the line tanks in the field in 2030 (assuming no significant losses), but they now seem likely to well overshoot that target.

At over 1,300, Greece can field more tanks today, than Russia. For Turkey, 2,200. (Poland) 1,600...

Yes, but how many donkeys can they field? How about Golf carts and motorcycles?

Russia's artillery advantage has also been seriously reduced, if not eliminated/reversed. Air defenses too.

🍈✌ ☮️

“The Truth Is Coming Out”… Russian President’s Special Envoy: Biden “Provoked the War in Ukraine to Cover Up His Family’s Corruption”
https://t.co/fs1xwTXULX— Tony Seruga (@TonySeruga) October 8, 2025

121 days till pitin matches length of “great patriotic war” against former ally Nazi germany🤔

The US and Israel are pushing a ceasefire which lacks detail and masks myriad pitfalls. Here's what a serious negotiation would look like.

Analysis | Middle East

In Deir al-Balah, a mother told me her son now counts the seconds between blasts. Policy, to her, isn’t a debate; it’s whether trucks arrive and the night is quiet. Donald Trump’s 20-point plan promises ceasefire, hostages home, Israeli withdrawal, and reconstruction. It sounds complete. It isn’t.

Without enforceable mechanics, maps, timelines, phased verification, and real local ownership; it risks being a short-lived show, not a durable peace.

On paper, the plan strings together familiar parts: a ceasefire tied to hostage releases, withdrawal linked to disarmament, and a multinational stabilization effort to guard rebuilding. Used well, those tools can buy civilians time to breathe: a tranche-based exchange that releases hostages as pauses begin and expands aid corridors with each verified step; and a properly mandated, regionally backed stabilization presence that keeps fighters away from families, protects convoys, and secures reconstruction sites so hospitals, schools, and water systems can function. Modest instruments, not magic, but correctly sequenced, they save lives.

The design breaks down where hard agreements usually do. First, it effectively treats disarmament as surrender, demanding that an armed actor relinquish leverage before credible political guarantees and security protections exist. Durable settlements don’t start with a leap of faith over a void.

Second, the withdrawal language is vague. If a “pullback” arrives bundled with continuing perimeter control, airspace, crossings, or security carve-outs, residents will experience it as occupation under a new brand. Independent analysis notes the text lacks concrete timelines and operational granularity past the opening phase.

Third, enforcement leans on statements rather than machinery. Without mapped guarantor responsibilities, triggerable penalties, and pre-positioned logistics, promises turn into press releases. Reporting on the Palestinian Authority’s potential role underscores how preconditions and sequencing could stall implementation.

There’s a deeper political absence, too. This deal does not deliver what Palestinians actually hope for: self-determination and a say in their future. After high-profile recognitions of Palestinian statehood, offering a Gaza-only fix that sidelines political rights makes those gestures look symbolic rather than substantive. Having Israeli institutions effectively able to veto consequential steps feels like Oslo all over again: process without power-balancing.

That is how interim arrangements harden into permanent limbo — deference to political will instead of instruments, asymmetric leverage left intact, and verification without consequences. Analyses of the current proposal also point to how leaders can convert hesitation into de facto veto power.

If Trump is serious about peace, Jerusalem and the West Bank must be inside the plan, not promised to some later round. Facts on the ground are moving the other way. The UN Security Council has said settlements lack legal validity and violate international law. The UN humanitarian office has documented widespread settler violence and access restrictions that corrode daily life and any negotiated horizon.

Independent Israeli media and NGOs describe accelerating de facto annexation trends. A plan that ignores this landscape will not produce the security it promises.

I don’t say this as a spectator. For three decades, and, crucially, from 1994 to 2012, I worked across Israel and the Palestinian territories, running dialogues, designing confidence measures, and trying to push fragile agreements into daily reality. I arrived at Oslo believing its interim architecture could be saved. Hard experience taught me why it often wasn’t: interimism without enforcement calcifies; asymmetry invites spoilers; and externally driven programs that sideline local voices manufacture the very grievances violence feeds on. Those are not laments; they’re operating instructions.

So what would a plan that acts like peace look like? Start with measured, verifiable sequencing. Convert the hostage-for-ceasefire idea into a tranche ladder with objective indicators.

Tranche 0: a 72-hour humanitarian pause and release of the most vulnerable hostages, independently verified.

Tranche 1: further releases and sustained relief corridors.

Tranche 2: armor out of GPS-mapped grid squares; municipal functions transferred to neutral civil administrators.

Tranche 3: localized arms-reduction pilots paired with trained community policing.

Tranche 4: broader demobilization tied to political benchmarks. Publish indicators per tranche, names returned, coordinates vacated, tonnage of aid delivered, verified hand-ins, police trained, on a public dashboard so guarantors act on facts, not spin.

Next, replace applause with commitments on paper. Regional states and major donors should sign a concise guarantor treaty with annexes that spell out who does what when breaches occur: logistics deployed within 48 hours, escrowed funds released or frozen, proportionate sanctions, or a rapid-response element under hybrid command.

Add an escalation ladder, a dispute-resolution clause, and a small guarantor secretariat that tracks readiness daily. Tie money to verification outcomes so incentives are immediate and reversible. Established policy work already frames these sequencing and governance choices—use it to draft the legal plumbing.

Then give monitoring real teeth. Stand up a Verification & Rapid Response Authority (VRRA) with three pillars: a Technical Verification Unit (remote sensing, forensics, chain-of-custody); a Civilian Observers Network (local monitors and NGO liaisons); and a Rapid Response Wing (pre-positioned transport, medevac, engineering). When the VRRA issues an evidence packet—geolocated imagery, metadata, documented hand-ins—it should automatically trigger the agreed guarantor response. Monitoring that cannot cause action is theater; people in Gaza do not have time for theater.

Demobilization must not be coerced by a vacuum. It should be gradual, conditional, and reversible — and paired with a transitional political compact that guarantees participation, association, and a mapped route to representation. Pilot DDR alongside livelihoods, public hiring, micro-grants, reconstruction jobs—and community-led policing reforms so neighborhoods feel safer, not abandoned. Field reporting shows that sequencing PA governance and security responsibilities will make or break feasibility; treat that as a design constraint, not a footnote.

Reconstruction must rebuild institutions, not patronage. Create a Donor Compact & Reconstruction Authority (DCRA) with pooled escrow and a multistakeholder board, Gaza municipalities, West Bank civil society, donors, independent auditors, and a VRRA liaison. Use digitized public procurement, local-first contracting, community sign-off on major projects, and payments contingent on VRRA-verified delivery. Coverage of an Arab-backed multibillion-dollar plan illustrates how donor politics can fragment; a compact like DCRA keeps money honest and visible to the people it is meant to serve.

Finally, coherence or collapse: a Gaza-only fix will not hold. Pair Gaza tranches with West Bank protections, temporary settlement constraints tied to compliance, increased international monitoring at checkpoints, and targeted support for communities under strain, because what happens in one arena cascades into the other.

If negotiators want something immediate and practical to insist on, here it is: redraft the plan into a tranche protocol with mapped withdrawals and a public verification dashboard; sign the guarantor treaty and pre-position logistics and escrow, with an explicit escalation ladder; and stand up the VRRA and DCRA with legal charters, independent boards, and automatic triggers so verification leads to action, not statements.

Gaza’s families don’t need grandeur; they need a night without terror, a clinic with light, a school bell that rings. Recognitions of Palestine should mean voice and agency, not just new communiqués. A plan that looks like peace but acts like control will fail them. Put Jerusalem and the West Bank inside the deal. Build the scaffold, measured tranches, mapped withdrawals, independent verification, accountable reconstruction, and you buy time for politics, dignity for civilians, and a future Palestinians can recognize as their own.

From Your Site Articles

Van Jones found out: Gaza dead baby jokes aren't funny

Media

On Friday, Van Jones joked about kids dying in Gaza.

“If you open your phone, and all you see is dead Gaza baby, dead Gaza baby, dead Gaza baby, Diddy,” Jones said on Bill Maher’s ‘Real Time’ HBO program.

“That’s basically your whole feed,” Jones said.

The audience laughed and applauded.

The CNN host came off as dismissive of these deaths, calling it a “disinformation campaign” on behalf of Iran and Qatar.

The backlash on social media was fierce, where users made clear that the bloodshed in Gaza was very real and not mere “disinformation.”

Progressive pundit Briahna Joy Reid wrote, “Turning ‘dead Gaza baby’ into a punchline is such an evil choice that I'm struggling to even engage with the outrageous lie that we only care about Gazan deaths because of an Iranian social media campaign.”

The Yaqeen Institute’s Omar Suleiman shot back, “Truly disgraceful and vile (Van Jones). I’m sorry dead Gaza babies bother you so much. Maybe tell the people paying you to put lipstick on a genocide to stop killing them.”

The Quincy Institute’s Trita Parsi said Jones’ comments were a blueprint for how pro-Israel elites try to censor “what is actually happening in Gaza: A genocide of children conducted by Israel and defended by plenty of folks in the US, many of them on Israel's payroll.”

NBC News’s Hola Gorani reacted in a post, “I've watched hundreds of hours of Gaza videos in the last 2 years, including content filmed by our brave teams inside the strip, and can confirm that the ‘dead Gaza baby’ images are quite real, not the product of a ‘disinformation campaign’ and that there is nothing funny about them.”

Media critic Sana Saeed might have summed it up best, “The reason Van Jones can get up, use ‘dead Gaza babies’ so crassly, toss in a joke about Diddy mid-sentence, and have an audience erupt in laughter - without hesitation for either context or content - is because of the depth and breadth of dehumanization that’s been permitted toward Palestinians…There is no America in which ‘dead Jewish babies’ could ever be invoked in such a vulgar way on such a platform.”

On Sunday, Jones apologized. Twice. Jones also turned off X replies to his apology.

This did not stop people from replying.

Democratic Senator Chris Van Hollen perhaps best summarized how many received Jones apology, “I’m glad Van Jones apologized for his sick joking about dead kids in Gaza.”

“But the problem goes deeper: he spread Netanyahu propaganda that the mass killings of civilians in Gaza—including 20K+ kids—is Iranian fake news,” the senator added.

“It’s not the students and young people who are fooled. It’s Van Jones,” Van Hollen said.

The senator is right. A recent poll showed a whopping 41 percent of Americans now call the actions of Israel’s government in Gaza a “genocide.” Another poll showed that in December 2023, 69 percent of Americans believed U.S. support for Israel was in their country’s national interest. Last month, that support for Israel had dropped to 47 percent.

To Van Hollen’s point, younger Americans are increasingly less supportive of Israel.

The mass killing of Palestinians, including children, is not something millions of Americans and the world are merely imagining due to foreign propaganda campaigns of Van Jones’ imagination. The deaths are real, the internet exists, and people are seeing this carnage in real time thanks to modern technology.

And as humanity demands, they are horrified by it.

It’s that simple. No one is making this up. If I included every negative reaction to Jones in the last 48 hours this column could become a novel.

Jones' comments on Friday night came almost literally at the same moment President Donald Trump hailed on X that “Israel has temporarily stopped the bombing in order to give the Hostage release and Peace Deal a chance to be completed.”

Whether Israel actually implemented a ceasefire or Trump’s plan is viable are separate questions. But that even the president acknowledges the ongoing Israeli war on Gaza is key.

This is no fantasy, Van Jones. It’s certainly no joke.

What’s important, and perhaps the lesson to be learned by this controversy, is that pro-Israel elites simply denying the most massive slaughters of human beings in the Middle East this century is no longer viable.

Americans have eyes. Hearts, too.

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Top image credit: Frederic Legrand - COMEO, Joey Sussman, miss.cabul via shutterstock.com

Why Trump won't get Afghanistan's Bagram base back

Middle East

In a September 20 Truth Social post, President Trump threatened the Taliban, declaring, “If Afghanistan doesn’t give Bagram Airbase back… BAD THINGS ARE GOING TO HAPPEN!!” He now wants the military base he once negotiated away as part of the U.S. withdrawal agreement his first administration signed in 2019.

Not unexpectedly, the Taliban quickly refused, noting “under the Doha Agreement, the United States pledged that ‘it will not use or threaten force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Afghanistan, nor interfere in its internal affairs.’” And with China now deeply entrenched in post-war Afghanistan, it’s likely Beijing will ensure that the threat remains little more than another off-the-cuff comment that should not be taken literally nor seriously.

Since early 2025, Trump has mentioned Bagram, not as a military objective but as a strategic chess piece in his broader confrontation with China. He has described the base as being “an hour away from where [China] makes its nuclear weapons,” framing it as a critical outpost the U.S. should never have given up. In Trump’s view, reclaiming Bagram would reestablish American dominance in a region he believes is drifting into Beijing’s orbit. It’s also a powerful political narrative: take back what Biden lost, restore strength and project American resolve in an era of perceived decline.

But while Trump talks about taking Bagram back, China has already moved in. After the U.S. withdrawal in 2021, Beijing wasted little time expanding its influence, becoming the first country to accredit a Taliban ambassador in 2023.

In August 2025, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Kabul for high-level talks, during which Beijing signaled interest in Afghanistan’s vast mineral reserves, including lithium, copper and uranium, and in expanding trade and infrastructure links under its Belt and Road Initiative. For China, Afghanistan is now a critical strategic partner. A renewed U.S. military presence would threaten those interests, and Beijing is unlikely to stand by quietly if Washington tries to force its way back in.

Some analysts believe Trump’s demand may be less about actually retaking Bagram and more about creating leverage. It could be a bargaining chip, a maximalist opening meant to extract something smaller, such as the return of some of the $7 billion in U.S. weapons left behind during the withdrawal. He might seek assurances regarding the protection of minority rights or commitments to restrict terrorist safe havens in exchange for concessions, even though concerns of ISIS-K and other terror groups have proven illusory.

According to Helena Malikyar, Afghanistan's former ambassador to Italy, “The U.S. has military bases in many other countries, but that doesn’t necessarily imply a colonizer-colonized relationship — consider Japan, Germany, Qatar, or Bahrain.” She adds: “That said, I doubt the U.S. has any urgent need for Bagram, given that Pakistan has granted access to its airbases since 1959. In fact, the airbases in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab are even closer to China than Bagram is.”

Rhetorically, Trump’s ploy also plays well, allowing him to cast Biden’s exit from Afghanistan as a historic blunder that he alone is prepared to fix. But whether it’s a bluff or a real objective, the rhetoric raises the stakes, and regional powers like China, Russia and even the Taliban are watching closely.

But as Zalmai Nishat, Research Fellow at Sussex Asia Centre, points out, “the Taliban is far from monolithic. While certain factions may see benefit in cooperating with the U.S., others, particularly those tied closely to Hibatullah [Akhundzada], would fiercely resist. Any move to reclaim Bagram would expose these divisions, and the Taliban’s response would depend on which faction prevails.”

This internal fragmentation is only one layer of a far more complex equation. Trump’s push for Bagram would not just challenge the Taliban but also confront a regional order that no longer centers on Washington. Realities on the ground have shifted dramatically since the days of U.S. occupation. China is intent on solidifying its role in Afghanistan’s reconstruction and won’t tolerate a U.S. return that threatens its access to valuable minerals or its broader security interests.

Iran would certainly see U.S. facilities as potential targets and Russia, the first country to formally recognize the Taliban government, has a broad footprint in Afghanistan today. It provides oil and wheat at discounted prices, cooperates with its security services on counterterrorism programs and promotes its 11-nation Moscow Format to address Afghan issues. Neither Beijing nor Moscow is likely to support a renewed American military presence that could destabilize the fragile balance they seek to maintain.

Critically, the American people are likely to reject a military redeployment to a country where two decades of fighting achieved little and the threat of Afghanistan turning into a sanctuary and safe haven for terrorism has not borne out.

Even if the Taliban were to agree to a negotiated solution, it would be difficult for President Trump to sell the deal. It took two decades after the fall of Saigon for the United States to reestablish diplomatic relationships with Vietnam, and it’s reasonable to believe that popular and congressional support would be equally opposed. Like most of President Trump’s verbal and Truth Social pronouncements, the Bagram proposal can be taken literally or seriously, but not both.

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Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said he supported the plan following a meeting with Trump at the White House on Monday, but it’s unclear if Hamas will accept these terms.

Here is Trump’s proposal, verbatim:

1. Gaza will be a deradicalized terror-free zone that does not pose a threat to its neighbors.

2. Gaza will be redeveloped for the benefit of the people of Gaza, who have suffered more than enough.

3. If both sides agree to this proposal, the war will immediately end. Israeli forces will withdraw to the agreed upon line to prepare for a hostage release. During this time, all military operations, including aerial and artillery bombardment, will be suspended, and battle lines will remain frozen until conditions are met for the complete staged withdrawal.

4. Within 72 hours of Israel publicly accepting this agreement, all hostages, alive and deceased, will be returned.

5. Once all hostages are released, Israel will release 250 life sentence prisoners plus 1700 Gazans who were detained after October 7th 2023, including all women and children detained in that context. For every Israeli hostage whose remains are released, Israel will release the remains of 15 deceased Gazans.

6. Once all hostages are returned, Hamas members who commit to peaceful co-existence and to decommission their weapons will be given amnesty. Members of Hamas who wish to leave Gaza will be provided safe passage to receiving countries.

7. Upon acceptance of this agreement, full aid will be immediately sent into the Gaza Strip. At a minimum, aid quantities will be consistent with what was included in the January 19, 2025, agreement regarding humanitarian aid, including rehabilitation of infrastructure (water, electricity, sewage), rehabilitation of hospitals and bakeries, and entry of necessary equipment to remove rubble and open roads.

8. Entry of distribution and aid in the Gaza Strip will proceed without interference from the two parties through the United Nations and its agencies, and the Red Crescent, in addition to other international institutions not associated in any manner with either party. Opening the Rafah crossing in both directions will be subject to the same mechanism implemented under the January 19, 2025 agreement.

9. Gaza will be governed under the temporary transitional governance of a technocratic, apolitical Palestinian committee, responsible for delivering the day-to-day running of public services and municipalities for the people in Gaza. This committee will be made up of qualified Palestinians and international experts, with oversight and supervision by a new international transitional body, the “Board of Peace,” which will be headed and chaired by President Donald J. Trump, with other members and heads of State to be announced, including Former Prime Minister Tony Blair. This body will set the framework and handle the funding for the redevelopment of Gaza until such time as the Palestinian Authority has completed its reform program, as outlined in various proposals, including President Trump’s peace plan in 2020 and the Saudi-French proposal, and can securely and effectively take back control of Gaza. This body will call on best international standards to create modern and efficient governance that serves the people of Gaza and is conducive to attracting investment.

10. A Trump economic development plan to rebuild and energize Gaza will be created by convening a panel of experts who have helped birth some of the thriving modern miracle cities in the Middle East. Many thoughtful investment proposals and exciting development ideas have been crafted by well-meaning international groups, and will be considered to synthesize the security and governance frameworks to attract and facilitate these investments that will create jobs, opportunity, and hope for future Gaza.

11. A special economic zone will be established with preferred tariff and access rates to be negotiated with participating countries.

12. No one will be forced to leave Gaza, and those who wish to leave will be free to do so and free to return. We will encourage people to stay and offer them the opportunity to build a better Gaza.

13. Hamas and other factions agree to not have any role in the governance of Gaza, directly, indirectly, or in any form. All military, terror, and offensive infrastructure, including tunnels and weapon production facilities, will be destroyed and not rebuilt. There will be a process of demilitarization of Gaza under the supervision of independent monitors, which will include placing weapons permanently beyond use through an agreed process of decommissioning, and supported by an internationally funded buy back and reintegration program all verified by the independent monitors. New Gaza will be fully committed to building a prosperous economy and to peaceful coexistence with their neighbors.

14. A guarantee will be provided by regional partners to ensure that Hamas, and the factions, comply with their obligations and that New Gaza poses no threat to its neighbors or its people.

15. The United States will work with Arab and international partners to develop a temporary International Stabilization Force (ISF) to immediately deploy in Gaza. The ISF will train and provide support to vetted Palestinian police forces in Gaza, and will consult with Jordan and Egypt who have extensive experience in this field. This force will be the long-term internal security solution. The ISF will work with Israel and Egypt to help secure border areas, along with newly trained Palestinian police forces. It is critical to prevent munitions from entering Gaza and to facilitate the rapid and secure flow of goods to rebuild and revitalize Gaza. A deconfliction mechanism will be agreed upon by the parties.

16. Israel will not occupy or annex Gaza. As the ISF establishes control and stability, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will withdraw based on standards, milestones, and timeframes linked to demilitarization that will be agreed upon between the IDF, ISF, the guarantors, and the Unites States, with the objective of a secure Gaza that no longer poses a threat to Israel, Egypt, or its citizens. Practically, the IDF will progressively hand over the Gaza territory it occupies to the ISF according to an agreement they will make with the transitional authority until they are withdrawn completely from Gaza, save for a security perimeter presence that will remain until Gaza is properly secure from any resurgent terror threat.

17. In the event Hamas delays or rejects this proposal, the above, including the scaled-up aid operation, will proceed in the terror-free areas handed over from the IDF to the ISF.

18. An interfaith dialogue process will be established based on the values of tolerance and peaceful co-existence to try and change mindsets and narratives of Palestinians and Israelis by emphasizing the benefits that can be derived from peace.

19. While Gaza re-development advances and when the PA reform program is faithfully carried out, the conditions may finally be in place for a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood, which we recognize as the aspiration of the Palestinian people.

20. The United States will establish a dialogue between Israel and the Palestinians to agree on a political horizon for peaceful and prosperous co-existence.

More details

OSINT Study: Russia Has Exhausted Over Half of Its Stockpiles of Armored Vehicles and Artillery

The Russian military has depleted more than half of its stockpiles of armored vehicles and artillery held in storage.

https://militarnyi.com/en/news/osint-study-russia-has-exhausted-over-half-of-its-stockpiles-of-armored-vehicles-and-artillery/

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 8, 2025

Russian President Vladimir Putin remains committed to his theory of victory, which holds that Russia can outlast the West and Ukraine in a war of attrition, and his demand for Ukraine's full capitulation. Putin met with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and General Staff leadership, Federal Security Service (FSB) Head Alexander Bortnikov, and the commanders of the Russian groupings of forces on October 7 and claimed that Russian forces seized 4,900 square kilometers of territory in Ukraine so far in 2025 — roughly the size of Delaware.[1] ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have only seized 3,561 square kilometers in 2025. Putin claimed that Ukrainian forces are retreating along the entire line of contact and that the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) is meeting all the Russian military's weapons and equipment needs at an accelerated pace. Putin claimed that Russia remains committed to its goal of “unconditionally” achieving all its objectives in the war. Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces are advancing in “practically all directions” on the front.[2] Putin‘s and Gerasimov’s claims are in line with Putin's long held theory of victory, which assumes that Russian forces will be able to continue gradual advances indefinitely, prevent Ukraine from conducting successful counteroffensive operations, and win a war of attrition against Ukrainian forces.[3] Putin continues to believe that the Russian military and economy can outlast and overcome Western support for Ukraine and Ukraine's own ability to continue defending against Russian aggression. Kremlin officials, including Putin, have repeatedly affirmed their dedication to achieving Russia's original war goals from 2021 and 2022.[4] Putin's public statements continue to demonstrate his unwillingness to engage in good-faith negotiations that result in anything less than full Ukrainian capitulation and his determination to protract the war to achieve his war aims on the battlefield.

Putin acknowledged Ukraine's long-range strike campaign against Russian oil refineries amidst ongoing gasoline shortages and price surges in Russia and occupied Ukraine. Putin stated on October 7 that Ukraine is striking deep into Russian territory but attempted to downplay the significance of Ukraine's strike campaign, claiming that it “will not help.”[5] Putin stated that Russia's primary task is to ensure the safety of Russian civilians, strategic facilities, and energy infrastructure. Ukraine has intensified its strikes against Russian oil refineries, exacerbating gasoline shortages across Russia and occupied Ukraine and causing gasoline prices to skyrocket at the pump.[6] Russia is turning to Belarus to alleviate its limited gasoline supplies in Russia. Reuters reported on October 7 that industry sources stated that Belarus increased its rail-transported gasoline exports to Russia by four times month-on-month in September 2025.[7] Belarus reportedly exported 49,000 metric tons of gasoline or 14,500 barrels per day to the Russian domestic market and 33,000 tons of diesel fuel in September 2025.

A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger expressed concern about Ukraine's strike campaign and criticized the Kremlin's failure to protect Russia's energy infrastructure. The milblogger claimed on October 8 that Ukrainian forces are striking Russian oil infrastructure to maximize economic damage in Russia.[8] The milblogger claimed that Ukraine's demonstrated ability to target refineries 2,000 kilometers into Russian territory, which was previously outside of Ukrainian strike capability radius, raises concerns for Russia. The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are specifically targeting the electrical desalting units with atmospheric-vacuum tubes (ELOU-AVT) within the oil refineries, which the milblogger characterized as the “heart” of the refineries that play a key role in processing and separating crude oil. The milblogger claimed that growing Ukrainian strike capabilities threaten infrastructure in Russia's deep rear and are especially concerning given Russia's dependency on energy prices to fund its war in Ukraine. The milblogger called on Russian authorities to pay more attention to protecting energy infrastructure and criticized Russian authorities’ attempts to shift responsibility for protecting oil refineries onto private businesses. Russian milbloggers have repeatedly complained throughout the war about the Kremlin's failure to adapt to repeated successful Ukrainian strikes and to construct protective shelters at critical infrastructure facilities.[9]

The Kremlin is intensifying its efforts to use defunct US-Russian arms control treaties to gain concessions from the United States on the war in Ukraine. The Kremlin is moving to withdraw from the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA), with the Russian State Duma denouncing the agreement on October 8.[10] The PMDA committed the United States and Russia to disposing of at least 34 tons of their stockpiles of weapons-grade plutonium, which is crucial for nuclear weapons production, left over from Cold War era nuclear warheads.[11] Russia and the United States agreed to the PMDA in 2000, and it entered into force in 2011.[12] Putin issued a decree suspending Russia's participation in the agreement in 2016, citing US sanctions against Russia, US laws supporting Ukraine, NATO's eastward expansion, and the claimed buildup of US forces in eastern Europe.[13] The Duma claimed that it denounced the PMDA on October 8 due to “anti-Russian” steps from the United States that have changed the strategic balance that existed at the time of the agreement and that create threats to strategic stability.[14] Russia's Federation Council and Putin still need to approve the denunciation law, but the Kremlin has likely already decided to withdraw from the agreement.[15]

Russian officials largely blamed the United States for not adhering to the PMDA, likely in an effort to use the withdrawal from the agreement as blackmail for further concessions. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov claimed that Russia's continued adherence to the agreement's obligations is “unacceptable” and “inappropriate.”[16] Ryabkov claimed that the United States cannot meet any of Russia's conditions to resume the PMDA as the situation has “radically changed.” Ryabkov claimed that the growing “graveyard” of arms control agreements is due to destructive US policies that have “discarded” the principles that underpinned strategic stability for several decades.[17] First Deputy Chairperson of the Duma Committee on International Affairs Vyacheslav Nikonov claimed that Russia and the United States can revisit the PMDA if the United States “behaves well.”[18] First Deputy Chairperson of the Duma Defense Committee Alexei Zhuravlev claimed that the West is provoking an arms race such that Russia's adherence to old agreements would be “foolish” since Russia “should have the best weapons in the world.”[19] Duma Chairperson Vyacheslav Volodin claimed that those who want to exploit Russia must understand that this is not possible and that Russia should have terminated the PMDA long ago.[20]

The Duma’s move toward withdrawing from the PMDA comes after Russia similarly withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in August 2025.[21] The United States suspended its participation in the INF Treaty in 2019 due to Russian violations, and Russia followed suit soon after. The Kremlin's decisions about the PMDA have followed a similar pattern, with Putin signing the decree to suspend Russia's participation in the treaty in 2016, but Russia is only now moving to withdraw.[22] The Kremlin is likely resurrecting discussions about treaties that Russia suspended years ago in order to achieve political and informational effects that benefit Russia's war effort in Ukraine. Russia appears to be using a combination of carrots and sticks in these efforts, but both avenues aim to push the United States to turn its attention away from the war and toward US-Russian bilateral relations. Russia's withdrawals from arms treaties like the INF Treaty and PMDA aim to use the threat of an arms race to achieve this effect, whereas Russia's recent offer to extend the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) for one year after its expiration in February 2026 aims to entice the United States with the prospect of renewed arms control talks.[23] The Kremlin appears to be shifting away from using promises of bilateral economic and financial deals to entice the United States, as the Kremlin did more frequently in the early months of 2025 after US President Donald Trump entered office.[24]

The Kremlin's moves to withdraw from PMDA likely immediately aim to prevent US sales of Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine and are part of an ongoing reflexive control campaign. The Kremlin continued on October 8 its reflexive control campaign aimed at influencing US decision-making on Tomahawk deliveries to Ukraine. Kremlin officials continued to claim that US personnel will have to directly participate in Ukrainian Tomahawk strikes and that the missiles will not affect Russia's determination to achieve its war goals or the situation on the battlefield.[25] Kremlin officials also responded to possible US deliveries of Tomahawks by threatening the United States. Kremlin newswire TASS amplified a claim from Alexander Stepanov from the Institute of Law and National Security at the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration that the Duma’s ratification of Russia's military cooperation agreement with Cuba is Russia's “symmetrical” response to possible Tomahawk deliveries.[26] Stepanov claimed that Russian supplies of Iskander and Oreshnik ballistic missiles to Cuba would be a justified response. Stepanov’s claims come against the backdrop of Belarusian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Viktor Khrenin’s October 8 meeting in Belarus with Cuban Chief of the General Staff and First Deputy Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces Roberto Legra Sotolongo.[27] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is pursuing various multi-pronged information efforts to deter the United States from selling Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine.[28] Russia's October 8 withdrawal from the PMDA likely aims to reinforce the Kremlin's efforts to frame US-Russian relations as entering a dangerous stage and to divert US attention from Ukraine to bilateral relations and arms control talks.

The Russian military command reportedly redeployed elements of the 41st Combined Arms Army (CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) from south of Pokrovsk to the Novopavlivka direction, which will likely improve Russia's command and control (C2) in both sectors. An open-source analyst on X (formerly Twitter) reported on October 8 that the Russian military command redeployed elements of the 35th, 55th, 74th, and 137th separate motorized rifle brigades (all four of the 41st CAA, CMD) from south of Pokrovsk to the Novopavlivka direction.[29] The X analyst reported that the entire 90th Tank Division (41st CAA) is now operating near Novopavlivka and Ivanivka (southwest of Novopavlivka) and that only elements of the 15th and 30th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 2nd CAA, CMD) and 27th Motorized Rifle Division (2nd CAA) remain south of Pokrovsk. ISW has observed reports that elements of the 1195th Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment (41st CAA) and 1452nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 41st CAA) are operating in the Novopavlivka direction.[30] Elements of the 2nd CAA have been operating south and east of Pokrovsk since October 2023.[31] The reported redeployments of elements of the 41st CAA to the Novopavlivka direction indicates that almost all of the 41st CAA’s units and formations are now operating in the area, which will likely streamline C2 in the area.[32] The decision to redeploy elements of the 41st CAA away from the area south of Pokrovsk while keeping some elements of the 2nd CAA in the area will also likely streamline the 2nd CAA’s C2 in the Pokrovsk direction.

The reason for the redeployment of elements of the 41st CAA is unclear at this time. The area east and south of Novopavlivka has been relatively less active recently compared to other areas of the front that Russia is prioritizing, although a Ukrainian military source suggested that Russian forces recently intensified the tempo of attacks in the area.[33] The Russian military command may be redeploying 41st CAA elements to allow them to rest and reconstitute away from more active sectors like the area near Pokrovsk. The redeployments may alternatively indicate that the Russian military command intends to intensify offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction. Russian forces may aim to collapse the Ukrainian salient near Novopavlivka, level the frontline, and reduce the threat of Ukrainian counterattacks on Russia's flanks in the area. An intensification of Russian offensive operations near Novopavlivka would likely also aim to generate informational effects about deeper Russian advances into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. The Russian military command may have reduced the force grouping south of Pokrovsk as it intends to deprioritize frontal assaults on Pokrovsk itself from the south, choosing instead to focus on efforts to envelop Pokrovsk from the north.

European officials continue to report drone sightings and GPS interference in European airspace. Lithuanian National Radio and Television (LRT) reported that GPS interference forced a Ryanair plane flying from Vienna, Austria, to Vilnius, Lithuania, on October 8 to abort its first landing attempt.[34] The pilot was able to land the plane after a subsequent landing attempt. Alain Quevrin, the country director for arms manufacturing company Thales Belgium, stated on October 8 that the company has seen an increased number of drones flying over its top-secret facilities as compared to a few months ago.[35] Quevrin reported that drones have flown over the company's site in Liege, the only Belgian facility that assembles and stores 70mm rockets.[36] Ukrainian forces notably use Thales 70mm rockets. European officials have yet to attribute the GPS interference or drone sightings to Russia. Russia has engaged in a multipronged campaign against Europe since at least 2022 that has included drone incursions into European airspace, GPS jamming of planes flying over eastern Europe, and sabotage operations targeting Europe's defense industrial base (DIB).[37]

European officials continued to warn that Russia's recent drone attacks against Europe are part of a broader campaign to generate fear and disunity in Europe. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stated on October 8 that recent drone incursions into European airspace are part of a “deliberate and targeted” campaign to unsettle European citizens.[38] Von der Leyen stated that one or two drones in European airspace could be a “mistake” or “coincidence” but that three to ten incursions constitute a pattern.[39] Von der Leyen stated that Russia is using the incursions to try to sow division among European states.[40] ISW continues to assess that Russia's increased covert and overt attacks against Europe indicate that Russia has entered “Phase 0” — the informational and psychological condition setting phase — of its campaign to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.[41] Russia also likely aims to pressure Europe to decrease its support for Ukraine out of fear that continued support will increase Russia's attacks.[42]

more + maps https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-8-2025/

Blowback from Russian rhetoric… cracks in the edifice of the Russian economy.

Kyiv Independent (9 Oct):

“The Russian stock market plunged to a three-year low on Oct. 8 following remarks by Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov about “collapsing” relations between Washington and Moscow.

The drop brings the MOEX Russia Index, the primary benchmark of the Russian stock market, to its lowest levels since September 2022.

“(Russia and the United States) have a certain edifice of relations that is cracking and collapsing,” Ryabkov said on Oct. 8. “The Americans are to blame for this. Now the cracks have reached the foundation.”

The comments shattered hopes for an end to Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, with Ryabkov claiming that the “strong momentum” for peace, built upon the August meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Alaska, had been “largely exhausted.”

In the wake of Ryabkov’s statement, the MOEX Russia Index dropped by 4.05%, a record low since September 2022”

What have you done to FtrPilot?

Why Tomahawks? Maybe the 3 October strikes shook them loose. A serious counter strike may be in the works.

Kyiv Independent (9 Oct):

“Russian strikes have destroyed more than half of Ukraine’s natural gas production capacity ahead of winter, Bloomberg reported on Oct. 9, citing its undisclosed sources.

Ukraine’s gas network, which met the country’s needs before the full-scale war, has been repeatedly hit by missiles and drones, endangering millions of households that depend on gas for heating in winter.

Russian forces launched one of the largest barrages yet on Oct. 3, firing 35 missiles and 60 drones at gas facilities in Kharkiv and Poltava oblasts, according to state-owned energy company Naftogaz.

The strikes destroyed around 60% of Ukraine’s gas production, Bloomberg’s sources said. Naftogaz called the attack “the most massive” assault on gas infrastructure since the war began.

Ukraine’s largest private energy firm, DTEK, said it was forced to halt operations at its Poltava facilities following the strikes. Two days later, Russia launched another attack targeting infrastructure critical for residential heating, causing further destruction, Naftogaz said.

The strikes show Moscow’s strategy of targeting energy infrastructure to weaken civilian morale. Since 2022, Russia has repeatedly aimed to disrupt Ukraine’s heating and power systems with attacks.

According to Bloomberg, Kyiv appealed to its G7 partners for urgent equipment to repair damaged facilities and reiterated its requests for additional air defense systems to protect energy infrastructure.

Ukraine is also seeking financial aid to import gas to cover the production shortfall.

As a result of the strikes, Ukraine’s Energy Minister Svitlana Hrynchuk said on Oct. 7 that Kyiv plans to increase natural gas imports by 30% to compensate for the losses.

If attacks continue, Ukraine expects to import about 4.4 billion cubic meters of gas — worth roughly 2 billion euros ($2.3 billion) — by the end of March, Bloomberg’s sources said.

Viktoria Voitsitska, former secretary of the Ukrainian parliament’s energy committee, told the Washington Post that gas infrastructure is the most vulnerable part of Ukraine’s energy system.

Because gas production, processing, and storage sites are dispersed across the country, “building protection for such assets is billions of dollars, a lot of manpower, and a lot of time,” she said”

A serious counter strike may be in the works:

Kyiv Independent (9 Oct)

“Ukraine’s prime minister, top Zelensky aide [Yermak) heading to US (early) next week”

Answering Trump’s question, about what they will use the Tomahawks on, perhaps?

Winter is coming to Russia too.

“Ukraine’s prime minister, top Zelensky aide [Yermak) heading to US (early) next week”

—
That should be the other way around. Yermak runs the unelected Presidential Administration which it turn runs the Ukrainian Parliament. The dreaded Zelinski is just the head of the largest party in Parliament and a figurehead for public relations. Where ever Zelinski goes, Yermak is there.

Yermak is the son of a KGB argent and worked for them early in his career. He was responsible for the removal of the mine fields along the Crimean border which allowed the Russian 57th Army to take southern Ukraine unopposed.

September 24. /TASS/. The people of Russia are consolidated around the country's President Vladimir Putin and are ready for an additional economic burden in difficult conditions, especially since this burden is balanced, said the press secretary of the head of state Dmitry Peskov in an interview with RBC radio.

“The overwhelming majority of the population of our country is absolutely consolidated around President Putin. This is an absolutely indisputable fact,” Peskov said, answering the question of how Russians feel about economic difficulties. “Those who support President Putin, are they ready for any additional burden in the current conditions? I have no doubt that we are ready. Is it balanced? Yes, it is. In many countries, much more radical packages of crisis development are being adopted,” the Kremlin spokesman said.

https://tass.ru/politika/25142871

Кремлевская табакерка
October 9:The crisis in Russia will last one and a half to two years. The rich will share with the state

This forecast was given to us by a high-ranking source in the Kremlin. “There will be a crisis, I say everything honestly. According to experts, it will last one and a half to two years, with a likely aggravation in the first half of next year. Of course, there is nothing pleasant, but this is not the highest price to pay for achieving the goals that Russia faces. I want to paraphrase, remind you of the words of Dmitry Peskov that everyone who supports the policy of our president is ready for additional loads. Vladimir Vladimirovich is waging a major war for Russia. I am sure that everyone should be happy about this fact. And against this background, any crisis seems just nonsense,” our interlocutor believes.

He also announced a number of anti-crisis measures. “It is already known: there will be tax increases and new taxes, which, I am sure, everyone will gladly pay for the greatness of Russia. This is the case when the additional financial burden can only cause joy and pride. There will be a number of other measures that will optimize budget revenues. For example, we will curtail the self-employment regime ahead of schedule, there are still plans. Everyone understands the challenges, everyone is ready to work to go through the crisis in the best possible way and end it with one result - with Victory,” the representative of the Presidential Administration said.

Separately, he highlighted plans according to which rich Russians “will seriously share their assets with the state when necessary.” The source refused to go into details, but assured that “it will be a beautiful and effective story.”

https://t.me/kremlin_secrets/6273

It is interesting that more and more voices in Russia are pointing to P as the one who pushed through the decision to invade Ukraine. It seems that this could lead to him being dumped. Does that mean there will be a new wannabe Tsar, or will something else happen?

“Vladimir Vladimirovich is waging a major war” - Dmitry Peskov

Now the official Party Line, no more “Special Military Operation”.

Major war costs - are all because of Putin, The Doom of Russia.

Kyiv Independent (9 Oct):

“Ukrainian forces struck a Russian gas plant and an oil pipeline station in Russia’s Volgograd Oblast overnight on Oct. 9, Ukraine’s General Staff reported.

Explosions and fires were reported at both the Korobkovsky Gas Processing Plant in Kotovo and the Yefimovka Linear-Production Dispatch Station, the military said…

…The Telegram channel Astra previously reported a fire at the Lukoil gas plant in Kotovo following a drone attack. Volgograd Governor Andrei Bocharov said that “fires at fuel and energy facilities” were being addressed after attacks in the region...

…The Kotovo gas plant is one of the largest facilities of its kind in southern Russia. It has a capacity of 450 million cubic meters of natural and associated gas per year, as well as 186,000 tons of a wide light hydrocarbon fraction annually.

The plant, which began operations in September 1966, plays a key role in the region’s energy infrastructure.

“This facility is critical for Russia’s oil and gas infrastructure: it provides processing and transportation of gas condensate, as well as the production of raw materials for the chemical industry,” said Andrii Kovalenko, head of Ukraine’s Center for Countering Disinformation…

…The Yefimovka Line Production Dispatch Station services several main pipelines transporting oil and petroleum products in the region, with a throughput capacity of 50 million tons per year.

Volgograd Oblast lies in southwestern Russia, some 250 kilometers (150 miles) from the front line in Ukraine.”

Кремлевская табакерка

“A bad omen, perhaps to death.” Gerasimov worried because of the meeting with Putin

The concern of the head of the General Staff was caused by the place where Vladimir Putin's recent meeting with military leaders began - the tomb of Russian emperors in the Peter and Paul Cathedral in St. Petersburg. “The military are superstitious people, and Valery Vasilyevich is no exception. Everyone works in conditions of constant threat - from a general to a soldier. Therefore, Valery Vasilyevich was not very pleased to meet with Vladimir Vladimirovich, in fact, at the graves. This is not a very good omen, a bad one. Perhaps even to death. God forbid, of course,” a source close to Gerasimov admitted to us. He did not specify whose death could be an omen. The Ministry of Defense called such fears “strange superstitions.” “Gerasimov is just worried. He may be dismissed, plus several people from his entourage face serious problems. So he got down to nonsense. He was afraid of dead monarchs,” our source in the ministry believes.

He cited the example of Andrei Belousov, who is now in no danger, and he feels calm. “Andrei Removich was not only inspired by the meeting with the president, he also made an interesting, most important decision - to strengthen the front and protect our refineries with the help of prayers near the ashes of members of the royal family. This is who you need to take an example from. And Gerasimov should not follow the signs, but fight better, “the channel's interlocutor is sure.

https://t.me/kremlin_secrets/6274

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