Posted on 02/24/2024 5:59:01 AM PST by SpeedyInTexas
https://bsky.app/profile/meanwhileua.bsky.social/post/3lzfsliz5ca2m
30 s video
The Beriev Be-12 Chayka (Russian: Бериева Бе-12 Чайка, romanized: Chayka, lit. ‘gull’, NATO reporting name: Mail) is a Soviet turboprop-powered amphibious aircraft designed in the 1950s for anti-submarine and maritime patrol duties.
“The Ministry of Finance is raising taxes and introducing new fees, but this only puts further pressure on businesses.“
Vladimir Ilyich Lenin — ‘The way to crush the bourgeoisie is to grind them between the millstones of taxation and inflation.’
Thanks for that great graphic from Bluesky, Showing the devastation being wrought upon Russia’s oil industry, because of Putin’s crime spree against his neighbors.
Putin is the Doom of Russia.
A bit difficult to create a strategic reserve when recruiting numbers are very close to losses numbers
Additionally since it appears that $ not patriotism is driving recruiting, what will happen when the rubles are not there to fund the recruiting or pitin goes all in on printing money?
Multiple rumors Vladimir Saldo, collaborator and governor of occupied Kherson region was killed last night in Ukrainian strike on hotel dinner party near Yalta, Crimea.
BANNON: Germany has no manpower. The UK admits it can’t fight. France talks big but is broke. Poland stayed home. And now Russian hackers have leaked that Ukraine has 1.7M casualties, 625k this year alone. More U.S. money won’t bring peace; it just means more dead Ukrainians.
1.7… pic.twitter.com/jpMaufxr3U— Johnny Midnight ⚡️ (@its_The_Dr) August 22, 2025
Neither side is going to change their position, no matter what. How much money we throw at that fight isn’t going to change anything, other than the number of dead people. I’m all for spending less, and hopefully the body count slowing down some.
Limited Russian tactical forces recently infiltrated Ukrainian defenses in two border settlements in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast but have not established enduring positions in the area. The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian Dnipro Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on August 27 that Ukrainian forces stopped Russian advances in Zaporizske (3.75 kilometers from the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative border) and Novoheorhiivka (730 meters from the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative border) but that Russian forces are operating within both settlements and have not yet secured positions.[1] The Ukrainian military officials reported that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in Zaporizske and Novoheorhiivka. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on August 20 and 25 that elements of the Russian 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) seized Novoheorhiivka and Zaporizske, respectively.[2] It is premature to characterize these reported advances as a breakthrough into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast as the activity is at most a small-scale infiltration. It is also inaccurate to characterize these reported advances as Russia‘s “first“ territorial gains in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, especially as Russian forces entered Dnipropetrovsk Oblast long before the Russian MoD claimed the seizures of Zaporizske and Novoheorhiivka. ISW observed geolocated footage in June and July 2025 that indicated that Russian forces had advanced in Dachne and Maliivka (both northeast of Zaporizske and Novoheorhiivka), and geolocated footage from August 25 further indicated that Russian forces had advanced in Vorone (west of Maliivka).[3] ISW assessed in November 2024 that the Russian military command would likely advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast in order to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) that support Ukrainian positions in Donetsk Oblast and attempt to envelop these positions.[4] Russian forces may also be trying to advance in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast to set conditions for further operations in the region.
Russian forces are using infiltration tactics in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast similar to those they used near Dobropillya (northwest of Pokrovsk) in early August 2025. Trehubov reported that Russian forces are operating in small groups of five servicemembers, who infiltrate behind Ukrainian lines, wait and accumulate, and then attack in different directions simultaneously.[5] Trehubov specifically noted that Russian tactics in Zaporizske and Novoheorhiivka are similar to those that Russian forces employed near Dobropillya, and ISW has observed reports that Russian forces have been increasingly adopting these tactics throughout the frontline.[6] Russian forces recently infiltrated east and northeast of Dobropillya but have been unsuccessful in establishing enduring positions and exploiting the penetration thus far.[7] Such infiltration tactics also appear to be vulnerable to well-organized Ukrainian counterattacks.[8] ISW’s Assessed Russian Advances map layer notably only shows the Russian Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT) and does not differentiate between enduring Russian positions and limited infiltration missions.[9] Russian forces are likely using infiltration tactics that do not automatically result in enduring positions, and Russian actors often leverage maps that attempt to show these movements to exaggerate the presence of meaningful Russian activity on the battlefield.
The Kremlin appears to be resuming its drone and missile strike campaign targeting Ukraine's energy infrastructure ahead of Winter 2025, likely in an effort to undermine Ukrainian will to resist Russian aggression. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 95 Shahed-type and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea on the night of August 26 to 27.[10] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 74 drones over northern, southern and eastern Ukraine and that 21 drones struck nine locations. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Russian strikes caused power outages in Poltava, Sumy, and Chernihiv oblasts, leaving more than 100,000 households without electricity.[11] The Ukrainian Ministry of Energy stated that Russian strikes damaged a critical electrical substation in Sumy City and gas transportation infrastructure facilities in Poltava Oblast.[12] The Ministry of Energy added that Ukrainian authorities consider the strikes to be a continuation of the Russian campaign to destroy Ukrainian energy infrastructure on the eve of the heating season. Ukrainian officials stated that Russian strikes also de-energized water utilities in Sumy City and damaged an electrical substation in Novhorod-Siverskyi, Chernihiv Oblast; a school in Kharkiv Oblast, and an apartment building in Kherson City.[13] Ukraine's largest private energy company, DTEK, reported that a Russian strike on August 26 destroyed the DTEK coal enrichment plant in Donetsk Oblast, which prepares coal for heating.[14]
The Kremlin is attempting to undermine US and European joint efforts to determine appropriate security guarantees for Ukraine by seemingly demanding that Russia and the United States privately discuss such matters. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on August 27 that the Kremlin does not want to publicly discuss the issue of Western security guarantees for Ukraine and called such public discussions “unhelpful.”[15] Peskov also stated that Russia takes a “negative view” of European proposals of security guarantees for Ukraine and that Russia will perceive European force deployments to postwar Ukraine as an expansion of NATO's presence.[16] Peskov’s statement was likely in response to the August 26 Financial Times (FT) report that the United States is reportedly willing to supply supporting assets to a European-led force grouping as part of postwar security guarantees for Ukraine.[17] Peskov’s rejection of the Western proposals for security guarantees and his efforts to discredit public discussions of these proposals are likely part of the Kremlin's efforts to demand that Russia have a veto over any Western security guarantees for Ukraine and to sideline Ukraine's European partners from providing Ukraine robust security guarantees as part of a conflict termination agreement.
The Kremlin signaled that Russian President Vladimir Putin remains unwilling to meet with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky unconditionally. Peskov reiterated a recurrent Kremlin excuse that any Russia-Ukraine contacts at a high or top level require extensive preparations, but that the heads of the Russian and Ukrainian negotiating groups remain in contact.[19] Peskov added that Russia and Ukraine have not scheduled the next round of talks between their negotiating groups. Peskov attempted to shift blame onto Ukraine for the Kremlin's unwillingness to organize a Putin-Zelensky bilateral meeting by claiming that the resolution of the war requires “reciprocity from Kyiv.”
Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev reiterated Azerbaijan's continued support for Ukraine's territorial sovereignty and condemned the Soviet Red Army for “invading and occupying” Azerbaijan in 1920 — further aggravating already deteriorating Russian-Azerbaijani relations. Aliyev stated in an interview with Saudi Arabian state-owned outlet Al Arabiya published on August 27 that “the Russian army invaded Azerbaijan and occupied the country” in 1920.[20] Aliyev stated that Azerbaijan had “created [its] own state, but the Bolsheviks took it away.” Aliyev also notably characterized Russia's war against Ukraine as an “invasion” and reiterated that Azerbaijan has supported Ukraine's territorial integrity since the start of the full-scale invasion. Aliyev recalled the “recent cooling” of Russian-Azerbaijani relations, stating that Azerbaijan will “never tolerate” any “aggression or disrespect” against Azerbaijan. Aliyev stated that Russia's downing of the Azerbaijan Airlines plane in December 2024 and the Kremlin's reaction are “causing great disappointment and discontent” in Azerbaijan. Russian-Azerbaijani relations have been declining since a Russian air defense system shot down an Azerbaijan Airlines flight 8243 over the Republic of Chechnya in December 2024, causing the plane to crash in Kazakhstan.[21] Aliyev publicly rejected the Kremlin's attempts to cover up Russia's role in the days following the incident.[22] Russian-Azerbaijani relations continued to decline in June and July 2025 over small-scale incidents that Aliyev seized upon to reiterate his demands that Russia take responsibility for the plane crash.[23] Russian forces conducted a Shahed drone strike against the Ukrainian gas compressor station in Odesa Oblast that transports Azerbaijani gas overnight on August 5 to 6 and struck the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijani Republic (SOCAR) oil depot in Odesa City overnight on August 7 to 8.
The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) contingent arrived in Belarus to participate in joint military exercises connected to the Belarusian-Russian Zapad-2025 military exercise. The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on August 26 and 27 that Tajik, Kyrgyz, and Kazakh forces arrived in Belarus to participate in the Interaction-2025, Search-2025, and Echelon-2025 military exercises at the Losvido and Lepelskyi training grounds in Vitebsk Oblast (in northern Belarus bordering Lithuania, Latvia, and Russia) from August 31 to September 6.
The President instructed General Andrei Mordvichev to assess and calculate the resources that are needed for the speedy (no later than the middle of next year) complete liberation of the DPR. This caused shock in Valery Gerasimov’s entourage. “Such issues should be resolved not by the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, but by the Chief of the General Staff. But Mordvichev, with the help of intrigues, achieved that Vladimir Vladimirovich brought him closer to himself. Never mind, this situation will not last long. Although now Valery Vasilyevich, of course, has received a strong blow. But he was not so worried,” said a source in Gerasimov’s entourage. In turn, a source in the Ministry of Defense confirmed our insider. According to him, Putin is considering the resignation of Gerasimov due to the lack of great success at the front. And Mordvichev is now the main candidate for the post of head of the General Staff. “And how else to check the military leader, is he ready to take such a post? Set him an important task for the entire NWO,” the channel's source is sure. However, the Kremlin refused to comment on the issue of Gerasimov’s resignation. “Vladimir Vladimirovich now has to make a number of difficult decisions. Whether to announce mobilization, which section of the NWO zone to pay the most attention to, how to distribute forces and resources. The President greatly appreciates the experience of General Mordvichev. Therefore, I gave him a responsible assignment. Do not look for a double bottom where there is none,” said the source in the Presidential Administration.
100%.
Another tired line spouted by a newly revealed Putin lover. You are all for mass murder, torture, and genocide by your Russian masters
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