Estonia has announced it will send 180 soldiers to Ukraine to "Defend it" as part of the Coalition of the Retarded.
pic.twitter.com/pBsD8BGk7P— Chay Bowes (@BowesChay) August 20, 2025
Posted on 02/24/2024 5:59:01 AM PST by SpeedyInTexas
This list only includes destroyed vehicles and equipment of which photo or videographic evidence is available. Therefore, the amount of equipment destroyed is significantly higher than recorded here. Loitering munitions, drones used as unmanned bait, civilian vehicles and derelict equipment are not included in this list. All possible effort has gone into avoiding duplicate entries and discerning the status of equipment between captured or abandoned. Many of the entries listed as 'abandoned' will likely end up captured or destroyed. Similarly, some of the captured equipment might be destroyed if it can't be recovered. When a vehicle is captured and then lost in service with its new owners, it is only added as a loss of the original operator to avoid double listings. When the origin of a piece of equipment can't be established, it's not included in the list. The Soviet flag is used when the equipment in question was produced prior to 1991. This list is constantly updated as additional footage becomes available.
(Excerpt) Read more at oryxspioenkop.com ...
Ukrainian drones just hit the Novoshakhtinsk refinery in Rostov. Explosions and fires.
Agreed the perpetual paranoid aggressive “victims”
In Russian mir, only the invasions of their lands count, the invasions of neighbors, alliance with nazi Germany…. are memory holed , much like they can launch drone attacks daily, but when Ukraine does it is a terrorist act
Estonia has announced it will send 180 soldiers to Ukraine to "Defend it" as part of the Coalition of the Retarded.
pic.twitter.com/pBsD8BGk7P— Chay Bowes (@BowesChay) August 20, 2025
“Ukrainian drones just hit the Novoshakhtinsk refinery in Rostov.”
Long lines for gasoline in Russia today:
Fuel Stations Packed in Russian Far East As Drone Strikes Cause Shortages
OilPrice.com (Aug 20)
“Russia’s Far East is grappling with acute fuel shortages after a new wave of Ukrainian drone strikes forced multiple refineries offline, squeezing supplies just as seasonal demand rises.
According to The Moscow Times, queues have formed at filling stations in Khabarovsk and Primorsky regions, with some depots rationing gasoline as refiners halt operations for repairs. The outages come on top of cumulative damage that has sidelined nearly 13% of Russia’s refining capacity in recent months.
Ukrainian outlets including NV.ua reported that Moscow has extended limits on refined product exports in a bid to stabilize domestic availability, while retail fuel prices are already moving higher. Russian media confirmed that at least seven refineries have been targeted over the past three weeks, underscoring the scale of disruption.
Energy analysts note that while Russia has been able to maintain crude oil exports by rerouting flows, refined products are more difficult to substitute, especially in remote regions reliant on local output. Attacks in Saratov, Ryazan, Samara, and Volgograd, as well as Rosneft’s facilities in Siberia, have hit gasoline and diesel supplies harder than crude.
The implications extend beyond domestic markets. Russia’s refined product exports fell sharply in July following refinery outages, tightening diesel availability in Europe and Asia. With BP’s new discovery off Brazil and ExxonMobil’s ramp-up in Guyana set to add crude volumes globally, the mismatch between crude availability and refined product shortages highlights the vulnerabilities of Russia’s fuel system under sustained drone pressure.
Russia military intelligence HQ in Sevastopol explosions and fire.
Finland’s Pres. Stubb:
“The best way to present it is that if you’d take the relative land mass of what Russia wants right now from Ukraine, it would be a little bit like giving up Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, Virginia & Maryland”
https://x.com/visegrad24/status/1958186380292493726
Russian occupiers decided to test a new “space program” right on the frontline in Ukraine: one of them, after hitting a mine, soared higher than any Roscosmos launch. Russian soldiers excel at transformation, turning into Ladas. Ironically, relatives of five occupiers killed in a Lada will each receive one as compensation.
https://x.com/visegrad24/status/1958187173556953346
24 s video
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-20-2025
The Kremlin is demanding that Russia have a veto over any Western security guarantees for Ukraine in an effort to undermine ongoing US, European, and Ukrainian efforts to establish conditions for lasting peace in Ukraine. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated on August 20 that any serious discussions on Western security guarantees for Ukraine without Russian input are a “road to nowhere” and that Russia “cannot agree” that now-proposed “collective security issues” can be resolved without Russia, effectively demanding a Russian veto over Western security guarantees for Ukraine.[1] Lavrov also threatened that Russia will take “firm and harsh” action to ensure that Russia's “legitimate interests” are a part of any postwar security arrangement for Ukraine.
The Kremlin is likely trying to inject its demands into the ongoing US, European, and Ukrainian joint effort to create a security structure that will serve as a safeguard against a future Russian re-invasion in the event of a peace settlement.[2] Granting Russia veto power over Western security guarantees would enable the Kremlin to dictate conditions that will weaken Ukraine's ability to resist another Russian invasion by preventing Ukraine from forming binding bilateral or multilateral security agreements such as are now being discussed, increasing and modernizing its military, and receiving support from Ukraine's partners. Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova recently said that Russia could not tolerate the presence of troops from NATO member states in Ukraine as part of any security guarantees.[3]
European leaders recently released a joint statement reaffirming that no peace agreement should place limitations on Ukraine's armed forces or on its cooperation with third countries nor can Russia have veto power over Ukraine's pathway to joining the European Union (EU) or NATO.[4] European Commission Vice President Kaja Kallas stated on August 19 that Russian President Vladimir Putin cannot be trusted to honor any promises or commitments to permanently cease military activity against Ukraine and that any security guarantees must be robust and credible to deter the Russian military command does not re-group and launch a future invasion of Ukraine.
The Kremlin appears to be demanding that any security guarantees be based on those proposed in the Istanbul 2022 framework, which would grant Russia and its allies the right to veto Western military assistance to Ukraine and leave Ukraine helpless in the face of future Russian threats. Lavrov stated on August 20 that Russia is in favor of collective security guarantees that are “truly reliable” and that a good example of such guarantees was evident in the 2022 Istanbul Ukraine-Russia negotiations, which would have permanently prohibited Ukraine from joining NATO, imposed limitations on the Ukrainian military, and banned Ukraine from receiving Western military assistance without any imposing restrictions on the size or capability of Russian forces.[5] The security guarantees proposed in the draft 2022 Istanbul Protocol treated Russia as a neutral security “guarantor state” of Ukraine along with the other permanent members of the UN Security Council, failing to identify Russia as a belligerent in the war. The outlined security guarantees would give China and Russia veto power over any action the guarantors could take in response to a renewed Russian attack by granting the UN Security Council the authority to take “measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.”[6] Such “security guarantees” would allow the Kremlin and its allies to dictate the means and tools that Ukraine could use to defend itself against Russia and restrict the ability of other guarantor states to come to Ukraine's assistance.
The Kremlin is continuing to indicate that Russian President Vladimir Putin is unwilling to have an immediate bilateral meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on the timeline proposed by US President Donald Trump. Lavrov stated on August 20 that Putin confirmed his readiness to continue direct negotiations with Ukraine in the Istanbul format.[7] Russian and Ukrainian delegations have engaged in three rounds of bilateral talks in Istanbul since February 2025, which have resulted in nine prisoners of war (POW) exchanges, but little more.[8] Lavrov claimed that Putin would consider raising the level of the delegation heads after working groups had been established but added that a summit between Putin and Zelensky would need thorough preparations that could take time. Several US officials have stated that Putin promised Trump that he would meet with Zelensky following the multilateral summit between the United Stated, Ukraine, and European leaders on August 18.[9] Trump stated on August 18 that Zelensky and Putin need to meet urgently and that waiting too long before having a leader-level bilateral meeting would result in thousands of deaths.[10] Lavrov may have attempted to portray the Kremlin's proposal of continued negotiations within the Istanbul framework and working groups as fulfilling Putin's reported promise to Trump to hold a bilateral meeting with Zelensky. Continued negotiations within the Istanbul framework are a far cry from a head of state-level bilateral meeting, however, and Lavrov’s statement is likely part of the Kremlin's continued efforts to protract peace negotiations and deflect blame for delays onto Ukraine and the West.
The Russian economy continues to face budget deficits as a result of increased defense spending and detrimental effects of Western sanctions and secondary tariffs. Reuters reported on August 20 that the Russian government is preparing to increase taxes and reduce its spending as it attempts to maintain its defense expenditure amid economic cooling.[11] Russian Finance Ministry data indicated that the Kremlin ran a budget deficit of 4.9 trillion rubles (roughly $61 billion) from January to August of 2025, exceeding the target for the entire year by a quarter.[12] Russian Federation Council Committee on Budget and Financial Markets Chairperson Antatoly Artamonov claimed in late July 2025 that Russia needed to “urgently start fiscal consolidation” amidst increasingly pessimistic economic indicators and a decline in oil and gas revenues.[13] Reuters reported that Russia spends over 17 trillion rubles (roughly $211 billion) or 41 percent of its federal budget on its defense and national security. A Russian government source stated that Russia's defense spending likely constitutes more than the stated eight percent of Russian GDP and assessed that defense spending if unlikely to decrease in 2026 or in an event of a ceasefire.[14] Reuters reported that the Russian government is increasingly pulling funds away from the healthcare and education sectors, and Russian officials are pushing for Russia to reallocate funds from non-defense budgetary items to the defense sector. Reuters reported that Russia has relatively a low debt-to-GDP ratio of around 20 percent; however, this metric is much less consequential as Russia is a rentier state which uses oil and gas revenues and Russia's sovereign wealth fund to fund its war in Ukraine. The sovereign wealth fund is a state-owned investment fund that Russia pulls money from to avoid incurring debt, but Putin is steadily depleting the fund's liquid reserves to fund its war in Ukraine.[15]
Russia is jeopardizing its economic stability and the livelihoods of Russian civilians to increasingly feed its defense industrial base (DIB) and sustain the war effort in Ukraine. Russia faces a growing list of costs from the war, including providing compensation for servicemembers and their families, expanding its DIB, and sponsoring recruitment drives for its war in Ukraine.[16] Russian officials have repeatedly attempted to convince the Russian population that the Russian federal budget prioritizes civilian and social expenditures while continuing to allocate greater sums of the budget to defense spending.[17] The Russian government also must face the future costs of compensating veterans and their families by providing them with financial, medical, and psychological support from the government over the coming decades.
Secondary tariffs are likely forcing Russia to sell oil below market price, which could be decreasing the incoming flow of foreign funds into the Russian economy and depleting Russia's primary source of wealth. Bloomberg reported on August 20 that India's state-owned oil refineries purchased an increased amount of Russian oil from August 18 to 19, and Russian deputy trade representative in India Yevgeny Griva told Bloomberg on August 20 that Russia expects India to continue buying Russian oil because of a five percent discount.[18] Bloomberg reported that Russia deepened its discount from one dollar in July 2025 to $2.50 a barrel to Dated Brent, likely to incentivize Indian refineries to purchase Russian oil amidst secondary tariffs.[19] Bloomberg reported that Chinese oil refiners stepped up purchases of Russian flagship oil as some Indian companies pulled back purchases of Russian oil in August amidst US threats of tariffs.[20] Bloomberg reported that China received shipments of 75,000 barrels per day from the Urals, a marked increase from the year-to-date average of 40,000 barrels per day. Secondary tariffs may cost Russia additional foreign funds if Russia is unable to successfully convince tariffed countries to buy more oil from Russia that would compensate the difference between the discount and market price. ISW continues to assess that secondary sanctions will likely further impact the Russian economy by undercutting Russian oil revenues which are essential for the Kremlin's financing of its war against Ukraine.[21]
The Kremlin is reportedly considering replacing Russian Investigative Committee (Sledkom) Chairman Alexander Bastrykin, likely as part of the Kremlin's efforts to form a new and younger elite. Moscow-based business newspaper Vedomosti reported on August 20 that the Kremlin is considering Bastrykin for the vacant position of Chairman of the Russian Supreme Court.[22] Unspecified sources close to the Russian Presidential Administration, Supreme Court, and judicial community told Vedomosti that Bastrykin’s replacement presents an opportunity to “introduce new blood” to Sledkom, given that Bastrykin has headed Sledkom since 2011 and is approaching the age of 72. The Kremlin allowed Bastrykin to remain in office past the age of 70 in September 2024.[23] The Kremlin's replacement of Bastrykin is in line with Putin's recent practice of reshuffling older members of his inner circle to other roles rather than retiring or firing them, as demonstrated by the appointment of former Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev to oversee the Russian shipbuilding industry in May 2025.[24] Putin has been recently promoting younger officials who have significant involvement with the Russian war effort such as former Tula Oblast Governor Alexei Dyumin, who became the youngest ever member of the Russian Security Council in September 2024.[25] The promotion of younger officials connected to the war effort is consistent with Putin's February 2024 announcement that he is forming a new elite out of veterans and committed supporters of the war effort.[26]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-20-2025
Dairy Queen in Kiev abandoned after small kitchen fire.
Private and public Kremlin statements indicate that Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to demand the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts before he will initiate a peace agreement. Helping Ukraine inflict battlefield setbacks on Russian forces remains essential to efforts to persuade Putin to reevaluate his position on the war and negotiations. Reuters reported on August 5 that three Kremlin sources familiar with the matter stated that Putin's belief that Russia is winning and his doubts that US sanctions will have a significant impact on Russia are driving Putin's decision to continue his war against Ukraine.[1] Two of the sources claimed that Putin's war aims take precedence over his efforts to improve relations with the United States and US President Donald Trump. One source claimed that the recent Ukrainian-Russian peace talks in Istanbul were a Russian attempt to convince Trump that Putin was open to peace but noted that the talks were devoid of any real substance. One source claimed that “Putin cannot afford to end the war just because Trump wants it.” A source described Trump's reported March 2025 offer — in which Trump purportedly proposed to lift all US sanctions against Russia, to “de jure” recognize Russian sovereignty over occupied Crimea, and to “de facto” recognize Russian control over the other parts of Ukraine that Russian forces occupied at the time — as a “fantastic chance,” but stated that stopping a war is more difficult than starting one. Putin rejected that offer.
The Kremlin insider sources likely leaked this information in an attempt to obfuscate Putin's actual, more extreme war aims. One of Reuters’ sources stated that Putin does not see the logic in stopping Russian offensive operations, as Russian forces are making relatively more rapid advances on the battlefield.[2] The Kremlin sources implied that Putin would be willing to establish a ceasefire if Russia first occupied (or was given) the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts. Recent Kremlin statements, including from Putin himself, have repeatedly indicated that Putin remains committed to achieving his maximalist objectives that amount to full Ukrainian capitulation, however.[3] Putin claimed as recently as June 20 that “all of Ukraine is [Russia's].”[4] Russian State Duma Deputy Anatoly Wasserman said in an interview with Azerbaijani news outlet Minval published on August 3 that the stated goals of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine are “incompatible with the continued existence of Ukraine” as a sovereign state and that Russia alone will determine the end date for its war.[5] Kremlin newswire RIA Novosti published two op-eds on July 30 entitled “There is no other option: no one should remain alive in Ukraine” and “Noted: Ukraine will end very soon.”[6] Kremlin insiders are likely speaking to Western media outlets in order to socialize Putin's demands to Western policymakers and audiences, frame Russia's demand for the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts as reasonable, and insinuate that there is a possibility for a full ceasefire and lasting peace should Ukraine and the West acquiesce to Putin's demands.
Putin has intentionally put himself in a position where he cannot present any peace settlement that falls short of his original war aims as a victory to the Russian military or people. One Kremlin source told Reuters that Putin does not feel that now is the time to end the war because Russian society and the Russian military would not understand such a decision.[13] The Kremlin has been engaged in a concerted multi-year effort to justify Putin's maximalist war objectives as necessary for the existence of the Russian state and to garner societal support for a protracted war until Russia achieves such goals.[14] Russian state and independent polling from early 2025 suggested that most Russians support continuing the war in Ukraine, and the Kremlin is likely seizing on these sentiments, which it has actively fostered, to justify Putin's decision to continue the war.[15] Putin is also increasing Russian society's reliance on military spending by heavily investing in Russia's defense industrial base (DIB), which now accounts for a significant portion of overall Russian domestic production.[16] ISW continues to assess that any sharp decrease in Russia's defensive spending will likely depress the Russian economy in the medium term, furthering Putin's incentive to continue a protracted war in Ukraine and instigate future military conflicts despite high Russian losses on the battlefield and critical constraints on its economy.[17] Putin has intentionally cultivated Russian society's commitment to his war aims and has not set conditions to take any off-ramps to accept a peace settlement that falls short of his original war aims.
Russia announced on August 4 that it will withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, likely as a rhetorical response to US President Donald Trump's August 1 announcement about the redeployment of US nuclear submarines toward Russia. Russia's INF Treaty withdrawal does not portend a shift in Russia's use of shorter- and intermediate-range missiles, however. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) claimed on August 4 that the conditions for Russia's “unilateral moratorium” on the deployment of weapons banned under the INF Treaty are “disappearing” such that Russia “no longer considers itself bound” by the INF Treaty's restrictions.[18] The Russian MFA claimed that the Russian leadership will decide on response measures after analyzing the deployment of Western land-based intermediate-range missiles. The Russian MFA claimed that Russia has “proactively made efforts to maintain restraint” following the US suspension of the INF treaty in 2019. The Russian MFA claimed that Western states have built up “destabilizing” missiles in areas near Russia, creating a “strategic” threat to Russian security. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded to the MFA's announcement, stating that Russia is no longer “limited” in any way and that Russia has the right to take “appropriate measures.”[19] Peskov claimed that the West should not expect any announcements about the deployment of Russian shorter- and intermediate-range missiles as this information is “sensitive.”[20] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on August 4 on his English-language X (formerly Twitter) account that the Russian MFA's statement is the result of NATO states’ “anti-Russian policy” and that “this is a new reality all [Russia's] opponents will have to reckon with.”[21] Medvedev vaguely threatened that the West should “expect further steps” from Russia. Medvedev’s August 4 threat on his English-language account is the latest in a string of recent nuclear threats against the West that are part of the Kremlin's wider reflexive control campaign that aims to push the West to make decisions that benefit Russia.[22]
Russia has long violated the INF Treaty and publicly flaunted its use of shorter- and intermediate-range missiles banned under the treaty. The United States suspended participation in the INF Treaty on February 1, 2019, and withdrew from the treaty on August 2, 2019, due to Russian violations of the treaty with Russia's development, testing, and deployment of intermediate-range 9M729 (SSC-8) missiles. Russia suspended its participation in the INF in response on February 2, 2019, but had not formally withdrawn from the treaty.[23] Russia conducted a strike against Ukraine using an Oreshnik ballistic missile (reportedly an experimental variant of the RS-26 missile, which has a range of 2,000 to 5,800 kilometers) in November 2024, and Putin publicly claimed on August 1 that Russia produced its first serial Oreshnik complex and missiles and that the missile system entered into service.[24] Russia has also routinely launched Iskander missiles, with a reported range of 400 to 500 kilometers, against Ukraine and permanently deployed Iskanders to Kaliningrad Oblast in 2018.[25] High-ranking Russian officials began to set conditions in the information space for Russia to permanently withdraw from the INF Treaty in June 2025, suggesting that the Kremlin had made the decision to withdraw previously.[26] The Kremlin is attempting to posture its withdrawal from the treaty as a response to Trump's August 1 announcement, however.
European and NATO allies announced that they will purchase over one billion euros worth of US weapons for Ukraine through a new NATO funding mechanism. Ukraine's Minister of Defense (MoD), Denis Shmyhal, announced on August 4 that the United States and NATO launched the Prioritized Ukrainian Requirements List (PURL) initiative, which is a new mechanism that will allow NATO members and partners to finance the supply of American weapons and technology to Ukraine through voluntary contributions.[27] Dutch Defense Minister Ruben Brekelmans stated on August 4 that the Netherlands is allocating 500 million euros (roughly $570 million) to purchase American weapons systems, including Patriot components and missiles, through the PURL initiative.[28] NATO announced on August 5 that Denmark, Norway, and Sweden will finance a combined $500 million military aid package to purchase air defense systems, Patriot munitions, anti-tank systems, ammunition, and spare parts from the United States through the PURL initiative.[29]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-5-2025
A Ukrainian company recently launched a new reusable interceptor drone designed to down Russian Shahed-variant drones. Ukrainian Technary design bureau CEO Hennadii Suldin told Ukrainian defense technology outlet Defender Media on July 30 that Technary has developed a reusable Mongoose interceptor drone, designed to intercept Russian Shahed-variant drones.[30] Suldin stated that the Mongoose interceptor drone has a jet engine and an automatic homing system, which allows the drone to approach an enemy drone, fire a projectile into a drone's engine or propeller, and then continue its mission or return for refueling. Suldin stated that the drone can lock onto a target from 800 meters and that the drone's auto-guidance system activates when the target is within a range of 150-200 meters. Suldin stated that the Mongoose interceptor drone can reach speeds of up to 300 to 310 kilometers per hour with a maximum flight altitude of 5,000 meters and a combat radius of 12 kilometers. Suldin estimated that a Mongoose interceptor drone could likely destroy 10 to 12 Shahed drones over its lifecycle and noted that the drone's reusability can help overcome Ukraine's currently constrained interceptor drone production capabilities.
Suldin stated that Ukrainian forces will begin integrating prototypes of the Mongoose interceptor drone in the near future. Ukrainian outlet Militarnyi noted that the Mongoose interceptor drone is designed to combat high-speed aerial threats such as the Shahed-136.[31] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat told RBC-Ukraine on July 31 that Russian forces are launching new, jet-powered Shahed drones that fly at speeds of 500 kilometers or more.[32] ISW previously observed reporting that Geran-3 drones can reach speeds of up to 800 kilometers per hour.[33]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-5-2025
launch drone attacks daily
—
Part of Holodomor II. This time they aim to finish the job of exterminating all non-Russian speaking Ukrainians, along with Russian-speaking traitors.
Like many “facts” within Russian mir, there is little discussion as to how areas in Ukraine became majority ethnic Russian or Russian speaking (not necessarily the same thing as Russians), but there should be.
Holodomor was just one part. Forced resettlement of Ukrainians from their lands and the mass resettlement of Russians in Ukraine, as well as making Russian the only language allowed to be taught are two other factors. Something practiced everywhere the Soviets occupied.
The comparisons to nazi Germany and the Soviet Union now Russia are nearly unlimited
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