Attack On Europe: Documenting Russian Equipment Losses During The 2022 Russian Invasion Of Ukraine (2 year anniversary)

This list only includes destroyed vehicles and equipment of which photo or videographic evidence is available. Therefore, the amount of equipment destroyed is significantly higher than recorded here. Loitering munitions, drones used as unmanned bait, civilian vehicles and derelict equipment are not included in this list. All possible effort has gone into avoiding duplicate entries and discerning the status of equipment between captured or abandoned. Many of the entries listed as 'abandoned' will likely end up captured or destroyed. Similarly, some of the captured equipment might be destroyed if it can't be recovered. When a vehicle is captured and then lost in service with its new owners, it is only added as a loss of the original operator to avoid double listings. When the origin of a piece of equipment can't be established, it's not included in the list. The Soviet flag is used when the equipment in question was produced prior to 1991. This list is constantly updated as additional footage becomes available.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 17, 2025

US officials acknowledged that Putin has yet to demonstrate a willingness to offer the concessions necessary to reach a peace agreement. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated in an interview with Face the Nation on August 17 that both Russia and Ukraine need to make concessions in order to achieve a peace agreement.[1] Rubio noted that any agreement in which only one side makes concessions would be a surrender, not a peace agreement. Rubio stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin offered “a couple” of unspecified concessions at the August 15 Alaska summit, but did not offer enough concessions to reach a just peace agreement immediately. Rubio reiterated Trump's August 13 statement that the United States is not in a position to accept or reject a deal on behalf of Ukraine and that Ukraine must decide for itself what conditions it will accept for a peace deal.[2] Rubio stated that the Trump administration wants a deal that allows Ukraine to rebuild its country and to “be assured” a Russian invasion “never happens again.” Rubio stated that harsher US sanctions against Russia would end the peace talks and continue the war for at least another year to a year and a half. ISW continues to assess that Putin has not moderated his original war aims throughout the full-scale invasion and has offered no indication that he intends to change or compromise on these aims in any peace talks with Ukraine.[3]

Russia will be unable to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast rapidly through force, as Russian forces have failed to do for over a decade. Russia could only rapidly seize all of Donetsk Oblast if Ukraine concedes to Putin's demand and withdraws from the remainder of the oblast. Axios reported on August 16, citing a source with direct knowledge of Trump's August 16 call with Zelensky and European leaders, that Trump stated that Putin told him that Russia could seize all of Donetsk Oblast if Putin so desired.[4] Putin's claim that Russian forces will inevitably seize all of Donetsk Oblast if the war continues is false. The Russian campaign to seize all of Donetsk Oblast has been ongoing since Russia's first invasion in 2014 and remains incomplete. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky noted on August 17 that Russia has tried and failed to seize all of Donetsk Oblast in the past 12 years of fighting in eastern Ukraine.[5] Russian forces have been bogged down in campaigns to seize multiple towns and cities in Donetsk Oblast since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022, and Russian forces are still struggling to achieve the objectives of several of these campaigns today. Seizing the remainder of Donetsk Oblast will very likely take Russian forces multiple years to complete after several difficult campaigns.

Russian forces have historically thrown themselves into costly campaigns to seize fortified or urban areas in eastern Ukraine, a reality far from Putin's claims of rapid advances. Russian forces undertook four notable campaigns in eastern Ukraine in 2024 into 2025 that illustrate how difficult it will likely be for Russian forces to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast through force.[6] Russian forces first began efforts to retake Kupyansk, Kharkiv Oblast in October 2023 and have conducted multiple separate campaigns aimed at seizing the town in the nearly two years since.[7] Russian forces are currently struggling to complete the encirclement or envelopment of Kupyansk from the northwest and have not yet seized the settlement despite 22 months of offensive operations. Russian forces began a dedicated effort to seize Toretsk, Donetsk Oblast in mid-June 2024.[8] Russian forces started this effort not far from the positions that Russian forces held prior to the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022. Russian forces seized Toretsk by August 1, 2025, taking 14 months to advance about 6.4 miles from the southeastern outskirts of Toretsk to the northwestern outskirts of Toretsk.[9]

The Russian campaign for Chasiv Yar, Donetsk Oblast, began in May 2023 after Russian forces seized Bakhmut (east of Chasiv Yar), and Russian forces intensified efforts to seize Chasiv Yar in April 2024.[10] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces completed the seizure of Chasiv Yar on July 31, 2025, although ISW has yet to observe evidence that Russian forces have seized the entirety of the settlement.[11] It has taken Russian forces 26 months to advance about 6.8 miles (roughly 11 kilometers) from wester n Bakhmut to the western edge of Chasiv Yar.Russian forces began efforts to seize Pokrovsk, Donetsk Oblast, in February 2024 after the seizure of Avdiivka and have dedicated multiple efforts to seizing Pokrovsk through frontal assaults, envelopment, or encirclement – all of which have thus far been unsuccessful after more than 18 months.[12]

Recent Russian advances northeast of Pokrovsk do not indicate that Russia can rapidly seize fortified or urban areas. Russian forces took open areas without any significantly fortified settlements during their recent penetration northeast of Pokrovsk near Dobropillya.[13] Russian forces still have not demonstrated any capability to rapidly seize large, fortified positions, however, as the campaigns for Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk have shown.[14] Russian forces are struggling to supply and reinforce their tactical penetration near Dobropillya and defend against Ukrainian counterattacks on the flanks —suggesting that Russian forces may not be able to consolidate their positions and exploit this penetration. The Russian effort for Dobropillya is just one part of Russia's broader 18-month effort to seize Pokrovsk, moreover. Russia's efforts near Dobropillya result from the failure of Russia's initial effort to encircle Pokrovsk from the southwest and northeast, causing the Russian command to try a deeper envelopment further northeast and north.

None of these many-months-long efforts to take Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk have been at the scale needed to seize all of Ukraine's fortress belt – Ukraine's highly fortified, main defensive line in Donetsk Oblast that consists of cities that are significantly larger in terms of size and population.[15] Russian efforts to seize the rest of Donetsk Oblast by force would take several years, given the number of fortified urban areas Russian forces must overcome to reach the Donetsk Oblast administrative boundaries.

Russia continues to deny Ukraine's sovereignty and to demand the right to dictate Ukrainian domestic affairs. The New York Times (NYT), Reuters, and BBC, citing anonymous European officials, reported on August 17 that Putin asked Trump on August 15 for guarantees that Russian would become an official language again in parts or all of Ukraine and that Ukraine would end its “persecution” of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP).[16] The UOC MP is not an independent religious organization, but rather is the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church's (ROC) subordinate element in Ukraine.[17] The ROC is notably an element of Russia's hybrid warfare toolkit, particularly in the Kremlin's efforts to promote Kremlin narratives and Russian nationalist ideology to sustain and expand Russia's influence in former Soviet states.[18] The ROC has also advocated for the codification of a Russian state ideology premised on the idea that Ukraine should not exist.[19] Putin's demands regarding the Russian language and the protection of the ROC’s activities in Ukraine via the UOC MP deny Ukraine the right to establish its own domestic laws as a sovereign and independent state.

Putin's demands that Ukraine make Russian an official language again and allow the UOC MP to operate in Ukraine are similar to Russian demands to exert control over Ukraine's domestic affairs in the 2015 Minsk accords. The Minsk II agreement required Ukraine to amend its constitution to give more autonomy to the Russia-controlled Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republic (DNR and LNR) and expand their role in Ukraine's politics.[20]

Russian President Vladimir Putin's insistence that any peace agreement must address Russia's perceived “root causes” of the war will make it difficult to reach a peace agreement as rapidly as Trump desires, given the complexity of the “root causes.” Putin reiterated his ongoing demand that any peace agreement must eliminate the “root causes” of the war during the joint press conference at the Alaska summit on August 15.[21] Putin stated on August 1 that the “main thing” in the peace process is the eradication of the war's “root causes,” which Putin described as issues related to Russia's security, the use of the Russian language in Ukraine, and the conditions for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP) – the ROC’s arm in Ukraine.[22] Putin's demands to formalize Russian as an official language in Ukraine and protect the ROC in Ukraine come from Russia's demands of Ukraine that the Kremlin made in the Spring 2022 Istanbul negotiations. Russia demanded in Spring 2022 during the Istanbul negotiations that Ukraine “prevent restrictions and discrimination” against the UOC MP and restore all of the church's rights.[23] Russia also demanded in Spring 2022 that Ukraine guarantee the Russian language as an official language.[24] Marco Rubio responded to a question regarding Putin's demands at the Alaska summit during an interview with Face the Nation on August 17, stating that Putin's demands to address the alleged “root causes” allude to long historical complaints that the Kremlin has repeatedly invoked.[25] Rubio stated that the United States is not going to focus on the “root causes” but rather on halting the fighting.

Russia's “root causes” extend beyond Ukraine, and eliminating them would require substantial negotiations with NATO. Russian officials have defined one of the “root causes” of the war as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to expand into eastern Europe and along Russia's borders in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s.[26] Russia issued a broad set of ultimatums to the United States in December 2021 demanding that NATO commit to not accepting Ukraine or any other countries as new members; not deploy any military forces to states that became NATO members after May 1997; refrain from military activity in Ukraine, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia; and refrain from deploying intermediate-range missiles within range of Russian territory.[27] The 2021 ultimatums also demanded that the United States commit to upholding the ban on NATO enlargement and refrain from deploying weapons in Europe. Putin's demand that any peace agreement eliminate the “root causes” of the war in Ukraine would require a lengthy, complicated negotiation process not only with Ukraine but also with NATO and the United States. Russia's demands about the “root causes” are demands for massive NATO concessions that would jeopardize NATO's integrity and European and US security more broadly.

Putin's offer of a Russian law forbidding a future invasion of Ukraine is not credible because Russia has already twice broken previous binding international commitments not to invade and because Putin has shown that he can freely change Russian law as he desires. US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff stated on August 17 that Putin agreed during the Alaska summit that Russia would “legislatively enshrine” promises that Russia would not invade any other territory in Ukraine or elsewhere in Europe – likely referring to the creation of new Russian legislation or amendments to the Russian Constitution.[28] Putin has extensively disregarded and amended the Russian Constitution to support his political objectives, as evidenced by the Kremlin's manipulation of the 2020 vote for a constitutional amendment to allow Putin to run for president again in 2024 and potentially remain in power until 2036.[29] Putin's two invasions of Ukraine also broke Russia's obligations under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum to respect the independence and sovereignty of Ukraine within Ukraine's borders at the time.[30] Russia has continually violated international agreements prohibiting aggression against Ukraine, including the Minsk agreements.[31] Putin's promise to codify Russian promises against future aggression into Russian legislation or the Russian Constitution is neither credible nor a concession, and there is no evidence to suggest that Putin would abide by any such law forbidding a renewed invasion of Ukraine after concluding a peace agreement.

The details about Ukrainian security guarantees to which Putin may have agreed remain unclear at this time, but the Kremlin may be attempting to resurrect its demands about security guarantors from April 2022 that would have neutered such guarantees. Axios stated on August 16 that sources briefed on Trump's call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and European leaders after the Trump-Putin meeting in Alaska stated that Putin said he was willing to discuss security guarantees for Ukraine and mentioned the People's Republic of China (PRC) as one of the possible guarantors.[32] Witkoff stated on August 17 that Trump and Putin came to an agreement that the United States and Europe could “effectively offer Article 5-like language” as a security guarantee for Ukraine against future renewed Russian aggression – referring to NATO's collective defense clause.[33] Putin's reported suggestion that the PRC could be a security guarantor mirrors Russia's proposed peace settlement in Istanbul in April 2022. The April 2022 proposed treaty listed the PRC, several Western states, and Russia as the security guarantors for Ukraine.[34] Russia demanded in the proposal that guarantor states provide Ukraine with aid in the event of a future attack only after all guarantor states had agreed to such a decision. The PRC is a close Russian ally that has significantly helped the Russian war effort and defense industrial base (DIB), and the PRC would not be a neutral guarantor.[35] Russia's involvement in the guarantee would make it meaningless. The parameters of the security guarantees for Ukraine that Putin is reportedly willing to accept are unclear. Any future peace settlement that includes stipulations similar to the demands that Russia made in April 2022 requiring unity among guarantor states would enable the PRC (or Russia, if Russia is one of them) to veto any decisions to help Ukraine in the event of another Russian invasion.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2025

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