Posted on 02/24/2024 5:59:01 AM PST by SpeedyInTexas
India says that it is ready to drop Russian oil, when the time comes. Even if China keeps buying, the loss of just the Indian market would be a huge financial hit on Russia.
OilPrice.com (17 July):
“India is not concerned about President Trump’s threat to crack down on Russia’s oil exports and slap secondary sanctions or tariffs on buyers of Russian crude if no peace deal on Ukraine is reached in 50 days.
“I’m not worried at all. If something happens, we’ll deal with it,” India’s Petroleum and Natural Gas Minister, Hardeep Singh Puri, said at an industry event in New Delhi on Thursday...
...For now, India appears unfazed and is playing down the threat, saying it has diversified its supply sources and more oil will be available soon on the market.
“India has diversified the sources of supply and we have gone, I think, from about 27 countries that we used to buy from to about 40 countries now,” minister Puri said.
“There is a lot of oil available in the market…Many countries, including Brazil, Canada and others, are ramping up output. I am not unduly worried about supplies as of now. We have diversified our sources,” Puri said.
India feels “no pressure” and has enough supply options to ensure uninterrupted flows of crude, the minister added.”
Slovakia agrees to approve EU’s 18th sanctions package against Russia, Fico says.
Kyiv Independent (17 July):
“The new Russian oil price cap is expected to lower the maximum cost per barrel to $47, down from $60, by subtracting 15% from the 22-week average price, and will be revised every six months instead of every three, one of the sources said.”
As a Beatles fan loved the movie yesterday. Back in the USSR scene is good
I though I read some time ago that we have a large number of mothballed patriot systems for some reason 50 comes to mind
What is the latest on the ukranian drone hunting drone
We have always maintained somewhere around 50 active batteries, and we probably have some in reserve. All of the components have been upgraded (replaced) over the years. Radars, launchers, command centers, etc. The current system is nothing like the original from the 80’s. We still had HAWK (the predecessor to patriot) components and missiles to send, so I’d assume we have a significant number of older patriot components in storage, and could likely assemble some batteries from those. Probably PAC-2, maybe even some old PAC-1. PAC-2 missiles were introduced in 1990, and have a shelf life of 45 years, so even the first ones made are still good. If nothing else, some of these components can replace combat losses. Ukraine doesn’t lose an entire battery, but they have lost components. Launchers, radars, command centers.
“All those miles of pipeline in Russia cannot be defended.”
You use drones to hit the vulnerable pumping stations along the oil pipeline. I would blow up the re-pressurization (compressor) stations of their gas pipelines. Whether the gas pipeline is in operation or not. The parts are all complex and European built (Seimens)
Yes, and here is the link.
Guns, Butter Or Socks? Russia's Tough War Economy Choices
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OoZwp—Vs8Y
worth the 9 min
Russia's Central Bank continues efforts to maintain the facade of domestic economic stability by pursuing economic policies that will likely exacerbate Russia's economic instability. Bloomberg reported on July 17, citing the Russian Central Bank's June 2025 monthly report, that Russia's seasonally adjusted annual rate (SAAR) of inflation decreased to four percent in June 2025, in line with Russia's four percent target inflation rate.[1] Bloomberg assessed the decrease in the SAAR of inflation as the first indicator that the Central Bank's efforts to lower the inflation rate have been successful. The Russian Central Bank report cautioned that the official annual inflation rate remains at nine percent, but assessed that if the current trajectory continues, the inflation rate could hit the target of four percent sometime in 2026. The SAAR is a short-term measurement, however, and its decrease is unlikely to positively impact the Russian economy in the long term. The Russian Central Bank reported that the cost of interest-bearing instruments — financial assets that generate interest — significantly decreased in June 2025, and that investors expect an average key interest rate below 18 percent between August 2025 and October 2025. The Russian Central Bank's report claimed that a strong Russian ruble significantly contributed to the SAAR decrease. A strong ruble increases Russia's purchasing power on the global market, which in turn decreases the ruble cost of imported goods such as machinery and technology, lowering input costs (expenses to produce goods or services) and inflationary pressure (that increases the price of goods and services over time) on firms that rely on imported components. A strengthened ruble softens the blow of Western sanctions as it makes parallel imports cheaper and keeps substitutes affordable. ISW assesses that secondary sanctions will likely further impact the Russian economy by undercutting Russian oil revenues and cheaper imports using the strengthened ruble, both of which are essential for the Kremlin's financing of its war against Ukraine. The Russian Central Bank reported two potential complicating factors in lowering the interest rate: the eventual waning of effects from earlier bouts of ruble strengthening that helped slow price growth in June 2025, and the ongoing rise in the cost of services, despite a stabilization of the exchange rate and cost of goods sensitive to credit.
Russia's unsustainably high payments to soldiers and the impacts of the resulting domestic labor shortage will likely further destabilize the Russian economy, regardless of the Kremlin's claims of economic stability. Russia's strategy of incentivizing volunteer recruitment by offering large one-time payments to recruits and simultaneous efforts to rapidly expand its defense industrial base (DIB) since 2022 has required Russia to significantly increase payments to both sustain military recruitment and to augment the DIB’s labor force.[2] Russia has had to significantly increase the federal and regional one-time bonuses to incentivize Russians to sign military contracts rather than take other jobs, given high Russian casualty rates.[3] Competition between Russia's DIB and civilian enterprises is raising the average salary for these positions and is raising prices in service industries writ large. These factors, coupled with labor shortages in the civilian and defense sectors, are likely contributing to the divergence between the cost of goods and services in the Central Bank's report by limiting Russian economic growth, force generation efforts, and defense industrial production. ISW continues to assess that Russia cannot indefinitely replace its forces at the current casualty rate without an involuntary reserve mobilization, which Russian President Vladimir Putin has shown great reluctance to order, nor can it sustain increasingly high payments to recruits, which the Russian economy cannot afford.[4] Russia is effectively burning the candle at both ends by simultaneously loosening monetary policy to stimulate short-term growth, while expanding fiscal expenditure to feed the military effort. This strategy will likely adversely affect the Russian economy by weakening consumer purchasing power, devaluing the ruble in the medium- to long-term, and creating deeper macroeconomic instability.
Russian bankers are reportedly privately expressing concerns over a growing number of non-performing (late and unpaid) loans despite the Russian Central Bank's claims of economic stability. Bloomberg reported on July 17 that unspecified top executives at “some of Russia's largest banks” have privately discussed seeking a state-funded bailout if the level of non-performing loans on their books continues to grow through 2025.[5] Bloomberg reported that it reviewed documents that indicate that three of Russia's systemically important lenders (financial institutions whose potential failure could disrupt the broader financial system and economy) may need to recover funds lost from the non-performing loans. Bloomberg reported that non-performing loans issued by Russian banks have grown by 1.2 percent in 2025 and could rise to six or seven percent from their current rate of four percent by 2026. ISW is unable to independently verify Bloomberg’s report about these unspecified large Russian banks and lenders, but has observed indications that Russian officials are growing concerned about economic stability in the wake of Russian Central Bank policy changes. Russian Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina previously downplayed the risk of systemic economic crisis, claiming that the Russian banking system has capital reserves of eight trillion rubles (about $102.5 billion).[6] Bloomberg reported that the Russian Central Bank has advised lenders to focus on restructuring credit with the borrowers and absorbing the bad loans, reflective of Russia's risky and contradictory economic policies, rather than recognizing the full extent of sourcing loans.[7] The Russian Central Bank is therefore likely disinterested in bailing out Russian major banks - an action that could cause liquidity problems and, in the worst case, cause bank failure. Any failure of a major Russian bank would undercut Russian President Vladimir Putin's long-standing narrative that neither the war in Ukraine nor Western sanctions are hurting the Russian economy.[8]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-17-2025
The sanctions, endorsed on Friday by ambassadors in Brussels, ban all transactions with 22 Russian banks, the Russian Direct Investment Fund and its subsidiaries, and the direct and indirect use of the underwater Nord Stream pipelines, which are currently closed off but which Moscow seeks to restart at some point in the future.
Additionally, the EU transforms the price cap on Russian crude oil, fixed at $60 per barrel since December 2022, into a dynamic mechanism that will remain 15% lower than the average market price, according to diplomatic sources. The new cap will kick in at $47.6 per barrel and be automatically adjusted every six months, with the possibility of ad-hoc tweaks if the market fluctuations require. The United States, a chief proponent of the price cap at the G7 level during the previous administration, has not supported the downward revision.
Moreover, a further 105 vessels belonging to the “shadow fleet”, the old-age tankers that Moscow employs to bypass the price cap, are denied access to EU ports and EU services. This brings the “shadow fleet” blacklist to more than 400 vessels.
In a key change to plug a notorious loophole, the EU has decided to forbid the imports of petroleum products made by refining Russian crude and sold across the bloc under a different label. These mostly come from India and Turkey.
The restrictions also target 11 companies outside Russia accused of enabling circumvention, including four in mainland China and three in Hong Kong.
The deal represents the 18th package of sanctions since February 2022. High Representative Kaja Kallas called it one of the “strongest” packages to date.
BIG three (Germany, France, and UK) have big plans to deploy troops to Ukraine via air, sea, and land.
pic.twitter.com/hjdwbj8foS— Alex Christoforou (@AXChristoforou) July 18, 2025
The weapons will be supplied in a “high triple-digit quantity,” he said, referring to a deal between Ukraine’s Defense Ministry and local arms producers that Berlin agreed to fund in late May.
“We need weapons systems that can reach far into the depth of Russian territory — to hit depots, command centers, airfields and aircraft,” Freuding said, adding that Germany is “ready to provide such systems.”
The general, who heads the Ukraine task force at the German Defense Ministry, did not specify what kind of long-range systems Germany is financing...
...”There will be no restrictions on long-range weapons,” Merz said at the time (28 May, when funding was announced). “Ukraine will be able to fully defend itself and also strike military targets outside the territory of Ukraine.”
Merz described the deal as “the beginning of a new form of military-industrial cooperation between our countries.””
Release the Gripens!
BeauBo...I believe you and I should personally welcome the Swedish bikini team to NATO!
Donald Trump withholding US weaponry (policy now reversed) has prodded the hapless Europeans into action. They were able to be stupid and sloppy on Muslims invasion/immigration, due to all they were able to squander on social welfare handouts, instead of national defense and weapons manufacturing.
Japan and South Korea have developed more high-tech weaponry due to low birthrates meaning smaller armies. Doing this with just about zero immigration.
Nearly 20,000 Gazprom sysadmins were disconnected from the company's information system, and malicious software was installed on its servers to destroy data.
https://x.com/Heroiam_Slava/status/1946159992567935011
Also, backup copies of data from the Gazprom information system, databases of 390 subsidiaries and branches, data from auxiliary systems, operating systems on accessible servers were destroyed, the BIOS was damaged (servers will not turn on and will require physical intervention), etc.
Interesting questions.
I think Pres. Trump genuinely wants to make deals with both Russia and China to restore peace and normal international relations.
But I doubt if either Russia or China will accept Trump's conditions for peaceful relations and I believe they will respond, instead, with aggression and violence.
Trump has already prepared with massive increases in US military spending, as well as urging US NATO and Pacific allies to increase theirs.
Such increases will add a total of $1 trillion to US and allies current $2 trillion in combined defense spending -- these are Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) numbers.
China and Russia's combined military-defense spending, at Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) is just shy of $1 trillion -- meaning we currently outspend them by more than double and will increase that to triple in coming years.
Add to those, Trump's sanctions and tariffs on China and Russia, and net effects will be to restore the status quo ante 1991 -- IOW, a new Cold War II.
Now, if you remember Cold War I, you know there were many efforts over decades to negotiate deals and practice detente with Cold War adversaries, but the basic plan from Day One remained in place, called "containment".
It used the massive preponderance of Western military forces to keep Soviets & Chi-Coms bottled up in their own countries and empires, under the theory that if Soviets & Chi-Coms could not expand then, like all traditional empires, they would eventually collapse, as indeed did happen in 1991 to the USSR.
A new Cold War II does not mean Pres. Trump will ever give up trying to negotiate good deals with the New Axis of Evil powers (China, Russia, Iran, North Korea), but it does mean that "Peace Through Strength" will require a lot more military strength along with economic actions (tariffs & sanctions) to enforce.
2019 -- Peace Through Strength, CVN-72 Lincoln CSG, with LHD-3 Kearsarge ARG, in the Arabian Sea near the Persian Gulf:
Streamed live on Mar 27, 2025 #leisrealtalk #china #chinesepopulation
What is China’s real population today? While I’ve previously estimated it to be no more than 900 million—and later 800 million—the truth is far more shocking. Drawing from viewer insights and new analysis, I now believe China’s actual population may be as low as 300–400 million. This isn't a sensational claim, but a sober examination of two critical factors: the Chinese Communist Party’s decades-long manipulation of demographic data to project a false image of a massive consumer market, and the catastrophic, underreported death toll from COVID-19. Join me as I break down how we got here.
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