Posted on 02/24/2024 5:59:01 AM PST by SpeedyInTexas
This list only includes destroyed vehicles and equipment of which photo or videographic evidence is available. Therefore, the amount of equipment destroyed is significantly higher than recorded here. Loitering munitions, drones used as unmanned bait, civilian vehicles and derelict equipment are not included in this list. All possible effort has gone into avoiding duplicate entries and discerning the status of equipment between captured or abandoned. Many of the entries listed as 'abandoned' will likely end up captured or destroyed. Similarly, some of the captured equipment might be destroyed if it can't be recovered. When a vehicle is captured and then lost in service with its new owners, it is only added as a loss of the original operator to avoid double listings. When the origin of a piece of equipment can't be established, it's not included in the list. The Soviet flag is used when the equipment in question was produced prior to 1991. This list is constantly updated as additional footage becomes available.
(Excerpt) Read more at oryxspioenkop.com ...
ATACMs should be high on the priority list.
The Pentagon is considering using the last remaining source of funding, approximately $4 billion in presidential drawdown authority, for military aid to support Ukraine. This authority allows the Pentagon to utilize its own stockpiles to provide military equipment to Ukraine. Previously, the Pentagon hesitated to spend these funds without guarantees of reimbursement through Congress, as doing so could affect U.S. military readiness.
https://twitter.com/NOELreports/status/1762879445122060732
a search for mafia associates in your countries, for the discreet lawyers and financiers who are helping Putin and his friends to hide money.
—
In the US, that would take out half of the politicians and most of the media.
They have unified command of this effort (Donetsk City-Avdiivka Axis) under the Central Military District, commanded by Colonel General (3 Star) Andrei Mordvichev. This is similar to how they have unified the command of the Kharkiv-Luhansk Axis under the Western Western Grouping of Forces, and indicates they have learned some lessons, and are getting better organized in theater.
ISW, 27 Feb:
"Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are struggling to hold defensive positions immediately west of Avdiivka and forecasted that Ukrainian forces will concentrate on a defensive line further west that Ukrainian forces began constructing in November 2023.
Russian forces are likely continuing attempts to advance in order to deprive Ukrainian forces of the respite that would allow Ukraine to establish a more cohesive and harder-to-penetrate defensive line in the immediate vicinity of Avdiivka...
...terrain and water features further west of Avdiivka, particularly the body of water that runs between Berdychi-Semenivka-Orlivka, will likely slow the already relatively slow rate of Russian advances in the area... will likely prompt the eventual culmination of the current Russian offensive effort in the area"
There is zero chance the fighter operated from a Luhansk air field, nor did it "enter Ukrainian airspace" other than occupied Crimea or North East Luhansk. They operate exclusively from inside Russian and Belarusian airspace.
“So, the Pentagon has “drawdown” funds and can use those funds to ship existing weapons to Ukraine.”
This (Presidential drawdown from inventory) has been a (the) main source of weapons all along for Ukraine, with Congress then providing budget plus ups to restock that inventory (even though that might take months or even years to execute, at least it was funded, reducing risk to The Operation and Contingency Plans to which those stocks were committed).
DoD had held back from expending the the last bit of that limited Budgetary Authority (this last $4 Billion), in case of emergency.
I am guessing that selected ammo and Air Defense missiles are just getting urgently required.
Maybe that is why supply flights resumed recently - DoD shooting the last remaining wadding in their budget authority.
I will be so relieved when Ukraine aid gets approved, because it will be up to the Europeans to fully supply the war otherwise, which will require exceptional effort for them. They are capable, but it would require a break from their longstanding practice of hanging back to get someone else to pay more of the bill.
ISW backs off warning of imminent annexation risk in Transnistria (27 Feb).
“Recent developments in Transnistria, the pro-Russian breakaway region of Moldova, are unlikely to pose a military threat to Ukraine and will more likely impact Moldova’s European Union (EU) integration prospects... ISW is amending its warning forecast in light of continued Transnistrian officials’ statements that the upcoming Congress of Transnistrian Deputies will discuss Moldovan economic policies, likely related to changes to Moldova’s Customs Code that went into effect on January 1, 2024...
...Moldova’s path towards EU membership required Moldova to change to its Customs Code to align with EU regulations. Moldova had previously exempted Transnistrian businesses from paying duties to the Moldovan government for Transnistrian imports from and exports to the EU and instead allowed Transnistrian businesses to pay duties to the Transnistrian government.
Transnistria responded to the January 2024 changes requiring that Transnistrian businesses pay required duties to the Moldovan government by increasing taxes on about 2,000 Moldovan businesses in Transnistria, but Transnistrian President Vadim Krasnoselsky stated on February 24 that customs payments to the Transnistrian budget still decreased by 18 percent since the start of 2024.
Major actors in Transnistria have varying economic and political interests. The American Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats Project (CTP) previously assessed that Transnistria is a mafia state run by Viktor Gushan, whose company Sheriff Enterprises controls a majority of the Transnistrian economy and receives large portions of Transnistria’s government spending.
Gushan’s businesses have been heavily oriented towards the EU after Moldova signed a trade deal with the EU in 2014 that guaranteed tariff-free access to EU markets. Gushan’s businesses would also benefit from the reestablishment of good Ukrainian-Transnistrian relations, as Transnistria imported and exported most of its goods through Ukraine until Ukraine closed those borders in 2022 due to Russia’s full-scale invasion — facts that would give Gushan good reason to oppose Transnistrian annexation into Russia for economic reasons.
EU officials have indicated that Moldova could join the EU without Transnistria. Gushan may prefer a Western-oriented Moldova in which Transnistria enjoys special tax exceptions over annexation into Russia or Moldovan EU membership without Transnistria. Moldova, however, is unlikely to reverse its customs code changes given its current commitment to joining the EU. Gushan’s calculus, therefore, is complex, and his preferences are unclear at this time. ISW will provide an update following the Congress of Deputies on February 28.
Russia may also hope to exploit a hybrid play in Transnistria taking advantage of recent developments. Gushan likely competes with the Transnistrian Ministry of State Security (MGB), reportedly a “department” of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) that takes orders from the Kremlin. Citizens of both Russian-influenced regions of Moldova — Transnistria and Gagauzia — notably recently protested Moldova’s new Customs Code. Russia may attempt to exploit domestic opposition to Moldovan policies to sow instability in Moldova and delay Moldova’s accession to the EU.”
Russian Aerospace Forces dropping like rain. A-50 (AWACS equivalents) MIA lately. Putin’s demilitarization campaign against Russia continues at a brisk pace.
ISW (27 Feb):
“Ukrainian forces have reportedly shot down two Russian Su-34s on February 27, the tenth downed Russian military aircraft within roughly as many days...
...Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated on February 21 that Ukrainian forces have downed seven Russian Su-34 and Su-35 fighter jets since February 16.
The February 27 Su-34 shoot-downs are likely connected with Russian glide bomb strikes in Donetsk Oblast, particularly near Avdiivka as Russian forces use heavy glide bomb strikes in an attempt to exploit gains in the Avdiivka area.
Ukraine’s downing of a Russian A-50 long-range radar detection aircraft on February 23 has likely constrained Russian strategic reconnaissance capabilities. Ihnat stated that Russian forces have not deployed another A-50 over the Sea of Azov since the downing and have increased their use of aerial reconnaissance drones across the theater to compensate.”
What ever happened to the Lend Lease program we heard so much about earlier in the war?
Kremlin snuff box
https://t.me/s/kremlin_secrets
Will Transnistria not be taken into Russia?
As we announced , the excitement around the meeting of deputies of all levels in Transnistria was not associated with an attempt to include this republic into the Russian Federation.
Today, deputies made an appeal to Russia regarding assistance to the PMR in the face of pressure from Chisinau. Obviously, we are talking about economic assistance, since after the abolition of preferential duties for Pridnestrovian goods, it will be more difficult for local businesses to compete in European markets and make money in general.
But there is an important point. Intelligence sources said that the meeting of deputies did not cause panic in Kyiv, as planned. Moreover, it became known about closer contacts along the Kyiv-Tiraspol line.
It is important to mention here that for the Transnistrian elites and business owners, any change in the situation only hinders, because now this is essentially a gray zone where smuggling flourishes, and in the context of a change in the legal status of the republic, the situation can radically change not for the better for the Pridnestrovians.
The interlocutors do not say what exactly the negotiators between Ukraine and the PMR are talking about, but the proximity of the weapons warehouse in the village of Kolbasna to the Ukrainian border is cause for concern.
The Foreign Intelligence Service also hints that Ukraine is allegedly negotiating the deployment of troops from NATO member countries and others on its territory. Allegedly, we are talking about ground units that will control the territory along the western border, as well as near Belarus and Transnistria.
Romania previously agreed to the deployment of troops along the border with the PMR, but this issue has not yet been officially resolved.
Russia continuing to model after the CCP, trying to implement a Great Firewall of their own, to isolate Russians from the rest of the world online, and dial up their Police State monitoring and censorship to 11, on a scale of 10.
ISW (27 Feb):
“Russia likely tested an element of its Sovereign Internet on February 27, likely in an effort to strengthen control over individual aspects of the Russian information space.
Russian sources reported several widespread outages of prominent social media platforms on February 27, including Telegram, YouTube, VKontakte (VK), Viber, WhatsApp, and Zoom, and later reported that service has since been restored.
Russian sources also reported that Russians were able to access some blocked social media platforms, including Instagram, Facebook, and Twitter, during the outage.
Russian State Duma Committee on Information Policy Deputy Head Anton Tkachev stated that Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor caused the outage while testing and reconfiguring gateways to identify and close “bottlenecks” to prohibited content.
BBC Russian Service quoted Russian organization ”Network Freedoms” as saying that Roskomnadzor may have been adjusting settings related to “technical means of countering threats” (TSPU), a set of tools that Russian federal law obligates Russian telecom providers to possess. “Network Freedoms” told BBC Russian Service that Roskomnazdor is developing procedures and training specialists to use TSPU to centrally manage the Russian internet and develop a service on state-affiliated social media network VK to better censor content on the site.
Russia is likely attempting to expand this centralization to other social media sites that are active in Russia given the Kremlin’s tensions with other social media platforms. Russia has declared Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp parent company Meta as a “terrorist” organization, and Telegram has refused to comply with some of the Kremlin’s more extensive censorship measures.”
“What ever happened to the Lend Lease program we heard so much about earlier in the war?”
Absolutely nothing. It was never used, and has since expired.
It had the potential to rapidly cover a huge potential escalation in requirements, but that upside risk (massive Russian advance) never materialized.
It’s use would have financially been unilaterally borne by the USA, minus whatever fraction might eventually be paid back by Ukraine in the future. It is a constant struggle to get the Europeans to pay a proportional share of expenses.
Reuters reports:
Russia bans gasoline exports for 6 months from March 1
“Russia on Tuesday (27 Feb) ordered a six-month ban on gasoline exports from March 1 to keep prices stable amid rising demand from consumers and farmers and to allow for maintenance of refineries in the world’s second largest oil exporter...
...Domestic gasoline prices are sensitive for motorists and farmers in the world’s biggest wheat exporter ahead of a March 15-17 presidential election, while some Russian refineries have been hit by Ukrainian drone attacks in recent months.”
Joe Blogs on Youtube recently posted on the Russian oil market:
Russia says it’s current export ban is to allow for planned maintenance of refineries, but that would add up to 9 months of planned maintenance out of 12, along with the last export ban - not the best planning. (nice quip there Joe)
They also said that the export ban was also to support domestic agricultural requirements, but that is BS, as the Spring planting season is only about a month, not six.
Total oil export volumes have remained in a relatively narrow band throughout the war (5.5-6-5 million barrels per day), supporting World oil supply and prices, but Russia’s proportion of less profitable discounted crude oil relative to higher margin refined products has increased, making for much lower overall profits and tax revenue.
The discount of Russian Urals Grade to the Brent benchmark is growing again, after the West began cracking down on smugglers (price cap enforcement) in October (and more seriously in December) 2023.
Aug-Oct 2023 Russian tax revenues on oil and refined products recovered (from around $6 Billion per month, to around $10 Billion) on higher Global oil prices and successful smuggling around the price caps, but they have since dropped back down to around $6 Billion, with the decline accelerating (likely due at least in part to attacks on refineries).
With refined product volume dropping, several Russian refineries are becoming uneconomic to operate, and some may have to close. Refined products production is now down 1/3 from before the war, potentially making 1/3 of refineries redundant. Soviet thinking might have them continue to operate at a loss instead, until things break.
Time to blow up more refineries - it seems to be working.
I don't think Transnistria wants to be annexed at this moment. They want economic aid from Russia. Being annexed right now would mean they are officially at war with Ukraine, and that's the last thing they want.
Transnistria is about to lose their number one source of income, and it might happen as soon as this year. Transnistria currently gets gas from Russia FREE. That's right, FREE. And FREE gas is pretty much what keeps Transnistria alive. It uses much of this gas to fire power plants that supply Moldova with about 70% of it's electricity. The income from selling electricity to Moldova accounts for about half of Transnistria's budget, not to mention free gas for their own electrical production, heating, cooking, industrial uses, etc. Moldova is currently constructing transmission lines into Romania and Ukraine to connect to Europe's grid. Without free gas, Transnistria will collapse. Moldova has already switched to alternative gas sources, save for Transnistria. Once they secure electrical power, they can cut off Gazprom completely.
Transnistria had their big meeting - No call for annexation to Russia, but a veiled call to Russia to fund them against Moldovan economic pressure (new customs duties, as part of Moldovan reforms to join the EU). Fat chance - cut a deal Transnistria, you are surrounded, and better off with the EU anyway.
Newsweek reports:
“Officials in Transnistria, a pro-Russian breakaway region in Moldova, have held a rare meeting in which they called on Moscow for help with security.
There had been reports that the region’s council of deputies could call on Russia to annex Transnistria, where Russian troops are already based, posing a security threat to Moldova as the war in neighboring Ukraine continues to rage.
While they did not do that, the officials have called on Russia’s Federation Council and parliament (State Duma) to help protect the region “in the face of increased pressure from Moldova,” Russian state news agency Tass reported.
The appeal referred to Russia’s “status of a guarantor and mediator” towards Moldova, with Chisinau accused of destroying the breakaway region’s economy and violating the freedoms of its population.
Dionis Cenusa, a risk analyst with the Lithuania-based Eastern Europe Studies Center, told Newsweek that the statement “is reserved in the part relating to the request towards Russia” and “has a moderate tone regarding the condemnation of Chisinau.”
But the document has sparked speculation about what Russia might do next...
...Moldova has no control over Transnistria, which claimed independence after the collapse of the USSR, sparking an intervention by Moscow.
Russian troops remain in the region whose independence neither Moscow nor the international community recognizes.
The Institute for the Study of War said this week that Vladimir Putin’s speech in November 2023 about the “Russian world” showed he viewed Russian speakers and those in post-Soviet states such as Moldova as occupying parts of Moscow’s rightful historical territory.
The think tank said the Kremlin considered Transnistria as a tool to execute hybrid war operations against Moldova and Ukraine, as well as to destabilize NATO.”
German Media is reporting that during the Engagement of several Houthi One-Way “Suicide” Drone yesterday in the Southern Red Sea, the Hessen (F-221), a Sachsen-Class Frigate of the Germany Navy currently Deployed to the Southern Red Sea as part of the E.U. Maritime Coalition dubbed “Operation Aspides” was claimed to have Accidentally Locked-On to a U.S. Air Force MQ-9 “Reaper” Surveillance Drone, with the Ship launching 2 SM-2 Surface-to-Air Missiles which Malfunctioned and fell into the Ocean.
https://twitter.com/sentdefender/status/1762886171862983159
Pretty embarrassing screw up. Sounds to me like the Weapons Control System was unable to establish a datalink with the missiles after launch. You wouldn’t fire a salvo of 2 missiles at a drone, so after the first engagement failed, they tried again without performing some failure analysis to figure out what happened. I doubt the missiles were at fault. Possibly a configuration error.
Simplified, once you launch an SM-2, the radar searches where it expects the missile to be, and once it finds the missile, it establishes a data link between the missile and the Weapons Control System. Without that data link, the engagement is terminated.
Russia believed the A-50 orbit was far enough back that the Patriots could not reach it.
Enter the S-200 into the arena.
Deep dive guesswork...The A-50 saw the missile launch but did not react thinking it was a Patriot and the A-50 was out of range.
Here's some educated guess work:
Why did a NATO war ship accidentally Lock-On to a U.S. Air Force MQ-9 “Reaper” Surveillance Drone?
Was the MQ-9 flying where he wasn't supposed to?
Not following safe passage procedures?
Improper IFF modes & codes?
WRT the missile/data link failure...hopefully there's enough data for fault analysis (blame assessment).
In my day, this would be called a "Fish Killer".
(Transnistria) “Being annexed right now would mean they are officially at war with Ukraine, and that’s the last thing they want.”
That war would probably last a week or two, once Ukraine got around to sending some folks to swat them down…
“Transnistria currently gets gas from Russia FREE”
Through pipelines transiting the Ukraine, who control the shut off valves.
The upcoming end of the transit agreement for Russian gas through Ukrainian pipelines (End of this year), may also have helped to drive Hungary’s change of heart.
The death of Russia’s energy weapon against Europe. The post Russki Mir.
Putin remains a Master Strategist
Reports of more Russian aircraft shot down possibly 2, is there a limit to planes and pilots?
The Germans continued to build plenty of fighters well into 1944, of the 1200 me-262s build only around 100 made it to the front due to fuel and pilot shortages. Is it possible we are seeing pilots being rushed into service. Additionally air frame hours have to be getting up there as well. The longer this goes on at this operational tempo, the maintenance issues will arise. Of course this applies to the current Ukrainian fleet, if/when western fighters arrive will be interesting to see what happens not only to these numbers, but how active the Russian and Ukrainian aircraft become with CAS
“is there a limit to planes and pilots?”
Planes are a challenge for Russia to produce at a high rate They are clearly losing them faster than they can produce. It seems that we may have already chewed through Russia’s ability to keep operational Su-24s, Su-25sand Ka-52 Attack Helicopters in the fight. Now we are digging into their Su-34s and Su-35s.
FtrPilot knows better, but I think that pilots mostly specialize on one aircraft, so that there is a reasonably high correlation between airframe losses, and losses of pilots particular to that airframe.
Russian Ground Forces are notorious for sending hastily/poorly trained soldiers into battle, but maybe the culture in their Aerospace Force is different (at least for pilots), with expensive airframes at risk.
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