https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/1930263612674777319
Posted on 02/24/2024 5:59:01 AM PST by SpeedyInTexas
This list only includes destroyed vehicles and equipment of which photo or videographic evidence is available. Therefore, the amount of equipment destroyed is significantly higher than recorded here. Loitering munitions, drones used as unmanned bait, civilian vehicles and derelict equipment are not included in this list. All possible effort has gone into avoiding duplicate entries and discerning the status of equipment between captured or abandoned. Many of the entries listed as 'abandoned' will likely end up captured or destroyed. Similarly, some of the captured equipment might be destroyed if it can't be recovered. When a vehicle is captured and then lost in service with its new owners, it is only added as a loss of the original operator to avoid double listings. When the origin of a piece of equipment can't be established, it's not included in the list. The Soviet flag is used when the equipment in question was produced prior to 1991. This list is constantly updated as additional footage becomes available.
(Excerpt) Read more at oryxspioenkop.com ...
https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/1930263612674777319
Where’s Putin?
lol those tires really fooled everyone 😂
They gained long-term access to internal systems, extracted 4.4 GB of sensitive data, hacked the official website to display an owl clutching a Russian aircraft, and obtained detailed info on personnel involved in bomber maintenance.
https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1930221232202436617
Why release this now?
No doubt, this hack occurred months or years ago.
Design data on ruzzian bombers can be used to determine soft points for the drones.
Location of fuselage fuel tanks on the Tu-22.
https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1930266419465466084
I see the outer edge of the support system of the Kerch Bridge was attacked this time and possibly once before. To understand the choice of this location knowledge of the bridge construction helps. It is two separate bridges running parallel. In this photo, the 4 lane automobile bridge is to the right with two lanes coming and 2 lanes going. The bridge to the left is the railway bridge with a visible passenger train on the inner of two lanes. The most severe attack on the bridge caused a fuel car train to ignite and burn for hours, greatly weakening the rail bridge, putting it out of commission for months. Part of the road bridge was also damaged and took months to restore.
Testing last spring (if memory serves) showed the rail bridge was still vulnerable, and I believe no more heavy trains have been used on this since. THis was an important reason for the use of the large ferry boats to transport heavy military loads, which Ukraine successfully put out of business with a number of strikes including the novel use of Sea Baby drone systems. Now Ukraine is continuing to weaken the bridge for military use; and a possible aggressive move on Crimea relatively soon?
This type of damage would not show up on low rez satellite pictures.
IMHO, Ukraine does not have the resources to make an aggressive move on Crimea.
Taking out the RR side of the Kerch bridge complicates ruzzian logistics...well worth the effort.
The Switchblade 600 is at the high end, with a Javelin warhead and autonomous targeting. Not really in the same class as the cheap FPV drones with a RPG warhead. Neither were the drones used in Ukraine’s attack on strategic bombers. There is certainly a role for lower end drones.
Ukrainian F-16 reportedly shot down near Sumy by Russian Su-35.
According to all the information and according to the images of the drones used, they were cheap $350-450 drones.
he Russian military is reportedly generating enough forces to replace losses and is reinforcing the size of the Russian force grouping in Ukraine despite experiencing an increased casualty rate per square kilometer gained. Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be embracing significant losses in exchange for diminishing returns to make battlefield gains and manage perceptions about Russia’s military capabilities to pressure Ukraine in negotiations. Putin stated on May 13 that 50,000 to 60,000 people voluntarily join the Russian military per month.[1] Putin gave this figure as part of a statement claiming that Russia has a higher monthly recruitment than Ukraine and therefore may be exaggerating these recruitment figures to posture a large Russian military amid ongoing negotiations with Ukraine and the West, however. Putin did not explicitly state when Russian recruitment levels hit 50,000 to 60,000 personnel each month, but previous Ukrainian and Russian statements imply that Russia may have aimed to reach this monthly recruitment figure in 2025. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov gave recruitment figures at the end of 2024, indicating that Russia is recruiting just enough military personnel to replace its recent casualty rates.[2] Russian Security Council Secretary Dmitry Medvedev stated in late January 2025 that roughly 450,000 people signed Russian military service contracts, that an additional 40,000 people joined Russian volunteer formations in 2024, and that the Russian military aimed to “maintain this momentum.”[3] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Head Major General Vadym Skibitskyi stated in early March 2025 that Russia’s recruitment plans for 2025 will “mostly” allow the Russian military command to replace its battlefield losses should the current tempo of offensive operations and losses continue.[4] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated in April 2024 that Russian forces are “increasing the number” of personnel in Ukraine by 8,000 to 9,000 new personnel per month through contract recruitment and that the Russian force grouping fighting against Ukraine increased from about 603,000 on January 1, 2025, to 623,000 just over three months later.[5] Syrskyi stated on May 13 that Russian forces have suffered 177,000 casualties in Ukraine since the start of 2025.[6] Syrskyi’s and Putin’s figures indicate that Russia may be generating enough forces to replace losses while also increasing the overall size of its force grouping in Ukraine.
Russia continues to tolerate personnel losses comparable to the casualty rate Russian forces sustained during a period of intensified advances in Fall 2024, despite a slowed rate of advance in the first four months of 2025.[7] Russian forces are likely able to generate enough forces to sustain their replacement rate and increase the size of the Russian force grouping in Ukraine by rapidly deploying low quality troops to frontline units. ISW has repeatedly observed reports that new Russian recruits only receive a month of training before deploying to Ukraine, and this limited training is likely constraining recruits’ combat capabilities and the Russian military’s overall capacity to successfully conduct complex operations.[8] The Russian military is currently prioritizing sending poorly-trained recruits into highly-attritional infantry assaults to make grinding advances — despite enduring a higher casualty rate per square kilometer gained — in an effort to pressure Ukraine and the West into acquiescing to Russian demands amid ongoing negotiations. Russia is also attempting to prolong negotiations to extract additional concessions from the United States and while making additional battlefield advances.
The Russian military may also be prioritizing recruitment as part of longer-term efforts to build out a post-war strategic reserve for a potential future conflict with NATO. US European Command (EUCOM) Commander and NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Christopher Cavoli informed the US Senate Armed Services Committee in April 2025 that the Russian military is reconstituting and expanding its force structure and materiel production at a faster rate than most Western analysts anticipated, despite suffering approximately 790,000 casualties since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022.[9] Cavoli stated that the Russian military command has deployed over 600,000 soldiers to the frontlines in Ukraine, which is nearly double the size of Russia’s initial invasion force and is consistent with Syrskyi’s report that there are 623,000 Russian military personnel in Ukraine. Putin signed a decree in September 2024 ordering the Russian military to establish a 1.5 million combat-ready force, indicating his long-term interests in increasing the size of the Russian military.[10] Cavoli’s report coheres with recent indicators signaling that Russia is expanding and upgrading military bases, barracks, training grounds, warehouses, and railways near Petrozavodsk, Republic of Karelia, to support a future influx of personnel.[11] Russia is also integrating railways and roadways in the Moscow Military District (MMD) with Belarusian infrastructure. ISW has long assessed that Russia’s restoration of the MMD and Leningrad Military District (LMD) is part of the Kremlin’s long-term restructuring effort to prepare for a potential large-scale conventional war against NATO.
The Russian military command appears to be establishing a tactical doctrine and force structure for motorcycle and civilian vehicles units in frontal assaults, underscoring the Russian military’s efforts to offset Ukraine’s drone advantages and achieve maneuver in modern ground warfare. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on May 13 that the Russian military command has developed a series of standards in equipping frontline units with motorcycles, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), and Chinese- and Russian-made buggies.[12] Mashovets stated that Russia is working to equip every battalion with up to 30 motorcycles, up to 20 ATVs, and up to six buggies; every platoon with up to nine motorcycles, up to 20 ATVs, and up to six buggies; and every “Storm V” penal recruit assault company with up to 15 motorcycles, up to 20 ATVs, and up to three buggies. Mashovets noted that the Russian military command is struggling to source enough motorcycles to equip every unit to the standard level and that equipment rates between frontline units vary considerably as a result. Mashovets stated that the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army (CAA) (formerly the 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]) had up to 1,125 motorcycles, up to 975 ATVs, and 210-215 buggies as of end of April and beginning of May 2025 and noted that other Russian CAAs have varying equipment allocations depending on the number of assault companies and platoons within the CAA. Ukrainian and Russian sources previously suggested that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is working to formalize Russian motorcycle usage, and the appearance of a defined doctrinal organization and allocation for motorcycle units within the Russian military is consistent with this effort.[13]
Russian forces currently appear to be utilizing motorcycles in tandem with armored vehicles, although Russian units may begin conducting assaults exclusively with motorcycles in the future. Mashovets stated that Russian units currently prefer to use motorcycles in tandem with infantry and armored vehicles.[14] The Russian military appears to be undergoing a transition period and moving towards regularly conducting assaults exclusively on motorcycles, although Russian forces may also continue to conduct these combined assaults if Russian commanders assess that motorcycle assaults are less successful. The Russian military may also continue to rely on combined assaults if the Russian MoD cannot improve its abilities to supply Russian units with motorcycles; however, as Mashovets noted that Russian servicemembers are continuing to rely on volunteer organizations to supply some units with motorcycles.[15] ISW previously noted that Russian motorcycle usage is a response to Ukrainian drone innovations and an attempt to offset the significant armored vehicle losses that Russian forces sustained in 2024 and possibly conserve some tanks and armored vehicles for future use.[16] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will likely increasingly depend on motorcycles and other quicker, unarmored vehicles, as slower-moving vehicles have become a hazard on the more transparent battlefield of Ukraine.[17] The Russian military will likely retain its lessons learned in Ukraine beyond the war in Ukraine.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-13-2025
Gazprom Neft CEO Alexander Dyukov has confirmed what energy analysts have long suspected: Russia is running out of cheap oil. The country is being forced to tap into so-called “hard-to-recover” reserves—deep, complex, and geologically intractable deposits that require expensive extraction methods, advanced technology, and massive government support.
According to Dyukov, even maintaining current production levels now requires tapping into these complex reserves. At Gazprom Neft alone, more than 60% of oil production already comes from these high-cost sources. By 2030, more than half of new oil production across Russia is expected to come from similar sites.
According to another source, the situation is even worse. The share of hard-to-recover oil in Russian reserves is expected to reach 80% by 2030. This was announced by First Deputy Minister of Energy Pavel Sorokin at Russian Energy Week.
As was already said today, two-thirds of our reserves can already be classified as hard-to-recover, and by 2030 we will be talking about 80% or more that can be classified as hard-to-recover reserves, Sorokin said.
This means that old high-yield, low-cost fields are depleted, Dyukov continued, and what remains underground is not cheap. The golden era of cheap extraction is over. What follows is a sharp increase in production costs, a decrease in profitability, and a growing dependence on the Russian state to keep the system afloat.
If oil prices remain at current levels, Moscow could lose half of its production by 2030. These figures may sound sensational, but this is the new reality. The fields the Kremlin is now actively exploiting were discovered in the 1980s—and they are already 90–95% depleted. New reserves will never be as profitable, which could lead the Kremlin toward complete bankruptcy.
https://kyivinsider.com/gazprom-ceo-sounds-alarm-russian-energy-crisis/
The goal of the Russian forces in this area is to establish a foothold in Myrnograd to initiate large-scale urban combat in the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad agglomeration. This is because the southern part of Myrnohrad is distant and detached from the core part of the city, where the bulk of Ukrainian forces are stationed, making it more vulnerable to Russian assaults.
To establish a foothold in Myrnohrad the Russians decided to accumulate forces in Hrodivka from which they would launch a direct mechanized assault towards the town. This is enabled by a 5 km section of a paved asphalt road between Hrodivka and Myrnohrad, allowing the Russian tanks and BMPs to utilize their full speed to reach the city and dismount stormtroopers for urban fighting quickly.
The main tactical disadvantages of the Russian forces in this area is the industrial zone of the nearby coal mine in the southern part of Myrnohrad, which includes high-rise buildings of mineshaft elevators that provide fortified concrete observation points that overlook the Russian route of attack.
Additionally, two elevated terrikons in the area allow for additional observation points to overlook all Russian movements around Myrnohrad, together with firing positions.
Forward Ukrainian positions in the fields before the city include 2 powerful strongholds built in 2015 and heavily reinforced with concrete bunkers, trenches, and dugouts overlooking the Hrodivka road.
Any Russian advance along this route faces deadly ATGM fire from these fortifications. To compound the threat, Ukrainian engineers have scattered anti-tank mines across the road, forcing Russian units to slow and use mine rollers on their lead vehicles, which exposes them further to Ukrainian strikes.
To properly advance and evade Ukrainian fire the Russians would need to maneuver across the fields; however, the Ukrainians anticipated this and built a network of anti-tank ditches and dragon teeth across the fields, effectively turning the Russian road of attack into a kill zone.
This means that the Russians would be forced to attack Myrnohrad by driving slowly along the paved road and deactivating anti-tank mines, since the surrounding fields are covered with anti-tank ditches and dragon teeth, while the Ukrainians positioned at the terrikon, industrial zone, and trench strongholds, have a firing solution on them.
Geolocated combat footage from the area reveals how a Russian mechanized platoon, consisting of a tank and 2 BMPs, was immediately detected by the Ukrainian forces stationed at observation points as soon as they left Hrodivka, and exposed themselves on the road. The lead tank was equipped with a mine roller, with the rest of the convoy moving slowly, meaning that Ukrainians detected them within minutes.
As the Russians just started their assault and were not yet within range of Ukrainian soldiers at trenches and terrikon that are armed with ATGM, the Ukrainian FPV drone operators immediately reacted and struck the Russian vehicles engines, effectively immobilizing them.
This led to a panic among Russian soldiers in the convoy as they thought that they would advance faster, if they moved on foot rather than vehicles, only to expose themselves to Ukrainian FPV drones right after leaving their tanks and BMPs, leading to quick eliminations, while others fled to the rear.
This left the Russian vehicles abandoned and damaged, but at risk of possible recovery by the nearby Russian forces, so the Ukrainian drone operators targeted open hatches left by the Russian vehicle crews with incendiary drone-dropped grenades that finished them off and blew them up.
Overall, the Russians launched a poorly calculated assault that almost completely ignored the strong networks of fortifications made by the Ukrainians, which forced the Russians in a narrow kill zone where the Ukrainians destroyed an entire mechanized platoon in minutes.
This assault is direct result of the intensification of Russian assaults across the Pokrovsk direction, and it is the first Russian mechanized assault here, after months of stalemate near Myrnohrad, meaning that attacks here will continue shortly.
https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1930296003002802683
I will try to gather info for analysis. Thanks.
According to Russian media, there are huge truck lines all over Russia after Operation Spiderweb. Each truck is checked for drones and other possible “surprises.”
https://bsky.app/profile/antongerashchenko.bsky.social/post/3lqrq64resk2m
22 s video
Why is ruzzia placing tires on their aircraft which are parked thousands of kilometers from Ukraine?
They were afraid of partisans using FPV quad copters from nearby locations.
Early on, partisans did attack an A-50 aircraft with an FPV drone.
I would wager that pootin called President Trump to inform him (President Trump) that he (pootin) has to respond and to please don't call him (pootin) crazy.
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.
