This list only includes destroyed vehicles and equipment of which photo or videographic evidence is available. Therefore, the amount of equipment destroyed is significantly higher than recorded here. Loitering munitions, drones used as unmanned bait, civilian vehicles and derelict equipment are not included in this list. All possible effort has gone into avoiding duplicate entries and discerning the status of equipment between captured or abandoned. Many of the entries listed as 'abandoned' will likely end up captured or destroyed. Similarly, some of the captured equipment might be destroyed if it can't be recovered. When a vehicle is captured and then lost in service with its new owners, it is only added as a loss of the original operator to avoid double listings. When the origin of a piece of equipment can't be established, it's not included in the list. The Soviet flag is used when the equipment in question was produced prior to 1991. This list is constantly updated as additional footage becomes available.
Reporting From Ukraine:
https://www.youtube.com/@RFU/videos
The complete transcript.
—
[ Russia Retaliates with FIRE to Serbian Arms Shipments to Ukraine! ]
Today [ June 3 ], there are interesting updates from Serbia. Here, an explosion rocked the biggest Serbian munitions factory just a day after the Russian Foreign Intelligence published a sharp report accusing Serbia of sending weapons to Ukraine. What follows may be a decision that will shape Serbia’s future and could lead to a change in course or even greater isolation, leaving Russia wary of losing its foothold in the western Balkans.
In what appears to be a rapidly escalating confrontation, Russia may be losing its long-standing ally in Europe. Just recently, a powerful explosion rocked the Krusik munitions factory in Valjevo, Serbia.
The blast occurred early in the morning, injuring 7 employees who were rushed to a local hospital. Krusik is a state-owned defense manufacturer whose products, including 120-millimeter mortar shells and Grad G-2000 rockets, have been captured on video in use by Ukrainian forces on the battlefield. This event marked more than just an industrial accident, it signaled a turning point in the relationship between Moscow and Belgrade.
The explosion came less than 24 hours after a blunt announcement by Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service, accusing Serbian companies of secretly supplying Ukraine with vast amounts of artillery and small arms ammunition. According to Russian intelligence, Serbia has used falsified end-user certificates and routed the deliveries through intermediaries in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Bulgaria.
The Russian statement sharply criticized Belgrade for undermining traditionally close ties and accused it of profiting from the blood of brotherly peoples. The timing of the statement and the Krusik explosion, separated by mere hours, strongly suggests that this was not a coincidence, but a coordinated act of sabotage meant to punish and intimidate.
Serbian-Russian relations have been deteriorating since the beginning of the full-scale war in Ukraine. While the Serbian public remains largely pro-Russian, and Belgrade maintains energy dependence on Moscow, President Aleksandar Vucic has attempted to walk a diplomatic tightrope. Serbia formally claims neutrality and continues to express a desire to join the European Union.
However, Vucic’s recent trip to Moscow, for the May 9 Victory Day parade, angered EU leaders, with officials, including EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas, voicing strong disapproval. At the same time, European diplomats have intensified visits to Belgrade, increasing the pressure on Serbia to choose a side. At the same time, Serbia’s vague positions on regional flashpoints, including Republika Srpska and Kosovo, have only added to Russia’s frustration.
Against this tense backdrop, Russia’s release of the weapons shipment accusation appears calculated. For years, it has been an open secret that Serbian ammunition has found its way to Ukraine, with the first reports originating not even a month after the initial Russian invasion.
Reports continue to emerge as in February 3, 500 M-21 rockets allegedly appeared in Ukraine, while recently uncovered 120mm mortar rounds bore markings from the same Krusik factory that experienced the explosion. Serbian officials have consistently denied direct sales, insisting the weapons are sold to authorized third parties. President Vucic noted that everyone must understand that sooner or later, Serbian ammunition can end up on any battlefield.
Yet the situation may now be changing. If Serbia were to formally sever its military ties with Russia and align fully with the EU, it could open new economic and political doors. Direct arms sales to Ukraine could boost Serbia’s economy and help advance its stalled EU accession process. But doing so would come at a cost. Serbia has been a key Russian foothold in the Balkans for decades.
Russia has invested heavily, not just in energy and arms, but in narratives, influence operations, and regional destabilization potential. Should Belgrade pivot decisively westward, Russia will almost certainly retaliate by ramping up nationalistic tensions in Serbia against Kosovo or Bosnia, threatening instability throughout the Western Balkans.
Overall, what started as a denunciation from Russia has now escalated into a physical act of violence with clear strategic implications. The sabotage of the Krusik factory is not just a warning, it is a message written in fire and shrapnel. Serbia is now at a crossroads. It must decide whether to yield to Russian pressure and bury its arms trade with Ukraine or to seek refuge in European unity, even at the risk of provoking Moscow’s wrath. What comes next may determine not only Serbia’s future, but the security balance in the Balkans.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XINMvbzlX6U
Russian President Vladimir Putin likely orchestrated a meeting with Kursk Oblast officials on May 20 to set conditions to justify the renewal of Russian plans to seize Sumy City and illegally annex Sumy Oblast. Putin met with municipal leaders in Kursk Oblast on May 20, during which the head of Glushkovsky Raion, Pavel Zolotarev, asked Putin to create a buffer zone in Sumy Oblast.[1] Putin asked how many kilometers deep this buffer zone should be, and Zolotarev claimed that Russia should seize “at least Sumy (City)” and implied that Russia should be “bigger.”[2] Acting Kursk Oblast Governor Alexander Khinshtein later responded to the interaction on his Telegram channel, claiming that his grandfather was from Sumy Oblast, so “this land is not foreign to [him].”[3] Sumy City is roughly 25 kilometers from the international border, and a buffer zone deep enough to include Sumy City would prevent Ukrainian forces from conducting tube artillery and tactical drone strikes against Russian territory. Western and Ukrainian sources reported that the Russian delegation at the May 16 Ukrainian-Russian talks in Istanbul threatened to seize Sumy Oblast in order to create a “security zone.”[4] ISW continues to assess that Russia has territorial aims beyond the oblasts that Russia has already illegally occupied or annexed and that Putin may intend to leverage further advances in Sumy Oblast to demand that Ukraine cede part of Sumy Oblast to Russia during future peace negotiations.[5]
The Kremlin likely arranged the interaction at the May 20 meeting in order to frame Putin as an effective and engaged wartime leader by responding to Russian requests to further advance in Sumy Oblast and suggesting that Russia lay claim to more territory within Ukraine. Putin’s visit to Kursk Oblast on May 20 for the first time since Russia claimed military victory in the oblast on April 26.[6] ISW has observed reports that Ukrainian forces maintain limited positions in Kursk Oblast as fighting continues, despite official Kremlin claims that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces out of the oblast entirely.[7] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 21 that Ukrainian forces continue active combat operations in Kursk Oblast.[8] Putin also met with Acting Kursk Oblast Governor Alexander Khinshtein and agreed to continue providing federal funding for local residents and to increase demining operations.[9] Putin’s meeting with Khinshtein is part of the Kremlin’s ongoing efforts to portray Putin as an effective and caring wartime leader and to downplay Russian failures in the Ukraine theater.[10]
Russian forces are highly unlikely to be able to seize Sumy City in the near- to medium-term given Russia’s demonstrated inability to rapidly seize even much smaller settlements in Ukraine in the past three years. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on May 19 that elements of the Russian 18th Motorized Rifle Division (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and 72nd Motorized Rifle Division (44th AC, LMD) are conducting most of the assaults in the Sumy direction and that elements of the 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade are likely also operating in the Sumy direction.[11] Mashovets stated that up to four or five motorized rifle and rifle regiments of the Russian mobilization reserve are also operating in the Sumy direction.[12] These limited elements reportedly operating in the Sumy direction are insufficient to seize a city as large as Sumy City (pre-war population of 256,000), and Russian forces have not demonstrated the capability to seize large cities since the first months of the war. Russian forces have not seized a Ukrainian city with a pre-war population greater than 100,000 since capturing Lysychansk, Luhansk Oblast in July 2022, but the seizure of Lysychansk was the result of a slow grinding effort that caused Russian offensive operations in eastern Ukraine to culminate in summer 2022, as opposed to a rapid and effective maneuver operation.[13] Russian forces have since struggled to seize much smaller settlements in subsequent campaigns despite using larger numbers of forces, especially in eastern and northern Ukraine.[14] Ukrainian officials have also previously expressed doubt that Russian forces would be able to conduct an effective offensive operation to seize Sumy City.[15]
Russia continues to reject American proposals to establish a ceasefire in Ukraine before starting negotiations to end the war. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on May 20 that the United States is waiting for Russia to present a document outlining the “terms that [Russia] would require in order to reach a ceasefire that would then allow for broader negotiations.”[19] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov directly rejected on May 21 the idea that Russia and Ukraine should come to “a truce and then we’ll see,” apparently disparaging the United States and its partners’ attempts to facilitate negotiations.[20] Lavrov claimed that Russia does not want to repeat the Istanbul 2022 Ukrainian-Russian talks. Lavrov’s May 21 statement is an explicit rejection of the US proposal for the establishment of a ceasefire first and then peace talks.[21] ISW has long assessed that Russia attempted to use the Istanbul 2022 talks to frame Russia’s demands for Ukraine’s full surrender as legitimate and reasonable.[22] Lavrov’s statements indicate that Russia continues to conflate the ceasefire and peace settlement processes, as Russia remains committed to making incremental gains on the battlefield indefinitely.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-21-2025
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2025
May 28, 2025, 9:30 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12 pm ET on May 28. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 29 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Western insider reporting about Kremlin demands to end the war in Ukraine continues to align with repeated public statements from Kremlin officials outlining Russia's demands, indicating that Russia's goal of Ukrainian capitulation and destruction of NATO remains unchanged. Reuters reported on May 28 that three Russian sources familiar with the peace negotiations stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin wants Western states to submit a "written" pledge stipulating that NATO will not expand eastward; Ukrainian neutrality; sanctions relief; the unfreezing of Russian assets in the West; and unspecified protections for Russian speakers in Ukraine.[1] Kremlin officials have repeatedly used allegations that the Ukrainian government is discriminating against Russian-speakers in Ukraine to justify Russia's calls for Ukrainian regime change and the installation of a pro-Kremlin puppet regime.[2] Russia's demands for a ban on NATO expansion, Ukrainian neutrality, and regime change are the same demands that Russia issued before the war in 2021 and when Putin launched his full-scale invasion in February 2022.[3]
Kremlin officials have consistently and publicly called for the demands that Reuters insider sources outlined. Russia has demanded since the outbreak of the full-scale invasion that Ukraine commit to a neutral, non-aligned status, which would require Ukraine to change its constitution and NATO to change its "open-door" policy.[4] Russian officials have also repeatedly claimed that any future peace settlement must eliminate the "root causes" of the war, which Russian officials have previously defined as NATO's alleged violation of unofficial commitments not to expand into eastern Europe and along Russia's borders in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s, and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against Russians and Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine.[5] Kremlin officials explicitly highlighted the "root causes" of the war and Russia's demands for Ukrainian neutrality again on May 28.[6] ISW continues to assess that these demands are part of the Kremlin's efforts to force the West into surrendering Ukraine and breaking the NATO security alliance.[7]
Putin reportedly maintains his demand that Ukraine cede all of the four oblasts that Russia has illegally annexed but not fully occupied, even as Kremlin officials have signaled that Russia has territorial ambitions beyond these four oblasts. A Reuters source reportedly stated that Putin is less inclined now to make territorial compromises and continues to demand the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts — including the areas that Russian forces do not currently occupy.[8] The source stated that "Putin has toughened his position" about territory. Putin first demanded in June 2024 that Ukraine cede all of the four oblasts, and Russian officials have often reiterated this demand since.[9] The Washington Post reported on May 27 that Ukrainian military intelligence assesses that the Russian military command has deployed 125,000 personnel to the borders of Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts — two oblasts that Russia has not illegally annexed.[10] Russian forces have been conducting offensive operations aimed at creating a buffer zone in Kharkiv Oblast since May 2024.[11] Russian forces also recently launched attacks to create a buffer zone in northern Sumy Oblast, with Russian officials calling for Russia to seize Sumy City, likely to set conditions for Russia to annex the oblast.[12] Russia will likely struggle to seize the entirety of the four illegally annexed oblasts, especially as the seizure of the heavily fortified fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast and the forcing of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast will require significantly larger force groupings than the forces currently deployed in eastern and southern Ukraine. The Russian military command would have solely concentrated its efforts on seizing all of the four oblasts if the Kremlin's territorial ambitions were truly limited to the four oblasts, but the deployment of significant forces to attack in Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts suggests that Russia intends to increase its territorial demands. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin maintains significant territorial ambitions in southern and eastern Ukraine, and Russian officials within Putin's innermost circle have even called for Russia to take control of most of the country.[13]
Putin continues to demonstrate his willingness to achieve his war aims militarily through a prolonged war in Ukraine during which Russian forces would continue to only make gradual, creeping advances. One of Reuters' sources reportedly stated that Putin will try to use military victories to show Ukraine and Europe that "peace tomorrow will be even more painful" if Putin is unable to secure his desired terms in a peace deal.[14] The source stated that Putin would take advantage of any tactical battlefield opportunities to advance further into Ukraine and that Putin believes that Russia can fight for years in the face of any sanctions or other economic measures the West might place on Russia in the future. ISW has long assessed that Putin holds a theory of victory that assumes that Russian forces will be able to continue gradual, creeping advances indefinitely and to outlast and overcome Western military aid to Ukraine and Ukraine's own efforts to mobilize.[15]
Russia will likely be able to continue its current tactics that are resulting in gradual, creeping advances as long as Russia is able to replenish its losses on the frontline. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on May 28 that almost 175,000 people have arrived at military units and that more than 14,000 people have joined volunteer units since the start of 2025, for a total of roughly 1,285 people per day.[16] Medvedev also reiterated Putin's May 13 claim that 50,000 to 60,000 people voluntarily join the Russian military per month.[17] Putin's claimed recruitment rate is notably higher than Medvedev's, and ISW cannot independently verify these claims. Reports from the Ukrainian General Staff about Russia's daily losses indicate that Russian suffered a daily loss rate of 1,550 per day in January 2025; 1,261 in February 2025; 1,312 in March 2025; 1,219 in April 2025; and 1,140 between May 1 and May 28.[18] Medvedev's May 28 claim that 175,000 soldiers have joined Russian military units since January 2025 indicates that Russia is replenishing its units at about a one-for-one ratio to its loss rate. ISW continues to assess that Ukrainian forces, supported by Western aid, can inflict higher personnel loss rates on the battlefield that could push Putin to make difficult decisions and force Putin to engage in good-faith negotiations to end the war.[19]
The Kremlin continues to promote its long-standing false narratives that the threat of NATO expansion forced Russia to invade Ukraine in 2022, and that NATO continues to threaten Russia's security. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed that Russia is alarmed by the accumulation of NATO troops along Russia's border and that NATO's eastern expansion and discussions to bring Ukraine into the alliance triggered Russia into launching its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[20] Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov claimed that NATO has deployed 34,200 troops on its "eastern flank" — which runs from Finland to Turkey — since February 2022.[21] Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed in June 2024 that Russia had deployed over 700,000 Russian soldiers to Ukraine, in contrast.[22] NATO had not significantly progressed Ukraine's path to membership in the years since the 2008 Bucharest Declaration, in which NATO promised Ukraine and Georgia paths to membership but took no formal steps toward Ukrainian membership in late 2021 and 2022.[23] Putin explicitly admitted in December 2024 that former US President Joseph Biden offered in 2021 to postpone consideration of Ukraine's membership to NATO for 10 to 15 years — demonstrating that Ukraine's NATO membership was not an immediate prospect and undermining the Kremlin's attempts to blame NATO for Russia's 2022 invasion.[24] ISW continues to assess that Putin did not invade Ukraine in 2022 because he feared NATO but because he believed that NATO was weak and aimed to destroy the alliance.[25]
The Kremlin continues to promote Russian President Vladimir Putin's envisioned Eurasian security architecture — a Russian-led bloc aimed at countering the West and NATO. Putin gave a video address at the 13th International Meeting of High Representatives Responsible for Security Issues on May 28 and advocated for the creation of his desired Eurasian security architecture based on Russia-dominated international organizations, including the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).[26] Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Head Sergei Naryshkin claimed at the meeting that Russia cannot be "weak" and that Eurasian and global security are dependent on Russia's strength — placing Russia at the center of this security architecture.[27] Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov attended a CSTO defense ministers meeting on May 28 where he criticized NATO's defensive posture in Central and Eastern Europe and claimed that the West does not just threaten Russia but all CSTO member states in an effort to unify CSTO members around Russia's anti-NATO sentiments.[28]
Russia and Belarus reduced the scope of the September 2025 Zapad-2025 joint Russian-Belarussian military exercise and relocated the main maneuver away from Belarus's western borders, likely to promote a veneer of cooperation and distract from Russia's limited military capacity outside of the Ukraine theater. Belarusian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Viktor Khrenin announced in an English-language social media post on May 28 that Belarusian officials decided to reduce the scope of the Zapad-2025 joint military exercise and relocate the main maneuver away from the western border of Belarus towards central Belarus.[29] Khrenin claimed that Belarusian authorities made this decision to demonstrate Belarus' readiness for de-escalation, dialogue, and peace. Belarussian authorities would not have been able to make this decision independently without Russia. Russia and Belarus are attempting to posture themselves as unthreatening, reasonable, and cooperative to the West. Belarusian officials previously claimed that at least 13,000 personnel would participate in the Zapad-2025 exercise, and Russia and Belarus likely had to downsize the joint exercise as most of its forces are fighting in Ukraine.[30] ISW observed elements of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (Moscow Military District [MMD]), 20th Combined Arms Army (CAA, MMD), and 6th CAA (Leningrad Military District [LMD]), as well as roughly 4,000 Airborne (VDV) personnel, including from the 7th, 76th, 98th, and 106th VDV divisions participated in the Zapad-2021 joint exercise.[31] Significant elements of these formations are currently fighting in the war in Ukraine.[32] Russian officials unexpectedly canceled the Zapad-2023 exercise, very likely due to Russia's equipment and manpower requirements for the war in Ukraine.[33]
Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to forward an unofficial Russian ideology formulated on Russian nationalism and to try to unify Russian society in support of Russia's war in Ukraine. The Kremlin published a video message from Putin on May 28 for Border Guards Day, addressing Russian border guards.[34] Putin claimed that Russian border guards have developed their "legendary traditions" throughout Russia's "1,000-year history" since the times of Ancient Rus' (Kyivan Rus), a medieval state based in Kyiv. Putin's reference to Ancient Rus' is part of the Kremlin's years long attempts to claim that the modern Russian state is directly tied to Kyivan Rus and to claim that Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians are one people who descended from Kyivan Rus.[35] Putin similarly referred to Russia's 1,000-year history on May 22, and Putin's continued promotion of Russian nationalism is a notable departure from his usual rhetoric promoting a civic Russian identity and nationalism based on ethnic and religious diversity.[36]
Putin also attempted to use his May 28 speech in honor of border guards to justify the use of Russian conscripts to defend Kursk Oblast. Putin used the mythos of the Second World War to glorify the role of border guards to "defend the interests of the Fatherland" and claimed that border guards have "repeatedly demonstrated themselves" in the war in Ukraine.[37] Putin claimed that he is confident that border guards will continue to repel threats to Russia and attempts to cross the state border. Putin and other Russian officials have repeatedly promised the Russian population that conscripts, whose military service is mandated by Russian law, will not be deployed to fight in Ukraine.[38] Conscripts made up a significant part of the forces that initially met the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast, however, leading to discontent among the Russian population.[39] The Kremlin has historically responded to issues surrounding the deployment of conscripts in combat zones with great concern, and Putin is likely attempting to use narratives about Kyivan Rus and the "Fatherland" to justify Russia's use of conscripts in Kursk Oblast.[40]
Ukrainian forces conducted a series of long-range drone strikes targeting Russia's defense industrial base (DIB) on May 27 and 28. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 28 that Ukrainian Special Forces and Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) struck the Kronshtadt drone factory in Dubna, Moscow Oblast.[41] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the plant specializes in producing drone ground-control systems for the Orion, Inokhodets, Molniya, Grom, Termin, Helios, and Sirius drones. Geolocated footage shows drones striking the Kronshtadt plant.[42] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the SBU also struck the Raduga plant in Dubna, which manufactures cruise missiles, including Kh-101/55 missiles, Kh-69 missiles, and Kh-59MK missiles.[43] Geolocated footage shows a drone strike against the Raduga plant.[44] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the Angstrem plant in the Elma Technological Park in Zelenograd, Moscow Oblast, which is one of Russia's largest microchip manufacturing plants.[45] Geolocated footage shows Russian air defense systems downing a Ukrainian drone over Zelenograd, a drone striking the technological park, and the aftermath of the drone strikes against the technological park.[46] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, who often reports on successful Ukrainian drone strikes against Russia, reported on May 28 that Elma Park is a critical hub for Russian import substitution.[47] Kovalenko also reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Dubna Machine Building Plant (DMZ), which produces drones, avionics, and control systems. A Russian insider source claimed that the DMZ also assembles Kh-101, Kh-5, and Kh-59 cruise missiles.[48] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against the Murom Instrument Plant, which produces ignition devices, on the night of May 27 in Vladimir Oblast.[49] The Ukrainian General Staff also confirmed earlier reports that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against the Dmitrievsky Chemical Plant in Kineshma, Ivanovo Oblast on May 26.[50]
Ukraine’s Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz stated on May 28, following a meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Berlin, that Germany will finance a “significant” portion of Ukraine’s Starlink satellite systems operation costs.[51] The German Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on May 28 that Germany would supply Ukraine with ammunition, small arms, and air defense and land weapon systems and invest five billion euros (roughly $5.6 billion) in Ukraine’s defense industrial base (DIB).[52] The German MoD stated that Germany would support more robust cooperation between German and Ukrainian defense industrial companies. Merz stated on May 28 that Germany would help finance Ukrainian production of long-range weapons.[53]
Ukrainian authorities recently identified a Russian servicemember responsible for the execution of two Ukrainian prisoners of war (POW) in January 2025. Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reported on May 28 that Ukrainian officials and military counterintelligence identified a Russian soldier of the 40th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) suspected of executing two Ukrainian POWs on January 9, 2025, near Guyevo, Kursk Oblast (southwest of Sudzha).[54] There has been a sharp increase in credible reports and footage of Russian forces executing Ukrainian POWs throughout 2024 and 2025.[55] ISW continues to assess that Russian military commanders are either complicit in or directly enabling their subordinates to conduct systemic executions in direct violation of international law.[56]
Key Takeaways:
- Western insider reporting about Kremlin demands to end the war in Ukraine continues to align with repeated public statements from Kremlin officials outlining Russia's demands, indicating that Russia's goal of Ukrainian capitulation and destruction of NATO remains unchanged.
- Putin reportedly maintains his demand that Ukraine cede all of the four oblasts that Russia has illegally annexed but not fully occupied, even as Kremlin officials have signaled that Russia has territorial ambitions beyond these four oblasts.
- Putin continues to demonstrate his willingness to achieve his war aims militarily through a prolonged war in Ukraine during which Russian forces would continue to only make gradual, creeping advances.
- The Kremlin continues to promote its long-standing false narratives that the threat of NATO expansion forced Russia to invade Ukraine in 2022, and that NATO continues to threaten Russia's security.
- The Kremlin continues to promote Russian President Vladimir Putin's envisioned Eurasian security architecture — a Russian-led bloc aimed at countering the West and NATO.
- Russia and Belarus reduced the scope of the September 2025 Zapad-2025 joint Russian-Belarussian military exercise and relocated the main maneuver away from Belarus's western borders, likely to promote a veneer of cooperation and distract from Russia's limited military capacity outside of the Ukraine theater.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to forward an unofficial Russian ideology formulated on Russian nationalism and to try to unify Russian society in support of Russia's war in Ukraine.
- Ukrainian forces conducted a series of long-range drone strikes targeting Russia's defense industrial base (DIB) on May 27 and 28.
- Ukraine’s Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine.
- Ukrainian authorities recently identified a Russian servicemember responsible for the execution of two Ukrainian prisoners of war (POW) in January 2025.
- Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Novyi Put (southeast of Korenevo).[57]
Russian forces conducted offensive operations in Kursk Oblast on May 27 and 28.[58] A Russian milblogger claimed on May 28 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked toward Tetkino.[59]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Tetkino direction.[60]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces reported ground activity in northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on May 28.
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on May 28 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that Russian forces seized Kostyantynivka (north of Sumy City).[61] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also seized Vodolahy (north of Sumy City) and advanced south of Bilovody (east of Vodolahy).[62]
Russian forces attacked north of Sumy City near Bilovody, Vodolahy, Volodymyrivka, Veselivka, and Zhuravka and toward Kindrativka and Oleksiivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, Loknya, and Basivka on May 28.[63]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "Rubikon" Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies and the 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Sumy Oblast.[64] Elements of the 104th, 234th, and 237th VDV regiments (76th VDV Division); 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division); 83rd Separate VDV Brigade; and 119th VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly attacking in the Sumy Oblast border area.[65]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on May 28 but did not make any confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on May 27 and 28 that Russian forces advanced to the northern bank of the Vovcha River in central Vovchansk and in eastern Tykhe (both northeast of Kharkiv City).[66]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Starytsia and Vovchansk on May 27 and 28.[67]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Chechen 204th “Akhmat” Spetsnaz Regiment’s “Bati” Detachment are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[68]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on May 28 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Stroivka (northeast of Kupyansk along the international border).[69] Milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest and west of Kamyanka.[70]
Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk near Stroivka and Doroshivka and toward Dovhenke on May 27 and 28.[71]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on May 28 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove; east of Borova near Zelenyi Hai, Nadiya, and Kopanky; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and toward Olhivka on May 27 and 28.[72]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on May 28 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces recently advanced south of Ridkodub (north of Lyman).[73]
Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Lyman near Ridkodub and toward Novyi Myr, Karpivka, and Zelena Dolyna; northeast of Lyman near Novomykhailivka, Kolodyazi, Katerynivka, and Yampolivka; and southeast of Lyman near the Serebryanske forest area on May 27 and 28.[74]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "Rubikon" Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Izyum (northwest of Lyman).[75]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on May 27 and 28 but did not advance.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Bilohorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on May 27 and 28.[76]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian “Smuglyanka” Detachment are reportedly operating in the Siversk direction.[77]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Chasiv Yar direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Dniprovska Street in central Chasiv Yar.[78]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on May 28 that Russian forces advanced southeast of Shevchenko Microraion (southwestern Chasiv Yar).[79]
Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Chasiv Yar itself, northeast of Chasiv Yar near Orikhovo-Vasylivka, north of Chasiv Yar towards Markove, and south of Chasiv Yar towards Predtechyne and Bila Hora on May 27 and 28.[80]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 215th Reconnaissance Battalion, are reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[81]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 27 and 28 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Druzhba (east of Toretsk) and to western Yablunivka (northwest of Toretsk).[82]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on May 27 and 28 that Russian forces, including elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]), advanced south of Rusyn Yar (northwest of Toretsk).[83] Other Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Shcherbynivka (directly west of Toretsk) and in southern Poltavka (southwest of Rusyn Yar).[84]
Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; east of Toretsk near Druzhba; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; west of Toretsk near Zorya and toward Oleksandro-Kalynove; and northwest of Toretsk near Yablunivka, Popiv Yar, Poltavka, and Rusyn Yar on May 27 and 28.[85]
A Russian milblogger claimed that the Federal Security Bureau (FSB) installed a "Donbas Dome" electronic warfare (EW) system in occupied Horlivka (southeast of Toretsk) to down Ukrainian first-person-view (FPV) drones.[86] The system reportedly directs all technical information to a central FSB command post.
Order of Battle: Elements of the 1195th Motorized Rifle Regiment (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Oleksandro-Shultyne (southeast of Chasiv Yar and northeast of Toretsk).[87] Elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Yablunivka; drone operators of the “Smuglyanka” detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Pleshchiivka (northwest of Toretsk); elements of the 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments, 381st Artillery Regiment, 174th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (all of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA), and 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly operating near Shcherbynivka; drone operators of the “Rubikon” Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Novopaske (west of Toretsk); and drone operators of the 346th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near Toretsk.[88]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 27 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced northwest of Yelyzavetivka (east of Pokrovsk).[89]
Russian forces attacked east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka, Malynivka, Myrne, and Yelyzavetivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Dachenske; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, and Udachne on May 27 and 28.[90] The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Ukrainian forces recently repelled a Russian assault consisting of roughly 30 motorcycles.[91]
The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on May 28 that Russian forces have increased their use of FPV drones and that Russian drone operators are sometimes 15 to 20 kilometers behind the front line.[92] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces operating in the Pokrovsk direction are deploying small mobile groups in civilian vehicles and buggies to down Ukrainian drones with small arms.[93]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 51st CAA (formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DPR AC], SMD) 60th Separate Motorized Rifle Battalion and 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 51st CAA) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[94]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on May 28 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka and Novoserhiivka and toward Muravka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka; and southeast of Novopavlivka near Troitske, Horikhove, and Bohdanivka on May 27 and 28.[95]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on May 28 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Odradne (southwest of Kurakhove).[96]
Russian forces conducted offensive operations west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil, Bahatyr, Andriivka, and Oleksiivka on May 26 and 27.[97] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bahatyr.[98]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 28 shows Russian forces raising a flag in central Zelene Pole (west of Velyka Novosilka), indicating that Russian forces recently seized the settlement.[99] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers credited the 1st and 2nd motorized battalions of the Russian 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) with seizing Zelene Pole.[100]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Zelene Pole and near Komar (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[101]
Russian forces conducted ground attacks northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vilne Pole, Komar, Burlatske, Shevchenko, and Vesele and towards Voskresenka; west of Velyka Novosilka near Zelene Pole; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil on May 27 and 28.[102] Russian milbloggers claimed Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Komar, Zelene Pole, and Novopil.[103]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA) are reportedly operating near Novopil.[104] Elements of the 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (GRU) are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets with TOR-2 thermobaric artillery near Komar.[105] Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets near Maliivka (northwest of Velyka Novosilka in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast in the Ukrainian near rear).[106] Drone operators of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (GRU) are reportedly operating in the Shakhtarske (Velyka Novosilka) direction.[107]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Zaporizhia direction on May 28 but did not make any confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces entered southern and eastern Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv).[108]
Russian forces attacked southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove, Shcherbaky, and Mali Shcherbaky and toward Novoandriivka; and south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka and Robotyne on May 27 and 28.[109] A Russian milblogger claimed on May 28 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Shcherbaky and Mali Shcherbaky.[110]
Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 1455th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and drone operators of the “Viking” drone detachment are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[111]
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on May 28.
Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 17th Tank Regiment (70th Motorized Rifle Division, 18th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[112]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of May 27 and 28. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched five Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles and one Kh-59/69 cruise missile from Kursk and Voronezh oblasts and occupied Crimea and 88 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[113] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 34 drones over northern, eastern, and southern Ukraine and that 37 drones were ”lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that the strikes affected Kharkiv and Kirovohrad oblasts.[114]
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
