Posted on 02/24/2024 5:59:01 AM PST by SpeedyInTexas
“ Any verification of this? ”. (Russia creating a buffer zone)
I believe that was in the context of Russia desiring to push further into Sumy Oblast in Ukraine, to acquire more “buffer” (standoff range from tube Artillery or tactical drones), rather than any attempt to fix the lines in preparation for cessation of hostilities.
Ukrainian drone strikes on Russia, including Moscow region have been ongoing for more than 40 hours.
Moscow airports closed - another air traffic train wreck for the Russian public.
DS has no updates, last was almost 18 km2
But S as a new post and updates on recent gains
Let's (almost) end with this phrase
"They (RF) now have a completely different terrain ahead of them, where the industrial landscapes of the Donbass, gradually fading away, give way to steppe lands with much rarer settlements - all the way to the Dnieper"
S also has a video of moto-units, I remember comparing earlier about egypt/india chariot driver +archer
Talk about ships that have sailed
"I suppose we’re getting closer and closer to full Skynet automation in the killing fields"
Back to iskaders, a reference to double tap earlier
About the recent comment by a Russian official that, legally, the dissolution of USSR required a referendum in Ukraine (referendum that hasn't been done), I have the feeling that it is to introduce the idea that ALL ukrainian oblasts should vote by referendum if they wish to (1) join Russia (2) join their fate to the Galicians in a demilitarized and denazified shithole.
SMO, not war, because Ukraine is not a foreign country. Slow SMO so that the inhabitants of Ukraine have some time to come to reality about which side has decency, morality and a future, and which one hasn't. A master trap.
DJT has reportedly rejected demands by EU warmongers that negotiations on the Ukraine conflict should result in an unconditional ceasefire. When DJT spoke to Ursula, Macron Dior and Friedrich “uses the small spoon” Merz after his call w/ VVP, they insisted that this next round of talks on resolving the conflict “must” end w/ an unconditional truce.
They in fact demanded the adjective “unconditional.”
DJT rebuffed this.
For his part, Peskov asserted that “the interests of entering the peaceful settlement process are above all else. The primary goal is to begin this negotiation process, and all other questions are secondary. There are no deadlines and there cannot be any.”
Meanwhile, General Mordvichev, a veteran commander of the Siege of Mariupol in 2022 and of the Battle for Avdiivka in 2023-2024, has just taken the helm of the Russian Ground Forces.
No military brings in a proven strategist, whose nickname is General Breakthrough, in order to strike a truce. After having submitted the AFU/Azov spectacularly in Mariupol, he followed that up by neutralizing the citadel of Avdiivka, from which cluster munitions and petal mines had been launched @ Donetsk City since 2014.
Notably, however, our Fave Podcasters & Bloggers spend less time on strategic LOC issues than superfluities attendant to talks & diplomacy, including a focus on Zelensky’s clothes or a focus on Macron Dior dusting his nose. These superfluities are *without heat.*
It’s as if the blogosphere has grown bored w/ the machinations of battle, as if the grit alone can’t hold their attention any longer, and are casting desperately about for new dimensions/new angles.
In regard to the iskaders, double tap I mentioned in the post above; there is lots of info on The Twitter if you search. Thanks.
Its supposed to be the city of Sumy and the Sumy oblast; prognosis for success? Zero
I wonder if Russia will try to maintain border security mostly with fence types like our US style southern walls, or with Berlin type cement walls with armed guards at frequent intervals.
Regarding the future of Odessa, I can remember seeing 3 years ago reports that residents of that city who had been almost 50% Russia friendly before 2/24/22, after the events of that week were totally pro Ukraine and marching in the streets with that message. I doubt episodes of indescriminate random bombing of civilian and business locations in and around Odessa has improved their opinion of a Russia based futures.
I wonder if Russia will try to maintain border security mostly with fence types like our US style southern walls, or with Berlin type cement walls with armed guards at frequent intervals.
—
They will never get to that point. None of the things you mentioned would stop an army for more than 1 minute.
Let's remember.
https://t.me/fighter_bomber/21129
On May 19, the FighterBomber Telegram channel—typically a reliable source for insights into Russian military aviation—suggested in a post that Russia's A-100 AEW&CS development program had been canceled.
The last official statement on the A-100 program was issued in December 2023, when Rostec reported that its subsidiary, Vega Concern, was delivering modernized A-50 AEW&CS aircraft to the Russian armed forces while concurrently developing the more advanced A-100 AEW&CS. The report noted that the A-100 is intended to replace the A-50 system and will significantly surpass it in capability.
The A-100 features a fully digital navigation system, a digital flight control system with a “glass” cockpit, and an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar. This “flying radar” system is mounted on an Il-76MD-90A airframe, which is powered by new, low-noise, high-thrust PS-90A-76 engines.
Reasons For Cancellation
There is considerable speculation on social media regarding the reasons behind the reported cancellation of Russia's A-100 AEW&CS program. The prevailing narrative attributes the cancellation to Western sanctions, which allegedly hindered Russia's ability to procure components for the advanced system. However, this explanation warrants skepticism. The A-100’s first flight occurred in 2017, with flight testing beginning in 2019.
Its first flight with an operational radar reportedly took place in February 2022. Given that Russia has been under sanctions since 2014, it is unlikely that the country would have continued developing such a critical system while remaining heavily reliant on Western components.
More plausible reasons for the program's cancellation or pause could include:
Combat losses highlighting the vulnerability of airborne radar systems to long-range missiles.
A review of system requirements, shaped by operational experience and the evolving dynamics of drone warfare.
The feasibility of cheaper, more flexible alternatives to traditional AEW&CS platforms
The FighterBomber Telegram channel, in a follow-up post, hinted at at least two of these factors. When AEW&CS platforms were originally conceived, there were no air- or ground-launched missiles capable of seriously threatening them at their typical standoff distances. These aircraft could operate deep within friendly airspace while surveilling enemy territory. That paradigm has changed. Modern long-range missiles—with ranges exceeding 300 km—now pose a credible threat to AEW&CS aircraft, even when they operate at maximum standoff range.
Russia is believed to have lost two A-50s in such incidents: January 14, 2024: An A-50 was reportedly downed over the Sea of Azov by a U.S.-supplied Patriot missile operated by Ukraine. February 23, 2024: A second A-50 was allegedly shot down over Russia's Krasnodar Krai by a Soviet-era S-200 missile.
Both incidents likely stemmed from the aircraft straying into the lethal envelope of air defense systems due to inadequate situational awareness. Compounding the threat, many modern AD systems are highly mobile, making them difficult to track and predict.
An airborne radar with a 300 km surveillance range is highly advantageous if enemy missile systems have a 60–70 km reach. However, that advantage erodes—and the risk to the platform increases significantly—when missile ranges exceed 150 km, especially if their launchers are mobile and untrackable. While AEW&CS platforms are equipped with defensive countermeasures, the recent losses indicate that these systems do not guarantee survivability. The threat will only grow as AD missile ranges continue to increase.
Following the A-100’s maiden flight, Russia's Ministry of Defense–run Red Star newspaper reported that the platform would serve as a command center for drones, leveraging the extended line-of-sight offered by its airborne position. However, drone warfare is evolving rapidly. Since drone capabilities are increasingly defined by onboard data processing, their advancement may loosely follow Moore's Law.
This technological momentum may have caused scope creep in the original qualitative requirements for the A-100, potentially making its envisioned role as a drone control hub obsolete or impractical. The very concept of an airborne drone control platform may now be outdated, given the rise of low-latency satellite communication constellations like Starlink. Ukraine has demonstrated this effectively by operating drones deep inside Russian territory using Elon Musk's Starlink network. In this context, Russia's most viable course may be to double down on the modernization of its A-50 fleet—at least until the dust settles and the long-term role of airborne command platforms becomes clearer.
AEW&CS Alternatives
Perhaps the most compelling reason to abandon the A-100 program is Russia's potential shift toward an alternative aerial warning and control architecture—one in which high-endurance fighter aircraft equipped with long-range radars and missiles function as distributed nodes of an AEW&CS network. While such a shift might seem risky amidst an ongoing conflict and a perceived existential threat from NATO, Russia possesses the necessary hardware, software, and tactical experience to implement this new concept. Three operational fighters—MiG-31BM, Su-35S, and Su-57—are already equipped with long-range radar systems and networking capabilities that allow them to act as airborne surveillance and control platforms. Additionally, the Su-34 fighter-bomber can carry specialized reconnaissance pods on external pylons, expanding its role beyond strike missions.
Russia has effectively modularized the capabilities of its Tu-214-based reconnaissance aircraft into three externally mounted pods for the Su-34:
UKR-RT: An ELINT pod that detects, locates, and analyzes enemy radio communications, radar emissions, and data links, enabling the targeting of command centers and UAV control stations.
UKR-OE: An optical-electronic pod for round-the-clock visual surveillance to locate and identify ground targets.
UKR-RL: A radar reconnaissance pod with side-looking radar sensors capable of detecting concealed or camouflaged targets in all weather conditions.
Together, these pods greatly enhance the Su-34’s reconnaissance capabilities. When networked with other advanced fighters, they can provide theater-wide situational awareness through real-time sensor fusion, creating a distributed and resilient alternative to traditional airborne early warning systems.
https://www.eurasiantimes.com/a100-aew-is-end-of-eye-in-the-sky-aircraft/
https://bsky.app/profile/wartranslated.bsky.social/post/3lo6fhyawzc2x
The site specializes in intercepting electronic signals from orbit, including from foreign commercial and military satellite systems. It is also involved in processing space-based intelligence used for Russia’s broader military and information campaigns.
https://united24media.com/latest-news/secret-russian-reconnaissance-space-hub-zvezda-targeted-in-drone-attack-8057
Кремлевская табакерка
In Crimea, 14 military personnel, including two officers, were killed in an enemy drone strike. These are the consequences of the drone attack
“Most of the drones were shot down. Unfortunately, not all of them. The enemy hit important targets, valuable military specialists were killed, 14 people. Among them were two officers,” our source in the General Staff reported. Of course, we will not disclose who exactly died and where the enemy ended up. At the same time, we are deliberately publishing information about the deaths of military personnel.
For a long time now, we have been calling on the Ministry of Defense to strengthen the air defense of Crimea and Sevastopol. And enemy drones and missiles constantly break through our defenses on the peninsula, which leads to serious consequences. Andrei Removich [Belousov], maybe it's time to hear our calls?
Once again, ruzzia is about 30 years behind the USAF.
https://x.com/ChuckPfarrer/status/1925877972973605137
https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1925825936471040453
1960s U.S. technology.
https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1925793953502138410
👀 The video shows the combat vehicle burning, and the crew running out of it after being hit by the ammunition.
https://x.com/Maks_NAFO_FELLA/status/1925869360142246173
“Thank God, total mobilization will begin soon!”
This was said by philosopher Alexandr Dugin. He contacted us specifically to comment on Vladimir Putin's statement about plans to create a buffer zone near the border with Ukraine. “ I told you that there would be a total mobilization of millions in Russia. Vladimir Vladimirovich, I am sure, will soon give it a start. I communicate with many military personnel and I know that without mobilization we will not be able to create any sanitary zone! [The wall to be built?] After all, we still have to liberate the DPR and other new regions of the country. We need to think about Kiev and promoting our interests in Europe. Thank God, Putin launched this process! Everything will begin soon!” - believes Alexandr Gelyevich. It must be said that the military is more modest in their assessments. They say that mobilization would not hurt to create a sanitary zone on the territory of several regions of Ukraine. But they do not give predictions about whether it will happen. And they do not comment on how total the recruitment into the army may become.
https://t.me/kremlin_secrets/5701
23MAY2025 Кремлевская табакерка
An important post for all the “tired”
Against the background of attempts at negotiations (either with the Americans or with the Ukrainians), part of society has the mistaken impression that the SVO is about to end. And then we'll see how we'll live! We are forced to publish this post in order to remove the obviously inflated expectations from the agenda. Let's pay attention to several very important processes and situations.
Firstly, there may be more air attacks. The dynamics of recent weeks show that the enemy has not only accumulated resources, but also greatly modernized the production of drones. And missiles, although so far in small quantities.
Secondly, in connection with the increased frequency of attacks, we need to get used to living in conditions of communication interruptions, unstable logistics and flight delays. And there is no need to complain here. The Russian people are very patient. It's okay if you flew to Moscow and were dropped off in Yaroslavl or Ryazan. This is war.
Thirdly, mobilization is probably unavoidable. If we want to win, of course. And the mobilization will be serious.
Fourthly, the economy needs to be held up. Not everything is smooth here. If, again, we want to win.
https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1925840896584454506
Kursk
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