My bad.
OK...LOL
Damage is being assessed.
https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1925115503640445124
Of course, all the drones were shot down.
Posted on 02/24/2024 5:59:01 AM PST by SpeedyInTexas
This list only includes destroyed vehicles and equipment of which photo or videographic evidence is available. Therefore, the amount of equipment destroyed is significantly higher than recorded here. Loitering munitions, drones used as unmanned bait, civilian vehicles and derelict equipment are not included in this list. All possible effort has gone into avoiding duplicate entries and discerning the status of equipment between captured or abandoned. Many of the entries listed as 'abandoned' will likely end up captured or destroyed. Similarly, some of the captured equipment might be destroyed if it can't be recovered. When a vehicle is captured and then lost in service with its new owners, it is only added as a loss of the original operator to avoid double listings. When the origin of a piece of equipment can't be established, it's not included in the list. The Soviet flag is used when the equipment in question was produced prior to 1991. This list is constantly updated as additional footage becomes available.
(Excerpt) Read more at oryxspioenkop.com ...
Damage is being assessed.
https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1925115503640445124
Of course, all the drones were shot down.
https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1925100564930527376
Great news!
Every autopen EO should be invalidated.
Every autopen pardon should also be invalidated.
Let the lawsuits begin.
Let the prosecutions begin.
https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1925177004611014933
https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1925160242179960964
Trump’s Golden Dome Missile Shield: What We Just Learned And Its Implications
Golden Dome is a very ambitious and costly endeavor that could have major ramifications beyond defending America’s skies.
https://www.twz.com/space/trumps-golden-dome-missile-shield-what-we-just-learned-and-its-implications
—
Air Force Chief Responds To Possibility Of Buying New ‘Block 80’ F-16s
The Air Force is still facing an aging fighter fleet and its top officer said loyal wingman drones won’t solve the problem alone.
https://www.twz.com/air/air-force-chief-responds-to-possibility-of-buying-new-block-80-f-16s
—
Plans To Modify Qatari 747 Into Air Force One Now Being Drawn Up By USAF
The USAF is moving forward with coming up with requirements for turning the secondhand 747 into an aircraft able to securely carry the president.
https://www.twz.com/air/plans-to-modify-qatari-747-into-air-force-one-now-being-drawn-up-by-usaf
https://x.com/UkrReview/status/1916390419400622560
My bad.
https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1916446736286961941
https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1916453844138991905
https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1916466998919233826
https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1916108495729971684
There will be no next attempt.
https://x.com/GloOouD/status/1915678637287690727
The invader shoots at the ISR drone, not the FPV drone.
📌 Ukraine will never recognize Crimea or any other part of its territory as Russian;
📌 Will not agree to restrictions on its Armed Forces and defense industry, military assistance from partners;
📌 No third country has the right to veto Ukraine's choice of alliances and allies.
https://x.com/Maks_NAFO_FELLA/status/1915738674399953182
Is it MAGA or is it MEGA?
When President Donald Trump negotiated with President Vladimir Putin on Monday, May 19, was he aiming to lower the cost of the Ukraine war to the domestic US economy, or to enrich it by transferring the war cost to the Europeans, particularly Germany, so that most of their planned €150 billion in loans and €650 billion in country budget outlays for the “ReArm Europe Plan” to fight Russia will get spent in the US?
Is Trump counting on Putin to give him enough of a battlefield pause or armistice in the Ukraine so that Trump can expand US force deployments and allied military procurement further north along the front from the Baltic Sea to Finland and Greenland; south along the Iranian frontier; and east against China?
The last of these, the eastern front war against China – explained Secretary of State Marco Rubio in a Senate committee hearing on Tuesday – is now the strategic priority for the US. Implementing it requires sequencing Trump’s wars. “Every minute we spend,” according to Rubio, “every dollar we spend on this conflict in Europe is distracting both our focus and our resources away from a potential for a much more serious and much more cataclysmic confrontation in the Indo-Pacific…they are related but they’re related both ways — they’re related on the one hand by the precedent that it could set, but they’re also related by the fact that every minute that we spend on this conflict that cannot be won by military means, every resource that’s expended into it is money and time that’s not being spent on preventing a much more serious confrontation from a global perspective in the Indo-Pacific.” – Min 53:51.
This is bigger, “much more serious” than MAGA – Make America Great Again. It’s MEGA – Make the Empire Great Again.
When Rubio went on to explain what the Putin-Trump telephone call was aimed at doing, he was confident the US is taking advantage of what he called Putin’s political weakness, the vulnerability of the Russian economy, high battlefield casualties, and the slowness of the Russian military advance. “I think [Putin] approaches it — we have to assume – from a cold, calculated cost-benefit nation-state evaluation of what’s in the best interest of his view of Russia. What I’m pretty certain of is this is not the war [Putin] thought he was getting when he first invaded Ukraine. I think he anticipated that the government would collapse and that, uh, he would be greeted as a liberator. It has not turned out that way, and in fact Russia today controls less territory than they did after the first two months of the war so they’ve suffered significant losses — they’ve suffered the losses of at least you know by some estimates 200,000-250,000 men in uniform and the Ukrainians have suffered less but nonetheless suffered as well. It is a battlefield today in which the front lines move 10 kilometres at a time in one direction or another. Even if [the Russians] are advancing, they’re advancing at a tremendously high cost. But the challenge Russia faces now is their entire economy stirring up. In their regard we want to see the conflict end in a way that’s enduring, meaning not a peace that lasts three months and then restarts again, but something that’s enduring that both sides could live with for a long period of time without it restarting again.” Min 2:46.50.
The idea that Putin cannot and will not challenge MEGA in Europe except slowly and weakly on the Ukrainian battlefield reinforces the American conviction that if Trump gives Putin enough rope now in the Ukraine, he will hang himself later in the face of MEGA strategy on all fronts, especially on Iran and China, as Putin did in Syria.
Even current critics of Trump’s negotiating tactics with the Russian president believe that Putin doesn’t want to fight MEGA, but aims to come to terms – business deals — that will undermine Russia’s alliances with Iran, North Korea, and China. Putin, as one of the critics claimed this week, “has clearly avoided winning the war because for him it can be achieved for a much greater purpose, a Great Power settlement, a new Yalta.” Min -8:47.
A NATO veteran responds: “The Chinese are in an ill humour. They will take a dim view of any Russian double-dealing, including facilitation of Trump’s sequencing which we can be sure they are aware of.” Regarding Rubio’s answers to the questions he was asked by senators this week, he adds: “I view that hearing with Rubio as nothing more than a council of war.”
In the podcast later today with Nima Alkhorshid and Ray McGovern, we will be discussing the implications for grand strategy on the Russian side, as well as the impact that Putin’s strategy is having on Russian military operations along the front lines. 
Click to listen today at 19:30 Moscow time, 17:30 London, 12:30 Washington.
Speaking operationally, the daily bulletin from the Russian Defense Ministry – banned for readers in many NATO countries – has been reporting the two main features of the battlefield. The first is the slow but steady acceleration of the advance on each of five army group directions, measurable by the rising rate of reported Ukrainian casualties. The second is the absence of electric war strikes against power plants and distribution grids west of Kiev.
The current daily average of Ukrainian Killed in Action (KIA) for May, as announced in Moscow, is 1,370; this compares with the average for April of 1,269, a month-on-month increase of 8%; for March of 1,255 (increase of 1%); for the second half of February, 1,183, and for the first half of February, 951. Since the beginning of February, these figures show the Russian spring offensive commencing and then gaining speed, territory, and firepower. The current daily KIA rate is now 44% higher than it was three months ago.
The record of Russia’s electric war strikes in the Ukraine indicates they occurred on October 10-12 and 16-20, 2022; October 22-27, 2023; March 29-30, 2024; June 1, 2024; and November 7, 2024. Putin then accepted Trump’s proposal for a 30-day halt to attacks on civilian energy infrastructure; that began after their telephone call on February 12. Click to follow each stage of the electric war. These missile and drone strikes have not resumed since February.
Some Russian and western military experts believe there has been a correlation between the impact of the electric war strikes and the success of Russian ground offensives, notably because the disruption of electricity has reduced the Ukrainian capabilities to move equipment and reserves to the front, rebuild fortifications, fight back against Russian breakthroughs, and refresh weakened units.
In a series of eighteen podcasts, retired Hungarian Army major Mark Takacs has been documenting these trends tactically and operationally. Russian military bloggers like Boris Rozhin and Mikhail Zvinchuk are inhibited in the analyses they publish but not because they lack the expertise or the sources. Together, however, they and Takacs expose the errors of fact and mistakes of judgement in Rubio’s account of Russian objectives and intentions.
Click to view the most recent Takacs analysis (lead images, top) of the successful Russian offensive between February and April on the southern flank of the Donbass. The presentation draws several conclusions which are relevant for understanding the end-of-war negotiations now under way.
Despite their tactical victories, Takacs says the Russian advance has been hampered by lack of command-and-control between infantry, artillery, and air support, especially drones. Instead of parallel and coordinated fire support, Takacs says that Russian commanders are taking a week or longer to pepper their targets and soften defences with artillery and drone barrages launched in advance, before the infantry moves. When they break through Ukrainian defences or defeat Ukrainian units, Takacs claims the Russians are often unable to maintain their momentum and press their advantage going forward. One reason he gives is that often they are unable to interdict the deployment of Ukrainian reserves and prevent deliveries of replacement weapons and ammunition.
A NATO veteran says: “it’s clear that Putin has been restricting the General Staff. While the tempo of the spring offensive is increasing, the President’s rule to limit Russian casualties by reliance on drones and artillery will continue. The repeated holes punched in the Ukrainian lines followed up by persistent failure to exploit, surround and destroy the Ukrainian forces, tells us that Putin does not want to risk the possibility at the operational level of a Russian spearhead being cut off and destroyed. At the strategic level I think he’s concerned to avoid a potential battlefield success which might increase the pressure on Trump at home and among the NATO allies to escalate sanctions. Call this an operational regime of throttle down.”
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 19, 2025
US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin held a phone call on May 19 to discuss ceasefire and peace negotiations regarding Russia’s war in Ukraine. Trump stated that he and Putin agreed that Russia and Ukraine will immediately begin bilateral negotiations about both a ceasefire and a peace agreement.[1] Trump also said that he called Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, French President Emmanuel Macron, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, Finnish President Alexander Stubb, and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen after his conversation with Putin and informed them that bilateral negotiations will begin immediately. Trump stated that the Vatican is “very interested in hosting the negotiations.” Trump also expressed interest in reviving US–Russian trade after Ukraine and Russia agree to a peace deal and said that Ukraine could also benefit from trade during the reconstruction process. Putin spoke to journalists following the call on May 19 and stated that he and Trump agreed that Russia would present Ukraine with a “memorandum” detailing conditions and timing for a future peace treaty as the two countries move toward conducting bilateral negotiations.[2] Putin also stated that Russia’s “main” concern is the elimination of the war’s “root causes,” reiterating a long-standing Kremlin narrative calling for the replacement of the current Ukrainian government with a Russian proxy government and Ukraine’s commitment to neutrality.[3] Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov told journalists on May 19 that Trump and Putin also discussed a possible nine-for-nine US–Russian prisoner exchange.[4]
Zelensky stated that he spoke with Trump before Trump’s call with Putin and spoke with Trump, Macron, Meloni, Merz, Stubb, and von der Leyen following the Trump–Putin call.[5] Zelensky reaffirmed Ukraine’s readiness for a full unconditional ceasefire as Trump has previously proposed. Zelensky stated that Ukraine is ready for direct negotiations with Russia “in any format” and offered Turkey, the Vatican, or Switzerland as possible venues for talks. Zelensky called for the negotiation process to involve both American and European representatives “at the appropriate level.” Russia must break its pattern of protracting negotiations and failing to offer any meaningful concessions to Ukraine in order for legitimate and good-faith negotiations to lead to a lasting and sustainable end to its war against Ukraine.
Russia must explicitly acknowledge the legitimacy of the Ukrainian president, government, and constitution and Ukraine’s sovereignty in order to engage in meaningful, good-faith negotiations. Putin and other Kremlin officials have repeatedly falsely claimed that Zelensky is the illegitimate leader according to the Ukrainian Constitution and that all Ukrainian governments since 2014 are also illegitimate.[6] Ukraine’s Constitution and law explicitly state that Ukraine cannot hold elections while martial law is in place and that Ukrainian authorities cannot lift martial law while “the threat of attack or danger to the state independence of Ukraine and its territorial integrity” remains.[7] Russia and Ukraine cannot engage in meaningful negotiations so long as Russia refuses to recognize the negotiating authority of Ukraine. Russian officials have forwarded the narrative about the Ukrainian government’s alleged illegitimacy as recently as May 17, and ISW continues to assess that this Russian effort is aimed at setting conditions for Russia to renege on any future Ukrainian–Russian agreements at a time of Russia’s choosing.[8] Any future peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine must include Russia’s explicit recognition of the legitimacy of the Ukrainian president, government, and constitution.
Russia must agree that ceasefire negotiations must precede peace settlement negotiations. The United States, Ukraine, and Europe have repeatedly called for the establishment of a ceasefire to allow for diplomatic talks to end Russia’s war in Ukraine to proceed.[9] Russia has consistently rejected this sequence of events as part of efforts to hold any ceasefire talks hostage to extract additional concessions from Ukraine and the West.[10] ISW continues to assess that Russia is committed to prolonging peace negotiations so as to continue making battlefield advances.[11] Peace talks ahead of an established ceasefire would allow Russia to continue to make advances in Ukraine, which Russia would likely try to leverage in Ukrainian–Russian talks to extract further concessions. Any future ceasefire will require Russia and Ukraine to engage in separate negotiations to agree on the necessary robust monitoring mechanisms, and conflating ceasefire talks with peace settlement talks will likely delay the implementation of a ceasefire.
Russia must show its willingness to make concessions of its own in any future bilateral negotiations, especially as the Kremlin appears to be setting conditions to expand its list of demands amid the peace talks.[12] Russian officials have called for Ukraine to cede all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts — even the areas that Russian forces do not currently occupy — before Russia can agree to a ceasefire.[13] Territorial demands are typically the subject of war termination negotiations, not ceasefire talks. Russia has reportedly already started to increase its demands, with Western and Ukrainian sources reporting that the Russian delegation threatened to seize Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts — two oblasts that Russia has not illegally annexed or claimed — during the May 16 talks in Istanbul.[14] This tactic suggests that Russia will make additional, more extreme territorial demands during war termination talks should Ukraine agree to Russia’s ceasefire preconditions.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-19-2025
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 20, 2025
Senior Russian officials continue to deny the legitimacy of the Ukrainian president, government, and constitution and Ukraine’s sovereignty despite Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent efforts to feign interest in peace negotiations to end the war. Russian Security Council Secretary Dmitry Medvedev claimed during the St. Petersburg International Legal Forum on May 20 that there are currently no Ukrainian officials with the authority to conclude a peace treaty with Russia and that Russia may need to consult Ukraine’s Constitution to identify authorized negotiation partners.[1] Medvedev questioned Ukraine’s sovereignty and claimed that Ukraine is a “failed state” whose leaders’ lack of legitimacy raises “serious questions” about who Russia can negotiate with during future peace negotiations.[2] Medvedev‘s claims directly contradict Putin’s reported agreement with US President Donald Trump to immediately begin bilateral negotiations with Ukraine.[3] Medvedev’s statements indicate that Russia is, in fact, not interested in engaging with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and other senior Ukrainian government officials who are key to bilateral negotiations to end the war.
Russian officials have repeatedly promoted the false narrative that Zelensky and the Ukrainian government are illegitimate to justify Russia’s refusal to engage in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine and further Russia’s long-standing war goal of establishing a pro-Russian puppet government in Kyiv.[4] Ukraine’s Constitution and Ukrainian law explicitly state that Ukraine cannot hold elections while martial law is in place and that Ukrainian authorities cannot lift martial law while “the threat of attack or danger to the state independence of Ukraine and its territorial integrity” remains.[5] Zelensky also recently clarified that a September 2022 presidential decree does not preclude him from negotiating with Putin.[6] Chairperson of Ukraine’s Verkhovna Rada Foreign Affairs Committee Oleksandr Merezhko recently stated that Ukraine’s Constitution “clearly” specifies Zelensky as Ukraine’s chief negotiator and noted that Zelensky’s constitutional powers allow him to override past decrees.[7] ISW continues to assess that any long-term peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine must include Russia’s explicit recognition of the legitimacy of the Ukrainian president, government, and the Ukrainian Constitution.[8]
Ukraine’s Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine and support Ukraine’s defense industry. Italian media reported in mid-May 2025 that Italian Defense Minister Guido Crosetto announced that Italy approved an eleventh military aid package for Ukraine, which will include one SAMP/T air and missile defense system, 400 M-113 armored personnel carriers, and ammunition.[14] Ukrainian state-owned defense enterprise manager Ukroboronprom reported on May 20 that it signed a memorandum of cooperation with Belgian ammunition manufacturer KNDS Belgium to coordinate the joint assembly of medium-caliber ammunition for automatic cannons.[15]
The European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom (UK) announced several sanctions packages against Russia on May 20.[16] The package is the EU’s largest targeting Russia’s shadow fleet and the Russian energy and military-industrial sector.[17] The EU also sanctioned the Russian Radiological, Chemical, and Biological Defense Troops; the 27th Scientific Center; and the Russian Ministry of Defense’s 33rd Central Scientific Research and Testing Institute for Russia’s use of chemical weapons in Ukraine.[18] The UK also announced new sanctions against Russia’s military, energy, and financial sectors on May 20.[19]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-20-2025
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 21, 2025
Russian President Vladimir Putin likely orchestrated a meeting with Kursk Oblast officials on May 20 to set conditions to justify the renewal of Russian plans to seize Sumy City and illegally annex Sumy Oblast. Putin met with municipal leaders in Kursk Oblast on May 20, during which the head of Glushkovsky Raion, Pavel Zolotarev, asked Putin to create a buffer zone in Sumy Oblast.[1] Putin asked how many kilometers deep this buffer zone should be, and Zolotarev claimed that Russia should seize “at least Sumy (City)” and implied that Russia should be “bigger.”[2] Acting Kursk Oblast Governor Alexander Khinshtein later responded to the interaction on his Telegram channel, claiming that his grandfather was from Sumy Oblast, so “this land is not foreign to [him].”[3] Sumy City is roughly 25 kilometers from the international border, and a buffer zone deep enough to include Sumy City would prevent Ukrainian forces from conducting tube artillery and tactical drone strikes against Russian territory. Western and Ukrainian sources reported that the Russian delegation at the May 16 Ukrainian-Russian talks in Istanbul threatened to seize Sumy Oblast in order to create a “security zone.”[4] ISW continues to assess that Russia has territorial aims beyond the oblasts that Russia has already illegally occupied or annexed and that Putin may intend to leverage further advances in Sumy Oblast to demand that Ukraine cede part of Sumy Oblast to Russia during future peace negotiations.[5]
The Kremlin likely arranged the interaction at the May 20 meeting in order to frame Putin as an effective and engaged wartime leader by responding to Russian requests to further advance in Sumy Oblast and suggesting that Russia lay claim to more territory within Ukraine. Putin’s visit to Kursk Oblast on May 20 for the first time since Russia claimed military victory in the oblast on April 26.[6] ISW has observed reports that Ukrainian forces maintain limited positions in Kursk Oblast as fighting continues, despite official Kremlin claims that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces out of the oblast entirely.[7] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 21 that Ukrainian forces continue active combat operations in Kursk Oblast.[8] Putin also met with Acting Kursk Oblast Governor Alexander Khinshtein and agreed to continue providing federal funding for local residents and to increase demining operations.[9] Putin’s meeting with Khinshtein is part of the Kremlin’s ongoing efforts to portray Putin as an effective and caring wartime leader and to downplay Russian failures in the Ukraine theater.[10]
Russian forces are highly unlikely to be able to seize Sumy City in the near- to medium-term given Russia’s demonstrated inability to rapidly seize even much smaller settlements in Ukraine in the past three years. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on May 19 that elements of the Russian 18th Motorized Rifle Division (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and 72nd Motorized Rifle Division (44th AC, LMD) are conducting most of the assaults in the Sumy direction and that elements of the 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade are likely also operating in the Sumy direction.[11] Mashovets stated that up to four or five motorized rifle and rifle regiments of the Russian mobilization reserve are also operating in the Sumy direction.[12] These limited elements reportedly operating in the Sumy direction are insufficient to seize a city as large as Sumy City (pre-war population of 256,000), and Russian forces have not demonstrated the capability to seize large cities since the first months of the war. Russian forces have not seized a Ukrainian city with a pre-war population greater than 100,000 since capturing Lysychansk, Luhansk Oblast in July 2022, but the seizure of Lysychansk was the result of a slow grinding effort that caused Russian offensive operations in eastern Ukraine to culminate in summer 2022, as opposed to a rapid and effective maneuver operation.[13] Russian forces have since struggled to seize much smaller settlements in subsequent campaigns despite using larger numbers of forces, especially in eastern and northern Ukraine.[14] Ukrainian officials have also previously expressed doubt that Russian forces would be able to conduct an effective offensive operation to seize Sumy City.[15]
Russia continues to reject American proposals to establish a ceasefire in Ukraine before starting negotiations to end the war. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on May 20 that the United States is waiting for Russia to present a document outlining the “terms that [Russia] would require in order to reach a ceasefire that would then allow for broader negotiations.”[19] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov directly rejected on May 21 the idea that Russia and Ukraine should come to “a truce and then we’ll see,” apparently disparaging the United States and its partners’ attempts to facilitate negotiations.[20] Lavrov claimed that Russia does not want to repeat the Istanbul 2022 Ukrainian-Russian talks. Lavrov’s May 21 statement is an explicit rejection of the US proposal for the establishment of a ceasefire first and then peace talks.[21] ISW has long assessed that Russia attempted to use the Istanbul 2022 talks to frame Russia’s demands for Ukraine’s full surrender as legitimate and reasonable.[22] Lavrov’s statements indicate that Russia continues to conflate the ceasefire and peace settlement processes, as Russia remains committed to making incremental gains on the battlefield indefinitely.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-21-2025
Ukraine’s Drone Warfare Revolution: A Game-Changer in Modern Military Tactics
Today at 06:12:18 am
Ukraine’s Drone Warfare Revolution: A Game-Changer in Modern Military Tactics
Story by Charles Mitchell
According to Valeriy Zaluzhniy, the former commander in chief of Ukraine, “The Russian-Ukrainian War has completely changed the nature of warfare,” These are the words that best describe the seismic shift in military warfare brought about by the conflict, which was led by the creative use of drones. These include the most recent instance in which Ukrainian forces shot down a Russian Buk-M3 missile system. The $100-million Buk-M3, Russia’s most sophisticated surface-to-air missile system designed to destroy a wide range of aerial threats, was destroyed. Its destruction not only puts Ukraine’s drone warfare skills to the test, but it also reveals strategic flaws in Russia’s air defense system.
Russia’s overwhelming numbers and artillery have been matched by Ukraine’s military, which has shown itself to be a formidable force thanks to its booming tech sector. The use of drones, which are currently central to Ukraine’s military strategy, is where this revolution is most evident. The Ukrainian army has incorporated drone use into its operations and even established specialized units for precision bombing, artillery firing, and reconnaissance. With its ability to precisely target high-priority targets like the Buk-M3, the FPV drones in particular has been a game-changer.
The effectiveness of the drone campaign is demonstrated by the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ ability to take down more than 40 Buk systems, including the most recent M3 variant. Oryx shared data showing that photographic evidence has documented significant losses in Russian air defense, including the destruction or non-operation of 30 self-propelled launch vehicles (9A317/M) and 23 transporter-loader vehicles (9A316). Both new technology and creative military strategies that make use of the accuracy and adaptability of drones are responsible for this operational excellence.
F-22 Super Raptor - Is It Already Flying?
Today at 06:02:58 am
Recently chrome coated F-22 Raptors have been spotted flying around near Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada. Does this mean there is a Super Raptor in the works? Watch the video to find out more and see how the F-22 Raptors are helping develop the sixth generation NGAD fighter.
Кремлевская табакерка
Gerasimov is preparing a blow to his competitor and wants to imprison him, like General Popov.
The enemy press published the following information : Valery Gerasimov is jealous of Andrei Mordvichev’s successes. And he even stopped allocating him fresh reserves. We are asked: is this true? According to several sources - in the Ministry of Defense and among officers who are directly on the battlefield - unfortunately, it is true. We wrote about the reason for this attitude a long time ago. Back in June of last year, Our blog was the first to publish information that Mordvichev was among the candidates for the post of Chief of the General Staff. At the end of January of this year, it became known that Gerasimov’s seat was shaky, and Andrei Nikolaevich could replace him. Finally, Mordvichev became closer to the post of Chief of the General Staff after the recent personnel changes and the change of the commander of the Ground Forces (as is known, Mordvichev took this post instead of Oleg Salyukov ).
“Gerasimov is not just jealous of Mordvichev and wary of him. He is collecting dirt on him, he already has several folders. And he says that it would be ideal if Mordvichev were imprisoned - like Ivan Popov. Well, and if that does not work out, then at least he will be demoted and deprived of the opportunity to apply for the post of Chief of the General Staff,” a source in the Ministry of Defense told us.
Another revealed the essence of the charges against the general that Gerasimov is preparing (they are different from the charges for which Popov was convicted). According to him, they want to accuse Mordvichev “of unjustifiably large losses of our troops, in particular, during the campaigns to take Avdiivka and Mariupol. And of the orders that led to such losses.” “It is clear that there were no unjustified losses. Yes, many guys died, but the battles were tough. And Gerasimov knows this very well. Moreover, he demanded that Andrei Nikolaevich go on the attack faster. And then, you see, he started thinking about the dead soldiers,” the channel's source said.
Gerasimov’s entourage refused to comment on this information. And they called “stupid” those who are now talking about changing the Chief of the General Staff. Including the fact that Mordvichev could become the new Chief of the General Staff.
bad link - no F-22 info
Your report here regarding top level struggles between Gerasimov and Mordvichev, probably explains the wierdly high Ukraine military death rate reported today as coming from Moscow sources. [The current daily average of Ukrainian Killed in Action (KIA) for May, as announced in Moscow, is 1,370; this compares with the average for April of 1,269, a month-on-month increase of 8%; for March of 1,255 (increase of 1%); for the second half of February, 1,183, and for the first half of February, 951. Since the beginning of February, these figures show the Russian spring offensive commencing and then gaining speed, territory, and firepower. The current daily KIA rate is now 44% higher than it was three months ago.] These figures are nearly identical to those that Kiev has been reporting as Russian casualties. Ukraine has also reported that Ukraine is loosing about 1 drone specialists per 100 or 1000 Russian soldiers (I forget which figure). But whether 100 pr 1000, this certainly paints a terrible figure for Russian “success”.
Of course Gerasimov wants to find someone to blame, but reaching all the way back to mistakes at the Mariupol campaign is quite a stretch. May Russia’s internal wars continue with vigor. Meanwhile figures for the past 2 days of Russia’s human losses, now under 1,000, suggest commanders are holding back on deploying meat waves. When they see what is happening at the top, they must fear what they will be blamed for if peace erupts suddenly. Russians/Putin are not only nasty in their ridiculous proposals for peace settlements, but equally self-destructive in their dealings with one another. This suggests good likelihood for the eventual success of the Europe/Ukraine peace position. So long as we and our leaders do not weaken our resolve for a fair outcome.
Actually in my previous comment I mistook Russian figures as daily rather than as MONTHly as was actually written. Since this Russian figure was for monthly dead, and the daily Ukraine figures is for Russian casualties (which I would estimate as half dead, or even higher), then it would appear Russia is loosing at least 15 times more dead than is Ukraine in recent months. The Russian casualty figures for the past two days indicates some Russian commanders are finally paying attention to unsustainable loss rate. If central command is no longer sending new recruits, this would also influence their meat wave decisions.
It's childish, unsourced nonsense like this that helps propel this bloodbath onward. Thank god people like you are on the hard left and are few and far between.
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