Posted on 02/24/2024 5:59:01 AM PST by SpeedyInTexas
This list only includes destroyed vehicles and equipment of which photo or videographic evidence is available. Therefore, the amount of equipment destroyed is significantly higher than recorded here. Loitering munitions, drones used as unmanned bait, civilian vehicles and derelict equipment are not included in this list. All possible effort has gone into avoiding duplicate entries and discerning the status of equipment between captured or abandoned. Many of the entries listed as 'abandoned' will likely end up captured or destroyed. Similarly, some of the captured equipment might be destroyed if it can't be recovered. When a vehicle is captured and then lost in service with its new owners, it is only added as a loss of the original operator to avoid double listings. When the origin of a piece of equipment can't be established, it's not included in the list. The Soviet flag is used when the equipment in question was produced prior to 1991. This list is constantly updated as additional footage becomes available.
(Excerpt) Read more at oryxspioenkop.com ...
Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s invitation to engage in bilateral negotiations in Istanbul and continues refusing to offer concessions to end the war in Ukraine. Putin spoke to media organizations on the night of May 10 to 11, following the May 10 joint US-Ukrainian-European proposal for a general ceasefire for at least 30 days beginning on May 12.[1] Putin did not agree to the joint US-Ukrainian-European proposal and instead proposed that Russia and Ukraine “resume” on May 15 the direct negotiations that he claimed Ukraine “interrupted” in 2022 in Istanbul. Zelensky and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan accepted Putin's proposal to hold bilateral negotiations in Turkey on May 15.[2] Zelensky stated that he would personally wait for Putin in Turkey and arrived in Turkey on May 15.[3] Putin assigned several Russian officials, who are notably not in Putin's innermost circle, to attend the talks in Istanbul, and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov confirmed on May 15 that Putin will not travel to Istanbul.[4] Putin's rejection of Zelensky’s invitation demonstrates Putin's continued resistance to making any concessions and engaging in legitimate, good-faith negotiations at the highest level.
The Russian delegation in Istanbul does not include officials in Putin's innermost circle and is largely the same delegation that Russia sent to the Russian-Ukrainian negotiations in 2022 in Istanbul. Putin announced on the night of May 14 that Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky is leading the Russian delegation in Istanbul.[5] The delegation also includes Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin, Chief of the Russian General Staff's Main Directorate (GRU) Igor Kostykov, and Deputy Defense Minister Alexander Fomin. Medinsky similarly headed the delegation in 2022, and Fomin and Galuzin’s predecessor participated in the 2022 talks.[6] Kostyukov is the only 2025 participant who did not attend the 2022 talks.
The 2025 Russian delegation also includes four experts from the Presidential Administration, GRU, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) that correspond with the four leading delegation members: Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration for State Policy in the Humanitarian Sphere Elena Podobreevskaya, Director of the Second Department of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Alexei Polishchuk, First Deputy Chief of Information of the GRU Alexander Zorin, and the Deputy Head of the Main Directorate of International Military Cooperation in the Russian MoD Viktor Shevtsov.[7]
Reported Kremlin instructions to Russian media explaining how to cover the Istanbul negotiations indicate that the Kremlin is preparing the Russian population for a longer war in Ukraine and is not interested in engaging in good-faith negotiations that require compromises from both sides. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on May 15 that it acquired a manual that Russian media received from the Presidential Administration's political bloc with instructions about how to cover the negotiations in Istanbul.[15] The manual reportedly instructed Russian media to explain Medinsky’s participation in the Russian delegation as “logical” since he led the Russian delegation in Istanbul in 2022 and is continuing this work. A political strategist who works with the Kremlin told Meduza that Russian officials overseeing domestic policy assess that the Istanbul talks will end in “deadlock” and that the Kremlin assesses that the West will likely impose new sanctions in response to such “deadlock.” The manual reportedly advises Russian media to preemptively talk about a “new package of sanctions” while claiming that new sanctions will not harm Russia's development as Russia “successfully copes with the challenges of any sanctions.” Russian media should reportedly vaguely say that “negotiations are taking place on worse terms for Ukraine” than three years ago, but the manual does not explain how current battlefield realities where Russia controls much less of Ukraine are “worse terms.” The Presidential Administration's claim that the May 2025 negotiations are taking place on “worse terms” for Ukraine compared to 2022 is an attempt to posture Russian military strength and battlefield successes while ignoring Ukraine's significant battlefield successes and ability to slow Russian advances in the last three years of the war. This claim also ignores significant Russian losses among elite forces and increasing reliance on poorly trained recruits.
The Presidential Administration's reported framing of the negotiations demonstrates that Russia expects Ukraine to refuse the terms the Russian delegation will present in Istanbul as Ukraine would not accept terms tantamount to its surrender. Russia similarly issued ultimatums to Ukraine, the West, and NATO in 2021 before it launched its full-scale invasion in 2022 certainly knowing that NATO and Ukraine would not undergo the transformations to their core charters, constitutions, and principles required to meet the Russian demands.[16] The West rejected Russia's pre-war ultimatums, allowing Russia to establish superficial justifications for its subsequent full-scale invasion. Russia's continued insistence on its 2022 Istanbul demands in May 2025 demonstrates that Russia continues to only be interested in a full Ukrainian surrender, is unwilling to offer compromises in any good-faith negotiations, and is prepared to continue the war to achieve its goal of Ukrainian surrender.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-15-2025
Quantity over volume 😂🤡
Here are some rules if you want to photograph that little cocaine nugget in green pants, Zelensky. pic.twitter.com/I3vBE1l7Zt— Dr. Jebra Faushay (@JebraFaushay) May 15, 2025
“the Kremlin is preparing the Russian population for a longer war in Ukraine and is not interested in engaging in good-faith negotiations”
Time to drop the bone-crushing secondary sanctions bomb.
“Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on May 15 that it acquired a manual that Russian media received from the Presidential Administration’s political bloc with instructions about how to cover the negotiations in Istanbul... that the Kremlin assesses that the West will likely impose new sanctions in response to such “deadlock.” The manual reportedly advises Russian media to preemptively talk about a “new package of sanctions” while claiming that new sanctions will not harm Russia’s development as Russia “successfully copes with the challenges of any sanctions.””
Sounds like the Kremlin knows that it is time for President Trump to drop the bone-crushing secondary sanctions bomb.
Let’s drop the bone-crushing secondary sanctions bomb!
“the Kremlin is preparing the Russian population for a longer war in Ukraine and is not interested in engaging in good-faith negotiations”
Time to drop the bone-crushing secondary sanctions bomb.
“Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on May 15 that it acquired a manual that Russian media received from the Presidential Administration’s political bloc with instructions about how to cover the negotiations in Istanbul... that the Kremlin assesses that the West will likely impose new sanctions in response to such “deadlock.” The manual reportedly advises Russian media to preemptively talk about a “new package of sanctions” while claiming that new sanctions will not harm Russia’s development as Russia “successfully copes with the challenges of any sanctions.””
Sounds like the Kremlin knows that it is time for President Trump to drop the bone-crushing secondary sanctions bomb.
Let’s drop the bone-crushing secondary sanctions bomb!
Pitin thinks that he has limited time to complete his conquest or his “reign” Will end.
So he is going all in, problem is “all in” in 2025 does not even remotely come close to what he could have done in 2022.
Ghosts of 1991 are appearing, mass casualties from a war( funny how 15k was “mass”), and plunging oil prices and subsequent revenue to fund his dreams.
“Syria plans to print a newly designed currency in Germany and the UAE instead of Russia, marking a departure from over a decade of wartime cooperation, Reuters reported on May 16”
Looking less likely that Russia will maintain its Naval Base on the Med at Tartus.
Syrian President al Sharaa is coming in from the cold, and being accepted by the West and the Gulf Arabs - a much better deal for him and the Syrian people, than a Russian alliance.
“Pitin thinks that he has limited time to complete his conquest”
There are still a few pillars of Russia’s economy that he is not finished demolishing yet - but he is working on it feverishly.
I think Russia has pretty much accepted defeat in Syria, though they will probably do whatever is necessary to prevent the Qatar-Turkey pipeline from ever being completed.
They are pivoting to Libya and the Sahel. There is currently fighting underway in Tripoli, and it will be no surprise if Russia and their proxy Haftar were involved. Taking Tripoli would solidify Libya as a permanent base in the Mediterranean while pushing Turkish forces out. Thanks Obama and Hillary.
Syrian President al Sharaa is coming in from the cold, and being accepted by the West and the Gulf Arabs - a much better deal for him and the Syrian people, than a Russian alliance.
I saw a story yesterday claiming Israel is holding "secret talks" with Syria to bring them into the Abraham Accords.
Report: Israel holding talks with Syria on Sharaa regime joining Abraham Accords
Now that Russia seems to be increasing its efforts in Lybia, what happened to the possibility of Putin establishing some kind of base in the Sudan? I saw recently that the Kurds in Turkey have moved to resolve matters with the Turkish government. THings are definitely changing in that part of the world. Putin is not happy.
(Russian clients) Taking Tripoli would solidify Libya as a permanent (Russian) base in the Mediterranean while pushing Turkish forces out.
Libya is a Geostrategic prize, that President Trump might be able to secure. It is up for grabs, due to their civil war.
It is a major oil producer, right off the Coast if Italy, and right next door to Egypt.
“what happened to the possibility of Putin establishing some kind of base in the Sudan?”
It is still cooking. The winning faction in Sudan’s civil war is offering Russia a Naval Base on the Red Sea, but it is a relatively small time port, that Russia would have to build out over many years.
The Kremlin has repeatedly publicly demanded that Ukraine cede all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts – even the territory that Russian forces currently do not occupy – but had not formally demanded that Ukraine cede all of Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts before the May 16 Istanbul meeting.[13] Russian officials have informally claimed all of Kharkiv Oblast as part of Russia and launched offensive operations to create buffer zones in Kharkiv and Sumy Oblasts in May 2024 and March 2025, respectively, that are likely part of Russian territorial expansion efforts, however. Kharkiv Oblast occupation governor Vitaly Ganchev claimed in early February 2025 that Kharkiv Oblast is “strategically” and politically significant for Russia and that he was “certain” that Russian forces would seize all of Kharkiv Oblast because Russia needed a “sanitary zone” to protect itself from Ukrainian shelling.[14] Ganchev further claimed that Kharkiv Oblast would have held a “referendum” to become the “fifth oblast to join Russia” in September 2022 had it not been for the successful Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kharkiv Oblast at that time. Russian forces launched attacks across the Sumy-Kursk Oblast border in April 2025 to create a buffer zone and possibly press further toward Sumy City in order to expand Russian territorial demands in Ukraine.[15] Russian forces similarly launched offensive operations in May 2024 to create a buffer zone in northern Kharkiv Oblast, and Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev stated at that time that Russia's envisioned “buffer zone” should encompass all of Ukraine, suggesting that the Kremlin's concept of the buffer zone is a thinly veiled justification for Russia's intent to subsume larger portions of Ukraine.[16]
Russian officials have long been informally laying claim to additional territories in Ukraine beyond Sumy, Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts. Russian officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, have consistently claimed that “Novorossiya” – an invented region of Ukraine that Kremlin officials have claimed includes all southern and eastern Ukraine – is an “integral” part of Russia and that Odesa City is a “Russian” city.”[17] Novorossiya geographically encompasses Kharkiv Oblast. Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo stated in April 2025 that the “return” of the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River to Russia is “fundamentally important” and an “absolute priority.”[18] Saldo called for Russia to completely control the areas of the Dnipro River that pass through Kherson, Zaporizhia, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts – a call for Russia to not only gain control over parts of Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts that Russian forces do not currently occupy but to control parts of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, which Russia has not formally claimed or illegally annexed. The Kremlin may increasingly adopt this pattern of informally discussing additional Russian territorial claims and then formally introducing these claims as demands in peace negotiations in the future.
ISW has consistently assessed that Russian President Vladimir Putin will not compromise in peace negotiations unless Ukraine and the West inflict significant battlefield and economic losses on Russia and force Putin to rethink his theory of victory. Putin articulated his theory of victory for his war in Ukraine in June 2024, which posits that Russia will be able to win a war of attrition against Ukraine by continuing gradual, creeping advances indefinitely and preventing Ukraine from conducting successful, operationally significant counteroffensive operations, assuming Russia's war effort outlasts Western support for Ukraine.[19]
ISW previously assessed that Russia faces a number of compounding materiel, defense industrial, manpower, and economic issues that threaten Russia's ability to continue the war in Ukraine in the long term.[20] Putin is likely prioritizing dividing Ukraine's Western allies and weakening Western support to Ukraine in order to secure his desired end state in negotiations, rather than effectively addressing Russia's domestic problems. Putin's decision to intensify offensive operations throughout Ukraine in March and April 2025 is only exacerbating these issues and underscores his commitment to pressuring Ukraine in negotiations. ISW continues to assess that increased Western – especially US – military aid and economic sanctions are necessary to enable Ukraine to inflict significant battlefield losses on Russia and force Putin to either change his theory of victory or make an economically painful and unpopular decision to implement another partial involuntary reserve call-up.
Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly approved a series of command changes in the Russian military, including a new Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on May 15 to appoint former Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces General Oleg Salyukov as Deputy Secretary of the Russian Security Council.[21] Kremlin-affiliated outlet Izvestia, citing an unspecified source, reported on May 15 that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) appointed Colonel General Andrei Mordvichev as Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces of the Armed Forces to replace Salyukov.[22] Mordvichev most recently served as the commander of both the Russian Central Grouping of Forces and Central Military District (CMD) and oversaw Russia's seizure of Avdiivka in February 2024.[23] Russian milbloggers claimed that the Russian MoD also appointed Colonel General Valery Solodchuk as the new CMD commander, and Russian outlet Ura reported that a high-ranking source in Russian military circles confirmed these reports.[24] Solodchuk most recently served as commander of the Kursk Grouping of Forces and led Russia's efforts to eliminate the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast.[25] Russian insider sources and milbloggers welcomed Mordvichev’s appointment and interpreted it as a sign that the Kremlin is initiating a modernization effort to enhance Russia's ability to plan and execute operations in Ukraine and beyond.[26]
The Kremlin is likely appointing Mordvichev to proliferate positional warfare tactics and operational concepts for grinding marginal advances – the main tactics Russian forces used in the Avdiivka-Pokrovsk direction – across Russia's Ground Forces. Mordvichev’s appointment indicates that the Kremlin approves of the tactics developed under Mordvichev’s command – namely, the use of grinding, highly attritional, infantry-led assaults – and aims to institutionalize these tactics that the CMD used to advance in the Avdiivka-Pokrovsk direction since late 2023.
Mordvichev is one of the few Russian commanders to have achieved tactical penetrations of the Ukrainian line in the last two years and one of Russia's most celebrated commanders at the moment, but these limited tactical penetrations have come at great costs.[27] Russian forces suffered significant personnel and equipment losses in exchange for approximately 60 kilometers of penetration since elements of the CMD first redeployed to the Avdiivka-Pokrovsk direction in October 2023.[28] Mordvichev’s appointment is likely also an effort to distill lessons learned and tactics from the CMD to the rest of the Russian military, as ISW has previously observed Russian units in the Kupyansk and Velyka Novosilka directions implementing the attritional assaults that the CMD utilized to seize Avdiivka in February 2024.[29]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-16-2025
After reading your comment about Libya, I realized that my information about the situation there was very out of date. I had followed the fight to overthrow Ghadaffi on a daily basis back then. I asked Google for information about the various countries and groups involved in the current struggle there. Below is the Google link with a number of articles including from Council of Foreigh Relations, Al Jazeera, Wikipedia and others. Also the AI generated overview of the situation which may or may not be totally accurate.
“The Libyan conflict involves numerous foreign countries and groups vying for influence and control. On one side, the Libyan National Army (LNA) led by Khalifa Haftar, is supported by Egypt, the UAE, Russia, and France. The other side, the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA), receives backing from Turkey, Qatar, and Italy. Additionally, various other foreign groups, including armed groups from Sudan and Chad, have also been involved.
Countries and Groups Supporting Khalifa Haftar’s LNA:
Egypt: Supports Haftar’s LNA with air strikes and other military aid.
UAE: Provides financial and military support to the LNA.
Russia: Supports the LNA and seeks to secure oil and construction deals.
France: Also supports Haftar’s LNA, offering military and political backing.
Countries and Groups Supporting the UN-backed GNA:
Turkey: Supports the GNA with military aid and mercenaries, seeking to expand its influence in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Qatar: Provides financial and political support to the GNA.
Italy: Supports the GNA and has been a key player in brokering political agreements.
Other Foreign Groups Involved:
Armed groups from Sudan and Chad: Participate in the conflict, contributing combatants to both sides.
Private security companies: Including the Wagner Group, have been present in Libya.
Al-Qaeda and Islamic State cells: Maintain a presence in Libya, contributing to the instability.”
It is interesting to see the various neighbors who are supporting one faction or another. Does Trump really want to jump into that snake pit?
Here is a recent source (probably OK when it was published 31MAR2025)
Trump's national security team is seeking to blunt Russian influence in the Mediterranean and in Africa by engaging eastern Libya warlord Khalifa Haftar, despite his well-documented human rights abuses.
Russia's steady expansion of forces in Haftar-controlled territory positions Moscow to help anti-Western military governments in Africa.
Trump officials conducted a show of force in Libya in February to try to weaken Haftar’s ties to the Kremlin.
Haftar’s opponents fear he will use aid from both Washington and Moscow to try to consolidate control over the whole country
https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2025-march-31/
It takes daily monitoring to keep an eye on Libya, (as well as Syria). I only check occasionally and that's not enough.
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