Attack On Europe: Documenting Russian Equipment Losses During The 2022 Russian Invasion Of Ukraine (2 year anniversary)

This list only includes destroyed vehicles and equipment of which photo or videographic evidence is available. Therefore, the amount of equipment destroyed is significantly higher than recorded here. Loitering munitions, drones used as unmanned bait, civilian vehicles and derelict equipment are not included in this list. All possible effort has gone into avoiding duplicate entries and discerning the status of equipment between captured or abandoned. Many of the entries listed as 'abandoned' will likely end up captured or destroyed. Similarly, some of the captured equipment might be destroyed if it can't be recovered. When a vehicle is captured and then lost in service with its new owners, it is only added as a loss of the original operator to avoid double listings. When the origin of a piece of equipment can't be established, it's not included in the list. The Soviet flag is used when the equipment in question was produced prior to 1991. This list is constantly updated as additional footage becomes available.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 31, 2025

The Kremlin continues efforts to sow division between the United States and Europe. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov accused “almost the entire European West” of attempting to prolong the war in Ukraine and contributing to the “rehabilitation of Nazism,” and continued to falsely portray the Ukrainian government as neo-Nazis during an interview on March 30.[13] Lavrov claimed that Europeans “unleashed” “all the tragedies of humanity before 1939, including World War II” and that elites currently in power in most European Union (EU) and NATO countries retain the “instincts” to bring about these tragedies. Director of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs International Organizations Department, Kirill Logvinov, reiterated to Kremlin newswire TASS on March 31 that Russia continues to view a European peacekeeping contingent in Ukraine as unacceptable and criticized ongoing UK and French efforts to create such a contingent.[14] Logvinov similarly blamed European countries, specifically European elites, of causing the war in Ukraine and seeking to extend the war. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev similarly criticized European countries for alleged “Russophobia” about the war and threatened Europe with Russian missiles.[15] Medvedev routinely makes extreme statements aimed at persuading Western states to act according to Russia's interests.[16] These statements are part of the Kremlin's broader efforts to falsely portray European countries as seeking to prolong the war in contrast to ongoing US efforts to secure interim ceasefires and eventually a full peace in Ukraine. This rhetoric is aimed at undermining Western unity in supporting Ukraine.[17]

Russia is reportedly struggling to restore what few tanks remain in its stocks. Ukrainian research outlets Resurgam and Viskovyi Vishchun published an analysis of satellite imagery on March 28 and concluded that Russia has 3,463 tanks at its main open air storage bases and 1,253 tanks at armored vehicle plants and that restoration rates have dropped from 120 tanks per month in 2022 to 30 to 35 tanks per month in early 2025.[76] The analysis estimated that Russia has an additional 2,000 tanks in closed (not open-air) storage warehouses. The analysis determined that Russia could restore roughly 1,200 of these tanks more quickly than newly producing them and that Russia would likely source spare parts from the remaining tanks for existing tanks. The analysis concluded that Russia has likely pulled all tanks most suitable for restoration from its existing stores and will have exhausted its stocks of tanks in “satisfactory condition” for restoration by the second half of 2025. The analysis stated that Russia will likely only be able to compensate for a maximum of 30 percent of its total tank losses since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022 at its current loss rates and will likely field fewer armored vehicles due to shortages. The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) estimated on February 10 that Russia lost 1,400 main battle tanks (roughly four tank divisions’ worth) in 2024 and that Russia could theoretically sustain these losses until February 2026 or 2027 by refurbishing Soviet-era tanks, though it is unclear if Russia could sustain these loss rates with a significantly slowed refurbishment rate.[77] Russia may not be willing to sustain these increased armored vehicle loss rates and has been conducting fewer mechanized assaults thus far in 2025.[78]

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on March 31 authorizing Russia's regularly planned semi-annual military conscription, which will conscript 160,000 Russians between April 1 and July 15.[79] The decree states that men aged 18 to 30 are subject to a 10-month conscription and that conscripts will not serve in occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, or Kherson oblasts and will not conduct “special military operation tasks.” The decree exempts men in 54 raions of Russia's far north due to inclement weather. Russia continues gradually increasing the number of men conscripted in its spring conscription cycles. Putin previously signed decrees conscripting 134,500 Russians in Spring 2022, 147,000 in Spring 2023, and 150,000 in Spring 2024.[80] Russia conscripted 133,000 Russians in the Fall 2024 conscription cycle.[81]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2025

Iran continues to coordinate with Russia and China on nuclear issues. Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi met with Russian Ambassador to Iran Alexey Dedov in Tehran on March 31 to discuss nuclear talks and sanctions relief.[26] Gharibabadi said Iran, Russia, and China will continue trilateral meetings and that Russia invited him to a UN Charter group meeting in Moscow in mid-April. The meeting follows a March 14 joint statement from Russia, China, and Iran that condemned US sanctions and described Iran's nuclear activities as “peaceful.”[27] It remains unclear what Iran hopes to gain from this coordination or how Russia and China plan to support Tehran under growing US pressure. CTP-ISW previously assessed that Russia is unlikely to secure US interests through mediation, particularly in talks on Iran's nuclear program and support of the Axis of Resistance.[28]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-31-2025

Кремлевская табакерка

The retirement age in Russia will be raised, as we said. Among the reasons are mobilization and “dozens of years of wars”

Back in January, we wrote that the authorities were planning to raise the retirement age. The channel's insider information was confirmed at the official level. Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Economic Policy Mikhail Delyagin allowed for the possibility of raising the retirement age in Russia to 70 years and above. This fully confirmed our information. The deputy saw plans regarding the retirement age in the intentions of the Ministry of Health to raise the age of youth to 44 years. But it turned out that the reason is not only that the country needs to increase the number of workers and reduce pension payments.

Philosopher Alexandr Dugin, citing plans being developed in the Kremlin, claims that it is a matter of mobilization. “ I have said more than once that Russia has several decades of wars ahead. Soldiers are needed for wars. The army needs to be replenished globally. Therefore, the authorities are taking wise steps. They are raising the age of youth (”War is a matter for the young,” remember?) and are going to raise the age up to which citizens can be mobilized. Those who cannot join the army now will eventually join it. Both at the front and in the rear, if fighting is absolutely impossible, the rear also needs soldiers. I would rephrase and say: “War is everyone's business,” Aleksandr Gelyevich said in a conversation with us.

The Kremlin did not comment on these words, noting only that they are considering “dozens of different solutions to strengthen Russia.” And the Ministry of Defense does not know about plans to raise the mobilization age and even extend it to some of the current pensioners. But they believe that such an idea “has its pros and cons.” After all, according to a source in the ministry, at some point those willing to sign contracts will run out, and the army will need to be actively replenished for a long time. And it's good that even now, when there is no mobilization in Russia, plans are being developed for what it will be like.

https://t.me/kremlin_secrets/5482

A significant watershed has been achieved in demilitarizing Russia.

We have arrived into the zone that this thread has long been tracking. Russia can no longer sustain the size of its operational tank force on the battlefield. The ability of its old Soviet storage to replace its combat losses has been exceeded. It is now a rapidly declining tank power, compared to its regional competitors, like Turkey and Poland.

Putin’s folly has taken Russia down to that. It’s words may threaten its neighbors, but it’s former Reserve of Tank Armies no longer do.

The overall quantity operational, as well as the quality, is now declining. It’s replacement rate is on track to continue to decline this year, until the old Soviet stockpile is effectively completely exhausted, except for parts cannibalization, later this year (at current loss rates of loss), and replacements will then be mostly limited to the low number that they are capable of producing new (only around 200 per year).

“restoration rates have dropped from 120 tanks per month in 2022 to 30 to 35 tanks per month in early 2025…. Russia could restore roughly (only) 1,200 of these tanks (Remaining from covered storage) more quickly than newly producing them... The analysis concluded that Russia has likely pulled all tanks most suitable for restoration from its existing stores and will have exhausted its stocks of tanks in “satisfactory condition” for restoration by the second half of 2025.”

The protests last time:

On June 14, 2018, the Russian government announced the plan of the pension reform presuming a substantial increase of the retirement age (for men from 60 to 65 and for women from 55 to 63).

On September 9, the demonstrations against the plans to raise the national retirement age were organized by Alexey Navalny all over Russia. The events occurred in more than 80 cities including the capital. The most of actions were not permitted by the authorities, and the police detained in total about 1000 participants. Beyond the anti-reform slogans, the participants chanted “Russia without Putin” and held signs with messages like “Putin, when will you go on pension?

The reform has heavily affected the Russia's local elections in September 2018: the results of the governing United Russia party was the worst for more than 10 years

Despite the protests, on September 27, the amended version of the bill was passed by the State Duma.
The pension reform was launched on January 1, 2019.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2018_Russian_pension_protests

If the retirement age will be raised to 70, what will happen?

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