The deal also opens up billions of euros to be spent on Ukrainian defense.
https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/1900585890113613993
Posted on 02/24/2024 5:59:01 AM PST by SpeedyInTexas
This list only includes destroyed vehicles and equipment of which photo or videographic evidence is available. Therefore, the amount of equipment destroyed is significantly higher than recorded here. Loitering munitions, drones used as unmanned bait, civilian vehicles and derelict equipment are not included in this list. All possible effort has gone into avoiding duplicate entries and discerning the status of equipment between captured or abandoned. Many of the entries listed as 'abandoned' will likely end up captured or destroyed. Similarly, some of the captured equipment might be destroyed if it can't be recovered. When a vehicle is captured and then lost in service with its new owners, it is only added as a loss of the original operator to avoid double listings. When the origin of a piece of equipment can't be established, it's not included in the list. The Soviet flag is used when the equipment in question was produced prior to 1991. This list is constantly updated as additional footage becomes available.
(Excerpt) Read more at oryxspioenkop.com ...
The deal also opens up billions of euros to be spent on Ukrainian defense.
https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/1900585890113613993
That is good news. Ammo depts, CC, POL…. should be concerned.
How about the kerch bridge?
This time it is a Russian town destroyed(liberated).
I would agree with that. Would also add railroad bridges within range
The port city is home of the remnants of the Russian Black Sea Fleet which had to flee from Russian-occupied Sevastopol.
https://x.com/Tendar/status/1900652635348176898
https://x.com/Tendar/status/1900651832965304687
“There is a large fire raging in Novorossiysk, Russia.”
Novorossiysk is a major oil export port.
ISW has observed no geolocated evidence to indicate that Russian forces have encircled a significant number of Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast or elsewhere along the frontline in Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed during a press conference on March 13 that Russian forces have “isolated” Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast and that it is “impossible” for small groups of Ukrainian forces to withdraw from positions in Kursk Oblast.[1] Putin claimed that Ukrainian forces will not be able to leave Kursk at all “if” Russian forces can conduct a “physical blockade” in the coming days. Putin stated during a Russian Security Council meeting on March 14 that Russian forces have “blocked” unspecified Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast.[2] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 14 that Russian authorities are fabricating claims about the alleged “encirclement” of Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast in order to influence the political and informational scene.[3] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces have regrouped and withdrawn to more advantageous defensive positions in Kursk Oblast and that Ukrainian forces are not under threat of encirclement.
Russian milbloggers have also not coalesced around claims that Russian forces have encircled or “blocked” a significant number of Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast in recent days, but milbloggers may alter their reporting to mirror Putin's claims in the coming days. Some Russian milbloggers claimed on March 12 and 13 that Russian forces encircled an unspecified number of Ukrainian forces in an unspecified area of Kursk Oblast, but many Russian milbloggers published maps on March 13 and 14 acknowledging that Ukrainian forces have viable egress routes into Sumy Oblast from their remaining positions in Kursk Oblast.[4] At least one Russian milblogger explicitly questioned claims that Russian forces encircled Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast on March 12, and another complained on March 12 that Russian forces are unable to encircle Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast because Russian forces cannot conduct rapid, mechanized breakthroughs into rear Ukrainian areas.[5]
Putin claimed in October 2024 that Russian forces “encircled” 2,000 Ukrainian troops in Kursk Oblast, but ISW never observed any Russian milblogger claims or geolocated footage to substantiate Putin's October 2024 claim.[6] Putin has repeatedly failed to acknowledge that the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast extends from the Ukrainian-Russian international border and that Ukrainian forces can transit the sections of the border under Ukrainian control.
US intelligence reportedly continues to assess that Putin is unwilling to end the war in Ukraine and remains committed to conquering Ukraine, which is consistent with ISW’s long-term assessment of Putin's objectives in Ukraine and unwillingness to negotiate in good faith. The Washington Post, citing unspecified people familiar with the matter, reported that classified US intelligence reports assess that Putin remains committed to his goal of dominating Ukraine.[16] The Washington Post reported that a US intelligence assessment dated March 6, 2025, concluded that Putin remains determined to “hold sway” over Ukraine. Current and former US officials told the Washington Post that if Putin did agree to a temporary ceasefire, Russia would use the ceasefire to rest and refit Russian forces and that Putin would likely break the agreement and falsely blame Ukraine for violating the ceasefire. Four Western intelligence officials and two US congressional officials told NBC on February 18 that intelligence from the United States and US allies shows that Putin still aims to control all of Ukraine and that there is no intelligence suggesting that Putin is ready for a peace deal.[17] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin maintains its long-standing goals in Ukraine, which amount to Ukraine's full capitulation, and the Kremlin has maintained its expansionist rhetoric despite recent talks with the Trump administration about peace in Ukraine.[18]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-14-2025
Генерал СВР
14MAR2025
Negotiations on a possible ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine have entered the final stage, with representatives of US President Donald Trump in Moscow and communicating directly with the Russian leadership. We have already reported that the Politburo has put forward a number of demands for possible agreements on ending hostilities, and now Trump’s representatives are trying to agree on these issues. It is worth paying attention to several very important details that accompany the negotiation process.
Yesterday, the preparation of the double, who is considered to be “Putin”, was much more thorough than the day before, when an unprepared recording of the double’s communication with representatives of the military leadership was released. A repeat of such a blunder in front of a wide audience would mean a serious crisis and doubts, primarily on the domestic track, that “the tsar is not real.” Although previous blunders quite clearly show that the role of Putin is played by a double, but two times in a row would mean a complete fiasco. It should also be noted that yesterday, at a joint exit with Lukashenko, “Putin” was not aware of the real state of affairs in the Kursk region.
Yesterday’s information from the assistant to the President of the Russian Federation Nikolai Patrushev about the dangers posed by NATO in the Baltic Sea is also worthy of attention. Since Nikolai Platonovich is the head of the “hawks” in the Politburo and runs the second largest tower of the Kremlin, it is possible to understand where exactly the attention of the Russian military leadership will be directed after the possible end of the conflict in Ukraine. Patrushev is perhaps the only strategist among the few tacticians in the military and security bloc of the country.
1. Don't say “they wouldn't do that, it doesn't make sense”.
Abandon any assumptions about what Russia might do that are based on what a Western liberal democracy would consider rational. Russia's decision-making framework is bounded by an entirely different understanding of history, geography, social policy and relations between countries from that of the West. To understand the choices open to Moscow, it is critically important to see the world through a Russian lens, rather than be guided by what “makes sense” in Washington or Brussels.
2. Don't confuse understanding Russia with excusing Russia.
Russia is guided by its own distinctive sense of historical imperatives, and consequently an enduring sense of privilege to disregard commonly accepted norms of behaviour. But the conviction with which these views are expressed does not necessarily make them right, or provide an excuse when they are acted on in ways the West finds repugnant.
3. Don't ask binary questions.
Don't ask about Russia “is it either this or that”, “either yes or no”. The answer is likely to be both, at the same time, or neither, or more. Dealing with Russia necessitates being comfortable with paradoxes and contradictions, and many things spoken and written about Russia are both true and not true at the same time. Consequently, when you ask “why does Russia do X”, don't look for just one answer. There will be several reasons, some of which will overlap and some of which will contradict each other.
4. Don't be distracted by bluster, bravado and bluff.
Just because Russia makes a lot of angry noise about your plans or proposals doesn't mean Moscow will not be prepared to live with them when they are implemented. Russia defaults to threats and feigned outrage in order to improve its negotiating position, because the West's responses show that this sometimes works. Listen instead for changes in tone that indicate real concerns.
5. Don't forget that Russia does not consist of just one man.
The current leader in the Kremlin at any one time is not the problem if he is driven by persistent Russian beliefs and imperatives. The country and its leaders respond to internal and external challenges in ways that remain consistent over centuries; course corrections that accompany a change of leadership tend to be temporary aberrations.
6. Don't just hope for “change”.
Change in Russia is rarely as deep as it appears, and certainly not always for the better; so it is dangerous to assume that political change in Russia is desirable because it will necessarily be an improvement. Russia's current behaviour towards other countries and its own citizens is reprehensible. But by historical standards, Russia is still in a period of unprecedented liberalism. It would be hard for things to get better, but it would be very easy for things to get far, far worse.
7. Don't expect Russia to respect values and standards that were invented elsewhere.
You can't embarrass Russia over its behaviour at times when it places no value on its reputation. “Naming and shaming” has limited effect: it is important to “name” by continuing to call attention to Russian actions and holding Moscow to account for them, but do not expect Russia to feel the “shame”. What western liberal democracies think, or believe, or would like to happen is not a deciding criterion when Russia considers which course of action to choose.
8. Do not hope to appeal to Russia's better nature. It doesn't have one.
Russia sees compromise and cooperation, with no evident and immediate benefit to state or leadership interests, as unnatural and deeply suspicious. This places strict limits on the potential for working with Moscow even on what may appear to be shared challenges.
9. Don't assume that there must be common ground.
It's natural to search for these shared challenges, assuming there must be some way we can work with Russia on mutual interests. But there is a reason this search does not bring results, despite being conducted intensively throughout the almost three decades since the end of the USSR. Whenever it appears that Russia and the West could work together on a problem, it quickly becomes clear that not only Moscow's understanding of the issue, but also its preferred solution and the methods it would favour to deliver it are entirely incompatible with Western norms, values and even laws.
10. Don't think that you can choose whether to be at war with Russia or not.
Sometimes de-escalation, taken to its logical conclusion, equates to surrender. At the same time, Russia will never be “at peace” with you. Normal relations with Russia include fending off a wide range of hostile actions from Moscow; this is the default state throughout history, and Western nations should by now be realising this is the norm.
https://icds.ee/en/the-moscow-rules-ten-principles-for-working-with-russia/
Martti J Kari
Russia: What Western Leaders & Media Still Don't Understand It's Strategic Culture?
Explanation and prediction of Russian state, how its toxic historical foundation, state cruelty, authoritarianism, broadly embedded hierarchy of kleptocratic corruption, shades of gray between truth, tactical truth, and lie, imperialism, conservatism, and exceptionalism hinders it from becoming a liberal free country.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sGwpn0dczlQ
English version 1h
Rob Dannenberg: The Art of Negotiating with Vladimir Putin
If Putin achieves a “peace agreement” with U.S. assistance that allows him to achieve two of his objectives for the war: the occupation of Ukrainian terrain and the “neutralization” of Ukraine, this will be for Putin a major victory and he will portray it that way. It's not difficult to see how this will set the stage for a future aggressive action by Russia just as the U.S. and Western lack of effective reaction to the annexation of Crimea in 2014 set the stage for the current conflict.
In 2022, with former President Joe Biden in the Oval Office, Putin assessed that the U.S. would respond in a similarly feeble manner and he launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine by launching paratroopers into the capital with orders to gun down civilians who happened to be in the way. While we seem to have forgotten the brutality of this unjustified invasion, let us not also forget that Putin's assessment of U.S. leadership was accurate. The Biden Administration for all its rhetorical support of Ukraine, slow-rolled the actual support and that is the principal reason why Ukraine was armed enough not to lose – but not armed to win.
President Trump's team should also keep in mind the basic principles of negotiating with Russia that have been true from the establishment of the Soviet regime in 1919, if not before. 1) Never let Russia believe it is negotiating from a position of strength. 2) Never concede any of your opponent's key negotiating objectives before negotiations have even started. 3) Make apparent before negotiations begin the cost of failed negotiations to your opponent. There is an old Russian adage about negotiations: what is ours is ours, what is yours is negotiable.
https://www.thecipherbrief.com/column_article/the-art-of-negotiating-with-vladimir-putin
John Schindler: Putin’s Attack on Ukraine Is a Religious War
Russia’s aggression against its neighbor isn’t just power politics and geostrategy, it’s about core issues of faith and identity
https://topsecretumbra.substack.com/p/putins-attack-on-ukraine-is-a-religious
True, reminds me of discussions I had with folks about the ME.
We have a tendency to think that people around the world have similar values, and if we see something so contrary to that we try to find something to explain it.
For instance, seeing a mother thanking their god that their child wore a suicide vest into a shop to blow up people is almost impossible to fathom, so we default to something like “there must be some other reason or they are mentally ill”
Nope, that is what they believe
Russian Mir is similar. Russia can have invaded other countries many times, been allied with nazi germany at the beginning of WW2, but Russia is always the “victim”
Russians invade Ukraine, justified, Ukraine invades Russia, Ukrainians are terrorists. Russia launches 10s of 1000s of drones and missiles into Ukraine, justified, Ukraine launches 1000s of drones into Russia, terrorist action. Russia razes cities, justified, Ukraine counters, terrorist action. NATO expands, this is threat to Russia, Russia expands through invasion and coercion, perfectly fine we need to defend ourselves….., Ukraine gets aid from countries, red line, Russia gets aid from China, NK, Iran, again perfectly fine.
Russia clamps down on press, free speech, democracy in action, Ukraine and Russian Orthodox Church (KGB) and Ukraine is a dictatorship
https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1900874600969289915
https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1900868515353055673
https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1900813506754007387
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