Chuck is doubling down on “Pontoon Ferries/Bridges” the same way he did when he pushed so hard that the Saki Airfield attack could only be ATACMS. At least this is an area where he has expertise, but I think he’s way out over his skis on this.
I haven’t commented on this. But others strongly disagree with the pontoons assertion.
Not taking side here but this is Chuck Pfarrer’s explanation {edited to make parties clearer}
It is a finding of fact that UKR has communicated an augmented company-sized force across the Dnipro. Not many people argue that. That unit has taken, and continues to hold, the village of Kozachi Laheri. Again, fact.
This unit has not only captured dozens of RU prisoners, but it continues (daily) to hold off Russian counterattacks.
Q) How’s that happening?
A) Ipso Facto, that unit is being supplied from the north bank of the river.
Q) But there is no pontoon crossing!
A) Fair enough. Please explain how a UKR ‘raiding force’ is still in possession of Kozachi Laheri. They don’t get supplied by Door Dash. How are they being supplied?
Having some actual combat experience (and formal training) in amphibious warfare, pontoons, causeway sections and river crossings, I’d suggest to readers it would be impossible for UKR to supply, maintain and reinforce the landing site without using pontoon sections.
The volume of ammunition, weapons, and materiel is too great to be supplied by small boats. Small craft that would be required to operate continuously, night and day, to meet the logistical requirements of a company in active combat.
It isn’t small boats, folks.
For interested parties, an idea of the daily tonnage of required food, fuel, ammunition and materiel for a company sized unit in combat may be computed using this reference:
https://army.mil/article/176881/logistics_forecasting_and_estimates_in_the_brigade_combat_team
Suffice it to say, were a taking about tons of equipment ammo, food, fuel, water and materiel - daily.
Q) But there is no bridge, you (fill in expletive).
A) But there is a UKR force operating across the river.
That unit fights every day. The longer that force holds on to the Kozachi Laheri landing site, the more certain I am that pontoon sections and ferry barges are being used to supply those troops.
Q) No way! (I was never in the military, but...)
A) Oddly enough, I was in the service. I have reconnoitered and sited river crossing points.
I’m delighted to listen to anyone who can convince me that UKR’s continuing lodgment at Kozachi Laheri is supported by some other means than pontoons.
I’d like to hear just exactly how the wheeled and tracked UKR vehicles now operating around Kozachi Laheri were communicated across the Dnipro.
It’s okay. Start typing. I’ll wait. (Extra points for providing a copy of your DD 212. Combat engineers will have their responses reposted.) <— a joke
Q) Yeah, but where are the pontoons? I can’t see them!
A) You can be sure that a UKR pontoon crossing would not be left in place during daylight.
I’d also remind readers that pontoons are components. Component parts that can be moved into and out of position and camouflaged when not in use. A pontoon crossing span is not a permanent fixture.
Q) Why can’t we see the crossing?
A) Military history is replete with a history of camouflaged river crossings.
River crossings are usually hidden. The trick is at least as old as the writing of Xenophon (~350 BCE).
More recently, the US experience in Vietnam proves this. The NVA (North Vietnamese Army) constantly surprised the US with semi submerged river crossings - pontoon sections that went undiscovered by overhead recons.
The NVA used these crossing points deliver armored vehicles into combat - often to the total shock of US forces.
Q) Why did I double down on the reports?
A) 1st, the unimpeachable reliability of the original sources.
These sources gave me hourly updates on the operation. Facts that I delayed reporting for 24-36 hours and were later confirmed my multiple ‘official’ reports. These guys have never given me bad information.
Q) Tell us who your sources are!
A) Seriously. People say that. Often while they are spewing obscenities.
The factors above allow me to continue these reports with a high degree of confidence.
I’d also suggest this: the extant and expanding UKR force on the south bank confirms that UKR is maintaining adequate levels of logistical support. And in my experience, that means pontoons.
Q) Helicopters?
A) Fair enough. But UKR is unlikely to risk helicopters in a highly challenging air defense environment for routine and ongoing resupply missions.
Aircraft are vulnerable in transit, on approach and then on exfil - and they are sitting ducks as they are unloaded on the LZ. We know that small boats were used to evacuate the wounded, so I’m thinking helos are not being risked here.
https://twitter.com/ChuckPfarrer/status/1691870499771470316
See #98