The Great Israeli Iron Dome Hoax (You gonna believe me or your lying eyes?)

Call it a billion dollar + scam. Add another congressionally funded $225 million tax dollars. Expect millions more on request.

In April 2002, noted MIT physicist Theodore Postol headlined his Technology Review article "Why Missile Defense Won't Work."

The notion is more hoax than possibility. His reasoning was detailed and technical. What's supposed to work doesn't as claimed

Hitting and destroying a missile with another one isn't possible. It may never be other than occasional lucky exceptions. Claims otherwise are fabricated to maintain funding and deceive populations into believing they're safe.

According to Postol, "(t)his should be of profound concern to every US citizen" and every Israeli one.

"The officers and program managers involved in developing the antimissile system have taken oaths to defend the nation."

"Yet they have concealed from the American people and Congress the fact that a weapon system paid for by hard-earned tax dollars to defend our country cannot work."

The same holds for Israel's Iron Dome. Postol asks is it more sieve than effective missile shield?

Israel's early warning system alone works as intended. It gives people time to shelter for safety.

According to Postol, "the probability of (Iron Dome) destroying the artillery rocket warhead is essentially zero."

The same holds for Iron Dome intercepts "chasing rockets from behind. Occasional Iron Dome intercept attempts arise in a near-vertical trajectory.

"That is the only engagement geometry where (it) has a non-zero chance of destroying the rocket - the artillery rocket warhead," says Postol.

At least 95% of ID attempts fail. During the 1991 Gulf War, fabricated Patriot missile defense success was reported as 96% or greater.

Postol and others at MIT analyzed the data. They called likely Patriot success ZERO.

When Israelis see overhead explosions erroneously called successful intercepts, they're observing ID warhead explosions.

Money spent on ID and other missile defense hoaxes are wasted taxpayer dollars and shekels. People are deceived to believe otherwise. Safety is available in shelters alone.

"I would not spend money on an interceptor that has a near-zero chance of intercepting an artillery rocket," says Postol.

A July 10 erroneous Reuters report is typical of major media lies. It claimed Israel's Iron Dome interceptor has shot down some 90 percent of Palestinian rockets it engaged during this week's surge of Gaza fighting, up from the 85 percent rate in the previous mini-war of 2012."

Postol calls these type reports media deception. "(T)he press needs to engage in more due diligence on these matters," he says.

Verifiable facts, not fabrications, should be reported. People have a right to know. ID intercept attempts fail the great majority of the time.

Crude Hamas rockets with 10 - 20 pound warheads "are not lethal weapons," says Postol.

They don't work as intended. Sheltering in time is the best defense. ID success is a political deception.

At the same time, it's expensive. It's a small missile. It weights about 200 pounds.

It costs $400,000 each, not $20,000 according to some Israeli sources. Raytheon produces it in America.

According to Postol, "(t)here's a significant question there about whether the Congress and the American people have accurate information about what this system is really costing."

Most important is its ineffectiveness. People are deceived. Huge amounts of money are wasted. Big Fat Lies substitute for truth and full disclosure.

Media scoundrels are complicit. They regurgitate fiction, not verifiable facts. Israelis and Americans are willfully deceived.

On July 19, Postol headlined his Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists article "The Evidence that shows Iron Dome is not working."

He explained much of what's covered above. "Close study of photographic and video imagery of Iron Dome engagements with Hamas rockets (currently and during 2012 Pillar of Cloud hostilities) shows that the low casualties…can be ascribed to Israeli civil defense efforts," not ID effectiveness.

Data show its performance hasn't improved from two years earlier. It's a failed system. It's willful deception. It's a hoax.

Effectiveness requires destroying rocket warheads. Their back ends are empty pipes.

If destroyed, warheads will fall and explode on the ground. Destroying a rocket warhead "is a considerably more demanding mission than damaging other parts of the targeted rocket," says Postol.

Success depends on approaching the rocket almost directly head-on. Engaging from the side or back has virtually no chance of success.

Photos of ID contrails show most ID intercept attempts either chase Hamas rockets from behind or the side.

"In both such cases, geometry and the speed of the interceptors and rockets make it extremely unlikely the interceptor will destroy the rocket's warhead," says Postol.

ID can miss many ways. "Because of the uncertainties in the exact crossing speed and geometry of two high-speed missiles, even a perfectly operating Iron Dome fuse may fail to place lethal fragments onto an artillery rocket's warhead," Postol explained.

"In addition, unless the distance between the Iron Dome warhead and the warhead of an artillery rocket is small (roughly a meter or so), there will be a greatly diminished chance that a fragment from the Iron Dome warhead will hit, penetrate, and cause the detonation of the artillery-rocket warhead."

Front-on engagements guarantee no success. Their "geometry merely indicates that an ID interceptor has a greater-than-zero chance of destroying the target-artillery rocket warhead."

Small-sized incoming rockets pose other problems. Successful intercepts are even harder to achieve.

When ID interceptors explode overhead, but have contrails showing they crossed the expected rocket trajectory from behind or either side, "it can be said with a high degree of certainty, that no intercept could have occurred," says Postol.

"It is absolutely clear: There is no evidence in the public record to show that Iron Dome is performing at an intercept rate of nearly 90 percent."

At best, it's 5% or less. Perhaps it's close to ZERO. Willful public deception deprives Israelis of information they need to know.

Transparency is nonexistent. Big Fat Lies substitute for truth and full disclosure.

ID is a hoax. It doesn't worked as claimed. Perhaps it never will. Hitting a missile with another one is like hitting a bullet with one fired at it.

Success may be a scientific impossibility other than occasional lucky exceptions.

Hundreds of millions of dollars are spent on failure. Willful deception keeps people from knowing they've been had. According to Postol:

"In the absence of Israeli data backing claims of Iron Dome efficiency, and based on the unambiguous evidence I have reviewed, a conclusion seems clear:"

"The Israeli government is not telling the truth about Iron Dome to its own population, or to the United States, which has provided the Israeli government with the bulk of the funding needed to design and build the much-heralded but apparently ineffective rocket-defense system."

Stephen Lendman lives in Chicago and can be reached at lendmanstephen@sbcglobal.net.

His new book as editor and contributor is titled "Flashpoint in Ukraine: How the US Drive for Hegemony Risks World War III".

Listen to cutting-edge discussions with distinguished guests on the Progressive Radio News Hour on the Progressive Radio Network.

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After all the blather of this piece (typical of leftist “evidence”) we get to the substance of the argument: “Success depends on approaching the rocket almost directly head-on. Engaging from the side or back has virtually no chance of success.”

That definition of success only really applies to the SDI initiative (as a nuclear warhead dropping off course would still cause a lot of damage, so it HAD to be completely destroyed in space for it to be rationalized). But this definition doesn’t apply for mere conventional weapons. Indeed as the professor himself points out, a 10-20lb bomb is not that powerful.

So simply knocking it off course, as has been pointed out already, is sufficient to avoid heavy casualties. This combined with retreats to bunkers ensures a low casualty rate. Knockng a rocket off course doesn’t take as much precision as blowing it up completely.

It’s an acceptable system for the area considered (which is small).

One of the most unique men who ever lived, and a man whose biography I was rereading again this week because it touches my heart every time I read it, is John Paton, a missionary to the New Hebrides. He tells a story about some angelic care that he received in his lifetime. He said that one night wild natives surrounded his house, frantically dancing and jumping up and down in the jungle, desiring to kill John and his wife. Well, they got on their knees realizing there was no way they could protect themselves against these wild cannibals and they prayed.

Soon after that the attackers all vanished into the jungle, they were gone. According to Paton’s biographer, a year later the chief of the tribe became a Christian, and John asked him at that time, “What happened that night about a year ago when your natives surrounded our little lean-to there on the sand and near the beach and all of a sudden they left?” And this is what the chief said, “Well, because of all those men you had with you, we left.”

John said, “There were no men, just myself and my wife.” The chief said that they had seen men standing guard, hundreds of big men in shining clothes, with swords in their hands, totally circling his home. Did God dispatch a legion of angels to protect His servant? It wouldn’t be the first time.

Ballistics is a well-understood science. Computers make it easy, not just calculating the intercept but refining it as the distance closes. The closer the merging rockets get, the greater the accuracy.

Apparently you don’t understand how _fast_ computers run today. The one you are using RIGHT NOW is SO FAST that in the time that it takes _light_ to go from the screen to your eyes, your computer has carried out at least 4 instructions; in the flight time for ID missile, it can carry out literally billions of instructions.

“Doesn’t have much time”? meh, the ID onboard computers are _bored_ during most of the process.

This is total claptrap. We can accurately calculate the trajectory of a cannon projectile and send one of our projectiles down range and hit the gun. And I do mean hit the gun, not just the area.

Current computers are incredibly fast and the calculation is fairly straightforward. The processor is mostly idle.

Hitting and destroying a missile with another one isn't possible.

This is categorically false. As a missile officer aboard a U.S. Navy cruiser I was a witness to the contrary. And that was forty years ago.

For one thing, one does not have to "hit" the target skin-to-skin, although I witnessed that as well. One need only get close enough to encompass the target in the blast radius of the warhead. For an expanding-rod warhead that's actually quite a way. For another, one seldom encounters a head-on or a tail-chase engagement. Any deflection within those is not particularly difficult to calculate - it's junior-high math. And lastly, how anyone could insist on the impossibility of something that has been demonstrated repeatedly in the unclassified press is a bit of a mystery to me. Theoretically impossible? Then there's a problem with the theory.

From JPost, Jan 15, 2014:

“That’s the bad news. The worse news is that these rockets are being turned into smart rockets. The Iranians took the Zilzal 2 and turned it into a guided rocket. The third generation of it contains a homing sensor and a GPS. The Syrians can have this capability too, to create a fully guided M-600 rocket with GPS. Hezbollah probably has these,” he said.

The M-600 carries a 500-kilogram warhead, and a guided version of it would be a devastating weapon, Rubin warned.

He showed a photograph of Tel Aviv and the Defense Ministry/IDF General Headquarters site, the Kirya, saying one M-600 strike could collapse half of the area.

“That would change the skyline of Tel Aviv. This is not a tactical threat, it’s not harassment. This is a strategic threat. Even worse news is coming; ballistic missiles are becoming smart,” he said.

In the next five to 10 years, Israel’s enemies will inevitably arm themselves with GPS-guided ballistic missiles such as Scuds, he said.

What technology, if any, can defend against a guided missile?

Iron Dome, as well as pre-emptive neutron bomb attacks. The Israelis are sitting on a very nice, capable stockpile of thermonuclear and atomic weapons that any first world country would be proud to own. They are probably 4th or 5th in the whole world, behind only the USA, Russia, China and maybe France. But I wouldn’t bet the farm on France having a bigger cache of weaponry. If I were Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, Syria, Lebanon or Turkey, I’d make a note of that.

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