World Terrorism: News, History and Research Of A Changing World #6 Disinformation, Inc.

VEVAK learned its methodology from the Soviet KGB and many of the Islamist revolutionaries who supported Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini actually studied at Moscow's Patrice Lumumba Friendship University, the Oxford of terrorism. Documented Iranian alumni include the current Supreme Leader (the faqih) Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, under whose Velayat-e Faqih (Rule of the Islamic Jurisprudent) apparatus it has traditionally operated. Its current head is Cabinet Minister Hojatoleslam Gholam-Hussein Mohseni-Ezhei, a graduate of Qom's Haqqani School, noted for its extremist position advocating violence against enemies and strict clerical control of society and government. The Ministry is very well funded and its charge, like that of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (the Pasdaran) is to guard the revolutionary Islamic Iranian regime at all costs and under all contingencies.

From the KGB playbook, VEVAK learned the art of disinformation. It's not so difficult to learn: tell the truth 80% of the time and lie 20%. Depending on how well a VEVAK agent wants to cover his/her tracks, the ratio may go up to 90/10, but it never drops below the 80/20 mark as such would risk suspicion and possible detection. The regime in Teheran has gone to great lengths to place its agents in locations around the world. Many of these operatives have been educated in the West, including the U.K. and the United States. Iranian government agencies such as embassies, consulates, Islamic cultural centers, and airline offices regularly provide cover for the work of VEVAK agents who dress well and are clean shaven, and move comfortably within our society. In this country, because of the severance of diplomatic relations, the principal site of VEVAK activities begins at the offices of Iran's Permanent Mission to the UN in New York.

Teheran has worked diligently to place its operatives in important think tanks and government agencies in the West. Some of its personnel have been recruited while in prison through torture or more often through bribery, or a combination of both. Others are Islamist revolutionaries that have been set up to look like dissidents - often having been arrested and imprisoned, but released for “medical reasons”. The clue to detecting the fake “dissident” is to read carefully what he/she writes, and to ask why this vocal “dissident” was released from prison when other real dissidents have not been released, indeed have been grievously tortured and executed. Other agents have been placed in this country for over twenty-five years to slowly go through the system and rise to positions of academic prominence due to their knowledge of Farsi and Shia Islam or Islamist fundamentalism.

One of the usual tactics of VEVAK is to co-opt academia to its purposes. Using various forms of bribery, academics are bought to defend the Islamic Republic or slander its enemies. Another method is to assign bright students to train for academic posts as specialists in Iranian or Middle East affairs. Once established, such individuals are often consulted by our government as it tries to get a better idea of how it should deal with Iran. These academics then are in a position to skew the information, suggesting the utility of extended dialogue and negotiation, or the danger and futility of confronting a strong Iran or its proxies such as Hizballah (Hezbollah). These academics serve to shield the regime from an aggressive American or Western policy, and thereby buy more time for the regime to attain its goals, especially in regards to its nuclear weaponry and missile programs.

MOIS likes to use the media, especially electronic media, to its advantage. One of VEVAK's favorite tricks is setting up web sites that look like they are opposition sites but which are actually controlled by the regime. These sites often will be multilingual, including Farsi, German, Arabic French, and English. Some are crafted carefully and are very subtle in how they skew their information (e.g., Iran-Interlink, set up and run by Massoud Khodabandeh and his wife Ann Singleton from Leeds, England); others are less subtle, simply providing the regime's point of view on facts and events in the news (e.g., www.mujahedeen.com or www.mojahedin.ws). This latter group is aimed at the more gullible in our open society and unfortunately such a market exists. However, if one begins to do one's homework, asking careful questions, the material on these fake sites generally does not add up.

Let's examine a few examples of VEVAK's work in the United States. In late October, 2005, VEVAK sent three of its agents to Washington to stage a press event in which the principal Iranian resistance movement, the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MeK), was to be slandered. Veteran VEVAK agent Karim Haqi flew from Amsterdam to Canada where he was joined by VEVAK's Ottawa agents Amir-Hossein Kord Rostami and Mahin (Parvin-Mahrokh) Haji, and the three flew from Toronto to Washington. Fortunately the resistance had been tracking these three, informed the FBI of their presence in Washington, and when the three tried to hold a press conference, the resistance had people assigned to ask pointed questions of them so that they ended the interview prematurely and fled back to Canada.

Abolghasem Bayyenet is a member of the Iranian government. He serves as a trade expert for the Ministry of Commerce. But his background of study and service in the Foreign Ministry indicates that Bayyenet is more than just an economist or a suave and savvy businessman. In an article published in Global Politician on April 23, 2006, entitled “Is Regime Change Possible in Iran?”, Bayyenet leads his audience to think that he is a neutral observer, concerned lest the United States make an error in its assessment of Iran similar to the errors of intelligence and judgment that led to our 2003 invasion of Iraq, with its less than successful outcome. However, his carefully crafted bottom line is that the people of Iran are not going to support regime change and that hardliner President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad actually has achieved greater popularity than his predecessors because of his concern for the problems of the poor and his fight for economic and social justice. To the naive, Bayyenet makes Ahmadinejad sound positively saintly. Conveniently overlooked is the occurrence of over four thousand acts of protest, strikes, anti-regime rallies, riots, and even political assassinations by the people of Iran against the government in the year since Ahmadinejad assumed office. So too, the following facts are ignored: the sizeable flight of capital, the increase in unemployment, and the rising two-figure rate of inflation, all within this last year. Bayyenet is a regime apologist, and when one is familiar with the facts, his arguments ring very hollow. However, his English skills are excellent, and so the naОve might be beguiled by his commentary.

Mohsen Sazegara is VEVAK's “reformed revolutionary”. A student supporter of Khomeini before the 1979 revolution, Sazegara joined the “imam” on his return from exile and served in the government for a decade before supposedly growing disillusioned.

He formed several reformist newspapers but ran afoul of the hardliners in 2003 and was arrested and imprisoned by VEVAK. Following “hunger strikes”, Sazegara was released for health reasons and permitted to seek treatment abroad. Although critical of the government and particularly of Ahmadinejad and KhameneМ, Sazegara is yet more critical of opposition groups, leaving the impression that he favors internal regime change but sees no one to lead such a movement for the foreseeable future. His bottom line: no one is capable of doing what needs to be done, so we must bide our time. Very slick, but his shadow shows his likely remaining ties to the MOIS.

Blair sees Iran 'strategic threat'

http://www.arabtimesonline.com/arabtimes/world/Viewdet.asp?ID=8811&cat=a

Blair sees Iran 'strategic threat'
UNITED NATIONS, (Agencies): Iran, whose president said last week that
Israel's days were numbered, called on the UN Security Council on
Tuesday to compel the Jewish state to give up its nuclear weapons.

Iranian UN Ambassador Javad Zarif wrote to the 15-nation UN body after
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, in a German TV interview, implied
for the first time that his country had nuclear weapons.

Israel had never before acknowledged having atomic bombs and, unlike
Iran, is not a member of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, known as
the NPT.

Israel is assumed to have about 200 nuclear weapons, Hans Blix, former
head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Vienna-based UN
nuclear watchdog, said last June.

Olmert's statement triggered widespread criticism from Arab states that
the West was working under a double standard in pressing Iran to
suspend
its nuclear activities while ignoring Israeli arms.

The Iranian letter marked the first formal call for action against
Israel by the UN Security Council, which is currently negotiating a
resolution that would impose sanctions on Tehran over its nuclear
ambitions.

Tehran says its nuclear program seeks only to produce electricity but
Western powers fear it is using a domestic nuclear program as a cover
for making bombs.

Meanwhile, British Prime Minister Tony Blair urged world leaders on
Wednesday to be bolder in supporting leading moderates against "forces
of extremism" in Iran and elsewhere and in advancing
Israeli-Palestinian
peacemaking.
Blair, on the final day of what may be his last Middle East tour, said
Iran was openly supporting terrorism in Iraq, undermining the Lebanese
government and blocking Israeli-Palestinian peace.

Iran has never recognised Israel and last year President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad called for Israel to be "wiped off the map".
Tehran, under Western pressure over its nuclear programme, also backs
the Lebanese guerrilla group and opposition party Hezbollah, which is
leading a drive for early elections after failing to obtain veto power
in government.
Blair, who will leave office next year and whose popularity has been
eroded by the Iraq war, rejected suggestions American or British action
in the Middle East was fuelling terrorism.

"We should stop buying into this wretched culture of blaming
ourselves,"
he told business leaders in Dubai. "If our policy has a fault, it is
that we are too shy of acting boldly to bring about change, to give
succour to those trying to live for the better."
Blair called on moderate leaders across the Middle East to join a
"monumental struggle" between democracy and extremism.

"We must recognise the strategic challenge the government of Iran
poses;
not its people, possibly not all of its ruling elements, but those
presently in charge of its policy," he said.

Iran wants "to pin us back in Lebanon, in Iraq and in Palestine", he
added.
Some Iraqi politicians, mainly Sunni Muslims, accuse Tehran of fuelling
sectarian violence by supporting Shi'ite militias.

"Our response should be to expose what they are doing, build the
alliances to prevent it and pin them back across the whole of the
region," Blair said.
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan called for key parties to seek a
negotiated settlement with Iran over its nuclear program and warned
that
military intervention would be "unwise and disastrous."

Annan issued the warning Tuesday as the Security Council debated a
resolution that would impose sanctions on Tehran for refusing to
suspend
uranium enrichment and as the United States considered sending a second
aircraft carrier to the Gulf as a show of force against Iran.
After two rounds of closed-doors talks Tuesday, the six key nations
trying to negotiate with Iran - Britain, France, Germany, the US,
Russia
and China - remain divided on the scope of sanctions. They scheduled
another meeting on Wednesday.
"Our goal is to get this resolution done this week," said acting US
ambassador Alejandro Wolff. But Russia's UN Ambassador Vitaly Churkin
said he was more concerned about the content than the timing.
The French government Wednesday warned against any attempt to "alter
the
scope" of proposed UN sanctions over Tehran's nuclear programme, after
Moscow sans altering the scope of the resolution," foreign ministry
spokesman Denis Simmoneau told reporters.
"That is why discussions are continuing, notably on what shape to give
to restrictive measures against entities and persons responsible for
sensitive activities targeted," he said.
Russia said on Wednesday attempts by its Western partners to ditch
agreed principles in handling Iran's nuclear ambitions were blocking
adoption of a UN Security Council resolution on sanctions against
Tehran.
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov told a news conference Russia was also
alarmed by what it saw as Western attempts to hamper its economic
cooperation with the Islamic republic and bring it under international
control.
Lavrov said the five permanent Security Council members and Germany had
agreed any action against Iran should rule out the use of force, help
find a negotiated solution to the problem and back efforts by the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
"Unfortunately we now have to overcome formulas in the initial draft,
which depart from these basic principles," he said referring to the
document proposed by Britain and France and supported by Germany.
Meanwhile, the US Defense Department declined to confirm Tuesday a
report it will increase its naval force in the Gulf region next year.
CBS television reported Monday, citing anonymous sources, that the
Pentagon is planning a major deployment of naval forces to the Gulf in
2007 in response to what the US considers acts of provocation by Iran.
The Pentagon would not confirm the report, however.
"We have very robust military and it includes a very capable navy that
is deployed throughout the world," Defense Department spokesman Bryan
Whitman said Tuesday.

Criticism of use of spray-planes for combating drugs in Afghanistan

http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/EKOI-6WP625?OpenDocument

Criticism of use of spray-planes for combating drugs in Afghanistan

Göttingen, December 19, 2006 - The decision of the Afghan government
to
use spray-planes or so-called crop-dusters to destroy opium poppy
fields
has been described by the Society for Threatened Peoples (GfbV) as
"short-sighted action for action's sake". "The widespread use of
pesticides will not only affect the health of many farmers and the
supply of foodstuffs", warned the GfbV Asia expert Ulrich Delius. "With
each spray-flight the Afghan government will lose more credibility
among
the Afghan people." Since Kabul has ordered the destruction campaign on
foreign pressure the violence against foreigners -- against Bundeswehr
soldiers too - will also increase.

The experience from Colombia, where since the 70s spray-flights have
been in operation, shows the ineffectiveness of such measures, said the
GfbV. Since the year 2000 more than 2.3 thousand million dollars have
been spent on spraying in the South-American country. This has not
however reduced the production. If heavy spraying takes place in one
region, the producers simply move to another one.

In Bolivia too experience with the forcible destruction of drug acreage
has proved negative. The coca acreage was certainly in the short term
reduced by massive military operations between 1997 and 2000. But in
2004 it was already bigger than before the compulsory measures. "It is
only cooperation with the farmers and a comprehensive promotion of
agriculture that drug cultivation can be really reduced", said Delius.

It is not just since the increase on opium production in 2006 that
Afghanistan has become a drug country. "The local governors and drug
barons carry out their business in the north of the country under the
eyes of the Bundeswehr and they are left in peace", reported Delius. 40
percent of the heroin sold in Great Britain comes from the province of
Helmand, which is controlled by the British. However the NATO takes no
action to curb the wire-pullers and profit-makers in the drug trade, as
the Executive Director of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, Antonio
Maria Costa, has demanded. "In the light of this inaction it is
particularly absurd to contaminate wide stretches of land and to punish
only the poorest victims of the drug business."

France says its elite forces are no longer a good fit in new climate of Afghanistan

http://www.startribune.com/722/story/889422.html

France says its elite forces are no longer a good fit in new climate of
Afghanistan

Last update: December 20, 2006 -- 8:10 PM

The latest: France is removing 200 of its best soldiers from
Afghanistan
as violence mounts. Military officials insist France remains fully
committed, with 1,100 troops still based in Kabul.

Why are the troops being removed? France's decision comes amid concerns
in Paris that NATO's mission in Afghanistan has grown confused and that
the alliance may be overreaching in its efforts to stabilize and
rebuild
the nation.

French officials and experts say that as the fighting has dragged on
and
the insurgency has grown in strength, the Special Forces were no longer
ideal for the mission. Such elite units tend to be more lightly armed,
and specialize in gathering intelligence or rapid attacks.

"The conditions no longer correspond to what the Special Forces do,"
said Capt. Christophe Prazuck, a spokesman for the French Joint Chiefs
of Staff.

Arm of U.S. mission: The French elite troops -- deployed in
southeastern
Afghanistan since July 2003 -- were France's contribution to a U.S.
anti-terror mission code-named Operation Enduring Freedom that is
separate from the NATO mission.

Seven of the 10 French troops killed in Afghanistan since 2003 were
Special Forces. The troops combed the border with Pakistan for Al-Qaida
and Taliban fighters and looked for Osama bin Laden. Long based in Spin
Buldak, a southern border town in Kandahar, the French moved their base
this year to Jalalabad in the east and are now expected home in
January.

NATO sparked changes: The anti-terror operation has been trimmed as
NATO's International Security Assistance Force has evolved. By October,
the NATO force's 32,800 troops became the prime fighting force, moving
into special forces' terrain in southern and eastern regions.

U.S. response: U.S. commanders say the work of special forces soldiers
is still critical in Afghanistan, whether it's small-group
reconnaissance missions, mentoring Afghan soldiers or supporting
conventional NATO and Afghan troops in combat.

But State Department spokesman Sean McCormack said the move was
understandable. France is heavily committed in Lebanon and Africa.

Associated Press

Iran Interior Minister: Friday's elections valid

http://www.iranmania.com/News/ArticleView/Default.asp?NewsCode=48239&NewsKind=Current%20Affairs

Iran Interior Minister: Friday's elections valid

Thursday, December 21, 2006 - ©2005 IranMania.com
Related Pictures

Archived Picture - Iranian Interior Minister Mostafa Pour-Mohammadi
said
the three elections held on Friday were valid, IRNA reported.

LONDON, December 21 (IranMania) - Iranian Interior Minister Mostafa
Pour-Mohammadi said the three elections held on Friday were valid, IRNA
reported.

Pour-Mohammadi's remarks were made at a press conference attended by
domestic and foreign reporters which began Wednesday morning.

"The constitution has express and good provisions for conducting
elections. We acted based on the law," he said.

Final results of the Assembly of Experts and Majlis by-elections held
throughout the country were announced Tuesday.

The interior minister said the presence of election inspectors,
supervisors of the Guardian Council and Majlis as well as
representatives of candidates in polling stations guaranteed the
elections' soundness.

He added that the ballots were being carefully canvassed and votes
counted with the Guardian Council's supervisory board making great
efforts to safeguard the Assembly of Experts and Majlis by-elections
while Majlis supervisors safeguarded the local council elections.

The minister praised the people's massive participation in the
elections, saying the message conveyed was that "the people were
confident their votes were being safeguarded."

"If they did not have such confidence, they would not have participated
in the elections in great numbers."
He noted that over 26 mln people participated in the three elections.

"Precise implementation of law, a positive atmosphere in the country,
fair representation of all political groups and factions in the
elections and the strong urgence of the Supreme Leader (Ayatollah Seyed
Ali Khamenei) in particular were among the very factors that encouraged
the nation to make a massive turn-out in Friday's elections," he said.

He said that the final result of the Tehran City Council elections
would
be announced today (Wednesday).

Pour-Mohammadi dismissed complaints of irregularities committed in the
elections, particularly a delay in counting the votes, saying "it is
natural among political activists who are sensitive to these kinds of
events."

The Times

November 18, 2006

'Robbers had tried to pray at mosque' before PC was shot

By Andrew Norfolk

PC Beshenivsky: murdered

ROBBERS went to say prayers at a mosque two hours before embarking on
an
armed raid that led to the fatal shooting of PC Sharon Beshenivsky, a
court
was told yesterday.

Two members of the alleged murder gang went to a mosque in Leeds for
Friday
prayers but returned early to their safe house because they had missed
the
start of the service.

A jury at Newcastle Crown Court has heard that the men were late
getting up
on the day of the robbery. Four had spent the previous night drinking
champagne and vodka before visiting a brothel.

Raza ul-Haq Aslam, who is accused of murder on the basis that he acted
as a
look-out during the raid at a Bradford travel agency, told the court
yesterday about the hours before PC Beshenivsky died and PC Teresa
Milburn
was injured.

The jury has heard that Mr Aslam was an employee of Caradon Estates, a
company paid by the Home Office to provide accommodation for
asylum-seekers.
One of its properties in Leeds became a temporary base for the men who
allegedly carried out the raid.

Mr Aslam, 25, said that he arrived at the house on the morning of
November
18 last year to find most of the occupants asleep. He said that he
later
washed himself in preparation for Friday prayers at about 1pm, but
Hassan
Razzaq and a man he knew as Uncle returned to the house and told him
that
the service at a nearby mosque had already started.

Mr Aslam said that he decided instead to pray in the house. He said
that he
had then planned to buy some food from a local shop but was persuaded
by
Faisal Razzaq, Hassan’s brother and another Caradon employee, to
drive with
him to Bradford to eat there.

Mr Aslam said that he and Faisal Razzaq travelled in one car and were
followed by another vehicle, carrying Muzzaker Shah and two Somali
brothers,
Yusuf and Mustaf Jama. The prosecution says that these were the three
robbers on their way to Universal Express. They are said to have tied
up its
employees before Shah shot the two officers as the trio escaped.

Mr Aslam said that when they arrived in Bradford, Faisal Razzaq
gestured to
indicate a road for the second car to turn into. He and Faisal Razzaq
parked
near by, and went for some lunch. Twenty minutes later they returned to
Faisal Razzaq’s car.

“There was a lot of police cars flying about the area. Faisal Razzaq
looked
a bit agitated,” Mr Aslam said. Five minutes after they returned to
the
house in Leeds, he said that Shah and the Jama brothers entered,
“shouting
and screaming. The loudest person was Muzzaker Shah. They were saying
thing
like ‘We effed up’.”

Mr Aslam said that Shah and the Jama brothers started shaving each
other’s
heads. They showered and he heard someone talking about burning their
clothes. He said he saw Shah produce “a wad of cash”, which he gave
to the
Jama brothers.

Questioned by Mukhtar Hussain, QC, for the defence, Mr Aslam said that
he
had discovered what had happened at the travel agency when he watched
the
news at home in Halifax, West Yorkshire, that evening.

He said that he telephoned Faisal Razzaq, who confirmed that the
robbery had
been committed by Shah and the Jamas brothers. Under cross-examination
by
Ben Nolan, QC, for Faisal Razzaq, Mr Aslam insisted that he had not
made any
mobile phone calls to assist with the robbery.

“I’m not part of Shah’s gang. Faisal Razzaq is. Please don’t
mix me up with
him,” he said. Three weeks after the robbery, Mr Aslam said that he
had told
a neighbour, a police officer, that he had information about the
shootings
and asked him what to do. The officer told him to telephone
Crimestoppers,
using a pseudonym. He made the call and contacted the incident room.
One
motive, Mr Aslam admitted, was the £100,000 reward that had been
offered.

Mr Aslam, Faisal Razzaq, 25, and Hassan Razzaq, 26, each deny charges
of
murder, robbery and four firearms offences. Yusuf Jama, 20, admits
robbery
and two firearms offences but denies murder and two further firearms
offences.

Shah has admitted murder, robbery and four firearms offences and will
be
sentenced at the end of the trial, which was adjourned until Monday.

Accessed 21 Dec 2006,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2-2458727,00.html

21 December 2006
The KGB's post-Soviet 'commercialization'

Russia today is honoring workers in the state security agencies - a professional holiday better known by its Soviet-era appellation, 'Chekists' Day' - as the legacy of the KGB grows increasingly commercial - and criminal.

By Victor Yasmann for RFE/RL (21/12/06)

The mysterious murder of former security officer Aleksandr Litvinenko is once again shedding light on how the Soviet-era KGB has evolved in contemporary Russia.

Before it was disbanded in 1991, the KGB was a massive organization, employing over half a million uniformed officers as well as a network of millions of informers.

A highly disciplined and militarized service, it controlled almost every aspect of life in the USSR and adhered with utmost loyalty to the Communist Party line, even across state borders. Its status and operation was strictly directed by 5,000 party documents.

The 1978 murder of Bulgarian dissident Georgi Markov, for example - carried out with the use of a ricin pellet lodged in the tip of an umbrella - was conducted by Bulgaria's secret service with help from the KGB.

The Communist Party had ordered the KGB to contribute their expertise and assist their Bulgarian colleagues in the liquidation of a "personal enemy of the Bulgarian leadership."
Beginning of the end?

But the KGB monolith could not survive the collapse of the Soviet Union. It was ultimately divided into several new organizations, including the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), the Federal Protection Service (FSO) and the body considered the true KGB successor, the Federal Security Service (FSB).

Many KGB officials evolved into new positions within those bodies. Tens of thousands of others reappeared in positions of political and entrepreneurial power.

The KGB was never officially condemned for its Soviet-era crimes, making it easy for many top security officials to make the transition to the world of politics - Russian President Vladimir Putin being the most obvious.

Those not in politics have also found numerous ways to make a living - most notably by opening the private security companies that mushroomed in privatization-era Russia or by entering the service of the oligarchs, who employed hundreds of former KGB officers to provide both security and intelligence.

Not surprisingly, the largest of these private security groups is the one at the disposal of Russia's aggressive Gazprom monopoly.
Marriage of convenience

Observers have dubbed this dubious partnership between business interests and security officers the "privatization of the KGB." At the same time, the official security bodies underwent their own period of "commercialization," launching veterans associations and other charity groups aimed at bolstering state funding for the secret services.

Another example of the growing commercial mind-set of the KGB heirs is their inevitable commingling with Russia's ascendant criminal element. In many areas, the lines between organized crime and the work of security groups has grown gray. In Putin's Russia, there is virtually no administrative or civilian control over security agencies.

This development is a marked change from the Soviet heyday of the KGB, when no less a figure than dissident and Nobel laureate Andrei Sakharov called the agency the only segment of the Soviet elite untouched by corruption.

Today's KGB descendants are, more often than not, divided along commercial or criminal lines. Litvinenko's murder is hardly the first instance of a former or present member of the security community translating their experience into business opportunities - and putting themselves in harm's way in the process. A few notable examples follow.
The case of Anatoly Trofimov

On 10 April 2005, a masked gunman shot dead retired FSB Colonel General Anatoly Trofimov, the former chief of the FSB's Moscow branch. Trofimov's young wife was also killed in the ambush outside their Moscow home; their 4-year-old daughter survived. Trofimov was the highest-ranking security official to be killed in Russia.

During his career in the KGB/FSB, he specialized in combating corruption, and led the investigation into a 1996 incident when two men were arrested carrying US$500,000 in cash out of the reelection campaign headquarters of President Boris Yeltsin. He was dismissed a year later, after two of his deputies were accused of selling cocaine.

After his murder, FSB investigators claimed the attack was the "likely result of his commercial activity." He was reportedly involved with several private security firms set up by retired KGB officer.

It is interesting to note, however, that Litvinenko described Trofimov as a behind-the-scenes critic of the Kremlin's policies in Chechnya who had opposed the 1998 appointment of Putin as FSB director. Litvinenko suggested Trofimov's murder was politically motivated, because no businessman in Russia would dare attack such a powerful figure from the security organs.
The case of Roman Tsepov

On 24 September 2004, 42-year-old Roman Tsepov, the director of an elite private security company based in St Petersburg, died of severe radiation sickness brought on by a mysterious substance he had ingested.

The substance has never been clearly identified, but some reports suggest he was fed an experimental poison containing heavy metals or large doses of a drug normally used to treat leukemia and other cancers.

Tsepov rose from the ranks of the Interior Ministry troops to become an extremely influential power broker in St Petersburg. In the early 1990s, his security firm, Baltik-Eskort, provided protection for the family of the city's mayor, Anatoly Sobchak, and his deputy, Vladimir Putin.

Tsepov maintained close ties with Putin after the latter's move first to the top of the FSB and then into the Kremlin. He also stayed close to Viktor Zolotov - who was first Sobchak's personal bodyguard and then chief of the presidential security service - and Rashid Nurgaliyev, an FSB general and Russia's interior minister since 2004.

Tsepov was also given license to act on behalf of the Kremlin in some of its most delicate deals, including talks with beleaguered oil giant Yukos. At some point, however, his work clearly aroused displeasure. The source of the poison and the poisoners themselves have not yet been identified; the investigation continues. However, many trails lead back to Tsepov's myriad business connections - which included influence in everything from casinos to ports to pharmaceutical companies.
The case of Igor Klimov

Igor Klimov, a colonel with the SVR, was shot dead on 6 June 2003 outside his apartment building in downtown Moscow.

Klimov, another close associate of Putin's, was picked by the president to serve as acting general director of the defense contractor Almaz-Antei, one of Russia's largest producers of air-defense systems.

Klimov was killed just weeks before he was due to become the CEO of Almaz-Antei. Many suspected at the time that his death was the result of his efforts to end the diversion or embezzlement of millions of dollars from the firm. Eventually, however, several arrests were made in the case that suggested his death may have been tied to a property battle between criminal organizations.

Copyright (c) 2006. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave. NW, Washington DC 20036. Funded by the US Congress.

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Online version provided by the International Relations and Security Network
A public service run by the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich © 1996-2004

20 December 2006
Colombian scandal shows all sides

As political allies come forward with evidence of cooperation with paramilitaries, the strengths of democratic institutions is revealed, but so is the president’s weakening position.

By Sam Logan for ISN Security Watch (20/12/2006)

As more Colombian politicians come forward with personal accounts of back room dealings with the country’s paramilitary forces, questions concerning the depth of corruption in politics commingle with concern that the Colombian military might somehow be involved in the scandal.

Close ties between the Colombian military and paramilitary leaders have long been suspected by human rights groups and other NGOs working in Colombia. Within Colombia, these links have been universally accepted yet categorically denied.

Meanwhile, the country's media and Supreme Court press forward in seeking the truth behind the connections between the political class and paramilitary leaders. As the Supreme Court calls witness after witness, it is building a critical mass of evidence against corrupt politicians. At the same time, others are leaking tips about certain individuals to the Colombian press, which could point out new leads for federal prosecutors. The result is a massive process of rooting-out corruption that may extend beyond the political class into the upper ranks of military commanders.

This so-called “political cleansing” has forced Colombian President Alvaro Uribe to walk a thin line between political destruction and survival.

Uribe had previously promised to deconstruct Colombia’s traditional political class, saying that more transparency was needed. He also wanted to democratize politics in Colombia, which was limited to individuals with land holdings or social clout. Until now, many were not sure how the president would achieve those goals. The political cleansing, however, may end the careers of many politicians and help Uribe to fulfill an important campaign promise.
The military question

Reports from human rights organizations such as Amnesty International (AI) and Human Rights Watch (HRW) decry direct ties between the Colombian military and Colombia’s paramilitary organizations.

In February of 2000, an HRW publication entitled “The Ties That Bind: Colombia and Military-Paramilitary Links” documented direct connections between the Third Brigade of the Colombian Army and a paramilitary group called the Calima Block, which had formed in the country’s southwest.

Many informants, who presumably would have good knowledge of such connections, were interviewed for the report. Six years later, other reports have corroborated this information, even after the Calima Block has disarmed with little to no recognition of close ties between this paramilitary group and the Colombian military.

This HRW publication and others have documented a history of close relationships between Colombia’s military commanders and the leaders of paramilitary units. From the mid-1990s until just a few years ago, paramilitary violence was clearly out of control, largely because there was very little resistance to the paramilitary commanders’ reign over their turf. Once the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) had been pushed out of a region, the Colombian military did little to secure the area - an arrangement many believe was made between mid-level military commanders and paramilitary leaders.

Many of the mid-level commanders who allegedly colluded with paramilitary leaders in the mid-90s have since been promoted. As commanders of Colombia’s military forces, the possibility that they have colluded with an organization the US government considers a terrorist group casts a shadow over the future of US military aid to Colombia.

“These guys were in the field and were critical to what was going on as the paramilitaries became the only anti-guerrilla strategy that was working,” Adam Isacson, Director of Programs with the Center for International Policy, told ISN Security Watch in a recent phone call.

“A big question we should be asking now is: where were the current heads of the Colombian armed forces working in the second half of the 90s when the paramilitaries were [rapidly] taking over new territories with the help of drug traffickers?” he said.
The political fallout

The process of political cleansing currently being pushed forward by Colombia’s Supreme Court and media has created a nationwide sensation.

“This is probably the most serious crisis that President Uribe has faced,” Michael Shifter, Vice President of Policy with the Inter-American Dialogue, told ISN Security Watch.

“It is crucial to take control, take the initiative and clean out the political system,” he argued. Shifter pointed out that Uribe has to get in front of the scandal and move past a reactive stance.

“So far he’s been reactive and defensive, and ultimately, if it continues this way it will undermine his authority, which has been his greatest strength,” Shifter said.

Links between paramilitary figures and politicians are unacceptable for Colombians and the international community. As Colombia’s Supreme Court continues its investigation, it is likely the judicial body will continue to uncover evidence that if made public could severely undermine Uribe’s presidency.

Publicizing damning evidence separates the Colombian press from many other media in the rest of Latin America. Leaks to the press, published on the front page of Colombian daily El Tiempo, often create follow-ups in full view of the public.

The current scandal began to gather momentum after evidence found on the laptop and in the database of paramilitary leader Rodrigo Tovar Pupo, also known as Jorge 40, delivered proof of direct ties between the paramilitary leader and Colombian politicians who had met with him for political support.

Another laptop, one used by a paramilitary leader known as Adolfo Paz, or Don Berna, has also been seized. So far, evidence on this computer has not been made public. But many find it hard to believe there is not a long list of military leaders and politicians very close to Uribe yet to be brought to light for paramilitary collusion.
Time will tell

For over four decades, Colombians have lived the reality of an ongoing civil war between the FARC and the country’s armed forces. At times, the conflict has been one of low intensity, at other times it has been extremely violent. From the 1960s, when the FARC began operations, until the mid-1990s, there was little progress in subduing the violence short of the brutal effectiveness of paramilitary groups. However, their brutality led to international infamy, forcing anyone who had colluded with paramilitary leaders to deny any involvement.

The denial of politicians’ and military commanders’ involvement with paramilitary groups notorious for human rights atrocities and drug trafficking has lasted for many years. For this reason alone, many claim, Colombia’s current political scandal is good for the country, even if it is painful.

“If you are doing things that are illegal, incorrect morally or even inconvenient politically, you have to deny all that,” Jorge Restrepo, Director with Colombia’s Conflict Analysis Resource Center, told ISN Security Watch.

“What [we’re seeing] now is the extent of the participation of society in a conflict we didn’t want to label as a civil war,” he added.

“It is opening up in front of our eyes. From 1997 until 2002 it was truly a situation of serious war. It was not a low-intensity conflict, and we [Colombians] were the first ones trying to deny that it existed,” Restrepo said.

He also pointed out that the perseverance of Colombia’s institutions, particularly the judicial system, was fundamental to the current process as well as where it would take Colombians into the future.

Colombia’s paramilitary groups appeared in 1997 as bands of men formed together to defend themselves from what many perceived at the time as a growing problem with the FARC. Nearly a decade later, paramilitary groups have evolved beyond groups of armed individuals into astute political actors, mafia-like warlords and cunning drug traffickers.

Colombia’s political scandal has shown a high level of integration between paramilitaries and the country's political class. Time will tell if the same level of integration can be proven beyond a reasonable doubt between paramilitaries and the Colombian military.

Yet two points are already clear, experts agree. First, Colombia’s democratic institutions, despite years of civil war, still function. This fact should keep well with anyone worried about the future of Colombia’s democracy. Second, president Uribe has lost a significant amount of credibility and authority. His ability to deal with this situation, moving into 2007, will be a test.

Sam Logan is an investigative journalist who has reported on security, energy, politics, economics, organized crime, terrorism and black markets in Latin America since 1999. He is the Latin American correspondent for ISN Security Watch.
Printed from http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=17069
Online version provided by the International Relations and Security Network
A public service run by the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich © 1996-2004

Time is the jihadists ally

http://www.religionglobe.com/

Time is the jihadists ally

Robert Fulford
National Post (Canada)
Saturday, December 09, 2006

As part of their culture of death, Islamic terrorists now use young
women
(and even occasionally a grandmother) as suicide murderers. The
appearance
of the first female killers, a few years ago, shocked people who
believed
they knew something about Islam. It was particularly appalling that
Hamas,
who claim to be pious, sent out girls wearing belts of explosives.
Surely
Islamic law forbids it.

When Ehud Yaari came to Toronto recently, I raised that issue with him.
He's
spent his whole working life, some 35 years, studying Arabs and their
ways
as a reporter on Israel's Channel 2 and a columnist in the Jerusalem
Report.

Muslims, Yaari says, were also puzzled by this problem. But Islam, like
most
religions, can be malleable. Hamas eventually received religious
permission
for the use of female bombers.

Of course they had to face the virgins question. A young man who blows
himself up in order to murder innocent people will be rewarded in
heaven, it
is said, by having 72 virgins at his disposal. What do girls and women
get?
Yaari says they are promised they can choose for their own one of the
young
male martyrs. Terrorist groups have distributed brochures on this point
in
the universities of the West Bank, describing suicide bombing as
romantic.

What the young male martyrs will have to say about this is not
altogether
clear. But theological questions are always complicated.

A sixth-generation Israeli, the descendant of Jewish farmers from
Ukraine,
Yaari was born in 1945 in Metulla, a village in northern Israel
surrounded
on three sides by Lebanon. He learned conversational Arabic as a child,
began taking lessons at 10, and was ready to study classical Arabic
poetry
by the time he reached the Hebrew University.

He understands the subtleties of Arabic oratory in ways that people
with
less learning, whether Arabs or not, can't grasp. He goes farther in
admiration of Osama Bin Laden's rhetoric than anyone I've read: "A
speech by
Bin Laden is a masterpiece," he says, in its allusions to previous
writing,
its hinted-at meanings, its elegance.

Yaari believes that jihadists decided long ago, perhaps as long ago as
the
failed Yom Kippur war with Israel in 1973, that they can't hope to
defeat
the military technology of the West. Instead they have adopted what
Yaari
calls "The doctrine of persistent conflict," the most promising version
of
warfare they've come up with since the West developed superior weaponry
centuries ago.

They can't have victory anytime in the near future, but they can deny
victory to the West -- in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon and several other
places. "The Arabs feel they have the answer to the West in military
terms."
Working within that doctrine, of persistent conflict, Islamists may
pause
for a ceasefire now and then, perhaps even sign a peace treaty, but
they
won't give up. Eventually, they assume, the West will collapse under
terrorist pressure. Then a new caliphate will arise and govern Europe
(one
Arab theory holds that its first capital will be Copenhagen).

Later it will expand to put the whole world under Islamic law. This is
the
one thing on which the Taliban, al-Qaeda, Hamas etc. all agree.

Their strategy rests on a powerful component, time. In the past, time
has
often been the friend of warriors, notably those who lay siege to a
town or
a castle and wait for starvation to defeat the inhabitants. But time
has
never been so central to strategy as it is with Islamists. Their
enemies,
above all the restless, impatient democracies, worry constantly about
the
length of a war. Witness the U.S. now desperately trying to devise a
timetable for leaving Iraq.

But the Islamists have no such worries. They believe they will win
someday,
not necessarily in 20 years, perhaps not in a century. Quite possibly,
not a
single fighter of today will see victory. No one worries about that, at
least in public. Persistence will produce victory. If you believe that
success is mandated and predicted by God, why would you care how long
it
takes?

This manner of thinking, so unlike anything most of us know, poses a
painful
question: How do you defeat a movement that does not expect to see
victory?
The West, as Yaari points out, has no strategy for this kind of war, no
doctrine its armies can learn and its politicians can preach. In fact,
it
appears that so far the West doesn't even know it needs a new strategy.

robert.fulford@utoronto.ca

C National Post 2006

UN troops in Lebanaon at risk of terror attack: Italain Foreign Minister

http://www.naharnet.com/domino/tn/NewsDesk.nsf/0/D11DBB6239087765C225724B003484DF?OpenDocument

U.N. Troops in Lebanon are at Risk of Attack, Italian Official Says
United Nations troops serving in Lebanon are at risk of attack and
should
remain alert, visiting Italian Foreign Minister Massimo D'Alema said
ahead
of a trip to the Palestinian territories Thursday.

"It is right to warn the (U.N.) contingent about the risks, because the
risks are real," D'Alema said during a visit at the Italian command in
the
southern Lebanese town of Tibnin on Wednesday.

He was referring to comments by the head of the U.N. peacekeepers in
Lebanon, Maj. Gen. Alain Pellegrini, that al-Qaida has penetrated
southern
Lebanon, the ANSA news agency said.

Israel TV reported earlier this month that the Jewish state had warned
the
U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon, or UNIFIL, that al-Qaida was planning an
attack on thepeacekeepers in Lebanon.

The report said Israel had received intelligence that al-Qaida's deputy
chief, Ayman al-Zawahri, had issued the order to attack UNIFIL. It did
not
give details on the source of the information or when the attack might
take
place.

In a video released this year marking the anniversary of the Sept. 11,
2001
attacks in the U.S., al-Zawahri denounced the beefed-up UNIFIL force in
Lebanon.

UNIFIL was deployed under a U.N.-brokered cease-fire that ended a
month-long
war last summer between Israel and Hizbullah in Lebanon.

Just over 11,000 UNIFIL troops patrol a buffer zone in southern Lebanon
alongside an estimated 17,000 Lebanese soldiers. The force, in which
France
and Italy are the biggest contributors, is mandated to go up to a
maximum of
15,000.

"The threat does not come from the (troops') relations with the locals,
but
it could come from the outside, from a terror attack," D'Alema said.
"And I
think it is right to warn the Lebanese armed forces, UNIFIL, police."

Earlier Wednesday, D'Alema was in Beirut, where he met with Lebanese
Prime
Minister Fouad Saniora and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, an ally of
Hizbullah that has been staging massive demonstrations against the
government.

On Thursday, D'Alema travels to the Palestinian territories to meet
with
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, who has called for early elections
as a
way of ending the domestic political crisis.(AP-Naharnet)

President of Turkmenistan dies at 66

http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2006/12/21/asia/AS_GEN_Turkmenistan_Obit_Niyazov.php

President of Turkmenistan dies at 66
The Associated Press
Published: December 21, 2006

ASHGABAT, Turkmenistan: President Saparmurat Niyazov, who created a
vast
cult of personality during two decades of iron-fisted rule over arid,
energy-rich Turkmenistan, has died, officials said Thursday. He was 66.

A terse report from state television said Niyazov died early Thursday
of
heart failure and showed a black-framed portrait of the man who had
ordered citizens to refer to him as "Turkmenbashi" --- the Father of
All
Turkmen. An announcer in a dark suit read a list of Niyazov's
accomplishments.

The funeral is to be held Sunday.

Under the Constitution, Parliament Speaker Overzgeldy Atayev is to take
over as acting president until elections that must be called within two
months. The Constitution, however, bans Atayev from running for
president in that vote.

Niyazov underwent major heart surgery in Germany in 1997 and last month
publicly acknowledged for the first time that he had heart disease. But
he did not seem seriously ill; two weeks ago he appeared in public to
formally open an amusement park named after him outside the capital.

Niyazov had led Turkmenistan since 1985, when it was still a Soviet
republic. After the 1991 Soviet collapse, he retained control and began
creating an elaborate personality cult and turning Turkmenistan into
one
of the most oppressive of the ex-Soviet states.

He ordered the months and days of the week named after himself and his
family, and statues of him were erected throughout the nation. He is
listed as author of the "Rukhnama" (Book of the Soul) that was required
reading in schools. Children pledged allegiance to him every morning.

He crushed all opposition and drew condemnation from human rights
groups
and Western governments.

His death, after two decades of wielding enormous power, raised
concerns
about whether political instability would follow.

"His death means a terrible shock for the republic, its residents and
the political class. It's comparable to a shock the Soviet Union felt
after Stalin's death," Vyacheslav Nikonov, head of the Moscow-based
Politika think tank, was quoted as saying by the RIA-Novosti news
agency.

The agency also quoted Khudaiberdy Orazov, a leader of Turkmenistan's
hard-pressed opposition, as saying he and other opposition leaders will
meet soon to discuss how to proceed.

A 2002 alleged assassination attempt against Niyazov sparked a severe
crackdown, leading to dozens of arrests that were criticized by
international human rights groups and the U.S. government. A former
foreign minister, Boris Shikhmuradov, was named as the mastermind of
the
alleged plot and sentenced to life in prison after a Stalinist-style
show trial broadcast on TV that included a taped confession in which he
said he was a drug addict and hired mercenaries for the attack while
living in Russia.

Turkmenistan --- a majority Muslim country dominated by the vast Kara
Kum
desert --- has the world's fifth-largest natural gas reserves, but
Niyazov
failed to convert that wealth into prosperity for his country's 5
million people.

Earlier this year, the eccentric leader announced he would provide
citizens with natural gas and power free of charge through 2030. But he
has also tapped the country's vast energy wealth for outlandish
projects
--- a huge, man-made lake in the Kara Kum desert, a vast cypress forest
to
change the desert climate, an ice palace outside the capital, a ski
resort and a 40-meter (130-foot) pyramid.

Niyazov was born Feb. 19, 1940. His father died in World War II and the
rest of his family was killed in an earthquake that leveled Ashgabat in
1948. He was raised in an orphanage and later in the home of distant
relatives.

Niyazov attended Leningrad Polytechnic Institute in Russia to study
power engineering and worked at the Bezmeinskaya Power Station near
Ashgabat after his graduation in 1966.

Named head of the Communist Party in Turkmenistan in 1985, Niyazov was
named president of the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic in October
1990
and led his nation through its Oct. 27, 1991, independence. He was
elected president of the new independent Turkmenistan in 1992 with a
reported 99.5 percent of the vote. In 1994, a reported 99.9 percent of
voters supported a referendum allowing him to remain in office for a
second five-year term without having to face new elections.

In 1999, he was effectively made president for life after Parliament
removed all term limits, but an August 2002 gathering of the country's
People's Council --- a hand-picked assembly of Niyazov loyalists ---
nonetheless went further and endorsed him as president for life.

Under Niyazov's rule, Turkmenistan adopted a strict policy of
neutrality
and spurned joining regional security or economic organizations that
sprung up in the wake of the Soviet collapse.

But Niyazov supported the U.S.-led anti-terror campaign in neighboring
Afghanistan, allowing coalition airplanes to use Turkmen airspace and
humanitarian agencies to pass through to deliver aid.

Niyazov also pursued strong nationalistic policies to encourage the use
of the Turkmen language over Russian and banned access to
Russian-language media, leading to an increased exodus of some of the
country's most educated citizens and decimating its school system.
Secondary education has been reduced in Turkmenistan to a required nine
years, causing human rights groups to complain of a deliberate attempt
to dumb down the population to prevent dissent.

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