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World Terrorism: News, History and Research Of A Changing World #6 Disinformation, Inc.
Global Politician/Ocnus.Net ^ | Dec 17, 2006 | Professor Daniel M. Zucker

Posted on 12/17/2006 4:03:30 PM PST by DAVEY CROCKETT

VEVAK learned its methodology from the Soviet KGB and many of the Islamist revolutionaries who supported Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini actually studied at Moscow's Patrice Lumumba Friendship University, the Oxford of terrorism. Documented Iranian alumni include the current Supreme Leader (the faqih) Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, under whose Velayat-e Faqih (Rule of the Islamic Jurisprudent) apparatus it has traditionally operated. Its current head is Cabinet Minister Hojatoleslam Gholam-Hussein Mohseni-Ezhei, a graduate of Qom's Haqqani School, noted for its extremist position advocating violence against enemies and strict clerical control of society and government. The Ministry is very well funded and its charge, like that of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (the Pasdaran) is to guard the revolutionary Islamic Iranian regime at all costs and under all contingencies.

From the KGB playbook, VEVAK learned the art of disinformation. It's not so difficult to learn: tell the truth 80% of the time and lie 20%. Depending on how well a VEVAK agent wants to cover his/her tracks, the ratio may go up to 90/10, but it never drops below the 80/20 mark as such would risk suspicion and possible detection. The regime in Teheran has gone to great lengths to place its agents in locations around the world. Many of these operatives have been educated in the West, including the U.K. and the United States. Iranian government agencies such as embassies, consulates, Islamic cultural centers, and airline offices regularly provide cover for the work of VEVAK agents who dress well and are clean shaven, and move comfortably within our society. In this country, because of the severance of diplomatic relations, the principal site of VEVAK activities begins at the offices of Iran's Permanent Mission to the UN in New York.

Teheran has worked diligently to place its operatives in important think tanks and government agencies in the West. Some of its personnel have been recruited while in prison through torture or more often through bribery, or a combination of both. Others are Islamist revolutionaries that have been set up to look like dissidents - often having been arrested and imprisoned, but released for “medical reasons”. The clue to detecting the fake “dissident” is to read carefully what he/she writes, and to ask why this vocal “dissident” was released from prison when other real dissidents have not been released, indeed have been grievously tortured and executed. Other agents have been placed in this country for over twenty-five years to slowly go through the system and rise to positions of academic prominence due to their knowledge of Farsi and Shia Islam or Islamist fundamentalism.

One of the usual tactics of VEVAK is to co-opt academia to its purposes. Using various forms of bribery, academics are bought to defend the Islamic Republic or slander its enemies. Another method is to assign bright students to train for academic posts as specialists in Iranian or Middle East affairs. Once established, such individuals are often consulted by our government as it tries to get a better idea of how it should deal with Iran. These academics then are in a position to skew the information, suggesting the utility of extended dialogue and negotiation, or the danger and futility of confronting a strong Iran or its proxies such as Hizballah (Hezbollah). These academics serve to shield the regime from an aggressive American or Western policy, and thereby buy more time for the regime to attain its goals, especially in regards to its nuclear weaponry and missile programs.

MOIS likes to use the media, especially electronic media, to its advantage. One of VEVAK's favorite tricks is setting up web sites that look like they are opposition sites but which are actually controlled by the regime. These sites often will be multilingual, including Farsi, German, Arabic French, and English. Some are crafted carefully and are very subtle in how they skew their information (e.g., Iran-Interlink, set up and run by Massoud Khodabandeh and his wife Ann Singleton from Leeds, England); others are less subtle, simply providing the regime's point of view on facts and events in the news (e.g., www.mujahedeen.com or www.mojahedin.ws). This latter group is aimed at the more gullible in our open society and unfortunately such a market exists. However, if one begins to do one's homework, asking careful questions, the material on these fake sites generally does not add up.

Let's examine a few examples of VEVAK's work in the United States. In late October, 2005, VEVAK sent three of its agents to Washington to stage a press event in which the principal Iranian resistance movement, the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MeK), was to be slandered. Veteran VEVAK agent Karim Haqi flew from Amsterdam to Canada where he was joined by VEVAK's Ottawa agents Amir-Hossein Kord Rostami and Mahin (Parvin-Mahrokh) Haji, and the three flew from Toronto to Washington. Fortunately the resistance had been tracking these three, informed the FBI of their presence in Washington, and when the three tried to hold a press conference, the resistance had people assigned to ask pointed questions of them so that they ended the interview prematurely and fled back to Canada.

Abolghasem Bayyenet is a member of the Iranian government. He serves as a trade expert for the Ministry of Commerce. But his background of study and service in the Foreign Ministry indicates that Bayyenet is more than just an economist or a suave and savvy businessman. In an article published in Global Politician on April 23, 2006, entitled “Is Regime Change Possible in Iran?”, Bayyenet leads his audience to think that he is a neutral observer, concerned lest the United States make an error in its assessment of Iran similar to the errors of intelligence and judgment that led to our 2003 invasion of Iraq, with its less than successful outcome. However, his carefully crafted bottom line is that the people of Iran are not going to support regime change and that hardliner President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad actually has achieved greater popularity than his predecessors because of his concern for the problems of the poor and his fight for economic and social justice. To the naive, Bayyenet makes Ahmadinejad sound positively saintly. Conveniently overlooked is the occurrence of over four thousand acts of protest, strikes, anti-regime rallies, riots, and even political assassinations by the people of Iran against the government in the year since Ahmadinejad assumed office. So too, the following facts are ignored: the sizeable flight of capital, the increase in unemployment, and the rising two-figure rate of inflation, all within this last year. Bayyenet is a regime apologist, and when one is familiar with the facts, his arguments ring very hollow. However, his English skills are excellent, and so the naОve might be beguiled by his commentary.

Mohsen Sazegara is VEVAK's “reformed revolutionary”. A student supporter of Khomeini before the 1979 revolution, Sazegara joined the “imam” on his return from exile and served in the government for a decade before supposedly growing disillusioned.

He formed several reformist newspapers but ran afoul of the hardliners in 2003 and was arrested and imprisoned by VEVAK. Following “hunger strikes”, Sazegara was released for health reasons and permitted to seek treatment abroad. Although critical of the government and particularly of Ahmadinejad and KhameneМ, Sazegara is yet more critical of opposition groups, leaving the impression that he favors internal regime change but sees no one to lead such a movement for the foreseeable future. His bottom line: no one is capable of doing what needs to be done, so we must bide our time. Very slick, but his shadow shows his likely remaining ties to the MOIS.

http://www.ocnus.net/artman/publish/article_27144.shtml


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o view this item online, visit http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=53629

Thursday, January 4, 2007
SECURITY BREECHES
Bill Clinton authorized Sandy Berger's access
Investigation into pilfered documents reveals former president signed letter
Posted: January 4, 2007
1:00 a.m. Eastern

By Chelsea Schilling
© 2007 WorldNetDaily.com


Sandy Berger
President Bill Clinton signed a letter authorizing former National Security Adviser Sandy Berger's access to classified documents that later came up missing, according to a newly released investigation report by the National Archives and Records Administration.

The sensitive drafts of the National Security Council's "Millennium After Action Review" on the Clinton administration's handling of the al-Qaida terror threats in December 1999 suspiciously disappeared after Berger said he intended to "determine if Executive Privilege needed to be exerted prior to documents being provided to the 9/11 Commission." Then-Attorney General John Ashcroft testified before the 9-11 commission about the millennium report, urging the panel to ask why the document's warnings and "blueprint" to thwart al-Qaida's plans to target the U.S. were ignored by the Clinton administration and not shared with the incoming Bush security staff.

The NARA investigation report said Clinton signed an April 12, 2002, letter designating Berger – and another person whose named is redacted – as "agents on his behalf to review relevant NSC documents regarding Osama Bin Laden/Al Qaeda, Sudan and Presidential correspondence from or to (Sudanese President) Omar Bashir, contained in the Clinton Presidential records." A subsequent letter from a National Security Council official, May 14, 2002, said Berger repeatedly was briefed that "he was not allowed to remove any documentation from NARA."

Last year, Berger plea bargained a criminal sentence on the charge of unlawfully removing and retaining classified documents. A judge gave him no prison time, a $50,000 fine, 100 hours of community service and a ban from access to classified material for three years.

(Story continues below)

According to the NARA report, after the 9-11 attacks, Clinton administration officials were swamped with calls regarding their handling of terrorist threats, and Berger soon realized he would have to testify. Berger said he put in over 100 unpaid hours of his time to be responsive.

The former White House adviser said the documents up for review were so numerous that he was unable to reconstruct them from memory, so he took 10-to-12 pages of notes and hid them in the pocket of his blazer.

The investigation report says, however, the May 14, 2002, letter stated "notes may be taken but must be retained by NARA staff and forwarded to the NSC for a classification review and appropriate marking. Berger, the letter said, "was made aware of this requirement."

In July 2003, Berger's handling of the papers began to "cause archival concerns in maintaining provenance" after he asked to leave the viewing office several times to hold very private phone calls. Later, in September, Berger once again stepped out of the office and headed for the men's room, but personnel reported an unknown white object beneath his pant leg.

A witness said Berger "bent down, fiddling with something white, which could have been papers, around his ankle."

After Berger's actions aroused suspicion in September 2003, an unnamed archives official hand-numbered drafts provided to Berger as a means of controlling the documents without consulting with NARA general counsel, security, management, the Office of the Inspector General or law enforcement.

In October, Berger returned to the archives office and was given one file folder of documents at a time. The NARA report indicates an e-mail numbered 217 came up missing after he reviewed it. Berger later said he slid the document under his portfolio.

When personnel noticed it was missing, they offered a copy of document 217 to Berger, and he reportedly slid the second file under his portfolio as well. Later, Berger said if he had been asked to return the file "it would have triggered a decision for him to give the documents back."

Instead, Berger said he had to make a private phone call and went to a desk outside the office. However, the phone line remained unlit, and he quickly departed to the restroom, a location from which he was reported to have recently returned.

Berger made numerous suspicious visits to the men's room in which personnel were concerned he might be hiding documents. He said he "went to the restroom on an average of every 30 minutes to one hour to use the facilities and stretch his legs."

According to the NARA report, Berger claimed he accidentally took the files outside of the archives building and didn't want to risk bringing documents back because personnel might notice something unusual. Instead, he took the files to a fenced construction area on Ninth Street, slid them under a trailer and returned to the office to finish his review. After doing so, he returned to the site, reclaimed the documents and took them to his office.

During the visit, Berger is reported to have hidden four documents in his pockets, all versions of the Millennium Alert After Action Review.

Archives officials decided to call Berger and ask him for the documents. He said he didn't think he had any files. They advised him NARA was treating the matter as a security infraction and was going to report the incident to the National Security Council. If Berger admitted to taking the documents by mistake, the incident would be reported as inadvertent removal. But, he maintained that staff members were in error, and he had given the files back to an assistant.

Later that evening, Berger claimed to have found two documents, and NARA made arrangements to pick up the files the following morning. However, NARA reports the documents were an e-mail and a facsimile Berger reviewed Sept. 2, 2003, not classified files viewed Oct. 2, 2003.

Berger said he could not find any additional documents and claimed he must have thrown them away. According to the NARA report, "He had destroyed, cut into small pieces, three of the four documents. These were put in the trash. By Saturday, the trash had been picked up. He tried to find the trash collector but had no luck."

The inspector general was briefed on the incidents Oct. 10. That day, OI investigators recovered documents from Berger's home at the request of his attorney. Six months later, the Department of Justice notified the 9/11 commission.

Berger said if someone had always been with him, he would not have taken any documents.

Despite his April 1, 2005, guilty plea for Unauthorized Removal and Retention of Classified Material, Berger still vehemently denies smuggling any documents in his socks. According to the report, he said he was adjusting them "because his shoes frequently come untied and his socks frequently fall down."

Just yesterday, the saga of Berger and the documents was ranked No. 6 on WND's annual list of most underreported news stories of 2006.


1,241 posted on 01/04/2007 2:17:32 AM PST by nw_arizona_granny (2007 shall be known as the final year to feel freedom in America, unless you fight the takeover ....)
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http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/organizedcrime/octa_e.htm

dated 11-17-2006

Strategic Priority: Organized Crime
2006 Canada / US Organized Crime Threat Assessment


Introduction

Canada and the United States have always been attractive targets for criminal organizations seeking profitable markets. Prosperous, broad-based economies and open societies provide opportunities for criminal organizations to establish themselves. From this initial foothold, fledgling criminal interests may become entrenched in the legitimate and illegitimate economies of Canada and the United States. Both countries face the difficult task of controlling very large perimeter areas. Coastal areas must be secured against criminal and security threats. The integrity of the Canada / US border must be maintained while still allowing for the free flow of people and goods.

The threat from organized crime can be subtle and insidious or violent and overt. It has profound social, economic and political consequences. It compromises the normal function of economic, government and social institutions. Organized crime can undermine democratic processes and corrode trust in public institutions. It is driven by greed and perpetuates itself through addiction, enslavement and the exploitation of human vulnerability.

Legal and illegal immigration, drug and contraband smuggling, and financial crimes remain key factors in assessing organized crime activity in Canada and the United States. Immigration has always been a driving force in the historical evolution of Canada and the United States. However, impoverishment and lack of language skills and social networks can force immigrants to become a readymade labor pool for criminal organizations and their illicit activities. Drug smuggling has always been one of the financial engines driving organized crime and a major component of the illicit traffic across the Canada / US border. More recently, contraband such as tobacco, alcohol, counterfeit goods and firearms have become critical sources of criminal revenue and a challenge to law enforcement in both countries. Finally, Canada and the United States are leading economic powers. Canadian and US stock markets, financial institutions, large and small businesses and their vast consumer bases are all targets for fraud, manipulation and other forms of financial crime.

Notes on Usage

Throughout this document:

* Priorities and other listings are presented in alphabetical order;
* The term “migrants” is used instead of “aliens” in the context of smuggling; and
* The letter “y” at the end of Russian terms indicates a plural.

Key Findings

Asian Organized Crime (AOC) groups are distinguished by a high level of criminal entrepreneurship. They use both personal relationships and specific business and technological skills to maximize profit.

* AOC is active throughout Canada and the United States, from major metropolitan areas and their suburbs to isolated rural communities.
* Over the past decade, pre-existing underground economies of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) and its satellite states have transformed into fully realized transnational organized crime syndicates.
* Increasingly, Russian organized crime is characterized by fluid, cellular-type structures. Senior members / associates of Russian criminal groups appear to recognize and accept the hegemony of a single “criminal authority” who plays an important role in dispute resolution, decision-making and the administration of criminal funds.
* Italian Organized Crime / La Cosa Nostra (IOC / LCN) is the most mature form of organized crime in both Canada and the United States. Its ability to form alliances with and coopt other organized crime groups gives it global influence.
* In both Canada and the United States, IOC / LCN is distinguished by its strict, vertically integrated, hierarchical structure. The resulting discipline and efficiency permit these groups to focus resources and maximize profit.
* African criminal enterprises are engaged in a variety of low- to mid-level criminal activities which include a number of financial fraud schemes.
* Albanian criminal groups are engaged in a range of cross-border criminal activity, including drug smuggling and money laundering.
* US authorities have reported a significant decrease in seizures and availability of Canadian pseudoephedrine. This development is attributable to joint Canada / US law enforcement efforts and recent changes to legislation governing the sale of pseudoephedrine and ephedrine for export.
* Expanding financial, telecommunications, trade, and transportation systems that support global economies also provide abundant opportunities for criminal exploitation. Identity theft, money laundering and Internet fraud are a few of the financial crimes that are growing in scale, scope, and sophistication.
* While there are few concrete linkages between Canadian and US gangs, many street gangs appear to be evolving into significant criminal enterprises with international implications.
* Globally, human trafficking and migrant smuggling are the third largest source of revenue for organized crime, after drugs and arms trafficking. Women and children are particularly vulnerable to this form of exploitation.
* Middle Eastern / Southwest Asian criminal enterprises are typically loosely organized theft or financial fraud rings that increasingly use small, legitimate cash businesses to facilitate their activities.

Joint Organized Crime Priorities

Asian Organized Crime
Asian Organized Crime (AOC) groups, also referred to as Asian criminal enterprises, are fluid, multi-faceted and diverse. They are distinguished by a high level of criminal entrepreneurship. AOC groups use both personal relationships and specific business and technological skills to maximize profit. AOC includes Chinese groups like triads; loose criminal affiliations; migrant smuggling organizations; Vietnamese street gangs; Korean groups; and to a lesser extent, the Japanese Boryokudan or Yakuza.

AOC crime profiles range from low-skill activities like extortion and protection rackets; through home invasions, which require some planning; to sophisticated credit card fraud, counterfeiting, and thefts of high-tech components, such as computer chips. Drug trafficking continues to be a significant source of AOC revenue. In Canada, Chinese organized crime groups import precursor chemicals from Asia for the production of MDMA (Ecstasy), a significant quantity of which is smuggled into the United States.

In Canada, AOC groups are active within traditional Asian population centers in British Columbia, Alberta, Ontario, and Quebec. There is also evidence of AOC migrant smuggling and drug trafficking activity in smaller population centers, such as the predominantly rural Atlantic Region. In the United States, AOC is active throughout the country, from major metropolitan areas and their suburbs to isolated rural communities.

Established Chinese criminal infrastructures facilitate the smuggling of large numbers of Chinese migrants into North America. Organized crime groups based in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) orchestrate mass illegal Chinese migrant smuggling operations, often in cooperation with one another. These global criminal networks are believed to engage in a variety of ancillary criminal offenses — including visa fraud — to support their primary profit-making activity.

In addition to migrant smuggling, many Asian criminal enterprises are involved in human trafficking. In this case, individuals are smuggled into Canada and the United States and forced into indentured servitude to pay the smuggling organization. In the United States, the debt is frequently paid through virtual slavery in brothels, sweatshops or restaurants.

Forecast

* Triad society dominance of the Asian criminal milieu and the extent of their global relationships combine to give triads real potential to become formidable organized crime threats to Canada and the United States.
* Fluid, non-hierarchical organizations characteristic of “non-traditional” AOC will grow increasingly prevalent.
* AOC groups will continue to represent a threat in terms of border integrity, particularly with regard to migrant and drug smuggling.

Eurasian / Eastern European Organized Crime
Since 1989, remarkable change has occurred in the political, social, and economic climate of the FSU and its satellite states. One of the most surprising transformations has been the maturation and expansion of pre-existing underground economies into fully realized transnational organized crime syndicates. E / EEOC is not limited to FSU-based organizations, but includes groups from the former Soviet Bloc nations of Central and Eastern Europe.

E / EEOC arrived on this continent fully formed. Most key groups have inextricable links to parent organizations in Russia and the FSU. Many Western observers view E / EEOC as a vertically integrated phenomenon, analogous to traditional mafia-type groups. Increasing evidence suggests, however, that a more fluid, cellular-type structure is the norm. Members of different E / EEOC cells may come together informally to carry out different types of opportunistic criminal activity.

Within the larger E / EEOC context, groups tend to follow ethnic lines. There is a “Soviet factor” in some criminal relationships, meaning that groups from the FSU work with each other more readily than with non-FSU groups. When specific resources or skill sets are required but not readily available, E / EEOC groups may build partnerships across ethnic and criminal lines.

Senior members / associates of Russian groups appear to recognize and accept the hegemony of a single avtorityet (criminal authority), who plays an important role in dispute resolution, decision-making and the administration of criminal funds. Another important figure in the Russian criminal environment is the krisha, or “roof, ” a sponsor whose authority and influence provides protection and stability. In Canada, E / EEOC networks tend to focus on key individuals (who may or may not be avtorityety in the original sense of the word) who act as criminal consultants — dispensing advice, making introductions, and providing “seed money” — in exchange for a cut of the final profits.

The traditional hub of E / EEOC activity in Canada is the Toronto area. E / EEOC is also present in Vancouver and other urban centers. Criminal activity is not limited to Russian entities, but also includes criminals with a range of Eastern and Central European ethnicities. E / EEOC is one of several criminal entities drawn to the diamond trade in the Canadian north. This is significant because Canada is currently among the top four producers of rough diamonds in the world and is projected to become the world’s leading producer over the next two to three decades.

In the United States, New York City remains a significant center of E / EEOC activity. Additionally E / EEOC activity has been noted in major metropolitan areas where there is a significant Eurasian / Eastern European population. E / EEOC signature activities in the United States range from money laundering and drug trafficking to various types of fraud. Aside from Russian organizations, ethnic E / EEOC interests operating in the United States include Polish, Romanian and Armenian groups.

Forecast

* While Russian and FSU organizations will continue to dominate, analysis indicates that emerging forms of E / EEOC from the former Soviet Bloc nations of Central and Eastern Europe - including Lithuanian, Latvian, Polish, Romanian, Armenian and Roma (Gypsy) groups — will challenge law enforcement in both Canada and the United States.
* E / EEOC groups will continue to build limited partnerships across ethnic lines to maximize strategic capabilities.

Italian Organized Crime / La Cosa Nostra
Canadian and US law enforcement agencies use different terminology to describe organized crime of Italian origin. Ethnic Italian organized crime groups based in the United States are referred to as La Cosa Nostra (LCN). By comparison, criminal groups based in Italy that conduct criminal activity in the United States are referred to as Italian Organized Crime (IOC). LCN groups are the more prevalent of the two types of ethnic Italian criminal groups in the United States. Canadian law enforcement refers to all ethnic Italian criminal activity as either Traditional Organized Crime or Italian Organized Crime. For the purposes of this document, Italian Organized Crime will reflect Canadian usage.

The principal Italian criminal groupings in Canada are the Sicilian Mafia and the ‘Ndrangheta, or Calabrian Mafia. The Sicilian Mafia is the most influential, with links to other Sicilian groups across Canada and in the United States, Italy and Venezuela. In many parts of Canada, the Sicilian Mafia exerts a powerful influence over the ‘Ndrangheta.

IOC / LCN is the most mature form of organized crime in both Canada and the United States. Its ability to form alliances with and coopt other organized crime groups gives it global influence. The emerging generation of IOC / LCN leaders has access to tremendous financial resources. In the United States, LCN initiation ceremonies dictate clear distinctions between official (or “made”) members and associates. In Canada, distinctions are drawn between “executives,” “members” and “associates” and the existence of LCN-style initiation rituals has not been confirmed. In both countries, IOC / LCN is distinguished by its strict, vertically integrated, hierarchical structure. The discipline and efficiency that result from this structure permit IOC / LCN to focus resources to maximize profit. This structure is in stark contrast to other forms of criminal activity, such as Asian and Eurasian / Eastern European organized crime, which tend to be more focused on opportunity and immediate profit rather than the development of the organization as a criminal enterprise over a long period of time.

Forecast

* Although drug trafficking continues to be a financial mainstay for IOC / LCN groups, they will continue to diversify into a variety of profitable ventures.
* The emerging generation of IOC / LCN members will make increasing use of technology to secure communications and maximize profits.

Strategic Environmental Issues

African Criminal Enterprises
African criminal enterprises are involved in money laundering; financial fraud schemes, including insurance and health care billing scams; check and credit card fraud; Canadian advance fee lottery fraud; and phishing (e-mail solicitation to obtain personal information) schemes.

In 2005, a joint FBI / RCMP mass-marketing fraud initiative reviewed counterfeit monetary instruments seized by Netherlands authorities between April 2003 and February 2005. The checks were to be delivered to consumers around the world as part of an African criminal enterprise advance fee fraud (provision of a fee in order to secure fictitious lottery winnings or lines of credit).

Aside from fraud, African criminal enterprises engage in narcotics and human trafficking, prostitution, migrant smuggling, and kidnapping.

Balkan Criminal Enterprises
Albanian groups have been implicated in Canadian and US counterfeit currency and immigration documentation schemes. There are indications that some Albanian groups are branching out into white collar activity such as real estate and health care fraud. They are also engaged in a range of cross-border criminal activity, including smuggling of marijuana and possibly other drugs, migrant smuggling, and money laundering.

Drug Production and Trafficking

Colombian Organized Crime and the Drug Trade
Colombian cocaine brokers are part of the highly diversified North American cocaine trafficking chain. They are intermediaries between cocaine producers in Colombia and Canadian and US cocaine trafficking organizations. In Canada, they sell the shipments to other crime groups, including Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs (OMG) and IOC. In the United States, Mexican trafficking organizations and OMGs are among the groups involved in domestic cocaine distribution.

The United States is a major transit point for cocaine en route to Canada from South America. The amount of cocaine seized along the British Columbia border inbound from the United States almost doubled in 2004.

Marijuana
Many criminal organizations in Canada are involved, in some way, in the marijuana trade. Some drug traffickers specialize in marijuana; others traffic in a variety of substances. Those who specialize in marijuana often control specific aspects of the trade such as brokering, transportation, or the laundering of proceeds.

Marijuana grow operations and trafficking are increasing across Canada. These activities are particularly serious in British Columbia, Ontario, and Quebec, although recent major seizures in rural parts of the Atlantic provinces indicate that the problem is by no means localized.

The smuggling of Canadian marijuana into the United States continues to be a significant problem for law enforcement agencies on both sides of the border. However, Mexico remains the major foreign source of marijuana for the US domestic market. Similarly, while Canadian growers supply marijuana to Canadian users, Canadian traffickers also import marijuana from Colombia, Jamaica, Mexico and other source countries.

MDMA (Ecstasy)
Over the past decade, the illicit synthetic drug trade in Canada and the United States has undergone significant transformation, and new developments emerge with each passing year. Many of these changes are attributable to the increased involvement of major organized crime networks in importation, domestic production and trafficking. Although the focus continues to be on MDMA, there has also been a surge in the production and trafficking of methamphetamine. In Canada, emerging drugs of concern include gamma hydroxy butyrate (GHB), ketamine, and diverted pharmaceuticals.

Prior to 2004, the largest seizures of MDMA in Canada involved shipments of tablets and powder imported from Europe. Beginning in 2004, there was an exponential increase in domestic clandestine synthesis and tableting laboratories. During that period Canadian law enforcement authorities seized 15 million dosage units of MDMA while US authorities seized 2 million dosage units. Given the respective sizes of the Canadian and US populations, this disparity is significant and suggests that large amounts of MDMA originating in or transshipped through Canada are destined for US markets. RCMP officials estimate that a significant quantity of the MDMA produced in Canada is eventually destined for sale in the United States.

Methamphetamine
Perhaps the most significant recent shift in illicit synthetic drug activity in Canada has been the continuing rise in methamphetamine trafficking and availability. The bulk of methamphetamine available in Canada is derived from domestic clandestine laboratories. These manufacturing operations involve primarily independent entrepreneurs and users and, increasingly, Asian organized crime networks and OMGs. In many cases, these groups operate “Superlabs,” which are capable of producing over five kilograms of methamphetamine or Ecstasy in a single “run” or “batch.”

Pseudoephedrine and Chemical Regulation
Canadian Precursor Control Regulations took effect in January 2003, governing the sale of pseudoephedrine and ephedrine for export. Companies involved in the sale of precursor chemicals must be registered and provide background information about individuals who purchase chemicals. Subsequent to the implementation of these regulations and related Canadian / US law enforcement efforts, US authorities have reported a significant decrease in Canadian pseudoephedrine seizures and availability.

By the end of the first quarter of 2006, 38 US states had passed measures establishing or enhancing restrictions on over-the-counter sales of pseudoephedrine products, most often associated with cold remedies. Retailers generally must keep such products in an area inaccessible to customers, limit the amount that can be bought at any one time, and require proof of identification prior to purchase. As a result, several states have noted a decrease in the number of seizures of small-scale methamphetamine laboratories. In Canada, the provinces of Manitoba and Saskatchewan announced in November 2005 that they would address the increasing use of methamphetamine by limiting access to single-source pseudoephedrine products. Both provinces now require that numerous cough and cold remedies containing pseudoephedrine be sold only in pharmacies, where they must be stored behind the counter. British Columbia, Alberta and Ontario are considering similar restrictions.

Financial Crime

Identity Theft
Criminal enterprises and loosely organized criminal networks perpetrate identity theft throughout Canada and the United States. These groups may use the proceeds from the theft, sale, and manipulation of sensitive information to finance other criminal ventures with the capacity to cause significant harm to Canadian and US government, citizens, businesses, and interests.

Of particular concern, new technologies and the Internet provide identity thieves with innovative tools for acquiring large amounts of personal data with minimal effort. “Phishing” scams are one of the most significant and lucrative identity theft-related threats to Internet users. Frequently, “phishing” scams operate in conjunction with “spamming” techniques that allow criminals to target millions of potential victims.

Money Laundering
The ability to launder large sums of money is a fundamental requirement for virtually every form of major criminal activity, except violent crime. Several “traditional” money laundering techniques are in common usage, most notably the exploitation of the banking systems through wire transfers, offshore bank accounts, and shell companies. These techniques include currency smuggling; smurfing; the use of money service businesses such as currency exchanges and wire services; electronic fund transfers; and commingling of licit and illicit funds.

Diamond Industry
The emerging Canadian diamond industry represents several potential challenges with regard to criminal activity. While issues like theft and fraud are continuing concerns, Canadian authorities have noted the potential use of diamonds as a money laundering vehicle and for the concealment of proceeds of crime. Portable and with high concentrated value, diamonds can be moved easily and efficiently between countries.

Internet Payment Systems
Internet payment systems (IPS) allow funds to be transferred to accounts around the world without resorting to the international banking system. Additionally, these payment systems enable clients to transfer funds globally via the Internet without regard to currency type, reporting, or regulatory restrictions. As such, these cash substitutes are ideal money laundering tools. At the layering stage (in which funds are divided up and moved around to hide their true origins), funds can be sent to a variety of locations worldwide. At the placement stage, an IPS can be used as a vehicle to “receive” funds into a particular account.

Stored value cards (gift cards or prepaid debit cards) are issued by banks, trust companies and other financial institutions and are accepted increasingly as legal tender in Canada and the United States. Often, stored value cards can be transferred from person to person as gifts and “reloaded” in value. They may hold large quantities of “virtual currency” and represent a convenient method of smuggling money from one country to another.

Black Market Peso Exchange
The Black Market Peso Exchange (BMPE), which operates primarily throughout South and Central America and Mexico, is a money laundering scheme that uses international trade to launder narcotics proceeds. The purpose of the BMPE is to repatriate illicit proceeds while evading local foreign exchange controls. This process allows criminal organizations to launder proceeds between North and South America without creating a paper trail or drawing undue attention to themselves.

Casinos
Casinos have been an organized crime money laundering venue in the United States since at least the 1960s. In Canada, casinos began operating in the late 1980s and are now located in a number of cities from coast to coast. Most Canadian and US casinos provide financial services such as casino accounts (analogous to a savings account in a bank), currency exchanges, and electronic funds transfers. Both Canadian and US casinos wire funds across the border. The fact that currency in casinos is largely exchanged in the form of chips and stored value cards renders the traceability of funds difficult.

Online casinos are proliferating. While they are legal in many countries, online casinos are illegal in both Canada and the United States. As a result, servers are located offshore, making them difficult to regulate under federal, provincial, or state legislation. This arrangement provides opportunities for a number of money laundering-related activities.

Telemarketing Fraud
Telemarketing fraud - often consisting of credit card, loan and investment scams - continues to target both Canadian and US citizens. US losses due to this type of fraud are estimated at nearly $1 billion per year while Canadian losses are estimated at more than CDN $16 million. However, RCMP analysts estimate that only five percent of victims ever report to authorities, meaning that actual losses may approach CDN $295 million per year.

Gangs

Serious gang-related criminal activity continues to challenge law enforcement on either side of the Canada - US border. While there are few concrete linkages between Canadian and US gangs, authorities in both countries are noting change and evolution in certain aspects of their gang situations. The fact that this evolution appears to be occurring concurrently suggests that gang activity — often dismissed as “petty crime” — is poised to transform itself into a much more serious form of criminal enterprise.

Most large Canadian urban centers play host to street gangs. Some of these pattern themselves consciously after US models like the Crips and the Bloods, while others, like Jamaican Posse groups and Vietnamese gangs, are structured along ethnic or national lines. From a Canadian police perspective, however, the greatest street gang-related threat is in the Prairie Provinces (Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta), where Aboriginal (Indian) street gangs like the Indian Posse, the Native Syndicate and the Saskatchewan Warriors are criminally active in cities like Winnipeg, Saskatoon and Regina.

Gangs hold out the promise not only of power and profit but, just as importantly, of family and belonging. For the adolescent demographic most at risk of being drawn into criminal activity, this is a powerful siren call.

In the United States, several violent youth gangs, including the Salvadoran-based Mara Salvatrucha, or MS-13, and the 18th Street Gang, or M-18, are transforming themselves into global, or at least hemispheric, entities. Many of the core members of these internationalized gangs are former US residents who have been deported to their countries of origin in Central America after serving prison terms in the United States for felony offenses.

These “megagangs” have established themselves in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, acquiring a major share of the local cocaine and crack cocaine trades in the process. They battle authorities for control of criminal turf in towns and cities across Central America. Inter-gang rivalries result in the death and displacement of bystanders on a daily basis. Like Aboriginal gangs in Canada, these gangs often function as surrogate families for young people disenfranchised by poverty.

The strength of these gangs lies in their increasing ability to redirect criminal activity back into the United States. Gang-connected “coyotes” prey on Central American migrants, charging exorbitant fees to smuggle them into the United States, while others have established smuggling and trafficking relationships with Mexican drug trafficking organizations.

The Central American experience has transformed these gangs into entities that are much more dangerous than their US forebears. As their influence grows, so does their sophistication. They do not hesitate to use high-powered weaponry. Although these megagangs have not yet moved into true enterprise-type crime, they traffic drugs and stolen documents, commit robberies and steal cars.

Human Trafficking / Migrant Smuggling

According to the United Nations, human trafficking and migrant smuggling are two of the fastest growing areas of international criminal activity. Globally, they are the third largest source of revenue for organized crime, after drugs and arms trafficking. The United Nations estimates that the victims of human trafficking for the sex trade alone generate approximately $5 billion a year in revenue.

Migrant smuggling is the illegal movement of persons across a national border. Generally, migrant smuggling occurs with the consent of the person being smuggled, who often pays large sums of money to a professional smuggler. The fee varies according to the distance traveled. The relationship between the smuggler and the person being smuggled is usually terminated upon arrival at the final destination.

Human trafficking is a crime in which people are treated as commodities. It is a form of slavery that includes involuntary servitude, kidnapping, extortion and violent crime. Victims of human trafficking may be found in sweatshops, domestic work, restaurants, agricultural labor, prostitution, and the sex trade. Victims may not even recognize that they are being victimized, or may be forced to protect their exploiters. Women and children are particularly vulnerable to this form of criminal activity.

Middle Eastern / Southwest Asian Criminal Enterprises

Middle Eastern / Southwest Asian criminal enterprises are generally based on familial ties, are typically loosely organized theft or financial fraud rings. They have been active in areas with significant Middle Eastern or Southwest Asian populations since the 1970s.

Middle Eastern and Southwest Asian criminals increasingly use small, legitimate cash businesses to facilitate their activities. Legitimate businesses may be used to commingle licit and illicit proceeds to facilitate money laundering and other illegal activities.



Return to Top
Content created: 2006-11-17
Content revised:
Page updated: 2006-11-17 Return to Top Important Notices


1,242 posted on 01/04/2007 2:30:15 AM PST by nw_arizona_granny (2007 shall be known as the final year to feel freedom in America, unless you fight the takeover ....)
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To: All; milford421

http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/qc/comm/2007/jan07/070103_e.htm


Pursuit Leads to Seizure of 120,000 Contraband Cigarettes by the Central St. Lawrence Valley Regional Task Force

(Cornwall, Ontario) On December 23rd , 2006, at 10:55 a.m., an officer from the Akwesasne Mohawk Police Service noticed a suspicious 1997 Chevrolet Venture van that was registered to a 57 year old female resident of Brockville, Ontario on Cornwall Island in Akwesasne, Ontario. The officer followed the van to Cornwall, Ontario where he activated his emergency equipment to stop the van on Cumberland Street. Suddenly the driver sped through a red lighted intersection and crashed into a fence on Ellen Avenue. The two occupants of the van quickly fled on foot and were not located by police. Further investigation revealed that the van was loaded with contraband cigarettes. Officers from the Central St. Lawrence Valley RCMP Detachment were contacted and attended the scene to seize the smuggling vehicle and contraband cigarettes.

Located inside the vehicle were 600 re-sealable bags of contraband cigarettes representing a total of 120,000 illegal cigarettes that originate from the United States. No arrests were made and no bystanders were injured as a result of the fleeing vehicle and subsequent crash.

Organized crime groups involved in smuggling or the illegal distribution and/or manufacturing of controlled or prohibited goods have deleterious social and economic impacts that must be stopped so that our borders remain secure.

-30-

Sgt. Michael Harvey
(613)937-2800 Ext. 293
Central St. Lawrence Valley RCMP Detachment


1,243 posted on 01/04/2007 2:35:04 AM PST by nw_arizona_granny (2007 shall be known as the final year to feel freedom in America, unless you fight the takeover ....)
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To: All; milford421; FARS; Founding Father

http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20070104/ts_nm/osama_taliban_dc

Mullah Omar says hasn't seen bin Laden for years

2 hours, 11 minutes ago

PESHAWAR, Pakistan (Reuters) - Taliban chief Mullah Mohammad Omar has added to the mystery over
Osama bin Laden, saying he had not seen his ally and fellow fugitive since U.S.-backed forces ousted the Taliban from
Afghanistan in late 2001.
ADVERTISEMENT

"No, I have neither seen him, nor have I made any effort to do so, but I pray for his health and safety," Omar said in an e-mailed response to questions sent by Reuters.

The questions were relayed to Omar through his spokesman Mohammad Hanif, and a reply was received late on Wednesday.

continues..........


1,244 posted on 01/04/2007 3:11:56 AM PST by nw_arizona_granny (2007 shall be known as the final year to feel freedom in America, unless you fight the takeover ....)
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To: All; WestCoastGal; Calpernia

From the Kim Komando radio program newsletter.
Komando.com

Fun with paper

I like spending time with my son Ian making models. Of course, he always wants to make cars.

We don't always buy model kits at the toy store. Sometimes we make them out of paper. It's not quite the same. But it is fun, nonetheless.

At Paper Toys, you'll find plenty of paper models to keep your children occupied. There are lots of cars. And there are also some oddities. For example, there's a model of Bill Gates' house.

Some of the models are very easy to make. But others are quite detailed. So look through them all before you decide on one. Then fire up your printer and have some fun!


TO VISIT TODAY'S COOL SITE, GO HERE:
http://www.papertoys.com

[paper dolls too]


1,245 posted on 01/04/2007 3:21:26 AM PST by nw_arizona_granny (2007 shall be known as the final year to feel freedom in America, unless you fight the takeover ....)
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To: All; milford421

[unknown url]


Ocean scoured for Indonesia jet

POLEWALI, Indonesia (AP) -- Rescuers scoured the ocean for a missing
jetliner Wednesday, one day after senior Indonesian officials
erroneously
said the Boeing 737's charred wreckage had been found in a remote
mountainous area and that a dozen people may have survived.

Three navy ships set sail soon after sunrise in the Makkasar Strait and
five
air force planes took off to search for signs of wreckage, said Bambang
Karnoyudho, head of the National Search and Rescue Agency.

Karnoyudho said that based on radar and satellite readings, he thought
it
most likely that the plane had fallen into the sea. "God willing, we
can
find it soon," he told The Associated Press.

Adam Air Flight KI-574, carrying 102 people, was flying from
Indonesia's
main island of Java to North Sulawesi's provincial capital of Manado
when it
disappeared Monday in stormy weather after sending out distress signals
--
one over mountainous jungles and the other along the coast.

Three Oregonians were on board: Scott Jackson, a 54-year-old
wood-products
industry representative, and his daughters, 21-year-old Stephanie and
18-year-old Lindsey, the Oregonian newspaper reported. It was unclear
whether any other foreigners were on the plane.

Air Force Squadron Commander Lt. Col. Mudjianto, whose team followed
the
plane's scheduled flight path to the site where its last distress
signal was
picked up, said visibility was good early Wednesday, but they had found
no
signs of the 120-foot-long plane.

Strong wind and rain forced surveillance planes back to base later in
the
day, and a severe storm was heading toward the island and due to hit
Thursday.

Relatives of the passengers -- some camped out at the Adam Air counter
at
the Manado airport -- were losing patience after being misinformed a
day
earlier about the fate of the plane.

Top Indonesian aviation, military and police officials -- and the
airline
itself -- said the plane had been found in a remote part of Sulawesi.
They
said that 90 people on board had perished, but that the remaining 12
may
have survived.

Descriptions were vivid, with officials saying corpses and debris from
the
plane were scattered over a 300-yard area of forests and jagged cliffs,
highlighting the often unreliable and chaotic nature of disaster relief
efforts in Indonesia.

Eventually, Transport Minister Hatta Radjasa acknowledged the news that
the
plane had been located was based on rumors from villagers, sparking a
series
of reversals from other officials.

"I don't understand how the authorities could be so heartless and
spread
rumors without thinking of the suffering of those waiting for news of
their
loved ones," said Ima Kulata, who was awaiting word about her cousin
and two
nieces.

"It's ridiculous," she said, crying after learning there may be no
survivors
after all. "How come they make such fools of us?"

Aviation experts say the search has been bogged down by bad weather, a
potentially damaged emergency locator and dense, remote island terrain.

"In an area of low population density, particularly if it is in
inhospitable
terrain -- such as jungle, or a deep ravine or covered by a canopy --
it
could sit for a long time without being found," said Laurence Benn,
head of
the Center for Civil Aviation in London.

The plane's tracking technology may have been destroyed upon impact,
but
even if an emergency transponder signal went off, there may be
interference
weakening the signal, Benn said. "The locator beacon also has a limited
battery life," he added.

The search has been further compounded by the misinformation spread by
Indonesian officials.

"Indonesia is a place full of miscommunication, contradictory
information
and confusion during an accident like this," said Nicholas Ionides,
managing
editor for Flight International Magazine in Asia. "There is gossip and
rumor
and you never know what the facts are."

A U.S. National Transportation Safety Board team was to arrive Friday
to
offer assistance. It was unclear whether any other foreigners were on
the
plane.

The Oregonian reported Tuesday that the Jackson sisters, both from
Bend, Ore., were traveling with their father, who lives part time in
Indonesia,
Brazil and Oregon.

Felice Jackson DuBois said her daughters sent her an e-mail that said
"Happy
New Year" shortly before takeoff.

"Any time I hear that they're going on an airplane, yes, I'm scared,"
DuBois
told The Oregonian. "But you can't live your life guided by your fears.
You
just want to hold out hope."


1,246 posted on 01/04/2007 3:38:18 AM PST by nw_arizona_granny (2007 shall be known as the final year to feel freedom in America, unless you fight the takeover ....)
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To: All; milford421; Founding Father; FARS; StillProud2BeFree; Calpernia; DAVEY CROCKETT

Is Islamist cryptography evil?


http://blogs.zdnet.com/Ratcliffe/?p=240
January 3rd, 2007
Is Islamist cryptography evil?
Posted by Mitch Ratcliffe @ 12:21 pm Categories: Business & Technology

The Global Islamic Media Front announced in an advertisement on January
1 that it will release "the first Islamic computer program for secure
exchange on the Internet." There will certainly be a cry for more limits
on encryption technology, which has been spreading despite having been
treated as a weapon by the United States for decades. Privacy
advocates, myself included, will be asked again whether we were wrong to insist
that crypto be available to the public.

Mujahideen Secrets, the upcoming Islamic jihadist cryptography
application, offers 256-bit symmetrical and 2,048-bit There are other Arabic
interfaces for encryption of data that make no reference to
jihad.asymmetrical encryption for the holy warrior. Basically, Mujahideen Secrets is
comparable to any number of commercial products available here in the
United States, including MF Encryption Pad by Data Fortress,
AliveComputing's Alive File Encryption, and many other apps listed here.

There are other Arabic interfaces for encryption of data that make no
reference to jihad.

The difference is an Islamist skin, which seems more a gimmick to
inspire confidence in the software than a guarantee it will be effective.
It's like being offered "Security, brought to you by the Republican
Party," which we have seen isn't all it's cracked up to be.

So, does this suggest we should have locked down crypto technology
years ago, jailed Jim Bidzos and Phil Zimmerman, among others, and
prevented this disastrous breach of national security? I know some former
federal agents who tried to lock up the technology and people who developed
and distributed it, but the answer is an unequivocal "No."

Publicly available encryption has helped far more than an
Islamist-branded product will ever hurt. The ability to hide messages, among many
good works, has helped democracy movements thrive around the world,
supports the work of human rights activists and, most recently, was probably
used to help members of Islam in anti-Ahmadinejad campaigns organize to
rebuke Iran's belligerent president.

When people have their hands on the same tools government and the
military has used in the past within totalitarian regimes, it transforms
more than the threat to American interests. Cryptography can assist free
peoples and in freeing people, so if a jihadist wants to use it that is
simply the price of our greater liberty, which, if we are right that
freedom is what people will overcome whatever evil cryptography may be
put to.


1,247 posted on 01/04/2007 3:44:15 AM PST by nw_arizona_granny (2007 shall be known as the final year to feel freedom in America, unless you fight the takeover ....)
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To: All

Imminent release of new jihadi software


http://www.upi.com/InternationalIntelligence/view.php?StoryID=20070103-024431-4603r
Imminent release of new jihadi software

WASHINGTON, Jan. 3 (UPI) -- The Global Islamic Media Front -- GIMF --
announced the imminent release of new computer software called
"Mujahideen Secret."

MEMRI -- The Middle East Media Research Institute - reports that
according to the advertisement for the software, it is "the first Islamic
computer program for secure exchange [of information] on the Internet,"
and it provides users with "the five best encryption algorithms, and with
symmetrical encryption keys (256 bit), asymmetrical encryption keys
(2048 bit) and data compression [tools]."

An announcement by the Global Islamic Media Front, an al-Qaida
mouthpiece, was recently disseminated across several jihadist forums in which
the group presents the "jihadi information and the Western peoples." The
message, written by Ahmad al-Hatheq Bi Allah, argues that the Internet
serves as the best alternative to broadcast television for Muslims to
execute a "kind of jihad" involving preaching and information
disbursement. As the Western media allegedly obfuscates "facts," the author
believes that it is incumbent upon Muslims to join Western Internet forums,
to show the truth convincingly through visual or voice arguments,
especially as it concerns Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, and Chechnya.

With successful debate, the author claims the American people will
place pressure upon the U.S. government, "the guardian or terrorism and its
marketing," to reverse its foreign policy, else the people are culpable
for attacks brought upon them, as Ayman al-Zawahiri exclaimed.


1,248 posted on 01/04/2007 3:48:39 AM PST by nw_arizona_granny (2007 shall be known as the final year to feel freedom in America, unless you fight the takeover ....)
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To: All

bitterlemons-international.org - Middle East roundtable




Jihadi Islam in Africa

January 4, 2006 Volume 5 Edition 1

The following articles may be republished with proper citation given to
the author and bitterlemons-international.org.

To subscribe, unsubscribe, or change to the HTML format, simply go to
www.bitterlemons-international.org and submit your email address on the
right side. At our website, www.bitterlemons-international.org, you
will also find past editions; an extensive documents file; information
about us; and subscription information.

IN THIS ISSUE


|| "Calculating the jihadi threat in the Sahel" - by Hrach Gregorian
Since the early 1990s, there has been a rise in activity by Islamist
missionaries and NGOs in all four countries of the Sahel.

|| "Chasing camels in the desert" - by Ricardo Rene Laremont
Ultimately, it will be new educational systems and enhanced health care
delivery systems that will convert the enemies of America into friends.

|| "Somalia after the Islamic courts" - by Nicola Pedde
Somalia faces three enormous threats: the doubtful political
capabilities of the TFG, the presence of Ethiopian forces and the Islamist
militias.

|| "The case of the GSPC" - by Hussein Solomon
The security response of the state cannot be divorced from broader
political strategies.



|| Calculating the jihadi threat in the Sahel

by Hrach Gregorian
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --

In a September 11, 2006 video, Ayman al-Zawahiri declared that, "Osama
bin Laden has told me to announce to the Muslims that the GSPC (the
Algerian-based Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat) has joined
al-Qaeda. This should be a source of chagrin, frustration and sadness for the
apostates [of the Algerian regime], the treacherous sons of France."

There is some question as to whether this pronouncement represents a
strategic gain for al-Qaeda in North Africa or is indicative of the
declining fortunes of the GSPC. Nevertheless, it helped to reinforce concern
in some quarters, most notably in Washington but also in European
capitals, the UN and the African Union, that terrorists might gain a firmer
foothold in the more remote, largely ungoverned areas of the Sahel, a
region composed of four countries, Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Chad that
covers an area roughly the size of the United States.

Islamic fundamentalism has been part of the Sahelian political and
social landscape for well nigh 60 years now. Its proselytizers, adherents
and fighters have moved easily across the porous borders of this vast,
sparsely populated desert region. Jihadi elements are a small but not
insignificant presence in the Sahel, plying their trade in fundamentalist
ideology and holy war alongside (and often in close collaboration with)
smugglers, drug dealers and kidnappers.

They have not gone unnoticed, particularly by the US government, which
is now investing tens of millions of dollars to counter the threat they
pose to the four countries but perhaps more importantly to neighbors in
the region who are situated in areas of substantial geo-strategic
import, whether it be the Maghreb or the Horn of Africa, and/or sit on very
valuable resources, principally oil, viz., Nigeria and the Gulf of
Guinea. The US policy objective is to stem terrorist threats in these areas
at their inception, or at "Phase Zero," in the parlance of the US
European Command (EUCOM), through the use of a full range of political,
economic, development and security tools. Critics wonder if such investment
is commensurate with the gravity of the threat, but there is little
question as to its popularity among the financially strapped and in some
cases politically fragile regimes in the region.

Since the early 1990s, there has been a rise in activity by Islamist
missionaries and NGOs in all four countries of the Sahel. Chad has been
the site of considerable stirrings, with locals reporting the presence
of large numbers of foreign travelers carrying false identity papers and
infiltration by Islamist networks linked to the Sudan. It is the
northern region of Mali, however, that has witnessed the most significant
influx of foreign Jihadists, with the GSPC penetrating from Algeria and
other armed elements moving in from South Asia and the Middle East. The
GSPC is by far the most worrisome of the Jihadist groups since it is the
best financed, most organized, and operationally active. It has
extra-regional ambitions and operatives not only in the Sahel but throughout
Europe. Although wounded by western-supported counter-insurgency efforts
and put upon by local competitors, including the Tuareg rebels of
northern Mali, the GSPC, despite a dramatic recent drop in membershi!
p, is still very active in the region, with between three hundred and
five hundred fighters.

GSPC fundraising, recruiting, establishment of support networks and
armed attacks will continue in the Sahel, as will similar efforts by
al-Qaeda affiliated or inspired organizations. There is much at stake here
for all players. Antipathy to US policy, particularly in the Near East
and Iraq, is a key factor in the overall impact of radical Islamists on
a sizeable percentage of Sahelians. Their ideology is especially
appealing to politically disenfranchised and economically marginalized
segments of the local population, many of whom resent the plundering of
national assets by a small ruling elite that is seen as corrupt and too
eager to embrace the West as much for political and financial gain as for
concerns about national security.

Money is an equal opportunity corrupter, however, and there are reports
that leaders of the GSPC are now criticized for being motivated more by
money than by ideology. According to one observer, GSPC leader Mokhtar
Benmokhtar's modus operandi "no longer [has] anything to do with a
political project, it is almost a way of life; it is basically criminal
banditry." All of this presents an interesting question for policy makers:
whether it makes more sense to "buy" or to kill Jihadists in the Sahel.
With a hundred million a year to spend in the region, the US might want
to pay serious attention to the overall cost/benefit equation here.-
Published 4/1/2007 (c) bitterlemons-international.org

Dr. Hrach Gregorian is president of the Washington, DC-based Institute
of World Affairs, a partner in the consulting firm Gettysburg
Integrated Solutions, and associate professor in the graduate program in
conflict analysis at Royal Roads University in Victoria, Canada.

-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
|| Chasing camels in the desert

by Ricardo Rene Laremont
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --

In the post-9/11 world it is thoroughly understandable that the United
States should reorganize its military, diplomatic, and military
resources to engage, understand, and, if required, contest militant Islam.
Since those tragic events in 2001, the United States has initiated wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq; it has seized, detained, and interrogated "enemy
combatants" in Guantanamo, Cuba, and other clandestine locations around
the world; and it has radically reformed domestic terrorism laws in an
effort to detect, deter, and destroy enemies of the United States. But
is the strategy comprehensive, or is it overly skewed toward military
initiatives without taking into account measures that are needed to win
the "soft war" of educating the minds and nurturing the bodies of
putative enemies of the US? The contention here is that military investments
are necessary and can be prudent. US investments in education and
health care overseas, however, which are equally important in this "!
soft war," seem to be unsatisfactorily under-funded.

Since 9/11 and the apparent permanent reversal of military fortune in
the war in Iraq, it has become abundantly clear to petroleum analysts
around the world that the Middle East, a region that serves the world as
a critical source for petroleum, is either unstable, at risk, or
inaccessible for investment and exploitation. Saudi Arabia, the world's
largest depository of petroleum reserves, survives for the moment yet it
suffers from internal dissension and the possibility of the eventual
demise of the regime. Iraq and its important source of petroleum at Basra
may sell petroleum to world consumers but that source of petroleum is
irregular and because of its location it may eventually come under the
tutelage of Iranian political or economic forces. America's consistent
failure to engage in diplomacy with Iran since 1979 means that China has
primary access to petroleum there. Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, Abu
Dhabi all are protected by an American military umbrella meaning that!
--at least for the moment--these sources of petroleum are
comparatively secure.

The general lack of security in the Middle East means that the US and
other consumers of petroleum must necessarily look to Africa for
alternate sources of petroleum. Indonesia and Russia may also serve as
providers to western markets but, given the proximity of the west coast of
Africa to western European and American markets, Africa's petroleum
necessarily must be considered an alternative to Middle Eastern oil. It is in
Africa where petroleum and Islam mix.

Because of the instability in the Middle East, the US has come up with
a military strategy to deal with the question of Islamic terrorism and
the protection of petroleum assets in Africa. To cite just one example
of this reorientation in strategy, in May 2003, NATO Supreme Commander
James Jones said that the Navy's Sixth Fleet that is based in Naples,
Italy, would eventually "... spend half the time going down the west
coast of Africa." So Africa has become a critical area of geopolitical
concern for reasons of religious activism and petroleum.

The US has two plans for military joint training operations on the
African continent. The first is the Global Peace Operations Initiative
begun during fiscal year 2006. That initiative provided $100.4 million in
FY 2006 and requested $102.6 million for FY 2007 to train and equip
battalions and specialty units in Senegal, Ghana, Benin, Mali, Kenya,
Ethiopia, Malawi, Botswana, Mozambique, South Africa, Zambia, Gabon and
Nigeria. The amount involved here is very modest. On average the amount
dedicated per country averages close to $800,000 per recipient.

Of more direct interest to the subject here is the Trans-Saharan
Counter-Terrorism Initiative, which is an outgrowth of the Pan-Sahel
Initiative. The PSI was started right after 9/11 and spent approximately $16
million during 2002-03 to deploy teams of Special Operations soldiers to
Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger to provide counter-terrorism training
and equipment. The big media coup in this initiative occurred when GSPC
militants in Chad were tracked down during 2004.

The TSCTI received $3 million dollars in funding during FY 2005 and was
scheduled to receive $100 million yearly from FY 2007 through FY 2011,
resulting in a total of $500 million. Troops to be trained under this
program would include Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Algeria, Nigeria,
Senegal and Tunisia.

It is clear that this new program in its expanded form takes cognizance
of the double nexus between maintaining state stability and security
and maintaining access to petroleum and natural gas sources. The
inclusion of Algeria, Nigeria and Tunisia and the design of the new military
training program prove that Department of Defense planners understand the
need to be engaged both militarily and socially in these key countries.
The new program is multi-departmental, involving the State Department
in airport security, the Treasury Department in money laundering and
USAID in educational and health programs. What is clear from a review of
the new program is that the military engagement or "the hard power" is
clearly there. What is equally clear is that "the soft power" or the
need to address the question of education and health care is not well
funded.

In this new security arrangement, Algeria is the biggest "winner".
Besides the military training received, Algeria has been able to purchase
$276 million in armaments from the US government during 2005 alone. In
addition, Algeria has purchased $6.1 million dollars in armaments from
private markets. The second largest beneficiary from these changes in
policy has been Morocco. In 2005 it was able to purchase $18 million in
armaments from the US government and $3.9 million in private markets. US
government arms purchases by the other beneficiary countries in these
programs have been paltry. The emergence of Algeria as a key player in
these new security arrangements may speak volumes about future
American-Algerian cooperation. If we were to simply "follow the money", we would
have to assume that Algeria and the United States may have a newly
meaningful and enhanced military, intelligence and diplomatic relationship.

Regarding the "soft" aspect of this analysis, this is the area where
much greater attention and funding are warranted. Ultimately, it will be
new educational systems and enhanced health care delivery systems that
will convert the enemies of America into friends. It would seem that a
modest investment in educational and health care initiatives would reap
substantial benefits. Upon a review of USAID programs for the countries
discussed here, however, it seems that "soft investment" is missing.

For example, in Mali, USAID program expenditure for FY2007 is budgeted
to amount to just under $32 million to be spread on health care, basic
education, governance, economic growth and communications projects.
During the same period and on the same programs, USAID has budgeted less
than $19 million for Nigeria. There is nothing for Chad, Mauritania or
Niger.

In other words, with the exception of Mali, sufficient funds have not
been made available for basic education and health care in at least four
critical countries. This is due to either poor planning or poor
execution of policy, especially given what we already know about the
ameliorative effect that these kinds of initiatives have on positive public
perceptions of the US. Why the military aspect of this anti-terrorist
initiative in the Sahel has been funded while the non-military programs have
been neglected is difficult to comprehend.

Beyond the lack of balance in the appropriations for "hard" and "soft"
initiatives, the other aspect that seems to be at least somewhat
misguided is that the most of the military training has taken place in the
Sahara desert. The expenditure of $500 million over a five-year period
may be entirely appropriate if the center of gravity for the Islamist
movement were located in the desert. Quite evidently, that is not the
case. Militant Islamism is an urban phenomenon. In urban areas, educational
systems are often under-funded and directed by Islamists (often with
Saudi, Moroccan or Libyan support). Improving standards of hygiene and
medical care would improve relations between the US and the residents of
beneficiary countries. In Niger, for example, Cuba has sent hundreds of
doctors who improve health care there by reforming hygienic methods and
providing rudimentary medicines. How can Cuba afford to send hundreds
of doctors to Niger and the United States not? Can we afford not!
to?

Beyond the provision of educational and medical support in urban areas,
the last missing element in this effort to detect and monitor militant
Islamism involves the need to collect basic intelligence or information
regarding the socioeconomic causes for militant Islamism. At least from
the public information that is available, it seems that the United
States has a limited presence on the ground in urban environments where
Islamists live and recruit. It would seem that an almost immediate
investment in human intelligence gathering capabilities is needed in places
like Kano, Abidjan, Monrovia, Freetown, Dakar and Lagos.

Finally, I would like to underscore that the traditional forms of Islam
that have been practiced in Africa over centuries (especially variants
of Sufi Islam) have never posed a security risk to the interests of the
United States. It is only one smaller, more violent variant of militant
Islam that needs regular surveillance and counter-measures. This
violent form of Islam finds political expression because real and legitimate
frustrations exist in many Muslim communities regarding failed
educational systems, sub-standard health care delivery systems, high rates of
infant mortality, and endemic poverty. It seems that while we must
continue with our investment in military programs, to avoid the "soft power"
alternatives that are both available and inexpensive would seem to work
only to the detriment of our collective security.- Published 4/1/2007
(c) bitterlemons-international.org

Ricardo Rene Laremont is professor of political science and sociology
at the State University of New York at Binghamton.

-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
|| Somalia after the Islamic courts

by Nicola Pedde
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --

After years of warlord control over Mogadishu and southern Somalia in
general, in 2006 the so called "Islamic courts" conquered all the
center-south territories of the former Italian colony. Defeated and forced to
flee from Mogadishu, the remains of the Transitional Federal Government
moved to Baidoa, where President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmad obtained
concrete help from Ethiopia and indirect support from the United States. Then,
just before Christmas 2006, Ethiopian and Somali forces launched an
offensive against the courts in southern and central Somalia, quickly
defeating the Islamist forces. Not only Mogadishu but also the southern
city of Kismayo fell after several days of fighting, leaving the Islamic
militia disbanded and with only one possible alternative: hiding in the
thickly-forested Lower Juba region and waiting for revenge.

The Islamic courts are part of Somali history and tradition, though
relegated in the past to mere administrative, social and religious duties.
Somalis have never been strong religious zealots, nor has Somalia had a
strong religious tradition or history. The courts were simply part of
society, and they appeared in the recent past as a solution to the
decline of the traditional clan role. The courts' forces were quickly
welcomed as a new and positive element of stability by the local population;
they reestablished order at the local level and openly confronted the
warlords' arrogant armed militias.

In 2005, to increase their power and territorial control the most
important courts decided to join forces. This alliance is what quickly
allowed them to conquer Mogadishu and central and southern Somalia and
relegate the remaining forces of the warlords and the TFG to Baidoa. The
courts then tried to establish an Islamic form of government based on a
parliament or Shura and an executive government, the Fulinta. The Shura
was composed of 110 members from all the courts or local entities and
was chaired by the radical Sheikh Hassan Dahir Haweis. The Fulinta
comprised 25 members, called Hoghhaie (secretaries), and was chaired by the
moderate Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmad.

The original hierarchy of the courts was gradually replaced by
factionalism. In the aftermath of the conquest of Mogadishu almost a dozen
major factions emerged within the most important courts, mainly dominated
by religious leaders and characterized by growing conflict. The most
important faction was certainly the Shabab (youth), the only real armed
group serving the courts. It could count on almost 3,000 armed and
trained men and an additional more poorly equipped and trained force of about
6,000.

In recent years Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were the two main sources of
income for the courts (except for remittances from Somalis abroad),
through a huge network of private donors and charitable societies. Shabab
leader Abdulkardir Omar Addani was openly known as one of the most
important recipients of these funds, which have been heavily invested in
religious and social infrastructures all over Mogadishu and the surrounding
area. Elements in Pakistani intelligence along with Pakistani private
entities and charitable funds were also suspected not only of financing
some religious organizations but of favoring the illegal entry into
Somalia of terrorists from Afghanistan.

However, it was Iran that provided potentially the most important
source of support for the courts of Mogadishu in the last phase of their
power. The Islamic Republic had a double set of direct interests in
Somalia. First, to pave the way for the development of a client state
relationship that would transform Somalia into a "third front" in case of a
major international crisis. And second, to determine whether the local
uranium mines were "rich and easy to develop", as repeatedly stated by
Somali sources.

The first sphere of interest presented a complex mix of challenges. The
country was totally unknown to Iranians in terms of both politics and
of society, with a composition of forces on the ground only
partially--and probably temporarily--interested in interacting with Shi'ite Iran.
The courts looked at Iran as a good temporary partner, and above all
considered the alliance beneficial in the context of the crisis with
Ethiopia. Shabab leaders Addani and Adan Hashi Farah (Airo) had a completely
different vision of the alliance, seeing Iran as a stable source of
support as well as a partner supposedly linked with jihadi forces
throughout the Middle East.

Lebanese Hizballah personnel were repeatedly spotted in Mogadishu and
instructors from that organization and from Hamas were present in
southern Somalia from 2003. While the long-term evolution of this alliance
was uncertain, in the short-run there was clearly a mutual interest in
having at least open contact and basic support, for example in the
training camps in the Lower Juba and the Lower Shabelle regions.

But Somalia was and probably still is for Tehran also a territory where
it can compete for influence with Saudi Arabia, one of the main threats
to the internal security of the Islamic Republic. Tehran is well aware
of the role the Saudis are playing with Iran's Arab minorities, and the
bilateral dimension of Iranian-Saudi relations is, despite appearances,
at its lowest peak. Iran is also unhappy with the role the Saudis are
playing in southern Iraq and with the Kurds, and for that reason Somalia
offers a unique opportunity to invest against Saudi Arabia's interests.
The country, in fact, not only represents a bridge that could easily
bring forces onto Saudi territory, but is also an arena where Iranian
financial and military support could threaten regional Saudi interests.

As for the courts, they were ready to take advantage of Tehran's
availability in training and financing their militias while postponing the
problem of how to deal with this complex mix of Sunni and Shi'ite sources
of support. The overall logic was probably more in favor of the Saudis,
who are considered more stable and generous in the long run, while the
Iranians were perceived as an immediate but probably temporary
opportunity.

Factions among the courts were already on the brink of an internal
clash right after having taken control of Mogadishu and southern Somalia.
There was disagreement on several political, social and religious
issues, including regarding the Shabab and its role inside the courts system.
With no more than 5,000-7,000 fully equipped soldiers, including,
according to Somali military sources, nearly 70 "white" troops (probably
American and European converts), the Islamist militias were trying to
surround Baidoa and TFG forces without considering the real potential of
the Ethiopian army.

The strength and tactical capacity of the courts units were highly
overestimated by many foreign observers. Within a few days the entire
defensive system of the Islamist forces collapsed. Mogadishu was abandoned
largely due to fear of the local population after a brief summit of
tribal leaders suggested that the courts quickly leave the city. Kismayo
fell a few days later.

Today, for the first time in more than a decade a renewed feeling of
Somali nationalism seems to be emerging. The Islamist militias were
enthusiastically expelled by the population, while Ethiopian forces were
welcomed with stones and burning tires. An additional factor is the
unexpected positive role played by the clans, gathering forces without
relapsing into tribalism.

Yet Somalia today faces three enormous threats: the doubtful political
capabilities of the TFG, the presence of Ethiopian forces and the
Islamist militias. The nightmare of any Somali today is assisting in the
rebirth of the role of the warlords. If the TFG leaders are not able
quickly to allay that danger the door will be reopened to instability and
potentially, again, to the courts.

Many Somalis are convinced that Addis Ababa is interested in taking
control of the port of Kismayo, maintaining Somalia in a state of chaos
and generally preserving its status of failed state with the active
support of the breakaway states of Somaliland and Puntland north of
Somalia--the latter the home region of President Yusuf. For the moment,
Ethiopian forces are at best simply tolerated as a necessary and temporary
evil. The longer they stay in Somalia, the less the government will be
able to gain support from the population. On the other hand, the less the
Ethiopians stay the more the Islamist militias will be able to
reorganize and regroup.

Last but not least, southern Somalia is a perfect place to hide.
Islamist forces could establish a temporary base there to rethink strategies
and reorganize forces. Several foreign cells of terrorists and
instructors had already arrived prior to the retreat and could influence a
shift in the overall strategy of the Islamist militias, which are not
totally defeated and are potentially subject to an evolution toward
terrorism. Additional forces and materiel could possibly come from the
already unstable territories of northern Kenya and southern Sudan, both
sanctuaries of terrorist cells.- Published 4/1/2007 (c)
bitterlemons-international.org

Nicola Pedde is director of Globe Research, a Rome-based independent
think tank and analysis center focusing on the Middle East and the Horn
of Africa.

-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
|| The case of the GSPC

by Hussein Solomon
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --

The Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) is a splinter
faction of the Algerian-based Armed Islamic Group. The GSPC has an estimated
4,000 fighters and largely operates in the mountainous Kabylie region
of Algeria. While the group does aim to topple Algeria's secular
government, it would be wrong to assume that this is purely a domestic issue.
Mohamed Berrached, a terrorist tried by an Algerian court in 1998,
confessed that Osama bin Laden was at the origin of the creation of the
GSPC. Indeed, the GSPC has emerged as a major source of recruiting and
other support for al-Qaeda operations in Europe. The hand of the GSPC
could be seen in the foiled terror attacks on France and the United Kingdom
and its Moroccan ideological offshoots were responsible for the Madrid
train bombings. The GSPC has also proved to be a menace across the
Sahel region. In June 2005, the GSPC launched an attack on a Mauritanian
military outpost, killing 15 soldiers and wounding several others.

In response to the viciousness of the GSPC's terror campaign, the
Algerian government launched several intelligence-driven military campaigns
against the GSPC that resulted in a number of successes. In 2004, for
instance, Algerian soldiers killed Nabil Sahraoui and various other
senior militants including Sahraoui's potential successor Abdi Abdelaziz.
However, the Algerians have understood the regional and international
dimensions of the GSPC and have strengthened their cooperation with
neighboring states. This cooperation soon bore fruit with the arrest of Amar
Saifi, the GSPC's number two, who was responsible for the kidnapping of
32 foreign tourists in the Sahara desert in 2003. He was intercepted in
Libya near the Chad-Libya border.

Such joint bilateral and multilateral initiatives need to be supported
by western countries since the existence of organizations like the GSPC
does constitute a threat to their own national security. The other
reason to support such initiatives relates to the fact that many
counter-terrorism initiatives in the Sahel, and in Africa more generally,
continue to be plagued by the eternal curse that many developing countries
face--the dearth of adequate financial resources and skilled personnel.
One of the most interesting mechanisms to support multilateral
counter-terror initiatives in the Sahel is the US-sponsored Trans-Sahara
Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCI), which seeks to provide training, equipment,
and financial resources as a means to enhance more effective regional
responses to the threat posed by terrorists.

It is however important that such multilateral cooperation be holistic
in scope by, for instance, understanding the links among organized
crime syndicates engaged in money laundering, counterfeiting and terrorist
financing. The GSPC funds its operations by smuggling cigarettes,
drugs, vehicles and arms. A counter-terror strategy only using the military
as counter-terror agents is bound to be defective. Other actors would
need to be brought on board including the police, customs and excise
officials as well as the banking sector.

The need for more holistic strategies also means that the security
response of the state cannot be divorced from broader political strategies.
Algeria in recent years provides good insights into these broader
political strategies. Whilst allowing his security establishment to
aggressively pursue terrorists, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika has also sought
to address the underlying sources of discontent that provide a
recruitment basis for terrorist organizations. Recognizing that the
disappearance of more than 7,000 people is a popular source of discontent amongst
citizens, in September 2003 he established a mechanism to address this
issue. This was followed by an amnesty and also the release from prison
of Islamists like Abassi Madani and Ali Belhadj of the Islamic
Salvation Front (FIS).

In the final instance, this war on terror can be won in the region if
there is strong co-operation between western countries and regional
governments, if African countries are properly resourced, and if the war on
terrorism is contextualized within a broader political strategy.-
Published 4/1/2007 (c) bitterlemons-international.org

Professor Hussein Solomon lectures in the Department of Political
Sciences, University of Pretoria where he is also Director of the Centre for
International Political Studies (CiPS).


1,249 posted on 01/04/2007 3:56:34 AM PST by nw_arizona_granny (2007 shall be known as the final year to feel freedom in America, unless you fight the takeover ....)
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To: All; milford421

Leader of Taliban warns foreigners


http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/custom/attack/bal-te.afghan30dec30,0,496929.story?coll=bal-attack-headlines

Leader of Taliban warns foreigners
Omar letter predicts 'thumping defeat' of international forces in
Afghanistan
By Kim Barker
Originally published December 30, 2006
KABUL, Afghanistan // Mullah Mohammed Omar, the reclusive leader of the
Taliban, said in a letter yesterday that international troops face a
"thumping defeat" in Afghanistan.

The authenticity of the letter, which also congratulated Muslims on the
religious holiday of Eid al-Adha, "the festival of the sacrifice,"
could not be independently verified.

Mohammed Hanif, a purported spokesman for the Taliban, sent a scanned
copy by electronic mail yesterday to news media. The letter was written
in the Pashto language on Taliban letterhead and signed by Omar and
Hanif, with an incomplete English translation.

"The reality that exists in Afghanistan is clear to everybody," the
letter said. "On one side the occupiers, the persecutors, have so much
power and modern technology and equipment, and on the other side, we have
our helpless Afghans, using ordinary means. But despite this, they have
been driving these superpowers crazy. And the superpowers are looking
for an escape route."

This has been a violent year in Afghanistan, the worst since the
Taliban regime fled more than five years ago and launched an insurgency
against the U.S.-backed Afghan government.

Almost 4,000 people have died in violence in Afghanistan in 2006, most
of them Taliban fighters. But an increasing number of civilian deaths
in NATO bombings and shootings have caused some Afghans in the south to
turn against international troops.

In his letter, Omar said the Taliban should stand with such Afghan
victims and take revenge on NATO troops.

Omar's letter comes at a key time, when the Taliban are preparing for
their annual spring offensive while reeling from the death of a key
commander.

Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Osmani, who was supposed to be Omar's successor,
was killed in a U.S. military airstrike Dec. 19. Although Taliban
officials initially denied that Osmani died, this week they acknowledged it.

In the letter, Omar did not mention Osmani's death. Hanif had said
Thursday that a message from Omar would be sent the next day.

Omar's whereabouts are not known. Afghan officials say he is hiding in
Quetta, Pakistan, while Pakistani officials say he is in Afghanistan.

Officials hope a tribal meeting, called a jirga, between tribal leaders
on both sides of the porous Afghanistan-Pakistan border will help quell
the violence. Although initially some hoped moderate Taliban forces
would join the meeting, Omar said in his letter no real Muslim would
participate.

"The ones who will take part in this jirga are the people who have been
sold to foreigners, and they will not represent any tribe in the
region," Omar wrote. "I am asking all the Muslims in the region to be aware
of the invaders and their satanic plans."

Omar ended the letter by stressing that Afghans had driven out any
other foreign troops that tried to enter Afghanistan:

"Our invader enemy has not been invited to come here, and they will not
leave without force either. They have used force to come here, and we
will use force to drive them away. That's what we Afghans have done to
our enemies. We have forced all of them to leave Afghanistan."

Kim Barker writes for the Chicago Tribune.


1,250 posted on 01/04/2007 4:01:53 AM PST by nw_arizona_granny (2007 shall be known as the final year to feel freedom in America, unless you fight the takeover ....)
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To: nw_arizona_granny

Gorgeous shot. But I am sad for the deer.


1,251 posted on 01/04/2007 4:03:22 AM PST by Donna Lee Nardo (DEATH TO ISLAMIC TERRORISTS AND ANIMAL AND CHILD ABUSERS.)
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To: All

January 3, 2007 PM Anti-Terrorism News

(Somalia) U.S. Navy on the alert for terrorists trying for escape by
sea from Somalia
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/01/03/america/NA_GEN_US_Somalia.php

Homeland Security: A Tighter Border Plan? - Newsweek: Entry controls
tightening after European-born Muslims found attending Pak terrorist
camps
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/16409847/site/newsweek/

Iran's Secret Plan For Mayhem - Iran supporting Iraqi Sunni and Shiite
terrorists, according to secret Iranian documents captured by Americans
in Iraq
http://www.nysun.com/article/46032

(Iraq) New video shows 5 kidnapped in Iraq - 4 Americans and Austrian
abducted in November spoke briefly
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070103/ap_on_re_mi_ea/iraq_kidnapped_contractors

(Iraq) Dozens Of Bodies Found In Baghdad (45 bodies with signs of
sectarian killings)
http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/1/797EE07B-A4E9-4EB3-9DCE-70D782B32614.html

Hezbollah holds talks with Saudi king -source
http://today.reuters.co.uk/news/articlenews.aspx?type=worldNews&storyID=2007-01-03T143805Z_01_L03132364_RTRUKOC_0_UK-LEBANON-HEZBOLLAH-SAUDI.xml&WTmodLoc=NewsLanding-C4-World-3

Americans, Europeans told: Leave Gaza
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?c=JPArticle&cid=1167467653889&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull

Fatah Member Assassinated by Hamas in Gaza
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/news.php3?id=118682

Two Fatah Officers Shot Dead in Hamas Ambush
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/news.php3?id=118687

Hamas Bodyguard Injured While Freelancing as Bomber
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/news.php3?id=118683

(Thailand) Victim 'carried mosque bomb'
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2007/01/03/national/national_30023146.php

(Spain) Suspects who helped Madrid bombers escape held - allegedly
helped Mohamed Belhadj and Mohamed Afalah to flee after the Madrid bombing
in March 2004, which killed 191 people and injured over 1,700
http://www.expatica.com/actual/article.asp?subchannel_id=81&story_id=35313

Spanish police arrest 5 men suspected of links with international
terrorism
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/01/03/europe/EU_GEN_Spain_Terror_Arrests.php

(Spain) ETA political wing says bomb attack was unexpected - Saturday's
attack injured 19 and left 2 missing & presumed dead
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20070103/ts_afp/spainattacksbasque_070103153401

(Sudan) Five killed in bomb attack on civilians in Darfur
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/IRIN/f3645e1ba724df265d640da2591d358f.htm

Related News:

Scholastic joins education industry's campaign for Islam - Publication
for elementary students promotes Americans in madrassas
http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=53603

(Minneapolis) Airport hesitant to grant Muslim prayer room - Somali
immigrant leaders also ask directors for signs in native language,
exceptions for cabbies
http://www.twincities.com/mld/twincities/news/16370149.htm?source=rss&c

Wafa Sultan - A Daring Voice Calls For a New Islam
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1187385,00.html


1,252 posted on 01/04/2007 4:28:25 AM PST by nw_arizona_granny (2007 shall be known as the final year to feel freedom in America, unless you fight the takeover ....)
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To: All; milford421; DAVEY CROCKETT; Founding Father

Foreign spying on US defense technology seen rising


http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20070103/wr_nm/security_usa_technology_dc_1

Foreign spying on US defense technology seen rising
Wed Jan 3, 6:04 PM ET

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Foreign countries, especially nations in the
Asia-Pacific region, have intensified their efforts to steal sensitive
U.S. defense technology, according to a Pentagon report circulated on
Wednesday.

The Defense Security Service Counterintelligence Office recorded an
annual jump of nearly 43 percent in the number of suspicious foreign
contacts reported to U.S. authorities by defense contractors and other
defense-related sources.

The agency, which helps protect the U.S. defense industry from foreign
espionage, said in an unclassified report that spies used phony
business offers and computer hackers to target advanced U.S. technology
including lasers, sensors, missiles and other systems. The report covered the
fiscal year ending September 2005 and is the most recent for which
complete statistics are available.

In one case, a female spy seduced an American translator to learn his
computer password. His unclassified network was later found to be
infected by viruses planted by a foreign intelligence service.

The total number of suspicious foreign contacts climbed to 971 during
fiscal year 2005, the report said. The number of countries trying to
obtain U.S. technology also rose, to 106 from 90 a year earlier.

"The majority of reported targeting originated from East Asia and the
Pacific, which accounted for 31 percent of all reporting," the Pentagon
agency said in the report.

The Near East made up 23.1 percent of the targeting, followed by
Eurasia at 19.3 percent and South Asia at 13.2 percent. Africa and the
Western Hemisphere, not including the United States, accounted for 11.5
percent.

continued..............


1,253 posted on 01/04/2007 4:37:13 AM PST by nw_arizona_granny (2007 shall be known as the final year to feel freedom in America, unless you fight the takeover ....)
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To: All

Idiots Like Us


http://www.tucsonweekly.com/gbase/Books/Content?oid=91014

PUBLISHED ON JANUARY 4, 2007:
Idiots Like Us
In 'Capturing Jonathan Pollard,' military intelligence isn't so
intelligent
By JARRET KEENE email the Weekly
Idiots Like Us
Buy this book from Amazon.com!

Capturing Jonathan Pollard: How One of the Most Notorious Spies in
American History Was Brought to Justice, by Ronald J. Olive. Naval
Institute Press, $27.95.
There's a great lyric from John Cale's 1979 live album Sabotage that
seems appropriate after reading retired special agent Ronald Olive's
nonfiction account of one of the most notorious spy cases of all time.

The lyric appears on the song "Mercenaries," and it goes something
like: "Military intelligence isn't what it used to be. So what, human
intelligence isn't what it used to be, either!" Cale sing-sneers the line
with just the right mix of irony and venom, letting you know there's a
joke buried somewhere under all the faux-macho posturing that agents of
espionage generally display in novels and movies.

Speaking of poison, according to the recent news, someone mixed a
radioactive cocktail for an ex-KGB agent, killing him--but not before the
doomed fellow fingered Russian President Vladimir Putin. Seems the dead
man, Alexander Litvinenko, was a vocal critic of Putin, which could
explain why Litvinenko ended up drinking his last shot in a London sushi
bar. Incredibly, whoever executed the hit ended up contaminating the
restaurant, putting more than 100 people at risk.

What, a simple bullet in the brain isn't easy enough for assassins
today? Military intelligence isn't what it used to be, indeed.

As dumb as today's hitmen are, they've got nothing on the CIA, FBI and
the Naval Investigative Service's Anti-Terrorist Alert Center. A
noticeably eccentric analyst by the name of Jonathan Pollard ransacked our
nation's most highly sensitive national security data and handed it over
to the Israelis for a pittance. Methinks the point of Olive's Capturing
Jonathan Pollard: How One of the Most Notorious Spies in American
History Was Brought to Justice isn't to showcase the sheer idiocy of the
American intelligence, but that's exactly what his book does. With any
luck, Olive's account will become mandatory reading at all levels of
federal and civilian law-enforcement agencies.

For the rest of us, Olive, a current Arizonan who was "the assistant
special agent in charge of counterintelligence in the Washington office
of the Naval Investigative Service," provides a candid and disheartening
explanation of how Pollard was able to walk off with 360 cubic feet (or
1 million pages) of classified documents and hand them over to Israel.
The story isn't pretty, especially when a simple background check and
the sharing of information between agencies would have prevented this
from happening. It's enough to make a layman wonder: Were Bush and his
cronies right to gut the CIA and establish the Department of Homeland
Security?

To be fair, Olive gives Pollard credit, pointing out the man's smarts
and knowledge. Olive had first-hand dealings with Pollard, here rendered
as the type of person who constantly seeks attention and wants to feel
important. The way he achieved this sense of worth was by divulging
secrets to American ally Israel. Throughout the book, Olive offers plenty
of psychological insight into the mind of man who now claims to be a
fallen Israeli soldier captured behind enemy lines: His father traveled
overseas extensively and often took the family along. While Jonathan was
still in his early teens, they went to Germany and visited the
concentration camp in Dachau. The experience shocked him, kindling a deep,
enduring loyalty to Israel and the Jewish people. In 1970, Jonathan was
accepted into the summer science school at the world-renowned Weizmann
Institute in Israel. It was most exhilarating time of his life, despite
the trouble he had getting along with other students. One of his
instructors alleged he was a troublemaker. This paragraph alone does much to
humanize Pollard, who in other newspaper profiles always comes across as
more devious, more cunning, more diabolical. Olive presents a
startlingly different portrait of Pollard as a man who is, in many ways, crying
out for help by walking out of his office building with a stack of
documents clearly marked classified--in plain view of his co-workers. You
don't know whether to laugh or weep when his co-workers then agonize for
hours about whether to alert someone.

Olive tells a great story here, though it's told from a more technical
perspective. There are some basic narrative techniques of a thriller
(the in medias res of the opening scene, and the cliffhanging chapter
endings), but Olive is out to clearly articulate what happened and how
Pollard was narrowly brought to justice.

But the scariest part of the book is only hinted at: that Pollard's
spying, capture and current portrait as a martyr for Israel may have been
orchestrated by Pollard himself, manipulating U.S. and Israeli
intelligence--and the media--so as to achieve legendary status. In the case of
Pollard, human intelligence, it seems, has trumped military
intelligence.


1,254 posted on 01/04/2007 4:42:51 AM PST by nw_arizona_granny (2007 shall be known as the final year to feel freedom in America, unless you fight the takeover ....)
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To: All; milford421; Founding Father; FARS

Jamestown Now Offers Video Coverage of its Public Events

WASHINGTON, DC (01/03/07)--The Jamestown Foundation is pleased to announce that it has added video streaming coverage of all its public events and conferences, joining the ranks of only six major foreign policy and international security organizations in Washington, DC that offer streaming video of their public events. "Video streaming is an important addition to Jamestown's multimedia offerings and an invaluable communications instrument that will enhance the policymaking community's understanding of our work," stated Jamestown President Glen Howard. Howard added, "With Jamestown's ever-expanding coverage, streaming video will only further serve its mission to reach policymakers more effectively and be especially useful to our supporters and donors who reside outside of Washington and are unable to attend our public lectures and conferences. The addition of video streaming will provide our supporters with the luxury of being able to listen in and review the important issues shaping conflict and instability in Eurasia."

To view the streaming video, please visit the Event Videos section located at the Jamestown website (http://jamestown.org/events.php). This section currently contains video links to recent Jamestown events; future event videos will be posted. The following events are now available to view at Jamestown's website:

Pakistan's Volatile North-West Frontier: Pashtun Tribes, Taliban, and al-Qaeda
Hassan Abbas and Michael Scheuer
December 14, 2006

Putin, Petroleum, Power and Patronage: The Dog Barks but the Caravan Moves On
Marshall Goldman and Lana Ekimoff
December 7, 2006

Upheaval in Kyrgyzstan: The Second Tulip Revolution
Erica Marat and John C.K. Daly
November 28, 2006

Putin and the Succession Question: What Happens Between Now and 2008?
Nikolai V. Zlobin and Peter Reddaway
November 14, 2006


Founded in 1984, The Jamestown Foundation is an independent, non-partisan research institution dedicated to providing timely information concerning critical political and strategic developments in China, Russia, Eurasia and the Greater Middle East. Jamestown produces five periodic publications: Eurasia Daily Monitor, Terrorism Monitor, Terrorism Focus, Chechnya Weekly and China Brief. Jamestown research and analysis is available to the public free-of-charge via Jamestown's website,

www.jamestown.org.

The Jamestown Foundation
1111 16th St. NW #320 Washington, DC 20036
tel(202) 483-8888 fax(202) 483-8337
www.jamestown.org


1,255 posted on 01/04/2007 4:47:37 AM PST by nw_arizona_granny (2007 shall be known as the final year to feel freedom in America, unless you fight the takeover ....)
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To: All; Founding Father; milford421; DAVEY CROCKETT

This page, well it is about Israel and the latest europe actions against them.............Aussie, is written in Aussie style, but the owner is a good bloke, LOL, has to be, they are on my mailing list for goodies, that I send, and they say thanks for.

Has a lot to see.

http://aussie_news_views.typepad.com/aussie_news_views/2007/01/european_produc.html


1,256 posted on 01/04/2007 5:04:23 AM PST by nw_arizona_granny (2007 shall be known as the final year to feel freedom in America, unless you fight the takeover ....)
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To: All; milford421

East side of Denver, 40th is blocked, as police are at the scene of a SuV, that appears to have a white top.

This is the Green Valley area.

It appears to have been burned out.

Report from the KOA helicopter that is in the air.

850koa.com

I will loose the station soon, but it sounds like the vehicle the Police are hunting for in the Williams murder.

(the football player)

Guess this is breaking news, as I was listening to the same report the newsroom got.


1,257 posted on 01/04/2007 5:16:36 AM PST by nw_arizona_granny (2007 shall be known as the final year to feel freedom in America, unless you fight the takeover ....)
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To: All; milford421

Streak of fire and light lit up the Denver sky, green and red, very long, breaking news, report from a KOA witness at the station building, said it lasted almost 10 seconds.

Could be a meator or an exploding plane.

The KOA copter, reported it also and may have a photo, if so, it will be on the website later at 850koa.com, also reported that there were also airplanes in the sky.

On the Williams murder, the traffic copter has seen the license plate and it is the one the Police was looking for, the vehicle has been painted and then set on fire, the police are still inspecting it with flashlites and have not opened the doors.

It is a Chevie Tahoe.

You should be able to listen to the news on the computer for another couple hours at:

850koa.com


1,258 posted on 01/04/2007 5:25:07 AM PST by nw_arizona_granny (2007 shall be known as the final year to feel freedom in America, unless you fight the takeover ....)
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To: All; Founding Father; milford421

http://aussie_news_views.typepad.com/aussie_news_views/2007/01/car_reverses_in.html

January 03, 2007
Car reverses over kerb into diners one dead.
[Australia]

Racial row breaks out over tragic cafe car crash

By Anthony Dowsley, Matt Cunningham and Shannon McRae
News.com.au
January 03, 2007 12:00

THE death of a man in a horror car crash at a Footscray cafe triggered racist outbursts and threats of violence yesterday.

Businessman and father of two Sang-Hun Ha, 42, of Glen Waverley, was drinking coffee with colleagues in Nicholson St when a woman reversed her car on to the footpath and through diners.

People screamed and leapt for their lives as the car hit.

It is believed the woman, 32, panicked when her car mounted the kerb and that she pushed down the accelerator pedal.

Mr Ha was pinned against the front of Cafe D'Afrique, and three other patrons were injured. The driver received head injuries in the 1pm incident.

After the crash, heated exchanges erupted in the street between members of different ethnic communities. One witness accused the African driver of deliberately hitting Mr Ha, and a fight started in a nearby chicken shop.

Two children, a boy and a girl believed to be the driver's children, were in the car when it crashed.

The injured were taken to the Royal Melbourne Hospital and to the Western Hospital at Footscray and Sunshine.

Footscray Acting Sgt Dave Evans said the driver and witnesses were in shock. "He (the victim) was pushed into the wall," he said of Mr Ha.

"There were a number of people who saw it and we will be speaking to them. She (the driver) is in hospital with shock."

Mr Ha had been having lunch with colleagues.

Cafe D'Afrique owner Fowzi Bakesy said about 12 people were sitting on the footpath outside his cafe when the driver crashed through.

[video here]

"As soon as the car approached, they all scattered," Mr Bakesy said through a translator.

He said Mr Ha often lunched at his restaurant with business colleagues.

Witness Ali Aboody said people had tried to stop the car as it reversed rapidly.

"I just saw a head go back and the car go through the shop," he said.

"Some of the people ran away, but some people were sitting down and they couldn't move."

Billal Rashid, who works at Super Star Chicken next to Cafe D'Afrique, said Mr Ha was killed instantly.

"The lady (driver) started screaming 'What I did, what I did . . . help me' and all this," he said.

"She had a kid with her and couldn't even stand up. I felt sorry for her."

Mr Rashid said a white woman started yelling "all this racist stuff" at the driver after the crash.

"This Australian lady . . . started yelling out, 'You f------ black bitch, you shouldn't be driving in this country' and all this racist stuff," he said.

"I thought they were going to start a fight, the Australians and the blacks, but the police turned up and everything cooled down a little bit."

Anita, a worker at the chicken shop, said Mr Ha had not stood a chance.

"There was crying and people yelling 'Oh my God'," she said. "The lady driver was injured and lying on the ground.

"You could see blood dripping from her head."

Tensions escalated when four Sudanese women fought with shop staff metres from the scene.

Workers at Ceragem, a massage therapy franchise run by Mr Ha, said he was a kind man.

A friend and employee of Mr Ha's read from a Bible at the crash scene. "He was my friend," he said. "A hard worker. A good man."

Worker Le Thieu said he'd called into the Footscray outlet, one of three in Melbourne, to wish them a happy new year.

"He came to Footscray for lunchtime," she said.

"Staff liked him."

About 30 devastated members of Glen Waverley's Korean community gathered at Mr Ha's house to mourn his death and comfort his wife and two daughters, aged 5 and 7.

Mr Ha moved with his family from Korea four years ago.

A family friend, who did not want to be named, said the family was shattered.

"We cannot believe it," she said. "He would go there so often.

"How can this happen? The person who owns the shop was his friend."

Mr Ha was a pioneer of the Ceragem massage technique in Melbourne, the friend said.

"He was . . . a very good businessman. He would encourage people to try the machine and then they would buy one, it was so good.

"But he was very family-oriented, very close to his wife and daughters."

Posted on January 03, 2007 at 10:02 PM in Tragic


1,259 posted on 01/04/2007 5:28:45 AM PST by nw_arizona_granny (2007 shall be known as the final year to feel freedom in America, unless you fight the takeover ....)
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To: All; milford421; Founding Father; DAVEY CROCKETT

http://aussie_news_views.typepad.com/aussie_news_views/2007/01/australias_open.html

January 02, 2007
Australia's open hand met with hate and contempt

Open hand met with hate and contempt

Piers Akerman
Daily Telegraph

January 02, 2007 12:00am

2_1_07_rats_in_the_silo_4CABINET documents from 1976 reveal then prime minister Malcolm Fraser ignored warnings about accepting Lebanese Muslim refugees deemed unlikely to have the qualities required for successful integration.

He was not the only PM to ignore such warnings.

Paul Keating went against the advice of immigration minister Chris Hurford and over-ruled warnings from intelligence agencies to accommodate a request for permanent status for the controversial Sheik Taj el-Dene Elhilaly.

According to the Cabinet documents released yesterday, the Fraser cabinet was told that many of the Lebanese Muslim refugees were unskilled, illiterate and of questionable character.

Those shortcomings are still reflected by a number of members of the community which has gathered around Hilaly at the

Lakemba mosque and are highlighted by the statistics on employment and welfare and in the crime rates.

History has shown Fraser, who stood by as Indonesia consumed East Timor, to have been a rather hollow man.

Though he was portrayed as the man who took on the Whitlam Government and urged its dismissal, the truth is somewhat different.

He was a reluctant champion of conservatism and is a greatly reduced figure now, given to appealing to groups from the Left in his dotage.

He certainly wasn't leading the charge to oust Whitlam, he was pushed to accept what others believed was a constitutional necessity.

Faced with the reality that the temporary relaxation of immigration standards opened the doors to a number of undesirables, he told The Australian he rejected such a conclusion and disingenuously blamed more recent governments for alienating modern Muslim youth by failing to help them integrate.

It might seem a no-brainer to suggest that Australia should only accept refugees willing to make an effort to integrate - that is surely what was needed then, and now.

Most refugees are more than grateful to the nations which offer them shelter. For whatever reason, significant numbers of Lebanese Muslims feel they are entitled not to join the wider community while accepting the hospitality of those whose taxes funded their flights to safety.

Prime Minister John Howard has recognised the problem, saying: "I do think there is this particular complication because there is a fragment which is utterly antagonistic to our kind of society and that is a difficulty."

However, in response to direct pleas from the UN High Commission for Refugees, Australia is now receiving members of another group who are showing a reluctance to integrate - from war-torn Somalia and the Sudan.

In an interview with The Daily Telegraph last Friday, Mr Howard acknowledged that things were "hard" for African refugees because "the cultural differences are great".

That's all well and good and, while most refugees acknowledge that they have some responsibilities and obligations to the nations which provide them with asylum, Australians have also learnt from tragic experience that there are some who don't feel any obligation to respect the culture and traditions of their hosts.

There is also an unhealthy fifth column in academia and legal circles which argues against Australian customs in favour of cultural statements antagonistic to our Anglo-European heritage.

Thus we have seen it argued in our courts that young Muslim men are culturally averse to the equality of women.

More recently, West Australian magistrate Colin Roberts was faced with an 18-year-old Sudanese man who police allegedly caught lighting fires.

It was suggested to the magistrate that the alleged offender may be suffering a mental condition and he was remanded in custody.

Rightly so. But the previous week, The Australian reported that young African refugees may have become habituated to violence because of their experiences at home, and might find it difficult to accept that carrying weapons is unacceptable in Australia.

True, but as we have seen from the violence wreaked by members of a minority within the Lebanese Muslim community, we have imported such problems in the past.

What are we doing to ensure that we are not importing similar problems for the future?

We should not have to wait another 30 years to set this matter right.

Posted on January 02, 2007 at 09:15 PM in "Religion of Peace", ALL Cultures / Religions are EQUAL File, Australia Haters Inc. | Permalink
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1,260 posted on 01/04/2007 5:33:17 AM PST by nw_arizona_granny (2007 shall be known as the final year to feel freedom in America, unless you fight the takeover ....)
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