POLAND AND RUSSIA HAVE CONFLICTING STRATEGIC INTERESTS (Ukraine)

POLAND AND RUSSIA HAVE CONFLICTING STRATEGIC INTERESTS AND THE SOONER BRUSSELS UNDERSTANDS IT, THE BETTER (Ukraine)

Russia wants to keep Ukraine in its exclusive zone of influence and Poland perceives Ukraine as a EU member in the near future. Those two strategies are irreconcilable.

COMMENTARY: By Joanna Strzelczyk Chief of Staff of Warsaw Mayor Lech Kaczynski Former Foreign Ministry Official (1990-1996) Article published in Rzeczpospolita Polish News Bulletin, Warsaw, Poland, Wed, Jul 13, 2005

Since 1989, with a short break in the late 1990s, the Russian question has been one of the most important ones in Poland's foreign policy, writes Joanna Strzelczyk, chief of staff of Warsaw mayor Lech Kaczynski, former foreign ministry official (1990-1996), in Rzeczpospolita.

Today, the question's significance has been rapidly growing, due chiefly to mounting Polish-Russian disputes and conflicts. That has been a result, on the one hand, of the neo-imperialism of Vladimir Putin, who has exploited historical issues to make short-term political gains, and, on the other, of controversies, present since the early 1990s, in Polish-Russian relations.

In the recent years, those controversies had been hushed for various reasons, so as soon as they became public knowledge, the situation intensified.

That was reflected in historical disputes, stimulated by the Moscow celebrations of the 60th anniversary of the end of world war II, which brought back into the spotlight issues such as the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact, the Katyn massacre, or Poland's post-war enslavement. Those are hot media topics, but also issues important for Poland's image in Europe. They are not, however, first-rate issues.

The anniversary celebrations are over and the real problem has now emerged, hidden so far under the historical and hysterical rhetoric: are we doomed to conflict in Polish-Russian relations? The answer is affirmative, and the issue is not new.

It is a consequence of the processes occurring in Europe following the collapse of the bipolar world. This means that Poland and Russia have increasingly divergent interests, and that this process will continue.

What are Poland's interests in Russia? In principle, there are only THREE: [1] regulating the historical issues, [2] access to the Russian markets, and [3] supplies of Russian energy commodities.

And what are Russia's interests in Poland? Only ONE: dominating Poland's energy and fuel markets.

A strategic goal inconsistent with Poland's national interests. And vice versa, as Poland's interests in Russia, with the exception of fuel imports, are inconvenient for Russia.

What are the controversial issues between the two countries? There are several, and all of fundamental significance for Poland and Russia.

The FIRST issue, Ukraine today and Belarus in the future. Russia wants to keep those countries in its exclusive zone of influence.

Poland, in turn, perceives Ukraine as an EU member in a relatively near future, and the other post-Soviet states Georgia, perhaps with time Moldova, and certainly post-Lukashenka Belarus in close relations with Europe. Those two strategies are irreconcilable.

The SECOND issue: energy commodities and the Polish fuel market. Russia is interested in monopolising supplies and promoting Russian investment in the broadly meant energy sector. Russian companies are an instrument of Moscow's foreign policy. That policy concerns all of Europe, but Poland in particular.

Given the above, it has to be admitted that Russia has reasons to feel irritated. The prospect of the moderate right winning the upcoming elections means that the controversial issues will further intensify.

The PO-PiS coalition, if it is successfully formed, will certainly attach great significance to close and friendly relations with Ukraine. It will also try to diversify oil and gas supplies, partly with transit through Ukraine something that Russia has so far managed to prevent.

The new government will also subject the Polish fuel market and all the related issues to closer scrutiny. The parliamentary committee of inquiry into PKN Orlen has already revealed such a strong involvement of official and unofficial Russian factors in this area that new regulations will need to be urgently passed. The very exposing of the mechanisms used by Russia to gain influence has to be irritating enough for the Kremlin.

In this situation, the various Russian secret services can be expected to carry out operations aimed at discrediting the centre-right parties, such as the PO and the PiS, to strengthen the position of not only leftwing formations but also those rightwing ones that Russia perceives as friendly.

Using historical issues to tarnish Poland's image in the EU is an even more tangible threat. As a result of such efforts, Poland appears as an irrational, quarrelsome country that lives in the past and thus attacks all its neighbours.

It is impossible, writes Strzelczyk, to talk about history in an honest and adequate way without remembering the Russians and the Germans who started world war II, who was its victim, and what are the moral and political consequences of that.

This, however, again puts Poland in the face of a propaganda war with two enemies. And weakens its position in the EU. For while it is clear that Poland's eastern policy should be part of the EU's policy towards Russia, respecting Poland's interests in the EU policy is a different matter altogether. Warsaw has few arguments convincing for Brussels and formulating them is what it should focus on.

The anniversaries pass and very well, let the atmosphere around them calm down. This does not mean that we should forget about history, but rather that we should look at it anew.

The shifting of stress in presenting historical issues such as the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact or Katyn should consist in remembering what has already been achieved and going forward, rather than stubbornly returning to the starting point.

And quite a lot has been achieved: Russia, formerly the Soviet Union, admitted officially that the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact had been invalid from the point of view of international law. It also admitted that Katyn was a work of the Russians. Discussing those issues anew could tempt Russia to backtrack on its earlier statements. Poland should adopt the principle that issues once agreed will not be discussed again.

An issue that needs to be taken up are war reparations, especially compensations for Poles sent to forced labour and exile in the Soviet Union. The issue, present in Polish-Russian talks for a decade now, has been progressing at a very slow pace. Efforts must be made to bring it to completion, Forced labour compensations already have a precedent, and it is time they became a European standard.

Russia has been loathe to pay the compensations, and has deliberately kept the dispute at an early stage, arguing that it lacks the funds and its own victims of Stalinism were paid only pennies.

Those are unacceptable arguments. As the Soviet Union's continuator, Russia has been paying the Soviet debts without protest. It is therefore time it started paying out compensations. It is the only historical issue that should be Poland's priority today. Warsaw should make all it can for the Polish claims to be understood and supported by Brussels.

As far as economic issues are concerned, the first-rate issue is the planned Baltic gas pipeline linking Russian gas deposits with western Europe. The pipeline will be an alternative for the Yamal pipeline crossing through Poland.

Perhaps it would be worth reminding the Russians that they are bound by a contract under which two lines of the Yamal were supposed to be developed, whereas only one has been developed and that is supposed to be it.

For that reason, Poland will incur substantial financial losses, and it would make sense to demand damages or start talks on alternative solutions offsetting them. Contracts should be kept. Russia does not stand above the law.

The Polish-Russian conflict, political, not historical, is therefore a fact. It cannot be avoided. Too much sets the two countries apart.

In fact, those divisions are inevitable if Poland is to retain its identity and not return from the European and euroatlantic path it has chosen. In its own interest, but also in Europe's. It is worth making sure that Brussels understands this.

The increasing capabilities of Georgian military were worrying the Russian officers, and on 20 February they finally ordered an all-out attack on Suchumi. This was led by a strike of six Su-25s against the city, which killed 20 and injured over 600 (including 200 Russians), Moscow later explaining this was in retaliation for a similar attack of GeAF fighters against an unknown Russian Army unit.

Actually, at the time the RuAF was already deeply involved in this conflict, flying almost permanent CAPs over the battlefield and disturbing a number of strike sorties flown by GeAF Sukhois. The situation worsened as the Russians and Abkhazians increased the pressure on Suchumi, and Shevardnadze publicly stated that the loss of this city would be equal to the loss of Georgian independence. Gratchov then increased the Russian involvement, stating the Russian Army is to remain in the country and “defend the strategic interests in the Black Sea area”. Suchumi remained under heavy artillery bombardment and in the early March was heavily hit by RuAF fighter-bombers as well. Heavy fighting was reported on the ground as well, with heavy loses on both sides: during only one day – on 16 March 1993 – the Abkhazians had over 50 and Georgias over 20 killed.

Under heavy pressure, Shevardnadze then requested from Russian President Yel’tsin to bring the situation under control and pull back the Russian Army units, ignoring the fact that meanwhile over 50% of the Abkhazian population - including some 250.000 Georgians - was ethnically cleansed and forced to left their homes. Indeed, Yel’tsin ordered per decree the supreme command of the Russian units to be moved from Tbilisi to Stavropol, but, he simultaneously permitted deployment of two airborne divisions and two motorized brigades to Georgia – or, more precisely, to Abkhazia. An additional airborne division, together with a full wing of attack and transport helicopters, was also brought closer to Caucasus, but not involved in fighting.

In the air the Russians monitored the increased activity of the GeAF Su-25s: on average the Russian radar stations detected 14 combat sorties flown by Georgian Sukhois a day, and the RuAF was requested to bring an end to such operations. At 1640hrs of 19 March a Su-27S was scrambled from Gudauta AB to intercept two low-flying Su-25s that were approaching the Suchumi area. Underway at a level of 2.500ft the Russian pilot, Maj. Schipko, an instructor from the Flying School in Krasnodar, attempted to approach his opponents when his aircraft was suddenly hit and blotted out of the skies by a singe SA-2 SAM. Maj. Schipko was killed. Who exactly fired that missile remains unknown: it is at least not confirmed if the Georgians have had any operational SA-2 systems in their hands at the time. The two GeAF Su-25s completed their mission as expected without any disruption.

It seems that this loss was quite a blow for the Russians, then in the following days they deployed additional assets in the battle zone: on 20 March even two ships of the Russian Navy appeared off of Suchumi and started shelling Georgian positions, while the number of air strikes was once again increased. With such support, the Abkhazian troops crossed the Gumista River in two places, but their advance was stopped in the face of bitter Georgian resistance, and the Abkhazians contained inside two small bridgeheads.

The fighting continued through the spring with no let up on either side. The outcome of the battle, however, was only a matter of time, then the Georgians lacked the resources, men, weapons, and ammunition to keep on fighting, and their air force could do nothing against the Russian air strikes. Time and again, of course, the units of the Georgian National Guard would report downing of some Russian helicopter, like a Mi-24 on 24 June, or a Mi-8 six days later (the wreckage of which was found full of weapons that were to be delivered to Abkhazians). In July 1993, the Abkhazians launched a dreadful offensive with full Russian support, putting the enemy under heavy air and artillery bombardments, as well as massive armoured attacks. Initially, the Georgians held their positions and made reported a number of successful defensive operations, as well as downing of a Russian Su-25 over Suchumi, on 3 July, as well as a Yak-52 reconnaissance aircraft and a Mi-8T (in the Tkwartichely area) on the following day. The GeAF remained active as well, losing also a Su-25 on 4 July, when this was shot down by several SA-14s over Nizhnaya Eshera: the pilot attempted to eject at a very low altitude but hit the water surface in the process. On the following day the Abkhazians reported to have shot down a Georgian Mi-24 over Suchumi, and the Georgians admitted to have lost another Su-25 – this time to their own anti-aircraft defences. The situation of Georgian troops in the Suchumi area, however, was detoriating with each new enemy attack: the local road network was under almost permanent Russian air and artillery strikes, and the Abkhazian troops were slowly advancing towards the south, eventually threatening to cut the city off. The GeAF flew dozens of supply sorties into Suchumi, while evacuating their civilians out of the place. During one such mission a Mi-8 transporting refugees was shot down over Otchamchira on 7 July, killing 20. Eventually, when the Abkhazians captured one of two roads leading to the south from Suchumi, effectively surrounding the city, panic spread between the defenders of the city and they started leaving their positions.

Pressing a number of civilian transports and airliners into service the GeAF did everything possible to improve the supply situation inside Suchumi, but its aircraft were extremely vulnerable to Russian and Abkhazian air defences and several were shot down. By the end of August, consequently, Suchumi fell.

In the following weeks the Abkhazians continued their advance towards the south, in some places pursuing Georgian units that were retreating southwards. The GeAF was now engaged in deploying reinforcements to neuralgic positions, mainly by helicopters, but these have also suffered numerous losses: on 30 September a Mi-8 should have been shot down near Racaka, and on 4 October another was lost while transporting 60 refugees from eastern Abkhazia to Svanetya. Eventually, the Georgians were forced to pull out completely from Abchasia, and even the fact that sometimes during the autumn a Russian Mercenary pilot Zhshitnikov, who flew for the GeAF, defected with his Su-25 from Georgia to Armenia, did not improve the situation. The GeAF also lost at least one additional helicopter – probably a Mi-24 – before the OSCE managed to negotiate a cease-fire in December 1993.

By the end of the fighting, the whole Georgian population of Abkhasia - over 250.000 - was ethnically cleansed, leaving the self-proclaimed "independent state" in hands of barely 50.000 Abkhazians and several thousands of Soviet troops. - LINK

The fact that you support Chechens just explains why you would also support their slaughter of Georgian Christians at Russia's behest.==

I don't support chechens. I just want them out of Russia and never came back.

For your information Joe abhkhazies (and south osetians) are cristians too. But third of georgians are muslims. Surprised?:)) Look Adzharia, the Georgia's province on border of Turkey.

I think you are really for freedom. So you you are for freedom for Chechens, Tatars, Bashkirs, Chuvashs, Mordvins, Buryats, Balkars, Karachays, Nogays, Karachays, Kumyks, Altais, Khakasses, Shors, Tofalars (or Karagasys), and Tuvans (who inhabit the area once known as Tannu Tuva, annexed by the U.S.S.R. in 1944), the Sakha (Yakuts) Evenks, Evens, Buryats, Mari (formerly Cheremis), Udmurt (Votyak) and Komi (Zyryan), and the closely related Komi-Permyaks ,Karelians, Finns, and Veps ,the Mansi (Vogul) and Khanty (Ostyak) the Nenets , the Selkup around the middle Ob, and the Nganasan, Abaza, Adyghian, and Kabardian (Circassian) Avars, Lezgian, Dargwa, Lakk, Tabasaran, the Chukchi, Koryak, and Itelmen (Kamchadal) the Nivkh (Gilyak) along the lower Amur and on Sakhalin Island, of the Yukaghir of the Kolyma Lowland.==

Yes let them go away if they wants. Especially muslims. So Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia with Bulkaria and so on let go. With them lot of problems will go.

Russia's problem is that they do not go:)). Except Chechnya. Dagestany militia quite recently fought chechen invasion together with federal troops.

Sibirian and Ural ethnicities you listed are live with russians for 300-400 hundreds of years. We so much intermixed that today there are many people of so multiple decents that you find just only small minority of those who may tell themselves as pure.
I'm myself has good chunk of one Ural ethnicity in my blood.
From other side I'm relative to Kuban cossacks. But directly I'm from Eastern Sibiria. So what? All my ansestor parts are live together:).
Maybe you say that I have to split myself:).

Ukraine's independence is a thorn in Putin's Russia's flesh.

Absolutely not. Friendly independent free and prosperous Ukraine is a dream of every Russian leader if he is not a complete fool (or a die-hard communist). The keyword here is friendly. A non-friendly Ukraine would be a big problem both for Russia and Ukraine. This was a constant concern of every Russian government. In fact, sometimes I think Russia has made too many concessions to Ukraine so it would seem that Russia needs Ukraine more than Ukraine needs Russia. Over the past 15 years, Ukrainians has been very troublesome partners. I could never really understand why. Probably, phantoms of the past, but it is time to grow up and move on.

About elections. Putin has made a big political mistake so obviously taking sides in Ukrainian affairs. That was plain stupid but hopefully will be mended over time. At the same time, all these tales about OMONs and Russian dioxine are just lies and propaganda. Again, Yushchenko has made a political mistake either so openly confronting Russia before the elections. Unfortunately, quite a few people In Ukraine (especially among the elite) thought that confronting Russia (using Poland's and Baltic states' strategy discussed here) will give Ukraine a free ride to NATO and EU. I personally think this strategy, were it to work, would have meant big troubles to Ukraine. Fortunately, whatever our Polish friends may think, it is not going to work.

in the long run Ukraine's problems are the problems of all the post-soviet countries (that is that countries that had emancipated themselves from the Russian occupation)

There were no Russian occupation of Ukraine. Russia and Ukraine were the parts of the former Soviet Union. As such, by the way, both Russia and Ukraine are responsible for all atrocities of the communist regime, along with the "occupation" of the Baltic states, were we to call it this way. You probably do not want to remember that over the years there were more Ukrainian than Russian leaders of the USSR. So if I were you I would be cautious in using such vocabulary.

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