Actually, at the time the RuAF was already deeply involved in this conflict, flying almost permanent CAPs over the battlefield and disturbing a number of strike sorties flown by GeAF Sukhois. The situation worsened as the Russians and Abkhazians increased the pressure on Suchumi, and Shevardnadze publicly stated that the loss of this city would be equal to the loss of Georgian independence. Gratchov then increased the Russian involvement, stating the Russian Army is to remain in the country and “defend the strategic interests in the Black Sea area”. Suchumi remained under heavy artillery bombardment and in the early March was heavily hit by RuAF fighter-bombers as well. Heavy fighting was reported on the ground as well, with heavy loses on both sides: during only one day – on 16 March 1993 – the Abkhazians had over 50 and Georgias over 20 killed.
Under heavy pressure, Shevardnadze then requested from Russian President Yel’tsin to bring the situation under control and pull back the Russian Army units, ignoring the fact that meanwhile over 50% of the Abkhazian population - including some 250.000 Georgians - was ethnically cleansed and forced to left their homes. Indeed, Yel’tsin ordered per decree the supreme command of the Russian units to be moved from Tbilisi to Stavropol, but, he simultaneously permitted deployment of two airborne divisions and two motorized brigades to Georgia – or, more precisely, to Abkhazia. An additional airborne division, together with a full wing of attack and transport helicopters, was also brought closer to Caucasus, but not involved in fighting.
In the air the Russians monitored the increased activity of the GeAF Su-25s: on average the Russian radar stations detected 14 combat sorties flown by Georgian Sukhois a day, and the RuAF was requested to bring an end to such operations. At 1640hrs of 19 March a Su-27S was scrambled from Gudauta AB to intercept two low-flying Su-25s that were approaching the Suchumi area. Underway at a level of 2.500ft the Russian pilot, Maj. Schipko, an instructor from the Flying School in Krasnodar, attempted to approach his opponents when his aircraft was suddenly hit and blotted out of the skies by a singe SA-2 SAM. Maj. Schipko was killed. Who exactly fired that missile remains unknown: it is at least not confirmed if the Georgians have had any operational SA-2 systems in their hands at the time. The two GeAF Su-25s completed their mission as expected without any disruption.
It seems that this loss was quite a blow for the Russians, then in the following days they deployed additional assets in the battle zone: on 20 March even two ships of the Russian Navy appeared off of Suchumi and started shelling Georgian positions, while the number of air strikes was once again increased. With such support, the Abkhazian troops crossed the Gumista River in two places, but their advance was stopped in the face of bitter Georgian resistance, and the Abkhazians contained inside two small bridgeheads.
The fighting continued through the spring with no let up on either side. The outcome of the battle, however, was only a matter of time, then the Georgians lacked the resources, men, weapons, and ammunition to keep on fighting, and their air force could do nothing against the Russian air strikes. Time and again, of course, the units of the Georgian National Guard would report downing of some Russian helicopter, like a Mi-24 on 24 June, or a Mi-8 six days later (the wreckage of which was found full of weapons that were to be delivered to Abkhazians). In July 1993, the Abkhazians launched a dreadful offensive with full Russian support, putting the enemy under heavy air and artillery bombardments, as well as massive armoured attacks. Initially, the Georgians held their positions and made reported a number of successful defensive operations, as well as downing of a Russian Su-25 over Suchumi, on 3 July, as well as a Yak-52 reconnaissance aircraft and a Mi-8T (in the Tkwartichely area) on the following day. The GeAF remained active as well, losing also a Su-25 on 4 July, when this was shot down by several SA-14s over Nizhnaya Eshera: the pilot attempted to eject at a very low altitude but hit the water surface in the process. On the following day the Abkhazians reported to have shot down a Georgian Mi-24 over Suchumi, and the Georgians admitted to have lost another Su-25 – this time to their own anti-aircraft defences. The situation of Georgian troops in the Suchumi area, however, was detoriating with each new enemy attack: the local road network was under almost permanent Russian air and artillery strikes, and the Abkhazian troops were slowly advancing towards the south, eventually threatening to cut the city off. The GeAF flew dozens of supply sorties into Suchumi, while evacuating their civilians out of the place. During one such mission a Mi-8 transporting refugees was shot down over Otchamchira on 7 July, killing 20. Eventually, when the Abkhazians captured one of two roads leading to the south from Suchumi, effectively surrounding the city, panic spread between the defenders of the city and they started leaving their positions.
Pressing a number of civilian transports and airliners into service the GeAF did everything possible to improve the supply situation inside Suchumi, but its aircraft were extremely vulnerable to Russian and Abkhazian air defences and several were shot down. By the end of August, consequently, Suchumi fell.
In the following weeks the Abkhazians continued their advance towards the south, in some places pursuing Georgian units that were retreating southwards. The GeAF was now engaged in deploying reinforcements to neuralgic positions, mainly by helicopters, but these have also suffered numerous losses: on 30 September a Mi-8 should have been shot down near Racaka, and on 4 October another was lost while transporting 60 refugees from eastern Abkhazia to Svanetya. Eventually, the Georgians were forced to pull out completely from Abchasia, and even the fact that sometimes during the autumn a Russian Mercenary pilot Zhshitnikov, who flew for the GeAF, defected with his Su-25 from Georgia to Armenia, did not improve the situation. The GeAF also lost at least one additional helicopter – probably a Mi-24 – before the OSCE managed to negotiate a cease-fire in December 1993.
By the end of the fighting, the whole Georgian population of Abkhasia - over 250.000 - was ethnically cleansed, leaving the self-proclaimed "independent state" in hands of barely 50.000 Abkhazians and several thousands of Soviet troops. - LINK
Your source Joe are very much biased.
Just one of many example. If it was georgian helicoppter then it always carries refugees not soldiers:)).
If it tells georgian troops then they are less number then opposites. In reality there was quite opposite too.
Whole war the georgian troops was numerious then abkhazies.
You yourself few time had emphasized that population of georgians in Sukhumi was bigger then abkhazies. Now go figure whose troopers was more numerious:)).
So if one use brains and try to analyze then he finds all these discrepancies.
If one base you convictions on that kind of sources with out thought then no wonder one make mistakes.