Posted on 07/14/2005 7:19:28 PM PDT by Leo Carpathian
POLAND AND RUSSIA HAVE CONFLICTING STRATEGIC INTERESTS AND THE SOONER BRUSSELS UNDERSTANDS IT, THE BETTER (Ukraine)
Russia wants to keep Ukraine in its exclusive zone of influence and Poland perceives Ukraine as a EU member in the near future. Those two strategies are irreconcilable.
COMMENTARY: By Joanna Strzelczyk Chief of Staff of Warsaw Mayor Lech Kaczynski Former Foreign Ministry Official (1990-1996) Article published in Rzeczpospolita Polish News Bulletin, Warsaw, Poland, Wed, Jul 13, 2005
Since 1989, with a short break in the late 1990s, the Russian question has been one of the most important ones in Poland's foreign policy, writes Joanna Strzelczyk, chief of staff of Warsaw mayor Lech Kaczynski, former foreign ministry official (1990-1996), in Rzeczpospolita.
Today, the question's significance has been rapidly growing, due chiefly to mounting Polish-Russian disputes and conflicts. That has been a result, on the one hand, of the neo-imperialism of Vladimir Putin, who has exploited historical issues to make short-term political gains, and, on the other, of controversies, present since the early 1990s, in Polish-Russian relations.
In the recent years, those controversies had been hushed for various reasons, so as soon as they became public knowledge, the situation intensified.
That was reflected in historical disputes, stimulated by the Moscow celebrations of the 60th anniversary of the end of world war II, which brought back into the spotlight issues such as the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact, the Katyn massacre, or Poland's post-war enslavement. Those are hot media topics, but also issues important for Poland's image in Europe. They are not, however, first-rate issues.
The anniversary celebrations are over and the real problem has now emerged, hidden so far under the historical and hysterical rhetoric: are we doomed to conflict in Polish-Russian relations? The answer is affirmative, and the issue is not new.
It is a consequence of the processes occurring in Europe following the collapse of the bipolar world. This means that Poland and Russia have increasingly divergent interests, and that this process will continue.
What are Poland's interests in Russia? In principle, there are only THREE: [1] regulating the historical issues, [2] access to the Russian markets, and [3] supplies of Russian energy commodities.
And what are Russia's interests in Poland? Only ONE: dominating Poland's energy and fuel markets.
A strategic goal inconsistent with Poland's national interests. And vice versa, as Poland's interests in Russia, with the exception of fuel imports, are inconvenient for Russia.
What are the controversial issues between the two countries? There are several, and all of fundamental significance for Poland and Russia.
The FIRST issue, Ukraine today and Belarus in the future. Russia wants to keep those countries in its exclusive zone of influence.
Poland, in turn, perceives Ukraine as an EU member in a relatively near future, and the other post-Soviet states Georgia, perhaps with time Moldova, and certainly post-Lukashenka Belarus in close relations with Europe. Those two strategies are irreconcilable.
The SECOND issue: energy commodities and the Polish fuel market. Russia is interested in monopolising supplies and promoting Russian investment in the broadly meant energy sector. Russian companies are an instrument of Moscow's foreign policy. That policy concerns all of Europe, but Poland in particular.
Given the above, it has to be admitted that Russia has reasons to feel irritated. The prospect of the moderate right winning the upcoming elections means that the controversial issues will further intensify.
The PO-PiS coalition, if it is successfully formed, will certainly attach great significance to close and friendly relations with Ukraine. It will also try to diversify oil and gas supplies, partly with transit through Ukraine something that Russia has so far managed to prevent.
The new government will also subject the Polish fuel market and all the related issues to closer scrutiny. The parliamentary committee of inquiry into PKN Orlen has already revealed such a strong involvement of official and unofficial Russian factors in this area that new regulations will need to be urgently passed. The very exposing of the mechanisms used by Russia to gain influence has to be irritating enough for the Kremlin.
In this situation, the various Russian secret services can be expected to carry out operations aimed at discrediting the centre-right parties, such as the PO and the PiS, to strengthen the position of not only leftwing formations but also those rightwing ones that Russia perceives as friendly.
Using historical issues to tarnish Poland's image in the EU is an even more tangible threat. As a result of such efforts, Poland appears as an irrational, quarrelsome country that lives in the past and thus attacks all its neighbours.
It is impossible, writes Strzelczyk, to talk about history in an honest and adequate way without remembering the Russians and the Germans who started world war II, who was its victim, and what are the moral and political consequences of that.
This, however, again puts Poland in the face of a propaganda war with two enemies. And weakens its position in the EU. For while it is clear that Poland's eastern policy should be part of the EU's policy towards Russia, respecting Poland's interests in the EU policy is a different matter altogether. Warsaw has few arguments convincing for Brussels and formulating them is what it should focus on.
The anniversaries pass and very well, let the atmosphere around them calm down. This does not mean that we should forget about history, but rather that we should look at it anew.
The shifting of stress in presenting historical issues such as the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact or Katyn should consist in remembering what has already been achieved and going forward, rather than stubbornly returning to the starting point.
And quite a lot has been achieved: Russia, formerly the Soviet Union, admitted officially that the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact had been invalid from the point of view of international law. It also admitted that Katyn was a work of the Russians. Discussing those issues anew could tempt Russia to backtrack on its earlier statements. Poland should adopt the principle that issues once agreed will not be discussed again.
An issue that needs to be taken up are war reparations, especially compensations for Poles sent to forced labour and exile in the Soviet Union. The issue, present in Polish-Russian talks for a decade now, has been progressing at a very slow pace. Efforts must be made to bring it to completion, Forced labour compensations already have a precedent, and it is time they became a European standard.
Russia has been loathe to pay the compensations, and has deliberately kept the dispute at an early stage, arguing that it lacks the funds and its own victims of Stalinism were paid only pennies.
Those are unacceptable arguments. As the Soviet Union's continuator, Russia has been paying the Soviet debts without protest. It is therefore time it started paying out compensations. It is the only historical issue that should be Poland's priority today. Warsaw should make all it can for the Polish claims to be understood and supported by Brussels.
As far as economic issues are concerned, the first-rate issue is the planned Baltic gas pipeline linking Russian gas deposits with western Europe. The pipeline will be an alternative for the Yamal pipeline crossing through Poland.
Perhaps it would be worth reminding the Russians that they are bound by a contract under which two lines of the Yamal were supposed to be developed, whereas only one has been developed and that is supposed to be it.
For that reason, Poland will incur substantial financial losses, and it would make sense to demand damages or start talks on alternative solutions offsetting them. Contracts should be kept. Russia does not stand above the law.
The Polish-Russian conflict, political, not historical, is therefore a fact. It cannot be avoided. Too much sets the two countries apart.
In fact, those divisions are inevitable if Poland is to retain its identity and not return from the European and euroatlantic path it has chosen. In its own interest, but also in Europe's. It is worth making sure that Brussels understands this.
[The Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
Maybe Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine would not have an anti-Russian stance if Russia stopped trying to impose her will over these nations.
I am really tired of repeating the same all over again. The only thing Russia wants to "impose" on all those nations is for them to be reasonably friendly to Russia as their neighbor. No more, no less.
You are right but partially. Abhazies are ortodox christians partly and smaller partly muslims and osetians are ortodox christians fully. On territory of Abkhazia the New Aphone Monastery are located. It is the holy place for ortodox christians.
Georgians are partly christians too with thier own church and smaller partly muslims.
Russian troops were not involved until georgians began to shell russian military base in Gudauta. From this moment russain army began to fire on georgians. Reciprocally.
Georgians do not deny that they shelled base first hand but say that base sold (or just gave) weaponry to abkhazies. Probably true.
SO it was mess. And Basaev was involved in it. It was before war in Chechnya so no one knew what will happen.
Later if you know same georgians widely helped chechens to fight russian army. SO not only russians you may rebuke if to be fair.
Maybe Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine would not have an anti-Russian stance==
Georgia and Moldova one case. Ukraine - another.
Ukraine doesn't have anti-russian stance. Same as Russia - anti-ukranian. It is just family matter, some small brawl.
Today there only small minority of pure russians or pure ukranians in the world.
For example, the father of madam Yulia is russian. I'm not sure but I red mother of mister "leper" himself is russian too.
They both speak russian better then thier ukranian dialect. I heard them both on interview.
SO go figure:)).
Surely there were such stories too. But those Red Army soldiers captured on the battlefield were initially housed in Polish POW Camps.
"I think that the situation when the internationally recognized borders are unjust is far more dangerous. "
Well with all due respect to your good natured proposals, I'm going to keep on playing a guessing game. Who'll decide when internationally recognized borders are just and when they are not ? Based on what criteria ? Is it History, language, culture, religion, ethnicity or something else ? Is it an Ancient History or more recent one ?
One of the Adolf Hitler stepping stones to power was the claims that Versaille treaty carving up parts of Germany to France, Czechoslovakia or Poland was "unjust" partitioning of German Nation. Islam believes that all the world should be Islamic and if the land that was previously under Islamic rule and then ceased to be (like Spain), this land was "stolen" from Islam. Previously "just" borders can become "unjust" overtime due to immigration. Example--Islamic immigration into Europe. Many Muslim immigrants and their descendants simply don't assimilate into the traditional cultures of Britain, France, Germany, etc. and complain about discrimination from Native populations. Should the Islamic anclaves in Europe be given autonomies then rendering the current European borders obsolete or unjust ? Or should native British, French, Germans, etc, demand that Muslim Immigrants and their descendants assimilate or leave ? What would be just in this case ?
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