Thank you, I was going to bring that up before. What you previously posted about materialism and physicalism had to do with metaphysics, but the question of how consciousness works is one of epistemology. It is possible to be a philosophical non-materialist and still expect/accept a material explanation for the workings of the mind. Nobody invokes mysticism to explain how a Slinky works.
Doctor Materialist says "Whatever is behind that door is based on all the physical laws that are in the room of all scientific knowledge.”
That's where I'm confused. "Scientific knowledge" comprises what we know. It isn't about what we can know, but currently don't. If that's the difference between materialism and physicalism, then I submit that materialism is purely a straw-man position that nobody has ever seriously advocated. (Ironically, it's the holy-book-thumping mystics that come closest to saying that we already know almost everything we are capable of understanding.) Nobody seriously contends that we actually have an adequate explanation in hand for consciousness. Dennett named his book Consciousness Explained to be provocative and boost sales. Few people seriously contend that there are no discoveries yet to be made that will affect our understanding of consciousness. (Certainly I don't, but I expect the missing pieces to come from biology and chemistry, rather than physics.)
So I'm afraid I still don't see the difference between materialism and physicalism when it comes to understanding the mind.
You are absolutely right that it has to do with metaphysics and that's why the term materialism carries such forebodingly negative baggage in the crevo debates around here!
The term materialism in taken to mean the belief that everything that actually exists is material, or physical.
Here's more on the quandary from Dictionary of Philosophy of Mind:
The problem is that the relevant notion of spatial extension may depend on the very notion of material in need of elucidation. If there is such dependence, conceptual circularity hampers the proposed characterization of materialism. The main worry here is that the notion of spatial extension is actually the notion of something's being extended in physical space, or the notion of something's being physically extended. It seems conceivable that something (perhaps a purely spiritual being) has temporal extension, in virtue of extending over time, even though that thing lacks extension in physical space. It does not seem self-contradictory, in other words, to hold that something is temporal (or, temporally extended) but is not a body. If this is so, the proposed characterization of materialism should be qualified to talk of physical space or physical extension. In that case, however, the threat of conceptual circularity is transparent. Even if there is no strict circularity here, the pertinent notion of spatial extension may be too closely related to the notion of material to offer genuine clarification. At a minimum, we need a precise explanation of spatial extension, if talk of such extension aims to elucidate talk of what is material. Perhaps a notion of spatial extension is crucial to an elucidation of materialism, but further explanation, without conceptual circularity, will then be needed. (Cf. Chomsky 1988.)
If there is indeed a coherently conceivable distinction between minds and material bodies, we must reject the view that materialism, understood as entailing mind-body identity, is conceptually, or analytically, true—that is, true just in virtue of the meanings of `mind' and `body'. Given such a coherently conceivable distinction, we can also challenge any version of materialism implying that psychological concepts (for example, the concepts of belief and sensory pain) are defined in terms of the ordinary physical causes of belief states and pain states. (Such materialism has been proposed by D. M. Armstrong 1977, and David Lewis 1966.) If `pain' is defined in terms of the ordinary bodily causes of pain, then it will not be coherently conceivable that there is pain without bodies. The concept of pain will then depend for its semantic significance on the concept of a bodily cause.
Materialists do not share a uniform view about the nature of psychological properties, such as the properties of being a belief, being a desire, and being a sensory experience. In particular, they do not all hold that every psychological property is equivalent or identical to a conjunction of physical properties. Only proponents of reductive materialism hold the latter view, and they are a small minority among contemporary materialists. Proponents of nonreductive materialism reject the latter view, and affirm that psychological properties can be exemplified even in an immaterial world. Such nonreductive materialists include functionalists about the mind, who hold that psychological properties differ from material properties in virtue of the special causal or functional roles of the former. Functionalists differ from behaviorists in acknowledging the psychological relevance of causal relations among not only stimuli and behavior but internal states as well. A third prominent version of materialism, eliminative materialism, recommends that we eliminate most, if not all, everyday psychological discourse, on the ground that it rests on seriously misguided assumptions about human psychology—assumptions that will disappear with the advance of science.