Near the beginning of the book, he lays out four possible hypotheses of consciousness. He labelled them A, B, C and D. "A" is that brains are computers, in effect. I forget what "B" was. He advocated "C", which boiled down to "consciousness is material but not algorithmic". "D" states that consciousness is not material (your position).
My apologies. This is from Shadows of the Mind, page 12 of the hardcover edition.
Do you know of a particular group that thinks much of the quantum coherence in tubulin ideas of Penrose?
I have reached page 416 of Penrose's Emperor's New Mind and nowhere, nowhere, does he take the position or imply that "consciousness is material". It cannot be algorithmic and all indications so far point toward immateriality. Penrose writes, among many other things, of aesthetics and beauty as indicators of mathematical truth.
Here is Penrose in his own words at page 12 of Shadows of the Mind:
"It seems to me there are at least four different viewpoints -- or extremes of viewpoint -- that one may reasonably hold on the matter:
A. All thinking is computation; in particular feelings of conscious awareness are evoked merely by the carrying out of appropriate computations.
B. Awareness is a feature of the brain's physical action; and whereas any physical action can be simulated computationally, computational simulation cannot by itself invoke awareness.
C. Appropriate physical action of the brain evokes awareness, but this physical action cannot even be properly simulated computationally.
D. Awareness cannot be explained by physical, computational, or any other scientifc means.
"The point of view expressed in "D", which negates the physicalist position altogether and regards the mind as something that is entirely inexplicable in scientific terms, is the viewpoint of the mystic; and at least some ingredient of "D" seems to be involved in the acceptance of religious doctrine. My own position is that the questions of the mind, though they lie uncomfortably with present-day scientific understanding, should not be regarded as being forever outside the realm of science. If science is yet incapable of saying much that is of significance concerning matters of the mind, then eventually science must enlarge its scope so as to accommodate such matters, and perhaps even modify its very procedures. Whereas I reject mysticism in its negation of scientifc criteria for the furtherance of knowledge, I believe that within an expanded science and mathematics there will be found sufficient mystery ultimately to accommodate even the mystery of the mind ..."
At page 7, he writes:
"In this book, I shall attempt to address the question of consciousness from a scientific standpoint. But I shall strongly contend -- by use of scientific argument -- that an essential ingredient is missing from our present-day scientific picture. The missing ingredient would be needed in order that the central issues of human mentality could ever be accommodated within a coherent scientific world-view. I shall maintain that this ingredient is itself something that is not beyond science -- although, no doubt, it is an appropriately expanded scientific world-view that we shall need ...
And at page 8:
"A scientific world-view which does not profoundly come to terms with the problem of conscious minds can have no serious pretentions of completeness. Consciousness is part of our universe, so any physical theory which makes no proper place for it falls fundamentally short of providing a genuine description of the world. I would maintain that there is yet no physical, biological, of computational theory that comes very close to explaining our consciousness and consequent intelligence; but that should not deter us from striving to search for one. It is with such asperations in mind that the arguments of this book are presented ..."
Boldings and underlinings are mine. Physicist, this is definitively not Materialism and I do not disagree with Penrose. This is a rejection of Materialism.