I certainly don't agree with everything Mr. Kaplan said here, but I must admit that I found this enlightening. It places the events we are currently witnessing in a different light.
Posted on 09/04/2003 9:13:06 PM PDT by rdb3
April 4, 2002
Summary by Trudy J. Kuehner
Robert Kaplan delivered the Fifth Annual Strausz-Hupé Lecture on January 17, 2002, drawing on his new book, Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos (Random House, 2002). Author of such books as Balkan Ghosts and The Coming Anarchy, Kaplan is a contributing editor of The Atlantic, a fellow of the New America Foudation, and a former senior fellow of the Foreign Policy Research Institute. Warrior Politics is available to FPRI members at a 20 percent discount off the regular price of $22.95.
The The Robert Strausz-Hupé Lecture has been held each year since 1998 in honor of FPRI’s founder, who was said to have introduced the term “geopolitics” into the American vocabulary. Sadly, Ambassador Strausz-Hupé passed away on February 24, 2002, at age 98. His most famous work, Protracted Conflict, published in 1959, also serves as the name of a collection of essays appearing in the Spring 2002 issue of Orbis on the war on terrorism; the Orbis special issue includes Strausz-Hupé’s last work, completed in December 2001. More information about the ambassador is available on our website.
While many see our times as being marked by new challenges requiring some new-age philosophy, in fact there is nothing wholly new about the issues we face: Mr. Kaplan noted that a framework for dealing with them can be found in the philosophies developed in ancient Greece, Rome, and China. He remarked that the subtitle he chose for Warrior Politics, Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos, was chosen to recognize the lessons these earlier philosophies hold for our times.
Throughout history, economic development, the rise of middle classes, and urbanization— i.e., all the things we associate with progress— have led to revolutions and upheavals. The perpetrators of the recent suicide attacks in the United States and elsewhere, like so many revolutionaries before them, are generally children of emerging middle classes. With the dramatic socioeconomic progress since the 1970s in countries like Indonesia, India, Brazil, and Nigeria, the continued growth of the young male population projected over the next 10-15 years (especially in sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East), and the increased urbanization of the Middle East as water supplies dwindle, we can be sure the next decade will see a cascade of upheavals worldwide, Mr. Kaplan observed.
But again, all of this has been dealt with in earlier times. The international order of the twenty-first century is complex, but no more so than it was at the time of the Peloponnesian Wars between Athens and Sparta, in which as many as fifty states participated on each side, joined in alliances as convoluted as those of the Cold War.
One modern student of ancient philosophies was Winston Churchill. His River War (1899), a narrative of Britain’s reconquest of the Sudan, evidences the sensibilities of Thucydides or Herodotus, a morality preceding monotheism. Having become an avid reader of ancient history once he experienced war for himself, Churchill would have been well familiar with the story in the Iliad of the Trojans, who believed that through their prosperity they could buy off enemies and ensure peace— until they were invaded by Greek warriors and besieged.
The lesson for Churchill, as for us, Mr. Kaplan stated, is that without a challenge, a great power will descend into decadence and partisanship. Britain in the 1890s was an empire at peace. London was the financial capital of the world, and Britain’s navy was supreme. But because it was at peace, it lacked a uniting moral struggle. Its campaign in the Sudan presages the policy battles in the United States in the 1990s over Bosnia and Kosovo and the debate whether those interventions were in our self-interest as a nation at peace. Churchill concludes that it’s through serving its self-interest that a country shapes and improves the world. Britain was pursing naked self-interest in the Sudan in the 1890s, and yet in doing so laid the groundwork for more than fifty years of civil administration thereafter that dramatically raised the Sudanese standard of living. Churchill believed in a morality of consequence, not of intentions. If the results are good, then virtue attaches to them.
Churchill also believed that geography and history were things to be acknowledged and overcome, not denied. Both a realist and an idealist, he painted a pessimistic portrait of Sudan, with its brutal climate and warring tribes, and yet he saw the challenges as being ones that moral people could surmount. Indeed, to him, without evil and intractability, there could be no good, no moral behavior, and no heroism.
Importantly, Churchill recognized the paramount importance of patriotic pride. A nation without pride in its history will lack courage. Livy’s romanticization of the earlier Roman struggle against Carthage is mirrored in the Allies’ subsequent romanticization of World War II. The way the United States was able to deal with September 11, finding strength and pride in its history, is testament to the key role this can play.
The moral priorities Churchill was willing to establish, too, are more connected to the ancient understanding of the need to choose one good over another than to the Judeo- Christian struggle between good and evil. In foreign policy, leaders are often forced to choose between two goods and may have to perpetrate evil to serve the greater good. The Bush administration’s preparedness on 9/11 to shoot down the fourth hijacked plane if necessary shows that it understands this, too, Mr. Kaplan stated.
There is often an ancient, real morality in states’ relations where we might not perceive it, he went on. In his 1972 essay “The Originality of Machiavelli,” Sir Isaiah Berlin concludes that far from being amoral, Machiavelli is guided by a definite morality— just not the Christian morality. Rather, his is the morality of the ancient polis, the values that secure a stable community. A different level of morality is required for those who must take personal responsibility for millions. Unlike our religious morality as interpreted in public discourse by politicians, good intentions are not enough for these leaders. In Machiavelli’s political and social world, if an outcome were unsuccessful, the act could not be virtuous.
This was also observed in the 20th century by George Kennan, who wrote that in foreign affairs, “other criteria, sadder, more limited, more practical, must be allowed to prevail” (Realities of American Foreign Policy, 1954) and Arthur Schlesinger, to whom morality in foreign affairs derived from “one’s own sense of honor and decency” and “the assumption that other nations have legitimate traditions, interests, values and rights of their own” (Cycles of American History, 1986). But they are only stating what was known to Machiavelli, Thucydides, and back to Aristotle, Mr. Kaplan noted.
Machiavelli’s Prince is for those who reject determinism and will use any means to overcome their fate. Because he liberated politics from the fatalism and self-righteousness of the medieval church and brought it into the realm of self-interest, which allows nations to deal with each other in mutual respect, William Manchester named Machiavelli the father of the Renaissance. Mr. Kaplan offered the examples of two recent leaders in the tradition of Machiavelli’s Prince: Yitzhak Rabin and King Hussein I.
In the late 1980s, it was Rabin’s hard line on the first Palestinian intifada that earned him the political support which he drew upon later in reaching the Oslo accords. And when King Hussein disbanded a Soviet-leaning, democratizing government in the 1950s and took strong measures to suppress terrorism in the 1970s, he knew that he was saving Jordan from other, crueler leaders. Both adhered to Machiavelli’s insistence on using only the minimum amount of cruelty needed and only when it was likely to do the greatest good. By contrast, because of his excessive cruelty, no virtue attaches to General Pinochet, even if he did make Chile the most prosperous Latin American country.
Thucydides wrote that only three things govern our intentions: fear, self-interest, and honor. In foreign affairs, these should not be denied, Thucydides explained, but managed in ways that optimize outcomes for the given nation. War is not an aberration, and the constant potential for it must be acknowledged. Similarly, the way to avoid tragedy is to cultivate a sense of it. Indeed, Mr. Kaplan observed, it was by thinking tragically, envisioning “What can go wrong?” that our founding fathers created a nation of optimism.
Turning to China’s traditions, at the time the classical world was developing, China also comprised many small kingdoms, the larger of which fought with each other in various alignments. Chinese thinkers learned the same thing that those in Greece and Rome had: sovereignty does not occur in a void. Peoples and tribes will unite and wars will occur because of differences with others. The Warring States period led to Sun-tzu’s Art of War, a summary of their convential wisdom that is as wise today. War represents a failure of a state’s politics to achieve its ends. The pursuit of pragmatic self-interest is a moral, not amoral, act. Avoiding war requires foresight, and therefore spies; nations that do not appreciate this are destined to experience tragedies. (This may not have been self-evident before 9/11 but it certainly is now, Mr. Kaplan remarked.)
The philosopher who best embodies all these ancient sensibilities to Mr. Kaplan is Thomas Hobbes (1582-1679). Profoundly moral, he took up where Aristotle left off. Liberal and progressive by the standards of his time, he rejected divine right, introducing the idea that government is only legitimate if it serves the interests of those governed.
Hobbes is also the first modern, moral philosopher to search for the roots of morality, which he traced to profound fear. We all have the deep subconscious fear of suffering violent death at the hands of another in the dark. We will go to great lengths to avoid this, giving up part of our freedom to a government, or Leviathan, with the overriding authority to protect us from other human beings. Our founding fathers certainly were informed by this philosophy of the ancients as stated by Hobbes, Mr. Kaplan said. This central authority and order must precede democracy. Without a central authority to punish wrongdoers, practically speaking nothing is immoral. The Federalist Papers show their understanding of our need for a central authority, but one they sought to make as untyrannical as possible.
Hobbes could be the philosopher for the next twenty years, Mr. Kaplan suggested. With a number of calcified, decaying regimes increasingly lacking legitimacy throughout the world— in the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia, etc. — our challenge is to recreate new, legitimate authorities before we can think of making those authorities democratic. Closer to home, the whole debate over the attorney general’s military tribunals is Hobbesian. Reading Hobbes would enrich our understanding of what degree of freedom we would give up for our protection.
If in the past we have had raison d’etat, which recognizes the self-interest of the state and that foreign policy operates on a more limited morality than domestic policy, in the future, we will have raison de systeme, he said: recognizing the self-interest of the system rather than of the state. We will and should never have a strong world government, because any world government would by definition lack opposition and become tyrannical. But we will have eminently strong, robust global institutions constituting world governance. Just as individuals give up some of their freedoms in favor of protection, nations will give up some of their sovereignty to maintain order and limit the level and amount of warfare around the word. This is all very Hobbesian: the highest morality will be the morality of keeping the system together, of moving toward more interlocking governments, and of international institutions to foster democracy. It closes the gap between the limited morality of foreign affairs and the Judeo-Christian concepts of private morality that have applied in domestic law. The War Crimes Tribunal and the Hague represent an embryonic beginning of this new system of order.
But one cannot bring in a more universally democratic world situation without being periodically ruthless, using methods indefensible by universal or democratic morality, Mr. Kaplan concluded. President Reagan’s deployment of Pershing missiles in Western Germany in December 1983 was denounced by the foreign policy mandarinate in the United States and demonstrators in Europe, but it led to a change in Soviet policy that ultimately led to the collapse of the Berlin Wall, and so led to a more democratic world. There are many other examples: most recently, Kabul was liberated by B-52s. A world of more than 200 nations and thousands of non-governmental organizations requires the organizing principle of some great power to move it toward a more peaceful democratic future. That great power has to operate from self-interest, supported by a people motivated by their romanticized past, even if it is emblemized by flags on pick-up trucks. The twenty-first century may witness the rough equivalent of China after the Warring States period ended in the third century BCE. The victorious Han empire governed a loose assemblage of states in a way that kept disagreement to a minimum for four hundred years. The Great Power organizing principle can work when we recognize the role of patriotic pride, a usable past, and methods that cannot be defended by the religious morality of public discourse but by an older, more limited pagan morality.
I certainly don't agree with everything Mr. Kaplan said here, but I must admit that I found this enlightening. It places the events we are currently witnessing in a different light.
Churchill concludes that it’s through serving its self-interest that a country shapes and improves the world. Britain was pursing naked self-interest in the Sudan in the 1890s, and yet in doing so laid the groundwork for more than fifty years of civil administration thereafter that dramatically raised the Sudanese standard of living.
The idea that, in serving your self-interest, you improve the world is only true if your view of your self-interest is rooted in morality. Britain pursued its self interest and built a chain of colonies that were stable and relatively enlightened. That speaks volumes about who and what Britain is. Belgium and Germany pursued their self interest on the same continent and built charnel houses that had no equal in history until the Nazis took power.
Indeed, to him, without evil and intractability, there could be no good, no moral behavior, and no heroism.
Good does not depend on the existence of evil for its own existence, yin in fact can exist just fine without yang. Evil does force the fence-sitters to choose sides, but it is danger and devotion to the good that inspires heroism.
A nation without pride in its history will lack courage
But, again, this pride must be rooted in morality or it is ill-founded. There are countries whose history is not deserving of pride, and patriotism separated from morality degenerates easily into jingoism and fascism.
Machiavelli is guided by a definite morality— just not the Christian morality. Rather, his is the morality of the ancient polis, the values that secure a stable community.
The idea that the highest purpose of government is to preserve stability is Hobbesian. We hold to a different view, that the purpose of government is to preserve liberty. It is night and day's difference. Some of Machiavellis guidelines for taking and holding power are useful, just as some of Hobbes analysis is useful reading, as long as you remember that he is not looking to set you or anyone else free.
Thucydides wrote that only three things govern our intentions: fear, self-interest, and honor.
Actually, there is a fourth, and that is morality. That is what makes the difference between a person, or a country, whose actions based on the first three are good, or if they are monstrous.
This is all very Hobbesian: the highest morality will be the morality of keeping the system together, of moving toward more interlocking governments, and of international institutions to foster democracy.
It is all very Hobbesian indeed. For him, the highest morality is the morality of keeping the system together. But there are systems which are not moral, and should not be held together. This idea is the root of our determination to be sovereign. Independent, that is. Independence, sovereignty, are not in themselves the highest goals but wedded to a moral sense they are important tools toward important ends, one being to chart an independent course despite the designs of some world system.
But one cannot bring in a more universally democratic world situation without being periodically ruthless, using methods indefensible by universal or democratic morality, Mr. Kaplan concluded.
Perhaps this is a good time to remind oneself that democracy itself is not the highest good, in fact democracy separated from morality is a ticket to Hobbesville. Or Kaplanville. Democracy is only a means to an end, that end being liberty, and can only be a means to that end when it is rooted in morality. Democracy can just as easily be a battering ram which will break down liberty, and the barriers that make liberty possible, which are sovereignty, and law, and morality.
The Great Power organizing principle can work when we recognize the role of patriotic pride, a usable past, and methods that cannot be defended by the religious morality of public discourse but by an older, more limited pagan morality.
I'm inclined to think that Kaplan is confused, and should not be entrusted with power over anyone.
"by the end of next year" became almost 10 years with no end in sight. While there, US forces helped Osama Bin Laden's Balkan network grow.
Wise guy, that Mr. Caplan. It is intersting to see that he still has new ideas.
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Thanks rdb3. |
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