Posted on 03/03/2011 5:25:04 AM PST by Homer_J_Simpson
Gordon W. Prange, At Dawn We Slept
http://www.onwar.com/chrono/1941/mar41/f03mar41.htm
Italians conduct air raid over Greece
Monday, March 3, 1941 www.onwar.com
In the Balkans... Italian aircraft bomb the earthquake stricken town of Larissa in Greece. British RAF Hurricanes destroy 5 Cant bombers (probably returning from Larissa) over Corfu.
In Moscow... The Soviet government denounces the Bulgarian signing of the Axis Pact.
Anatomy of a restaurateur: Dario Toffenetti
http://homepage.ntlworld.com/andrew.etherington/month/thismonth/03.htm
March 3rd, 1941
UNITED KINGDOM: London: The Chiefs of Staff estimate that one German armoured division and three motorised divisions could reach the Bulgar-Greek border by March 6, with an infantry division arriving by March 11. This is thought to be the maximum strength that the Germans could field until April 15.
This morning SS ATHELTEMPLAR arrives at anchorage off Methil, Fife, with her flag at half mast. Mr S. Hill, Second Officer of the ATHELSULTAN, bombed off May Island three weeks previously and returned to North Shields for repairs, was instructed to travel up to Methil to bring the ATHELTEMPLAR back to the Tyne. She too was to spend a further period under repair at Smith’s Dock having the entire amidship accommodation rebuilt.
Mr S. Hill, Second Officer of the ATHELSULTAN, bombed off May Island three weeks previously and returned to North Shields for repairs, was instructed to travel up to Methil to bring the ATHELTEMPLAR back to the Tyne. She too was to spend a further period under repair at Smith’s Dock having the entire amidship accommodation rebuilt.
FOWEY detached from giving anti-aircraft cover to EN79 at Duncansby Head, and CURAÇOA took over from Buchan Ness. EN79 did not continue without incident: With Tiumpan Head in sight, where part of the convoy should have detached to continue south whilst most made for Loch Ewe, they followed in error (one of the dangers of following ships closely, with most attention focussed on maintaining position). INDIAN STAR was dispatched to round them up, and, in the process, collided with MAURITZ, another ship in the convoy.
MAURITZ then proceeded to Stornaway for repairs. TEWKESBURY was repaired following the convoy reaching Loch Ewe at 1300 on 3 March, and then joined the ocean convoy OB295 for the usual tense journey to the dispersal point at 19º West. These convoys were vast, covering many square miles of ocean, and so communications across the entire convoy, in which it was vital to maintain radio-silence, relied upon signal lamps and flag hoists, often took much time. Real threats to the convoy had to be dealt with quickly if catastrophe was to be averted, and this overall necessity to be constantly at the ready led to misunderstandings, and false alarms, caused by imagined periscopes, unrecognised aircraft, etc. Once a ship opened fire it was difficult to propagate the order to cease fire, and so there was a great danger of being caught in friendly fire from excited gunners firing at anything that moved. Friendly fire was also a considerable hazard when a convoy was under attack by low flying aircraft. From dispersal the voyage continued uneventfully, and the crew were able to relax a little and enjoy the tropical clime, but still they had to be wary of potential surface raiders. TEWKESBURY unloaded her coal at Buenos Aires and then steamed up the River Pirana to Rosario to load beef.
The pilots of the RAF who flew convoy protection missions must have dreaded the task: During the passage of EN79 friendly aircraft overflew the convoy four times giving the correct recognition signal. On each occasion the ships in the convoy opened fire with machine-guns. One ship fired rockets, and HMS WOOLSTON who was in the vicinity also opened fire.
By the end of the war 17 out of the 35 ships comprising EN79 were sunk.
Many in the convoy were coasters, so, in fact, 65,778 grt of shipping was sunk out of a total of 96,123 grt.
(Bernard de Neumann)
Corvette HMS Trillium completed Greenock and departs for workups at Tobermory.
Destroyer HMS Holcombe laid down.
Corvette HMS Begonia commissioned.
Minesweeping trawler HMS Inchcolm launched.
Corvette FS Alysse (ex-HMS Alyssum) launched.
(Dave Shirlaw)
GERMANY: U-125 commissioned. (Dave Shirlaw)
U.S.S.R.: Moscow: The USSR warns Bulgaria that its does not approve of its pro-Axis regime, saying that the German occupation will only escalate the war.
GREECE: As German troops in Bulgaria reach the border, Italian air force planes bombard the earthquake zone of Larissa.
Athens: During the early morning there are no less than four meetings between the Greek and British military staffs, trying to agree on a defensive strategy. In the event of an attack on Macedonia the British urge a quick pull back to the Aliakhmon line whereas Papagos clings to the more advanced Nestos line, “If the Yugoslavs should fight, that is where we Greeks should stand”, declared Papagos. Dill snapped, “General, you will have to fight that battle.”
Wavell arrives later in the morning in Athens, and some time later Maitland Wilson, the commander-designate of the British forces in Greece, arrived at Tatoi airfield.
EGYPT: Cairo: Free French Headquarters to General de Gaulle:
I am happy to inform you that the garrisons of the Kufra Oases surrendered at 9:00 A.M. on March 1, after a three-week siege. The capture of these enemy positions by Free French forces, is one more step toward final victory. Vive le France!
Signed, De Larminet.
LIBYA: General Erwin Rommell Commander of the Afrika Korps, moves the advance force of the 5th Light Division forward and beings construction of a defence line 17 miles (27 kilometres) west of Aghelia. (Jack McKillop)
CANADA: Submarine depot ship HMS Forth arrived Halifax NS for service.
Destroyers HMCS Skeena and St Laurent arrive Halifax NS for refit. (Dave Shirlaw)
U.S.A.: Destroyers USS O’Bannon and Nicholas laid down (Dave Shirlaw)
PUERTO RICO: Pan American World Airways Sikorsky S-42A, msn 4206, registered NC15376 and named “Dominican Clipper, sinks after an accident in San Juan Harbor. Two are killed and 25 injured.
ATLANTIC OCEAN: U-97 lost a man overboard in the Bay of Biscay. [Bootsmaat Artur Mei].
Sloop HMS Enchantress successfully locates submarine HMS Taku damaged and adrift in the Atlantic. With corvette HMS Gladiolus and tug HMS Slavonia, Enchantress successfully escorts Taku into Londonderry on 10 March.
U-124 refuelled from the German supply ship Charlotte Schliemann at Las Palmas, Canary Islands. (Dave Shirlaw)
http://worldwar2daybyday.blogspot.com/
Day 550 March 3, 1941
Rommel moves German 5th Light Division along the Libyan coast road from Sirte to hold a narrow pass 17 miles West of the Allied forward positions at El Agheila. This will block any Allied advances towards Tripoli and serve as a base for offensive operations. Germans also construct defenses in the desert to prevent the Allies from bypassing this position.
Italian aircraft bomb Larissa in central Greece (devastated 2 days ago by 6.3 magnitude earthquake) but 5 Cant bombers are shot down over Corfu by RAF Hurricane fighters.
German battlecruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau arrive off the West coast of Africa near the Cape Verde Islands, threatening convoy routes to Britain.
440 miles West of Ireland, Bootsmannsmaat (Petty Officer) Artur Mei falls overboard from U-97 and is lost.
The Bureau of Ordnance is so far behind the requirements of ordnance materials, and is continuing to fall further behind, that drastic measures are necessary if our fleets, even at present strength are to have the necessary ordnance supplies to carry on a war. That drastic measures have already been initiated may be surmised from personnel changes already made.Soon to be superimposed on our Navy ordnance problems through the administration of the Lend-Lease Bill is the task of procurement, inspection and delivery of enormous—almost astronomical—quantities of ordnance supplies for the British Navy and any allies which may survive to fight the Dictators. I do not know if you have been informed of all the new ordnance plants that are being erected in various parts of the country to start from scratch the manufacture of various items of ordnance.
...
As you well know, this country is confronted with a most difficult problem that of determining just how much of our total output shall go to Britain and her allies, and how much to keep for ourselves. A wrong guess may well make our own problem insoluble. The minimum help needed by Britain is, of course, that which will keep her actively fighting while we are building up our strength. No help at all or too little help to Britain resulting in her defeat will greatly increase and complicate our problems of the future.
On a more academic note, this edition contains a profile of General Wavell. We have already seen one of these in the NYT magazine and the March 16 edition of same has an article written by the general himself. At this point it looks like he is the best know allied military figure.
Nice link. I’m glad I took the time to read the history. So the Times Square restaurant advertised today is less than a year old. Toffenetti owns the building after out-bidding Louis B. Mayer for the property. I’ll bet they have to sell a lot of pork sandwiches to pay for that!
Yes, page 60. But don’t miss the bonus on page 44 - look in the mirror, not at the direct image of Gypsy Rose Lee.
A lot of people don't realized just how big Gypsy Rose Lee was in her day. Which lasted a long time, by the way. My wife, coincidentally, is at this very moment reading a book called "American Rose: The Life and Times of Gypsy Rose Lee." Says she was a sort of early Ophrah. She even had her own talk show in the sixties.
I know, I know. That’s LIFE, I guess.
Along with the article on Wavell, notice to the famous picture on page 29. Now I wonder exactly when that was taken.
Here again is my partial listing of general warnings and acknowledgements by US officials regarding a possible Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.
These general warnings should have sensitized and alerted all of the US chain of command to search carefully for any specific data on threats to Pearl Harbor.
Pearl Harbor Time-Line
General Warnings of Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor:
As time permits, I hope to add to this list, and also begin the list of specific warnings, not all of them related to US code-breaking successes.
I think you point out some good pieces of information here on the theme that there were general warning signs and beliefs that Pearl Harbor could be a target to a surprise attack, but those signs were misread or misinterpreted up and down the chain of command.
Looking at just what you have posted there are some interesting aspects.
1. Quoting the Army's Pearl Harbor Board: "We must...conclude that the responsible authorities...all expected an attack on Pearl Harbor...{but} when testifying after the Pearl Harbor attack, they did not expect it." From the Joint Congressional Committee Report on Pearl Harbor Attack (JCC PHA also known as PHPT, for Pearl Harbor Part), vol 39 page 77.
Here's that same quote in full context:
We must therefore conclude that the responsible authorities, the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Staff in Washington, down to the Generals and Admirals in Hawaii, all expected an air attack before Pearl Harbor. As a general statement, when testifying after the Pearl Harbor attack, they did not expect it.
This is prefaced by quoting statements from Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Bloch, and General Short which say:
Admiral Kimmel said:
We had no reason to believe, from any intelligence we had, that the Japanese were going to make an air attack on Pearl Harbor or even that any attack was going to be made on Pearl Harbor. (R. 1771.)General Frank. "Was the attack a complete surprise to you?
Admiral Bloch. Yes, sir. (R. 1518.)General Gerhart. "Was the attack of December 7 a complete surprise to you?
General Short. It was. (R. 536.)
So here we have the three men that were in theater in Hawaii, who all were worried about a surprise attack at least right now in March 1941, yet they still were caught off guard on December 7th. Sounds to me like these men made some serious errors in judgment.
But we can't just stop there with these men in Hawaii so to expand on this item I offer this. As I've said before, there is plenty of blame to go around. General Marshall is quoted on this very same page (Document #39 is the Pearl Harbor Hearings Findings Report for those who don't know, it is the determinations of those who conducted the hearings) that "air attack was his primary concern."
That's well and good and the February 7th letter by him does play that out, but at the same time he wasn't convinced that the Japanese would strike that far away from their home waters.
In a March 1941 letter that he sent to F.D.R. he states his belief that a "major attack against Oahu is considered impracticable." He also goes on to say that "In point of sequence, sabotage is first to be expected and may, within a very limited time, cause great damage" (PHA 15-1635)
So while it can be said that the commanders in Hawaii dropped the ball in defending the island, their commanders up the chain of command were drawing wrong conclusions as well.
2. US intelligence worker: "For thirty-two years...Japanese naval strategy...envisaged [a naval] showdown with the Americans... For more than three decades the Japanese fleet trained and exercised for such an engagement...[specifically] an attack on the American fleet in Hawaiian waters at the outset of hostilities." JCC PHA volume 4, pages 1962-63.
I need some clarification here. PHA 4-1962-63 is testimony of Admiral Turner and does not contain these quotes. Can you double check this source and repost?
3. 1932, US Fleet Commander, Admiral Frank Schofield: "The Enemy [Japan] will strike where the fleet is concentrated. The enemy will use carriers as the basis of this striking force. The enemy may make raids on Hawaiian Islands." From Ladislas Farago, Broken Seal c1967, page 127
4. 1932 US war games "Japanese" carriers approached Oahu from the north, undetected, and "Japanese" planes attacked on a Sunday, achieving total surprise, destroying every battleship in the harbor and all US planes before they could take off. Victor page 33, quoting several sources including JCC PHA vol 2 pgs 821-22 and 866-67
I can cover both of these at once. First it is important to remember, that in 1932, the U.S. Pacific Fleet was not stationed in Hawaii so in that respect it is a different problem. But also, there have been many instances where naval exercises have simulated an attack on Pearl Harbor and since as of our current time line we are still watching the commanders voice their concerns over an attack on Hawaii, these 1932 exercises are not very surprising.
In the Victor references, they are of testimony of General Miles where he not only talks about war gaming on Hawaii in 1932, but also of actually landing troops in Honolulu Harbor on a Sunday morning (PHA 2-821). I don't have Victor's book (All I kept was my analysis on his use of source materials, but if necessary I can check it out of the library again) so I can't check to see if he misused this source too, this is a minor enough point that I don't see why he would.
5. 1938 War Department study: "there can be little doubt that the Hawaiian Islands will be the initial scene of action" by surprise attack. From Forrest Pogue George C. Marshall, c1966 page 172
This study is a report from Colonel Edward Markham to the Chief of Staff. In this report he stresses making Pearl Harbor as heavily defended as possible. Here is a bit more of that quote:
War with Japan will be precipitated without notice. One of the most obvious and vital lessons of history is that Japan will pick her own time for conflict. The very form of its government lends itself to such action in that its military and naval forces can, under the pretext of an emergency, initiate and prosecute military and naval operations independently of civil control. . . . If and when hostilities develop between the United States and Japan, there can be little doubt that the Hawaiian Islands will be the initial scene of action, and that Japan will apply her available man-power and resources in powerful and determined attacks against these islands.
Markham also goes on to say that it would be desirable to defend Pearl Harbor with an Army air force of 350 planes. This is a large force for what at the time is just a distance garrison. It makes it unfortunate that by 1941, in the letter to F.D.R. by Marshall previously mentioned that he expects that the island can be defended with a smaller force: "Including the movement of aviation now in progress Hawaii will be defended by 35 of our most modern flying fortresses, 35 medium range bombers, 33 light bombers, 150 pursuit of which 105 are of our most modern type." This of course would turn out to be woefully inadequate even if the planes had been on alert and ready to take off in response to the approaching Japanese. Marshall is just wrong on this assessment.
6. January 27, 1941: US Ambassador to Japan Joseph Grew reported: "My Peruvian colleague told a member of my staff that he had heard from many sources including a Japanese source that the Japanese military forces planned in the event of trouble with the United States, to attempt a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor using all of their military facilities. He added that although the project seemed fantastic the fact that he had heard it from many sources prompted him to pass the information. Grew." JCC PHA vol 14 pg 1042.
To expand on this. It is important to note that this message was sent to the Secretary of State who then passed it on the the CNO. A letter from 1 February 1941 passes this on from Stark (CNO) to Admiral Kimmel:
From: Chief of Naval Operations
To: Commander-in-Chief, Pacific FleetSubject: Rumored Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor
1. The following is forwarded for your information. Under date of 27 January the American Ambassador at Tokyo telegraphed the State Department to the following effect:
"The Peruvian Minister has informed a member of my staff that he has heard from many sources, including a Japanese source, that in the event of trouble breaking out between the United States and Japan, the Japanese intend to make a surprise attack against Pearl Harbor with all of their strength and employing all of their equipment. The Peruvian Minister considered the rumors fantastic. Nevertheless he considered them of sufficient importance to convey this information to a member of my staff."
2. The Division of Naval Intelligence places no credence in these rumors. Furthermore, based on known data regarding the present disposition and employment of Japanese naval and army forces, no move against Pearl Harbor appears imminent or planned for in the foreseeable future. (PHA 14-1044)
This is really unfortunate that naval intelligence downplayed the significance of this warning.
7. Early 1941, as reported by Representative Martin Dies, chairman of the House Committee on Un-American Activities: "Committee came into possession of a strategic map which gave clear proof of the intentions of the Japanese to make an assault on Pearl Harbor. The strategic map was prepared by the Japanese Imperial Military Intelligence Department... I telephoned Secretary of State Cordell Hull and told him... he directed me not to let anyone know... and stated that he would call me as soon as he talked to President Roosevelt. In about an hour he telephoned to say that he had talked to Roosevelt and they agreed that it would be very serious if any information concerning this map reached the news services... I told him it was a grave responsibility to withhold such vital information from the public. The Secretary assured me that he and Roosevelt considered it essential to national defense." From Martin Dies Assassination in American Opinion April 1964.
I can understand withholding it from the public. The question is, was it given to army or naval personnel anywhere in the chain of command. Do you have any other reference to this particular piece of data and where it ended up?
8. Early 1941, Korean agent Haan Kilsoo told US Colonel George Patton of a Japanese plan to attack Hawaii. From Toland Infamy p260-61
9. March 1941, Korean agent Haan Kilsoo sent a memo to Secretary of State Hull that Japan would attack Hawaii and other US territories. From Toland Infamy p260-61
Better cover both of these at once. This is one of those cases in which you have to be careful about the source material. Take a look at Toland's reference for these comments on p260-61 and post them if you would. I'll be happy to look into them further but here is my knowledge of Haan.
It is my understanding that Haan Kilsoo only claimed to have made these warning after the war. There is no mention of him in any of the Pearl Harbor Hearings or even in Patton's diaries as far as I can find. Honestly, I find the warning to Patton VERY suspect and recommend you do as well. Why would a man who was the Washington representative for the Sino-Korean People's League have information on an attack on Pearl Harbor, and more importantly why would he then give that information to General (he was never a Colonel in 1941 he was promoted to Brigadier General October 1st 1940) Patton, who at the time was just the commander of the 2nd Armored Division in Fort Benning, Georgia? That doesn't add up and makes me very suspect of the source in general.
10. 1941 there were three separate US war games in which "Japan" attacked the fleet in Hawaii. JCC PHA vol 5 pg 2136, also John Potter Yamamoto c1967 pgs 69-70
I'm still of the opinion that there were more than three.
11. 1941 General Sherman Miles, Army Intelligence G-2: "Now an air attack on Pearl Harbor or any other attack on Pearl Harbor had been...a source of study for twenty years in Hawaii and in the War Department [Washington]. It is not mentioned in this estimate of the situation because it was so obvious... That Hawaii could be attacked if Japan went to war was obvious to everyone." JCC PHA vol 34 pg 57
It's important to look at this entire quote in context.
Please note that this estimate starts out with this sentence : "This estimate is addressed to the objective of Nazi defeat." It was deliberately written that way. I was a little tired of certain defeatist attitudes among certain of my own people and I wanted to get out an estimate of the situation addressed to the objective of the defeat of the Nazis. Now an air attack on Pearl Harbor or any other attack on Pearl Harbor had been, I knew very well, a source of study for twenty years in Hawaii and in the War Department. It is not mentioned in this estimate of the situation presumably because it was so obvious. We had spent several hundred million in defense of Hawaii, we had our greatest fleet out there. That Hawaii could be attacked if Japan went to war was obvious to everyone. I reread that estimate yesterday. I regret that in stating the possibilities we stated an attack on the Philippines and did not state an attack on Hawaii, Alaska, West Coast, Panama, etc. It was an omission, but I think a rather obvious omission.
So first of all General Miles is talking about this "obvious omission" in reference of an estimate designed around the objective of defeating the Nazis. Secondly, and more importantly is this last two sentences on the omission. In this estimate they do mention an attack on the Philippines (which is also obvious in my opinion), but failed to mention Hawaii, Alaska, the West Coast, or Panama. All of these locations were potential targets but were not included in the report. Of these, with the exception of Puget Sound, Hawaii is the most heavily fortified and defended.
12. Admiral Richard Turner, chief of the navy's War Plans Division, testified that he himself, the Navy Department, and CNO Admiral Stark did expect an attack on Pearl Harbor. Sources beginning with JCC PHA vol 4 pg 1986, vol 5 pg 2213, vol 9 pg 4235 & others
You got to be careful here lest we get the wrong impression. Let's start with Admiral Turner. In the reference PHA 4-1986 that you give he does agree with the person questioning him that "Inherent in war with Japan was an attack on Hawaii and all through the entire time I felt that that was part of it." But also not that prior to this he was asked if he felt that the fleet at Pearl was ready for war in which he responded "Yes,sir". Also, he was asked where he believed an attack by the Japanese would come first to which he mentioned several places in the Southwestern Pacific. For the sake of context, here is that section of testimony:
The Vice Chairman. As a senior officer of the United States Navy of long experience and the Chief of War Plans Division of the Navy on December 7, 1941, it was your conviction that the Pacific Fleet based at Pearl Harbor was prepared for war?So Turner did have feelings on Hawaii getting attacked yet his eyes were still turned to the Southwest Pacific.Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Now, back for a moment to the question of your views or convictions as to the imminence of war, please, Admiral. You stated that during June or July of 1941 it was your conviction that war with Japan was imminent within a few months. Then I asked you, did you ever think an attack would be made on Pearl Harbor. I understood you to indicate that your conviction on that point was not quite as definite and certain as that war between the United States and Japan was inevitable within a few months. Could you help me a little further on that point?
Admiral Turner. I am sorry, I think that is the wrong impression. I was concerned at this time with the over-all picture and not specifically concerned with parts of the picture. Inherent in war with Japan was an attack on Hawaii and all through the entire time I felt that that was a part of it.
The Vice Chairman. But in June or July, Admiral, you had the conviction that war with Japan was inevitable within a few months?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. And that Japan would attack the United States?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Where did you think that first attack would come?
Admiral Turner. Well, I thought the major effort, the major part of the attack, would certainly come, I mean, the permanent amphibious, the conquest part, would certainly come in the Philippines and would come either against the Malay Peninsula, Kra Isthmus, or against Borneo, thence Java and thence westward to Singapore. The Japanese were strong enough by that time to launch two major efforts. I believed that they were pretty well convinced, by June or July, that they could not detach the United States, although they continued efforts to do so, from very definite military interest in the Far East.
For example, if they had attempted to go down to the China Sea and to have made a major effort against Malaysia without having a definite assurance from the United States that the United States would not intervene, they couldn't possibly have gone on down without the capture of the Philippines, because it would leave on their flank an extremely important position, which we could build up and later attack them and cut them off from the south.
So that I believe the whole diplomatic effort during that time, the summer and fall, was toward getting an arrangement with the United States for us to keep out of war while they went after the British and Dutch.
The reference to Stark also is pretty straight forward in that at some point in time, he discuss and or prepared for the possibility of an attack at Pearl Harbor. I don't think anyone disputes this anyway. Here is the testimony in which this reference is made:
Senator George. Admiral, there was a time, as you have testified about and others, other officers in the Army and Navy, when the possibility and strong, maybe, probability of an air attack on Pearl Harbor was discussed in Army and Navy circles, that is in 1940 and up during some early months even of 1941 and in your correspondence with the commander of the Pacific Fleet you did discuss the possibility of an air attack?Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
That's it on that page, but like I said, I think everyone agrees that the possibility of air attack was discussed by everyone up and down the line so that is not too profound.
The final reference here is relating to the testimony of Admiral Ingersoll also on the question of the possibility of an attack on Pearl Harbor only this was after the intercepted message of Nov. 29th stating that things would go going "automatically"
Admiral Ingersoll. The question of an attack on Pearl Harbor, of course, was always considered as a possibility.Mr. Gearhart. Remote or close?
Admiral Ingersoll. It was considered, of course, as a possibility because there was no other reason for putting anti-aircraft guns there or stationing fighting planes on the island or having radar installation or anything of that kind except to keep Japanese planes away. That was the only reason for putting them there, so that is why I call it a possibility.
Mr. Gearhart, Why is that your position?
Admiral Ingersoll. Now, as to a probability as to whether or not they would attack is something else.
So unfortunately all of these are cases where there was discussion of the possibility of an attack at Pearl Harbor, but none of them take a position that they felt there probably would be an attack at this location.
Colonel Rufus Bratton of G-2: "In various G-2 estimates submitted to the Chief of Staff [General Marshall] over a period of many months an attack on Hawaii had always been listed." JCC PHA vol 34 pg 18.
In Colonel Bratton's testimony he make clear that there were possibilities of an attack by the Japanese on U.S. assets, including Pearl Harbor. Once again though, the likelihood is given a back seat:
Lt. Col. Gibson. Did you at this time. Colonel, consider it a capability of the Japanese to attack Pearl Harbor ?Col. Bratton. Yes. Many of us considered and discussed the feasibility of such an attack—an attack on our West Coast, an attack on Alaska, an attack on the Canal Zone, an attack on Hawaii and other Pacific installations of ours, the Dutch or the British governments.
Lt. Col. Gibson. From a reading of these messages at that time did you come to the conclusion that the Japs were about to undertake an attack on some of the United States installations?
Col. Bratton. It was apparent that there was strong likelihood of some such attack. It was also apparent that the Japanese immediate major objective would be the British and Dutch possessions in the west Pacific. I believed at that time that any attack on any American installation would be in the nature of a diversion or have for its purpose the prevention of our going to the assistance of the Dutch or British.
Lt. Col. Gibson. Had you talked that thought over with Gen. Miles ?
Col. Bratton. I did.
Lt. Col. Gibson. General Kroner? Col. Bratton. As to Gen. Kroner, my memory is faulty, but I discussed this feature on many occasions with Gen. Miles, with Gen. Gerow and with the Chief of Staff when asked my opinion in the matter.
Lt. Col. Gibson. Did you inform the Chief of Staff that it was a capability of the Japs to attack Pearl Harbor?
Col. Bratton. In various G-2 estimates submitted to the Chief of Staff over a period of many months an attack on Hawaii had always been listed as one of the Japanese capabilities against us.
Lt. Col. Gibson. I notice in the estimate dated 29 November 1941 that the capability of the attack on Pearl Harbor wasn't included. I wonder how that happened, if you have any recollection of it?
Col. Bratton. In reply to that I can only say that those of us in the Army who were studying this situation always listed, mentally at least, an attack on Hawaii as a capability, but in our discussions of the situation with our counterparts in the Navy it was always emphasized by the latter that their forces in the Pacific were alert and so stationed as to make such a Japanese attack impracticable or suicidal, and we therefore relegated such an attack to the realm of remote possibility.
Again we have sign, this time by and intelligence officer but they still are seen as an unlikely scenario.
June 1941, US Major Warren Clear was sent to the Far East seeking intelligence about Japan's war plans. He visited British intelligence in Singapore and reported Japanese plans to attack Hawaii, Guam and other US islands. In 1967 he wrote: "my evidence will show that Washington, DC had solid evidence prior to P.H. [Pearl Harbor] that Japan would...[attack] Hawaii." Quoted from Toland Infamy page 261.
Again, I ask if you have the book on you if you can post the reference Toland uses for this one. I'm not familiar with it and would like to look into the source material further.
June 1941, US military attache' in Mexico City reported that Japan was building midget "submarines for attacking the American fleet in Pearl Harbor" JCC PHA vol 31 pg 3217
Here is the full section of that report:
The MA, Mexico forwarded a report that the Japanese were constructing special small submarines for attacking the American fleet in Pearl Harbor, and that a training program then under way included towing them from Japan to positions off the Hawaiian Islands, where they practiced surfacing and submerging.
Here is a reference to another form of attack that they as a whole were concerned about. In fact this report will be even more bothersome in light of a decision made by Admiral Kimmel and Bloch that I will go over later on this month.
As you can see, I'm in agreement that there were many signs that trouble was brewing. We all know that the U.S. as a whole knew that war was imminent. As we move forward here I think we will see that the entire incident at Pearl Harbor was a culmination of mistakes made at all levels. This I know is where you and I diverge in that to me there is no smoking gun placing blame on a single individual and also no intentional motive to get the Pacific Fleet destroyed. Instead I see a litany of errors which in the end placed the Fleet at the greatest disadvantage at the worst possible time. I for one do not place the blame on a single individual. Each error played a part that added up to a disaster.
Thanks for some great work here!
Most interesting to read your responses.
In general, I think you confirm my main points: that a Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor had for many years been expected and trained for -- all up and down the US chain of command.
And so far, at least, that's the only point I'm trying to make.
None of these warnings or US commanders' acknowledgments of concern say anything about exact dates, times or nature of coming attacks.
They only say that, to our guys, in Col Bratton's words:
"It was apparent that there was strong likelihood of some such attack."
I'm saying: that should have been much more than enough to put our entire intelligence organization on the alert for any clues which suggested "likelihood" was becoming "fact."
In other words, if you were already expecting an attack, and now you see more specific signs of an attack, in what possible psychological mode would you then turn a blind eye to those signs?
Well, that's getting a bit ahead of our story -- after all, "today" is still March 1941, and really, we don't yet know what the Japanese are going to do... ;-)
On your specific comments & requests, I'll take a look to double-check and see what else I can tell you...
The key question is, why did neither Kimmel nor Short put their commands on highest alert against air attack?
The answer is, because their superiors in Washington were essentially saying: go to sleep, children, no signs of a coming air attack against Oahu, Hawaii.
But there were lots of signs, at first just general warnings, but increasingly specific, received in Washington.
CougarGA7, referring to item #2: "I need some clarification here. PHA 4-1962-63 is testimony of Admiral Turner and does not contain these quotes."
Victor quotes this on page 33, citing JCC PHA volume 4 pages 1962-63.
He also cites on this: Ladislas Farago, Broken Seal c1967, page 124.
So I suppose it's possible that Farago cited the wrong pages, and Victor didn't take time to correct it?
CougarGA7, on items #3 &4: "I don't have Victor's book... so I can't check to see if he misused this source too, this is a minor enough point that I don't see why he would."
It's an interesting question, just exactly how many US naval exercises, including a "surprise attack" by carrier aircraft on Pearl Harbor, were run over the years beginning in 1932?
I think it's possible they were run every year, but so far have only seen specific references to those in 1932, 1938 and three separate such exercises in 1941.
Clearly, the entire US command expected that, in theory Japan could begin a war with a "surprise attack" on Pearl Harbor.
CougarGA7, item #6: "This is really unfortunate that naval intelligence downplayed the significance of this warning."
The memo here attributed to CNO Admiral Stark was actually written by Commander Arthur McCollum, Chief or the Far Eastern Section in Naval Intelligence.
According to all authors, McCollum played a key role, but to Stinnett and Victor, McCollum's role was crucial in helping spell out Roosevelt's grand strategy for bringing the US into World War II.
I don't remember discussing McCollum's Eight Action Memorandum, written in the fall of 1940, but to anyone who thinks there were actual brains at work, directing US policy in 1940-41, McCollum's memo is critical.
At some point, we'll need to get into it.
CougarGA7 referring to item #7, the Dias map: "The question is, was it given to army or naval personnel anywhere in the chain of command.
Do you have any other reference to this particular piece of data and where it ended up?"
This item also comes from Victor, page 47.
The reference is to an April 1964 article by Dias in American Opinion, page 33.
Martin Dias was a Texas Congressman of a now entirely extinct species called "Conservative Democrats."
He headed the House Un-American Activities Committee, also known as the Dias Committee.
One must presume Dias was not necessarily a great fan of very liberal, left-leaning-with-lots-of-Communists-running around-on-the-government-payroll, Franklin Roosevelt.
On the other hand, why would Dias lie about such a matter as the map, in April 1964?
That the map would never turn up is not surprising.
Literal tons of documents relating to Pearl Harbor were destroyed after the attack.
CougarGA7 on items #8 & 9, Haan Kilsoo: "Take a look at Toland's reference for these comments on p260-61 and post them if you would."
I don't have Toland's book.
This item also comes from Victor -- by the way, Victor has these all listed together in one chapter, makes it easy for me -- Victor page 36, references Toland and also Robert Thompson, A Time for War, c1991 pages 309 and 370-371.
For sure, Haan Kilsoo was a "suspect" character, and no other record of his warnings has been found, that I know of.
CougarGA7, referring to item 11: "In this estimate they do mention an attack on the Philippines (which is also obvious in my opinion), but failed to mention Hawaii, Alaska, the West Coast, or Panama. All of these locations were potential targets but were not included in the report."
Without doubt, US officials were focused on the coming Japanese attack toward South East Asia -- Philippines, Singapore, etc.
The question is, did they also expect a second attack?
Admiral Richmond Turner, Joint Army-Navy Planning Committee, quoted from item 12 above:
"The Japanese were strong enough by that time to launch two major efforts."
So where would Japan's second major effort strike?
Why not Pearl Harbor, since that is what had been expected for several decades?
CougarGA7 item #14, Major Clear's report: "Again, I ask if you have the book on you if you can post the reference Toland uses for this one.
I'm not familiar with it and would like to look into the source material further. "
Victor page 35, his only reference is Toland.
Victor page 36 says: "No records of Clear's, Sorge's, Haan's, or Gillette's reports have been found in government files."
CougarGA7, final comments: "We all know that the U.S. as a whole knew that war was imminent."
And that an attack on Pearl Harbor was a strong possibility.
So why then would anyone ignore more specific warnings and clues of such an attack?
The answer is, because their superiors in Washington were essentially saying: go to sleep, children, no signs of a coming air attack against Oahu, Hawaii.
But there were lots of signs, at first just general warnings, but increasingly specific, received in Washington.
What do you have that backs up the claim that Washington told them to go to sleep? To my knowledge there isn't any. Most of the data concerning the possibility of an attack was passed up and down the chain of command just as we see with the Peruvian report. Short and Kimmel had plenty of information to make proper decisions to protect themselves and they made bad choices that left them vulnerable. It was all the same thing up and down. An attack on Pearl was a possibility, but nobody really felt it was a probability.
Victor quotes this on page 33, citing JCC PHA volume 4 pages 1962-63. He also cites on this: Ladislas Farago, Broken Seal c1967, page 124. So I suppose it's possible that Farago cited the wrong pages, and Victor didn't take time to correct it?
I would say what is more likely is that Victor cited Farago and then used JCC PHA 4-1962-63 as his corroborating evidence. This makes Victor the one that cited the wrong page, not Farago and would fall in line with the rampant mistakes in his book. Of all the books on Pearl Harbor I've read, Victor's is by far the worse. I know he is one of your sources and it is where you are getting your back matter on and honestly, I'm glad that you are at least now looking at the back matter instead of just accepting his writing as truth. I really believe after we go through everything between now and December you will throw Victor's book away, even if you still are convinced in his theory, I think you will see that he has really mucked up his method of proving it.
Clearly, the entire US command expected that, in theory Japan could begin a war with a "surprise attack" on Pearl Harbor.
I agree, that there are probably more exercises against Hawaii than we can account for. We know for sure that the scenerio of a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was examined and practiced. Unfortunately, when zero hour came, they (again, up and down the chain of command) had accepted that it was a possibility, but didn't think that it would be the location of the first strike.
The memo here attributed to CNO Admiral Stark was actually written by Commander Arthur McCollum, Chief or the Far Eastern Section in Naval Intelligence.
The point though is that it was sent from the office of the CNO to the CinC of the Pacific. And that's what I'm getting at. This information, is important, and it was passed on. McCollum, who dictated the actual message is the one who downplays the significance of message in item #2.
This item also comes from Victor, page 47. The reference is to an April 1964 article by Dias in American Opinion, page 33. Martin Dias was a Texas Congressman of a now entirely extinct species called "Conservative Democrats."
I'm familiar with who Martin Dies (not Dias) is. I'm not even stating that there was no map. What I would like to know was who was this map given to? In the case of Victor, it's just another example of how he makes some really wild swings to try and prove his point. Even Stinnett makes no mention of this map and probably because it just can't be proved that it existed or who had access to it. If it existed and got destroyed, that stinks, but I can't accept as evidence the assumption of a map that may or may not have been given to military planners.
I don't have Toland's book. This item also comes from Victor -- by the way, Victor has these all listed together in one chapter, makes it easy for me -- Victor page 36, references Toland and also Robert Thompson, A Time for War, c1991 pages 309 and 370-371.
I recommend that you drop this from your list then. If I get time, I'll go look at Toland's books to see where these came from, but from all I know, the Haan data is very unreliable.
Admiral Richmond Turner, Joint Army-Navy Planning Committee, quoted from item 12 above:
"The Japanese were strong enough by that time to launch two major efforts."
So where would Japan's second major effort strike?
Why not Pearl Harbor, since that is what had been expected for several decades?
Putting this in context, Turners statement here on the second strike concerns a definite attack on the Philippines with a second attack on other "against the Malay Peninsula, Kra Isthmus, or against Borneo, thence Java and thence westward to Singapore." So sure, why not Hawaii? But from this testimony it is clear that Hawaii was not on his mind even as a secondary target.
Finishing up, if I get a chance to look at Toland's source material I will.
So why then would anyone ignore more specific warnings and clues of such an attack?
I wish there was a clear answer to that. As I said before, there is plenty of blame to go around. On every level there was information that should have led to some simple things that would have at least lessened this disaster.
I don't think anyone tried to set the fleet up to fail intentionally for certainly. I can't imagine any military man or politician would want to start in a war with their fleet destroyed.
Moving forward, tonight I am going to try and get caught up a couple of postings I wanted to get done this weekend for the 5th and 6th so be sure to look at them and keep looking at the source material. I know you are getting them from Victor's book, but I'd rather argue the content of the sources than have to go over how Victor uses them over and over again. Also, that Marshall letter I've mentioned I will post in full sometime this month. I don't have a day on it (except for its May file date), I only know it was written in March.
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