Posted on 02/25/2011 5:27:23 AM PST by Homer_J_Simpson
Gordon W. Prange, At Dawn We Slept
Winston S. Churchill, The Grand Alliance
http://www.onwar.com/chrono/1941/feb41/f25feb41.htm
British capture Italian supply base
Tuesday, February 25, 1941 www.onwar.com
In East Africa... Mogadishu is taken by the British forces after an advance of over 230 miles in the past three days. Considerable stocks of fuel and other supplies are captured.
In the Mediterranean... The Italian light cruiser Diaz is sunk by a British submarine while forming part of the escort for a Naples-Tripoli convoy.
http://homepage.ntlworld.com/andrew.etherington/month/thismonth/25.htm
February 25th, 1941
UNITED KINGDOM: Escort destroyer HMS Exmoor is the first of the ‘Hunt’ class to be lost. She is torpedoed off Lowestoft by E-boat S30 while escorting Thames/Forth convoy FN417.
Submarines HMS United and Unruffled laid down.
Corvette HMS Nigella commissioned. (Dave Shirlaw)
NETHERLANDS: The SS clamps down on a wave of popular demonstrations and strikes protesting the persecution of the Jews. Strikes broke out among the workers in Amsterdam in protest against the round-up of nearly 400 Jews, the head of the SS in Holland, Hanns Albin Rauter, ordered SS troops and German police to open fire on the strikers; 11 were killed. The Jews, 389 in all, were deported to Buchenwald. There 25 died from brutal treatment, or were shot; two months later, the rest were sent to the stone quarries of the Mauthausen camp; by the autumn there were no survivors. (86)
GERMANY: U-180 laid down. (Dave Shirlaw)
MEDITERRANEAN SEA: On patrol off the east coast of Tunisia, submarine HMS Upright torpedoes and sinks Italian cruiser ‘Armando Diaz’ as she covers a convoy from Naples to Tripoli, Libya. (Ric Pelvin)
Submarine HMS Usk believed lost with all hands due to mines, off Cape Bon in the Mediterranean. This date marks the last signal received from the submarine but there is no evidence to explain its loss. (Alex Gordon)(108)
ITALIAN SOMALILAND: This evening Lt-Gen. Cunningham’s British Nigerian troops of the 11th African Division have begun to occupy Mogadishu after a day’s lightning advance up the coast from Brava, 120 miles away. Meanwhile, the 12th African Division pushes up the river Juba towards the Abyssinian border town of Dolo. (Jack McKillop)
U.S.A.: The motion picture “The Lady Eve” opens at the Paramount Theater in New York City. Directed by Preston Sturges, this romantic comedy stars Barbara Stanwyck, Henry Fonda, Charles Coburn and William Demarest. (Jack McKillop)
The motion picture “Meet Boston Blackie” opens at the Rialto Theater in New York City. Directed by Robert Florey and starring Chester Morris, this is the first of a series of 14 B crime movies about the detective. (Jack McKillop)
A meeting is held in the Army Chief of Staff’s office in Washington, D.C., concerning defenses in Hawaii. The minutes state that “in view of the Japanese situation the Navy is concerned with the security of the fleet in Hawaii, and apparently the new commander of the fleet there has made a check and reported it to Washington and the Secretary of the Navy has outlined the situation to the Secretary of War. Their particular point is the type of air force in Hawaii, particularly Pursuit. They are in the situation where they must guard against a surprise or trick attack. It is necessary for the fleet to be in anchorage part of the time and they are particularly vulnerable at that time. I do not feel that it is a possibility or even a probability, but they must guard against everything. We also have information regarding the possible use of torpedo planes.” (Jack McKillop)
http://worldwar2daybyday.blogspot.com/
Day 544 February 25, 1941
Overnight, the German-held port of Brest, France, is bombed by Avro Manchesters of RAF Bomber Command 207 Squadron from Waddington, Lincolnshire. This is the operational debut of the Manchester, the forerunner to the better-known Avro Lancaster.
At 3.43 AM, 45 miles off Sfax, Tunisia, British submarine HMS Upright locates an Italian convoy from Naples to Tripoli, Libya (4 troopships, 2 cruisers, 4 destroyers, 1 torpedo boat). HMS Upright sinks Italian cruiser Armando Diaz (464 killed, 147 rescued) and unsuccessfully attacks a destroyer.
Operation Canvas. Nigerian Brigade of the 11th African Division has advanced 220 miles along the coast road from Jilib in 2 days. They take Mogadishu, the capital of Italian Somaliland, unopposed and capture 400,000 gallons of fuel and other stores left behind by the fleeing Italians.
British destroyer HMS Exmoor (escorting convoy FN417 from the Thames estuary to Methil, Scotland) hits a mine or is torpedoed by German motor torpedo boat S-30. A fuel line ruptures, igniting HMS Exmoor which sinks 12 miles off Lowestoft on the East coast of England (105 killed, 32 survivors picked up by sloop HMS Shearwater and trawler Commander Evans).
The motion picture “Meet Boston Blackie” opens at the Rialto Theater in New York City. Directed by Robert Florey and starring Chester Morris, this is the first of a series of 14 B crime movies about the detective. (Jack McKillop)
Crowther will be at the former venue and his initialed associate will cover the latter. Check back tomorrow for their reports.
"Here again that old serpent dichotomy raised its snaky head.
Marshall was aware of the danger to Hawaii and would do everything he could to provide protection to the outpost, yet deep down he did not believe the Japanese would attack..."
First of all, anyone who imagines that Gordon Prange blames everything on Kimmel & Short, while letting the top brass in Washington completely off the hook, has been smoking something illegal, instead of actually reading Prange's book.
Second, Prange wrote before 1980, when less information about "what Washington knew" was available, so Prange doesn't go nearly far enough.
In the end, Marshall, Stark & others at the top ignored numerous specific warnings, misinterpreted important clues, and refused to pass along vital data to Hawaii, despite the advise of such capable middle level Washington officers as Navy Commander Arthur McCollum and Army Colonel Rufus Bratton.
*You refuse to admit Short changed the "alert" status (and still have yet to admit you fully understand that. DO YOU???)
*You have yet to admit that Kimmel and Short did NOT have long-range recon out despite the fact they received what ALL historians call a "war" message days earlier;
*You refuse to acknowledge that cryptanalysts all confirm that NO Purple codes or other codes got through to Washington and/or were even decrypted, nor that the 14 part "war" message was not passed up the chain (this is undeniable).
So there is no talking to you. Please don't EVER quote Prange to me again unless it is to correct him with updated scholarship.
If we go back to Marshall's letter of the 7th we can see an example of what Prange is referring too as far as that "old serpent dichotomy".
My impression of the Hawaiian problem has been that if no serious harm is done us during the first six hours of known hostilities, thereafter the existing defenses would discourage an enemy against the hazard of an attack. The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by Air and by submarine, constitute the real perils of the situation. Frankly, I do not see any landing threat in the Hawaiian Islands so long as we have air superiority.
So we see that Marshall understands and has let General Short know (this is who this letter was to) that surprise attack by air or submarine constitute the most immediate danger. But in the same vein he states that if Hawaii survives the first 6 hours of hostilities without being attacked then the defenses in place should discourage the Japanese from attacking in the first place. This at least implies a belief that Hawaii would not be the first place struck.
It is important to understand that right now Pearl Harbor is the best defended U.S. base in the Pacific. It is even better defended than most of the bases on the Pacific Coast. San Diego, which Admiral Richardson had wanted to move the fleet to has about a third of the defenses that Pearl has right now.
In this same letter to Short from Marshall, he goes over the effort and difficulties to continue to improve these defenses at Pearl Harbor. Here is an example of some of what Marshall is currently facing.
The fullest protection for the Fleet is the rather than a major consideration for us, there can be little question about that ; but the Navy itself makes demands on us for commands other than Hawaii, which make it difficult for us to meet the requirements of Hawaii. For example, as I told Stark yesterday—he had been pressing me heavily to get some modern antiaircraft guns in the Philippines for the protection of Cavite, where they have collected a number of submarines as well as the vessels of the Asiatic Fleet—at the present time we have no antiaircraft guns for the protection of Cavite, and very little for Corregidor. By unobstrusively withdrawing 3-inch guns from regiments now in the field in active training, we had obtained 20 3-inch guns for immediate shipment to the Philippines. However, before the shipment had been gotten under way the Navy requested 18 of these guns for Marine battalions to be specially equipped for the defense of islands in the Pacific. So I am left with two guns for the Philippines. This has happened time and again, and until quantity production gets well under way, we are in a most difficult situation in these matters.This letter also covers the number of pursuit planes at or headed to Pearl, the concerns with how they stack up against the latest Japanese models, the desire to get P40s there by March, and also putting B-17s at Hawaii instead of the B18's currently based there. Finally, there is also discussion on barrage balloons and the complete lack of production of them (Only 3 are available with only 80 in production)I have not mentioned Panama, but the naval requirements of defense there are of immense importance and we have not been able to provide all the guns that are necessary, nor to set up the Air units with modern equipment. However, in this instance, we can fly the latest equipment to Panama in one day, some of it in four hours.
I don't see any evidence here that signs are being intentionally ignored or vital data not being passed, in fact just the opposite. There is an effort to beef up Pearl Harbor against a potential attack, there are comparisons and concerns over the equipment that the Japanese may employ against Hawaii, but at the same time there is a degree of doubt that Japan would strike this far out. Guess we will have to wait and see what the next entry brings us.
Agreed.
As of February 1941, there have been a number of warnings of a coming Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, but as of yet, no noticable Japanese military actions.
Marshall's actions "so far" are the best he can do under the circumstances, imho.
Note that while Marshall "let General Short know" of situations, Short DID NOT INFORM MARSHALL HE HAD CHANGED THE ALERT STATUS, thereby convincing Washington that he was on the highest alert level when he was on the lowest!!
Pal, your problem is not me, it's Homer, and that's who you should take up your complaint with.
I quote Prange because it's Homer's "textbook" for this course.
If you don't like Prange, then suggest Homer use a different book, and I'll quote from it.
But in my opinion, Prange did a pretty good job, considering that he didn't know everything which has since come to light.
The result is, Prange -- "fair and balanced" -- spreads the blame around to almost everyone from Washington to Pearl Harbor.
That seems fair to me.
LS: "You refuse to admit Short changed the "alert" status (and still have yet to admit you fully understand that. DO YOU???)"
It's true, I've read nothing about Short's alert status codes, or how they may have somehow prevented top-brass in Washington from issuing adequate warnings against the coming Japanese air attack on Hawaii.
LS: "You have yet to admit that Kimmel and Short did NOT have long-range recon out despite the fact they received what ALL historians call a "war" message days earlier..."
Not true. I've explained the problem of long-range recon at least twice, but you don't remember what I said, do you?
Do you need me to repeat or expand on it?
As for "war warning" messages, there were some in November 1941, but they did not warn against air attacks, and indeed specifically directed General Short to defend against sabotage.
LS: "You refuse to acknowledge that cryptanalysts all confirm that NO Purple codes or other codes got through to Washington and/or were even decrypted, nor that the 14 part "war" message was not passed up the chain (this is undeniable)."
Pal, as I'm certain you well know, the subject of codes and code-breaking success is complicated and confusing in the extreme.
It is so tangled up in precise meanings of critical words that almost anyone who wades into the subject can expect to make some mistakes somewhere.
For example, in your statement above -- your reference to "Purple" is incorrect.
Words like "purple," "magic" and "J codes" all refer to Japanese diplomatic correspondence whose codes had been broken and read by US intelligence for many years.
Breaking and reading Japan's diplomatic codes produced a number of general warnings of the coming attack.
But specific fleet movement data could only come from Japan's Naval Codes -- Kaigun Ango -- of which there were four categories:
So debates over more specific Pearl Harbor warnings involve not Purple or J-code "Magic," which were quickly read, but rather Japan's naval codes -- long said to have not been broken and read until after December 7, 1941.
But Stinnett and others show evidence that some Japanese Naval Code messages were at least partially read.
I don't need to "take up a complaint" with anyone other than you. YOU are the one who invokes Prange at every turn. If another so-called historian cites Prange, he is citing errors. Clausen and Lee are the only source to correctly incorporate the relevant material, and others, including Prange, IGNORED their findings.
You can't just slough off the codes as "tangled up" and that's why I have repeatedly referred you to Jacobsen AND OTHER cryptanalysts who utterly reject Stinnett as not knowing what he's talking about. Again, if you actually LOOK at Stinnett's end notes, he doesn't support a single solid statement with a broken code or testimony. The only thing he supports are "should have/could have" kinds of statements. ALL of his claims about radio traffic have been debunked. NONE of his so-called cryptanalitic evidence has survived scrutiny of the men who did this for a living, yet you continue to obfuscate, wiggle, and otherwise ignore their testimony and analysis, which is really all that matters.
The change in the alert status was critical, because Marshall, having ALREADY TOLD KIMMEL AND SHORT TO EXPECT WAR, was confident that Pearl Harbor, on "Alert 1," was able to defeat any attack easily---ESPECIALLY AIR, because that was what they had trained for. You really think infantry was going to storm the beaches at Oahu???
To have sent a second, "here they come" message would have alerted Japan that we were reading their DIPLOMATIC AND NAVAL codes.
Your explanation of utter failure to use long-range recon was insufficient and would have gotten Kimmel and Short court-martialed in any reasonable court.
Finally, my "pals" at least pay attention when I give them genuine and real sources rather than running back to a debunked source---and again, I'm not saying ALL of Prange is worthless, just the most critical elements about the Pearl Harbor warning. But that's the part you continually cite.
Remember how I told you that you had a credibility issue. This is an example of it right here. Stinnett is not a scholar. He is not a historian. He is a man who wrote with an agenda and from my research into his book on Pearl Harbor, shaped the evidence he had to fit his agenda. Not a good resource. LS on the other hand is a scholar, he is a historian. He has written probably the best book on U.S. History that you can buy. In fact, when my oldest was taking his 10th grade U.S. History course I made LS’s book the required textbook.
You say you pay scholars to give you information. This is somewhat of a silly statement on your part since first you imply that hacks like Stinnett and Victor are scholars, which they are not. And then you have a real scholar offering you information for free and you fight it every step of the way because it runs counter to your own predetermined biases.
This makes any argument you make weak at best, and laughable in general.
Sticking with the current time line, I can’t find any response from Short to the February 7th letter at all. There is a reference to a March 6th letter from Short to Marshall which may be it, but I’ll be damned if I can find it. I do have some really good correspondence between Short and Marshall in general though which will be very useful as we move forward. Up to this point Short has made no comment to anyone on what his alert status is but it may also be too early for that.
If I run across the March 6th letter I will be sure to evaluate it and make comment on it when it is time though.
In the past month or so, I've mentioned the name "Prange" dozens of times, and quoted four different passages from him.
Of the four quoted passages, three were simply snippets of what Homer had already posted -- about general warnings and top-brass awareness of threats to Pearl Harbor.
The fourth is this lengthy passage I quoted to you, demonstrating how Prange -- "fair and balanced" -- spreads the blame around to everyone from Washington to Pearl Harbor:
Quote from Prange on who was to blame
LS: "Prange is detailed, and did well for what he had at the time.
So did doctors who believed in applying leeches under the humoral theory of medicine."
No one has yet demonstrated where Prange is in actual error on anything he said.
The only complaint is that Prange didn't know as much as more recent authors have uncovered.
LS: "I don't need to "take up a complaint" with anyone other than you. YOU are the one who invokes Prange at every turn."
Yes, it's possible that you truly don't understand what's going on here, so I'll explain again.
This thread is run by "Homer_J_Simpson", whose real name I don't know (wouldn't recognize anyway), but probably a good many here do know him, and like him -- I like him, even though I don't know him. ;-)
Homer manages all of the original data which starts these threads, and I'd expect that he does 90+% of the work himself.
CougarGA7 and several others routinely contribute significant data as well.
All are hugely appreciated.
Among the items that Homer routinely posts are significant quotes from several books, including Winston Churchill's memoirs, and works of various historians, including on the subject of Pearl Harbor: Gordon Prange.
On occasion, Homer has also quoted Toland, who in that particular instance had a condensed version of the story which Prange explained in more detail -- Ambassador Grew's first warning from Japan of the planned attack on Pearl Harbor.
My point is: since Prange is Homer's "textbook", that's where we have to begin any discussion of Pearl Harbor.
So if you want to begin the discussion somewhere else, just ask Homer to use a different "textbook."
Indeed, if you truly wanted to be helpful, you'd offer to post data or quotes yourself, pal.
LS: "Clausen and Lee are the only source to correctly incorporate the relevant material, and others, including Prange, IGNORED their findings."
Both Prange and Stinnett discuss Major Clausen's investigation at length, and Prange conducted a personal interview with him.
Major Claussen was acting as General Marshall's defense lawyer, securing sworn affidavits from all levels of command.
Near the end, in 1945, Clausen even chased down Colonel Rufus Bratton near Berlin, forcing him to change his own testimony in light of Clausen's other affidavits.
I think Clausen's work was important, but don't think it was definitive.
LS: "You can't just slough off the codes as "tangled up"..."
But you yourself have already "tangled up" the whole discussion by confusing Japanese Purple diplomatic codes with their more secure Naval codes.
So all I'm saying here is: be careful, be careful what you say when you walk into this "minefield," because it's nearly impossible not to make some mistake or other in discussing the subject.
So, did Prange or Stinnett "tangle up" anything?
Sure, your former buddy Jacobsen claimed they did, but I can't verify that from sources that are readily available in print at bookstores.
LS: "Again, if you actually LOOK at Stinnett's end notes, he doesn't support a single solid statement with a broken code or testimony. The only thing he supports are "should have/could have" kinds of statements."
Actually, the afterword & appendixes of Stinnett's book include 57 pages worth of reproduced original documents and other data supporting his conclusions.
The notes with references section is 68 pages long.
LS: "ALL of his claims about radio traffic have been debunked.
NONE of his so-called cryptanalitic evidence has survived scrutiny of the men who did this for a living, yet you continue to obfuscate, wiggle, and otherwise ignore their testimony and analysis, which is really all that matters."
Nonsense. You have not cited or quoted even one actual reference.
When you do, I'll respond to that.
LS: "The change in the alert status was critical, because Marshall, having ALREADY TOLD KIMMEL AND SHORT TO EXPECT WAR, was confident that Pearl Harbor, on "Alert 1," was able to defeat any attack easily---ESPECIALLY AIR, because that was what they had trained for.
You really think infantry was going to storm the beaches at Oahu???"
Obviously, what I think is irrelevant.
What matters is, what did General Short believe that General Marshall was telling him to do.
The answer is clearly in the "war warning" Marshall sent Short -- prepare to defend against sabotage, not air attack.
Now, yes I understand, you keep claiming some misunderstanding over Short's alert codes puts all the blame on Short and takes it off Marshall and other top-brass in Washington, but I'm not so sure.
For one thing, both Short and Kimmel responded to Washington's "war warnings" with detailed reports of what they had done in response.
These details clearly demonstrated that Short was not at highest alert, but rather, as directed, had prepared to defend against expected sabotage.
So Washington's failure to understand or respond appropriately to Short's & Kimmel's status reports cannot be excused by some supposed misunderstanding of alert codes.
LS: "To have sent a second, "here they come" message would have alerted Japan that we were reading their DIPLOMATIC AND NAVAL codes."
Now you make an extraordinarily interesting, possibly unintentionally revealing argument.
Let's note first that you seem to admit our guys were also reading Japanese Naval codes.
If you'll stick to that, it could save us a lot of disagreement! ;-)
Second, how could additional "here they come" messages to Kimmel and Short possibly have alerted the Japanese?
And why would such an alert have mattered at Pearl Harbor?
LS: "Your explanation of utter failure to use long-range recon was insufficient and would have gotten Kimmel and Short court-martialed in any reasonable court."
In fact, both Kimmel and Short were cleared of wrong-doing, in this area, by their respective courts of inquiry.
Again, the key point is that full spectrum, long-range aerial reconnaissance could only be conducted for short periods after a clear warning of a coming air attack.
Neither Kimmel nor Short believed they had received such a warning.
What the cryptanalists will tell you is that you don't just "intercept" something like you see on TV then run to the commander and say, "oh, Admiral, they're coming." Consider that after we intercepted the famous Midway "water condenser" false message, we STILL didn't know exactly where the Japanese would be or in what force level. But anyway, since you don't want to take the time to educate yourself on this, I'll make it simple (and Stinnett completely obfuscates this): a message from the JN-25b Code would be intercepted. It first had to be decrypted. Even with the code breaking in operation, that wasn't done quickly: such a code had to be verified that, in fact, it was real and not some jibberish decoy. Then it had to be analyzed. This is the tough part. Many codes from 1941 were not analyzed until 1944. There were simply too many. Figuring out which ones were "the most important" was a rather significant job, and extremely time consuming. Rochefort got lucky with the "water condenser" message because it was something he could test pretty easily. Most weren't like that. Once decrypted and analyzed, they were passed simultaneously to CINCPAC and to Washington. Either or both might take the message seriously, or might conclude that it meant something just the opposite of what the codebreaker thought it meant.
And, yes, Stinett badly "tangled up" the codes and decrypts. I wrote a review of his book in Continuity; Jacobsen has written several article-length reviews. Not ONE of his "is" statements has a matching note---the only statements he supports with citations are the "could be/should be/could have/would have." That is to say, he doesn't understand codebreaking, or what the cryptanalysts were saying, and Jacobsen (and his colleagues) called him on it at length.
Now, I don't care if it's Homer Simpson or you, whoever relies on Prange for certain information is going to get bad information. Yes, he cited Clausen but clearly didn't understand what Clausen said to him in an abbreviated interview so he basically ignored the impact of Clausen's comments. As for Toland, really. His whole "Seaman Z" thing was blown out of the water and he was exposed as a fraud by Seaman Ogg himself. Churchill? As much as I like Winston, his study on the Second World War is not accepted by any mainstream historians as accurate.
Indeed, I have at least one of his books at home, and agree with him on virtually every subject -- except Pearl Harbor. ;-)
Perhaps you've noticed that LS comes into these discussions when I address him, along with you and others, on some post of mine.
So I hugely respect LS's view -- just wish I could get him to listen to reason on Pearl Harbor.
So far, am having no luck, but we really haven't even begun to get into all the details of what happened and what was known.
CougarGA7: "Stinnett is not a scholar. He is not a historian. He is a man who wrote with an agenda and from my research into his book on Pearl Harbor, shaped the evidence he had to fit his agenda. Not a good resource."
I'm not certain if any of that makes Stinnett's arguments totally invalid.
The real truth is, Stinnett did serious research, uncovering much previously unknown data, and arrived at very reasonable conclusions, based on his understanding of that data.
Of course, I'm most impressed with the fact that people like yourself and LS, instead of taking on Stinnett's arguments head-on, spend most of your efforts trying to impugn him, or me for daring to present Stinnett's data.
Indeed, you guys attack Prange, Victor and Toland in the same way.
So, which recent recognized authors on Pearl Harbor do you hold up as being the final authority and final words on the subject?
CougarGA7: "You say you pay scholars to give you information. This is somewhat of a silly statement on your part since first you imply that hacks like Stinnett and Victor are scholars, which they are not."
There is an overlap in the data presented by Prange, Stinnett and Victor.
Where they differ is in material that was simply not available in Prange's earlier work.
So, are we to consider all of the new data to be false, or falsely interpreted?
If so, that would seem to me to be a very important subject, to be addressed in the most scholarly way possible, in full context of explaining exactly what the real story was, as opposed to various myths which have been perpetrated over the decades.
If someone will recommend such a book, I'll be happy to buy and read it -- and present its arguments here.
But let me make another important and related point:
Anyone who has studied history at all -- certainly including CougarGA7 and LS -- must consider the question: just what, exactly, is history and who is an historian?
The answer, in a fundamental sense, is that our history is what we believe about our past, and about ourselves.
For example, the Bible is our history if we believe in it.
If we don't, then it is barely more than a bunch of fairy tales.
Indeed, fairy tales themselves were certainly considered true by some people at some times.
Point is: in a sense, our history is what we believe it is, and so the "battle" to win a correct understanding of history is as important as any in politics, religion or any number of other disciplines.
I'm certain that no one understands that better than LS, or, if I dare mention his name here, Glen Beck. It's what he preaches every day.
So what is our true history of Pearl Harbor?
If you inquire on Barnes & Noble's web site, you'll find hundreds of books listed.
But if you go into a typical Barnes & Noble store, you'll find there Prange, Stinnett, Victor, Toland and maybe someone else, maybe not.
What I'm trying to tell you is: those are the historians whose works on Pearl Harbor "matter" today -- because they are the ones telling us what our "real" history of that time was.
And all of them, to a greater or lesser degree, are historical "revisionists" -- meaning they don't accept the idea that all of the blame belongs on the shoulders of Admiral Kimmel and General Short.
So, if there is a book out there which tells the true story more completely and accurately, then I don't know about it, and it's not for sale in your typical book store.
Maybe somebody should write one? ;-)
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